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Judgment
K.P. Sivasubramaniam, J.—This appeal is directed against the judgment of the learned VI Additional Judge, City Civil Court, Madras in
A.S. No. 720/85 in confirming that of the learned VI th Additional Judge, City Civil Court, Madras in O.S. No. 4635/75. The defendant in the suit
is the appellant in the above appeal. The suit was filed by the plaintiff to direct the defendants to put the plaintiff in vacant possession of the suit
premises in the occupation of the defendants to direct the defendants to pay the plaintiff a sum of Rs. 225/- towards damages for use and
occupation from 1.1.75 to 26.3.75 at the rate of Rs. 3/- per day and for future damages and for a sum of Rs. 80/- being the arrears of rent for the
month of December 1974. According to the plaintiff, the suit property is a trust belonging to a Charitable trust of Sri Gopaldas Dwarakadas Trust
at Sreerangam, Trichy and other places. The defendants were let in possession of a portion of the said property on a monthly rent of Rs. 80/-. The
trust for some time in the past was requesting the defendants to vacate the said portion of the use of the Trust as they have no other place available.
The defendant however was evading delivery of possession. The defendants were trying to take advantage of the provisions of the Rent Control
Act and were putting off the delivery of possession. They became interested to continue in the premises and indulge in various acts of commission
and omission. The defendants have also sub-let portions of the premises. The plaintiffs further submitted that in view of the G.O.Ms. No. 1998
dated 12.8.74 exempting all trusts and Charitable Institutions from the operation of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease ad Rent Control) Act, l960
the remedy for the plaintiff was only through the filing of the suit. The plaintiff had duly terminated the tenancy by notice dated 9.12.1974. In the
written statement filed by the defendant, it was contended that the defendant was entitled to the protection under the Rent Control Act and that
eviction was not permissible. The stand taken by the plaintiff that the plaintiff was exempted under G.O.Ms. No. 1998/74 was not correct and the
said Government Order will not confer any exemption to the plaintiff. The plaintiff had purposely given a wrong description of the trust. In fact, the
correct name of the trust was Sri Gopaldas Dwarakadas Family Trust Estate. The defendant is a tenant, but the statement that the plaintiff requires
the same for the trust was not bona fide. The plaintiff was harassing the defendant in several ways. The defendant also questioned the trust being a
charitable or religious institution. The allegation that the defendant was in arrears of rent was also disputed. The defendant also filed an additional
written statement contending that the plaintiff was only a private trust and therefore had to proceed only under the provisions of the Rent Control
Act.
Mr. M.S. Subramaniam learned counsel for the appellant contends that:
(1) the plaintiff trust is not a public trust but only a private family trust, and that
(2) therefore, the exemption granted u/s 29 of the Rent Control Act by virtue of G.O. Ms. No. 1998 (Home) dated 12.8.74 hereinafter called the
first G.O., as amended by G.O. Ms. No. 2000(Home) dated 16.8.1976 hereinafter called the Second G.O. was not available to the plaintiff trust
and hence the suit was not maintainable
In support of his contention that the plaintiff trust was only a private trust, the learned counsel elaborately referred to the various features of the
Trust Deed and contended that even in the plaint, the plaintiff has nowhere claimed that the trust was a public trust. The correct nomenclature of
the trust itself would signify that the trust was merely a family trust. He further contended that the objects and particulars of the trust had not been
disclosed and that the recitals themselves would disclose that the beneficiaries were not the general public comprising of uncertain and fluctuating
body of persons but only the individual belonging to family. Reference was made to the following judgments in the context of ascertaining as to
whether the trust was a public trust or a private trust:-
Deoki Nandan Vs. Murlidhar,
The State of Bihar and Others Vs. Charusila Dasi,
AIR 1979 SC 623 (Trustees of G.G.F. Trust v. CIT Bombay)
Mr. M.S. Subramaniam further contended that though the first G.O. issued u/s 29 of the Rent Control Act would appears to have granted
exemption in favour of both private and public trusts, the second G.O. which superseded the first G.O restricted the exemption only to public trusts
and not to private trusts. According to him, the second G.O. was retrospective and therefore would cover the present suit which was filed on
27.3.1975, namely in between the first G.O. and the second G.O. Even though the suit was filed prior to the second G.O., by virtue of its
retrospective effect, the plaintiff trust was not entitled to the exemption and hence cannot maintain the suit. He also relied on the judgment of
Mohan, J. as he then was, dated 17.6.1985 in A.S. No. 632/79 (The Educational Trustee Company Ltd v. Sri Kanniga Parameswari Amman
Koil)
Per contra, learned counsel for the respondents submits that the trust is entitled to the benefits extended to public trust and satisfies all the
requirements of a public trust. In fact, the trust had been recognised as religious and charitable institution by the State Government and the Trust
had been granted exemption under the Tamil Nadu Urban Land Tax Act 1966 by virtue of G.O.Ms. No. 2659, Revenue dated 9.12.1977 (Ex.A-
3). Reliance was also placed on the judgment of Srinivasan, J. as he then was, reported in 1992 (1) L.W. 578 (Dewan Bahadur M.O.
