KOHINOOR CARPETS, PANIPAT vs RAJINDER ARORA

WHETHER an appeal is maintainable under Section 15 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986, against the imposition of penalty by the District Forum, under Section 27 thereof, is the significant and threshold common question in this set of two appeals, i.e., First Appeal Nos. 6 and 11 of 1991. This order will govern both of them.

THE requisite facts relevant to the issue aforesaid may be noticed with relative brevity from First Appeal No. 11 of 1991 (M/s Kohinoor Carpets, Panipat v. Mr. Rajinder Arora). THE complainant Shri Rajinder Arora had instituted the proceedings before the District Forum, Hisar, which culminated in his favour by its order dated 11th April, 1990. THEreby compensation to the tune of Rs. 750/- was awarded to the complainant and the present appellant was directed to either deposit the said amount with the District Forum or pay the same directly to the complainant within one month of the date of the receipt of the copy of the order, failing which the provisions of Section 27 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (hereinafer referred to as ''the Act'') were to be invoked. THE appellant Shri Nand Lal failed to comply with the said order within the time specified. At the instance of the complainant Rajinder Arora, the District Forum summoned the appellant to appear before it on the 13th August, 1990, but he yet again did not care to do so. Another direction was issued to him to come present on the 31st January, 1991 but even on this date he neither paid the compensation nor did he put in appearance. THE District Forum vide the order under appeal came to the conclusion that the appellant had disobeyed its orders deliberately and proceeded to impose the penalty of one month''s imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 2,000/- against the present appellant under Section 27 of the Act. A warrant of arrest was forwarded to the Superintendent of Police for arresting him to undergo the period of imprisonment in the Sub Jail, Panipat. Aggrieved by the said imposition of penalty, the present appeal, purporting to be under Section 15 of the Act, has been preferred. THE position is similar in the connected First Appeal No. 6 of 1991 (M/s Narwana Gas Service, Narwana v. Parmodh Kumar). Inevitably, the issue of the very maintainability of the appeals has cropped up at the threshold. Learned Counsel for the appellants were given repeated opportunities for addressing their submissions on this preliminary issue. Mr. Mohan Jain, learned Counsel for the one of the appellants, had primarily based himself on the language of Section 15. It was sought to be contended that this provision envisages an appeal by any person who is aggrieved by "an order" of the District Forum and with considerable literality (virtually bordering on the hypertechnicality), it was submitted that this Section visualises no preconditions or limitation, with the result that any other order made by the District Forum would become appealable if a grievance is raised by a party. It was pointed out that the imposition of penalty has been made by a formal order, which is expressly labelled as such and is dated 31st January, 1991. Therefore, according to the learned Counsel, this order of imposition of penalty was within the wide-ranging ambit of Section 15. Some tenuous reliance was sought to be placed on Shah Babulal Khimji v. Jayaben D. Kania and another, AIR 1981 Supreme Court 1786, with particular emphasis on paras 79 and 119 of the said judgment. Mr. R.P. Yadav, Advocate, on the other hand, had placed reliance on Kanshi Ram v. Siri Ram and another, 1980 Punjab Law Reporter 642.

At the very outset one must notice that the question herein is not entirely free from difficulty and as yet appears to be res integra. In any case, in spite of repeated opportunities given to the learned Counsel, no judgment covering the issue on all fours could be cited before us. Inevitably, the matter has, therefore, to be examined on the larger scheme and language of the Act and on general principles. Consequently, it would be apt to set out the relevant parts of the provisions of the Act, which call for consideration, for facility of reference "15. Appeal.- Any person aggrieved by an order made by the District Forum may prefer an appeal against such order to the State Commission within a period of thirty days from the date of the order in such form and manner as may be prescribed."

"19. Appeals.- Any person aggrieved by an order made by the State Commission in exercise of its powers conferred by sub-clause (1) of Clause (a) of Section 17 may prefer an appeal against such order to the National Commission within a period of thirty days from the date of the order in such form and manner as may be prescribed."

"23. Appeal.- Any person aggrieved by an order made by the National Commission in exercise of its powers conferred by sub-clause (i) of Clause (a) of Section 21, may prefer an appeal against such order to the Supreme Court within a period of thirty days from the date of the order."

"27. Penalties.- Where a trader or a person against whom a complaint is made fails or omits to comply with any order made by the District Forum, the State Commission or the National Commission, as the case may be, such trader or person shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than one month but which may extend to three years, or with fine which shall not be less than two thousand rupees but which may extend to ten thousand rupees, or with both."

In the present interpretative exercise, the larger approach to the question seems not only to be important, but indeed crucial. It needs no great erudition to recall that the rigour and the technicalities of the earlier strict rule of grammatical construction have now been considerably mellowed down by, what is called, the schematic approach to the construction of a statute. The object and purpose of an Act is not to be lost sight of by myopically focusing oneself on a single provision thereof, as if it stood in total isolation. We are inclined to the view that the brief Section 15 is not to be construed as if in a vacuum, but only as one link in the chain of the other connected sections and in the larger mosaic of the statutory pattern of this Act

WITH this broader approach in mind, one has to read Sections 13, 14 and 15 of, the Act together and construe them harmoniously. Section 13 somewhat exhaustively provides for the procedure on the receipt of a complaint by the District Forum. The succeeding Section 14, as its very heading shows, provides, in some detail, for the findings of the District Forum in its final order, after complying with the procedure prescribed. It is in this sequence that Section 15 immediately follows and lays down that any person aggrieved by an order made by the District Forum may prefer an appeal against it to the State Commission. The reference to the order under Section 14, though not explicit, is implicit in this provision. The intent is somewhat clear that the substantive right of appeal conferred by Section 15, is directed against an order made by the District Forum under Section 14 only. Even if Section 14 is viewed with strictitude and in relative isolation, the same result would, in essence, ensue. Section 15 talks of an order made by the District Forum and not of any or every order made by it. It bears repetition that such an order has a contextual reference to the preceding Section 14 containing the findings of the District Forum on a complaint preferred before it under Section 12. To construe "an order" as "any order" in Section 15, when carried to logical lengths, would lead to an obvious absurdity. If it were to be so, then every order, whether inter locutory, interim or one merely giving an adjournment made by the District Forum would come within the sweep of Section 15. This could hardly be the intent of the framers of the Constitution. It is well settled that even where two interpretations are possible, the one which leads to absurd or mischievous results, has to be necessarily avoided. Therefore, to read Section 15 as laying down that any and every order of whatever nature, passed by the District Forum, would become appealable thereunder, appears to us as running patently against the basic canons of construction.

CONSIDERABLE, if not conclusive support, is derived for the view we are inclined to take, by a close analysis of Sections 19 and 23 quoted above. A plain reading of Section 19, which confers similar, if not identical, right of appeal against the orders of the State Commission, would show that any person aggrieved by an order made by the State Commission in exercise of its powers conferred by sub-clause (i) of Clause (a) of Section 17 may prefer an appeal against such order to the National Commission. This in turn is confined only to the complaints preferred before the State Commission where the pecuniary value of the claim exceeds Rs. 1 lakh. No other order of the State Commission, namely, within its appellate and revisional jurisdiction, is made appealable. The intent of the Parliament is therefore manifest from this provision that the appellate power is conferred only against the substantive orders of the State Commission made in its original jurisdiction on a complaint directly preferred before it. Since Section 19 expressly confines the appellate power against the exercise of jurisdiction by the State Commission under Section 17(a)(i) only, it necessarily follows that whenever the State Commission chooses to impose a penalty under Section 27, the said order would clearly not be appealable. The identical position then emerges in the context of Section 23, which provides for an appeal against the orders of the National Commission to the Supreme Court. This appellate power is again expressly limited to the exercise of jurisdiction conferred by sub clause (i) of Clause (a) of Section 21, which pertains only and exclusively to original complaints before the National Commission where the value of the goods and services, and the compensation, if any, exceeds Rs. 10 lakhs. No other order of the National Commission is made appealable. This being so, the identical legal position would be that whenever the National Commission also chooses to act under Section 27 and imposes a penalty thereunder, the same cannot be made the subject-matter of any right of substantive appeal against it. The legal position under Sections 19 and 23 being undisputably manifest as above, the salient feature that emerges is the fact that the identical exercise of the power of imposition of penally under Section 27 by the State Commission or the National Commission is not made appealable under the Act. Would it stand to reason to construe and hold that the same power under Section 27, when exercised by the District Forum, would become appealable under Section 15? In our view, it is not so. The language employed in Section 27 is again a pointer to the same effect. Thereby the failure or omission to comply with any order made by the District Forum, the State Commission, or the National Commission, as the case may be, becomes subject to penalty thereunder. The three redressal agencies are put on an identical footing by the tenor of this provision. Therefore, it would be anomalous to hold that whilst in the case of the two redressal forums of the State Commission and the National Commission the exercise of power under Section 27 is clearly non-appealable, yet it would be so in the situation when the same is exercised by the District Forum.