Parthasarathy Iyengar''s Chanties v. P. Satyam), in support of the contention that even a private trust, if it is religious and charitable will fall within
the ambit of the second G.O. and it will not be outside the said notification just because some of the objects are secular.
With reference to the issue as to whether the second G.O. is retrospective or not, the learned counsel for the respondent drew the attention of
this Court that the judgment rendered in A.S. No. 632/79 was reversed by a Division Bench of this Court in the Judgment reported in The Idol of
Sri Kannika Parameswari Amman and others Vs. The Educational Trustees Co. Ltd., Madras and others, and it was held that the second G.O.
was not retrospective. Reliance is also placed on another judgment of a single Judge of this Court reported in (1983)-96-L.W.663 (Shantha
Ammal v. Arasadi Karpaga Vinayagar Temple by its Trustee), holding that the second G.O. was not retrospective.
In the present case, I find that there is no need to dilate further, upon the legal content in the submissions on both issues raised as above. The
facts of the case clearly establish that the plaintiff trust is a public trust and therefore the questions as raised above do not arise for consideration.
The exemption granted by the State Government under the Urban Land Tax Act (Ex.A-3) may not conclusively establish that the plaintiff trust is a
public trust. But the decree granted by this Court in C.S. No. 721/23 dated 17.2.25 (Ex.A-1) would make it clear that this Court had recognised
the plaintiff trust as a public trust. That is a decree issued in the context of a petition praying for administration of the trust under the directions of
this Court and for framing a scheme for the management of the said trust properties. It is true that the learned counsel for the appellant would seek
to raise a doubt as regards whether those, proceedings would have been initiated u/s 92 of C.P.C, since in Ex.A-1 decree there is no specific
mention of Section 92, C.P.C. But a perusal of the decree clearly shows that the proceedings pertain undoubtedly and only to the powers of the
Civil Court u/s 92, C.P.C. The prayer itself is for administration under the directions of the Court and for framing a scheme for the management.
The decree as formulated by the Court also prohibits alienation of the properties of the trust without the permission of the Court. Parties are also
given liberty to apply to the Court for any directions in respect of any matter concerning the trust. Such prayers and relief''s are incidental to the
powers of the Civil Court only u/s 92 of C.P.C, and as such the fact that this Court had already recognised the plaintiff trust as a public trust,
cannot be ignored. The suit now under appeal having been filed by the trust for ejectment as against tenant, the tenant cannot seek to question the
status of the plaintiff trust which is already recognised by this Court as a public trust. It may or may not be open to the tenant to question the status
of the plaintiff trust as a public Trust in a properly constituted suit seeking for such a decision. That would be an issue to be decided by the
appropriate forum if and when such a decree is prayed for. But the tenant appearing as a defendant in a suit for ejectment, cannot plead that the
Court shall ignore the decree of a competent Civil Court u/s 92 of C.P.C, and hold that the trust is not a public Trust.
Further, it is also to be noted that even assuming that the plaintiff trust is only a private one, the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court
reported in The Idol of Sri Kannika Parameswari Amman and others Vs. The Educational Trustees Co. Ltd., Madras and others, cited above has
clearly held that the proceedings initiated under the first G.O. will not be affected by the second G.O. Therefore, the suit filed by the plaintiff trust
being exempted under the first G.O., is maintainable. In view of the above conclusions, the other issues raised before me such as whether the
defendant was a tenant holding over and entitled to the benefits of the Rent Control Act and whether a decree for ejectment can be executed in
view of the Rent Control Act etc, do not arise for consideration. Therefore, I am not referring to any of the submissions of both sides on these
issues. Therefore, I do not find any grounds to interfere with the judgments of the Courts below. With the result, there are no merits in the above
Second Appeal and the same is dismissed. No costs.