WHAT next calls for pointed notice is the fact that Section 27, with its heading of ''Penalties'' appears long after Section 15 and at the fag end of the statute. It is followed only by Chapter IV, containing miscellaneous provisions under Sections 28 to 31. Contextually it deserves highlighting that the consistent scheme of the Act is that the right of appeal against the orders of all the three redressal forums constituted by the Act immediately follows the provisions pertaining to the procedure and jurisdiction thereof. This is the identical situation in the three distinct sections, namely, Sections 15, 19 and 23, which separately confer the appellate power against the substitutive orders of the District Forum, the State Commission and the National Commission, respectively. Viewed in this light and in the context of the scheme of the statute, it would seem somewhat incongruous that the earlier Section 15 would envisage an appeal against the imposition of penalty by Section 27, which is considerably subsequent thereto.

THE scheme for enforcement of the orders of the three redressal agencies under the Act has then to be viewed in a larger perspective. This necessarily involves the correlating of Sections 25 and 27 of the Act. Both these provisions are directed towards the speedy enforcement of the orders of the District Forum, the State Commission or the National Commission, as the case may be. To put it tersely, both Sections 25 and 27 are in the nature of the execution proceedings of the orders made by the three redressal agencies. While Section 25 visualises the enforcement of such orders by a civil process, as if they were a decree or order made by a Court of law, Section 27 confers a quasi-criminal sanction for their enforcement by way of punishment with imprisonment or imposition of monetary penalties. It is somewhat exiomatic that execution proceedings are not normally appealable, and it is only as a matter of rare exception that a statute may expressly provide for an appeal against the executory process. It is manifest that the Act does not in terms confer any right to appeal against she proceedings either under Section 25 or Section 27. Viewed from this angle as well, it would seem that any appellate power against the imposition of penalty under Section 27 is not to be easily countenanced by a process of strained interpretation. It remains to advert to the somewhat tenuous reliance of the learned Counsel for the appellants on precedent. A bare perusal of the exhaustive judgment of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Shah Babulal Khimji v. Jayaben D. Kania and another (supra) would show that the same is totally off the mark from the question which is under consideration herein. The ratio of that judgment pertains to the specific and detailed provisions of Section 104 of the Civil Procedure Code, read with Order 43, Rule 1 thereof. In the alternative it considered the scope, meaning and the purport of the word ''Judgment'' and the context in which it was to be made appealable under the letters patent applicable to the High Courts. None of these considerations are even remotely attracted in the present case. It deserves repetition that the Civil Procedure Code is not applicable to the proceedings under this Act, except for the very limited extent, as specified in sub-section (4) of Section 13. The larger observations relied upon by the learned Counsel in paras 79 and 119 of the said judgment also, in our view, do not in the least advance the case of the appellants. The said judgment is, to our mind, not at all attracted in the present situation.

What has been said above, applies equally, if not with greater force, to the Division Bench judgment in Kanshi Ram v. Siri Ram and another (supra), which had been relied upon. A bare look at the very brief contents of the judgment would plainly indicate that it relates to the peculiar and specific provisions of Sections 13-N, 13-00 and 13-Vof the Gram Panchayat Act. Obviously, there is no similarity, whatsoever, of those statutory provisions, for what calls for construction herein. The judgment is, thus, plainly distinguishable and, indeed, wholly off the mark.

BEFORE parting with this order, in all fairness, one must take notice of the contention of the learned Counsel for the appellant, which appears to us, as based more on sentiment, rather than logic. It was urged that the penalties under Section 27 envisage not only heavy monetary amounts by way of fine, but also a minimum term of imprisonment of one month and upto a period of three years. It was submitted that if such an onerous order, involving the very liberty of a citizen, was to be wholly unappealable, then in peculiar situations it might lead to a serious failure of justice, where the District Forum may go patently contrary to law. On compassionate grounds it was suggested that one appeal be provided against the orders of this nature. In appraising the aforesaid contention, one has to recall the hallowed rule that the right to appeal is a pure creature of the statute. There is no inherent or natural right to a first appeal. If the Parliament in its wisdom does not provide any appeal from an order, it cannot be created on the ground that such an order is onerous in nature. The best judge for the provision of the substantive right of appeal is the Legislature and not the Courts on any grounds of compassion or sentiment. Consequently, if for the exhaustive reasons given above, it is found that the order under Section 27 is not appealable, the same cannot be made so by interpretation on the ground of the rigour and onerousness of the penalties imposable under the said section.

APART from the above, we are inclined to the view that even on larger principle de hors the specific provisions, the stand taken on behalf of the appellants would be contrary to the very purpose and objects of the Act, and its Rules. It is self-evident that the Act has been made to provide for the better protection of consumers, as has been spelt out in its preamble, and for the settlement of consumers disputes with particular emphasis on a summary and expeditious disposal thereof. This is evident from sub-rule (9) of Rule 4 of the Haryana Consumer Protection Rules, which lays down that a complaint before the redressal agencies should be decided within 90 days, and at the highest within 150 days if the matter requires analysis or testing of goods by the laboratory. Similarly, sub-rule (8) of Rule 8 prescribes a period of 90 days for the disposal of an appeal before the State Commission. The principle of expeditious disposal is, thus, writ large over the Act and the Rules. Now, as has been elaborated earlier, the orders under Section 27 in most of the cases would be in the nature of execution. The imposition of penalties by way of imprisonment or fine provides a quasi-criminal sanction for enforcing the substantive orders of the redressal agencies. On the other hand, Section 25 lays down that the orders of the redressal agencies are executable as decrees or orders of a Court by such agencies themselves or through the aid of the regular Civil Courts as well. The law''s delays with regard to execution of the orders of the Courts have been epitomised in the hoary adage that in India the troubles of a litigant begin after he has obtained a decree in his favour. Obviously, having that in mind, the Parliament in the present Act having provided for the expeditious execution of the orders of the redressal agencies either under Section 25 or by way of penalty under Section 27. On a parity of reasoning if the contention of the appellants were to be accepted, the orders under Section 25 would also become equally appealable. If such orders are to become the subject-matter of a first appeal, they could inevitably launch another chain of litigation merely with regard to execution of the substantive orders. Once the order of the District Forum under Section 27 is made appealable to the State Commission under Section 15, then inevitably same would also come within the revisional jurisdiction of the National Commission as well. Thus, a labyrinth of litigative process would be unleashed afresh. The argument of rigour and compassion raised on behalf of the appellants is more than well met by the patent and urgent need of the expeditious disposal of disputes under the Act and ensuring the fruits of litigation to the consumer. Viewed from this angle also, we are inclined to hold that a further appeal against the orders under Section 27 of the Act could neither be the intent of the legislature nor such a construction would advance the larger goal of this beneficent statute. To conclude, the answer to the question posed at the outset is rendered in the negative and it is held that no appeal under Section 15 lies against the imposition of penalty by the District Forum in exercise of its power under Section 27 above.

IN the light of the above, both the appeals must fail as not being maintainable.

LEARNED Counsel for both the appellants had, however, urged that in the event of non-maintainability of these appeals as a matter of law, they would wish to urge that these proceedings may be treated as a revision in the alternative under Clause (b) of Section 17 of the Act. This aspect of the case would be taken up separately at the next hearing. Pronounced in open Court. Appeal dismissed.