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Judgment
5 paragraphs · 1,039 wordsAGGRIEVED by the order dated 30.11.1991 passed by the District Forum, Bathinda, in Complaint No. 228 of 1991 under Section 27 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (for short the "Act''), the complainant has filed this appeal under Section 15 of the Act. Perhaps at the outset it may be mentioned that we are somewhat seeptical whether the present appeal would at all lie under Section 15 of the Act against the dismissal of a petition under Section 27 of the Act?
THE facts giving rise to the aforesaid issue lie in a narrow compass. During the course of hearing in complaints No. 51 and 178 of 1991 filed by the complainant, the District Forum, Bathinda, passed the following two ad interim orders on 16.10.1991 : - "Copy of the application has been given to the opposite party, who is directed to bring the bill of the telephone of the complainant for the month of September 1991 in this Court on 30.10.1991. " "Issue notice to the opposite party for 10.12.1991. THE respondents are directed to restore telephone connection of the complainant provided he has paid bills of the telephone." The complainant filed a complaint on 30.11.1991 before the District Forum, Bathinda, praying that the opposite parties be punished for contempt under Section 27 of the Act for not complying with the afore-mentioned orders of the Forum meticulously inter alia on the grounds (1) that the Department had issued a duplicate bill for Rs. 305/-, but that included Rs. 100/- as reconnection fee for the telephone and (2) that he (complainant) made the payment of the bills on 2.11.1991, whereas the telephone connection was given to him on 19.11.1991, and thus there was an inordinate delay on the part of the Telephone Department in restoring his telephone connection. The District Forum after hearing the parties'' Counsel found that no case of contempt was made out against the opposite parties, and dismissed the complaint on that score. Hence the appeal.
Sh. T.L. Goyal relying on the provision of Section 15 of the Act, contended that this provision envisages an appeal by any person who is aggrieved by the order of the District Forum under Section 27 of the Act. This question does not seem to be free from difficulty. The matter is, however, not res integra. Reference in this connnection may well be made to the order of the Haryana State Commission in Kohinooor Carpets, Panipat & Others v. Mr. Rajinder Arora, II (1991) CPJ 429, where in after an exhaustive discussion on principle and precedent, it has been observed as under : - "That Section 27, with its heading of ''Penalties'' appears long after Section 15 and at the fag end of the statute. It is followed only by Chapter IV, containing miscellaneous provisions under Section 28 to 31. Contextually it deserves highlighting that the consistent scheme of the Act is that the right of appeal against the orders of all the three redressal forums constituted by the Act immediately follows the provisions pertaining to the procedure and jurisdiction thereof. This is the identical situation in the three distinct Sections, namely, Sections 15, 19 and 23, which separately confer the appellate power against the substitutive orders of the District Forum, the State Commission and the National Commission, respectively. Viewed in this light and in the context of the scheme of the statute, it would seem somewhat incongruous that the earlier Section 15 would envisage an appeal against the imposition of penalty by Section 27, which is considerably subsequent thereto. The scheme for enforcement of the orders of the three redressal agencies under the Act has then to be viewed in a larger perspective. This necessarily involves the correlating of Sections 25 and 27 of the Act. Both these provisions are directed towards the speedy enforcement of the orders of the District Forum, the State Commission or the National Commission, as the case may be To put it tersely, both Sections 25 and 27 are in the nature of the execution proceedings of the orders made by the three redressal agencies. While Section 25 visualizes the enforcement of such orders by a civil process, as if they were a decree or order made by a Court of law, Section 27 confers a quasi-criminal sanction for their enforcement by way of punishment with imprisonment or imposition of monetary penalties. It is somewhat axiomatic that execution proceedings are not normally appealable, and it is only as a matter of rare exception that a statute may expressly provide for an appeal against the executory process. It is manifest that the Act does not in terms confer any right to appeal against the proceedings either under Section 25 or Section 27. Viewed from this angle as well, it would seem that any appellate power against the imposition of penalty under Section 27 is not to be easily countenanced by a process of strained interpretation. "To conclude, the answer to the question posed at the outset is rendered in the negative and it is held that no appeal under Section 15 lies against the imposition of penalty by the District Forum in exercise of its power under Section 27 above. "
WE concur with this view of the Haryana State Commission and it is held that the appeal does not lie under Section 15 of the Act against the dismissal of a petition under Section 27 of the Act. Faced with this difficulty, Shri T.L. Goyal desires this appeal to be treated as a revision. There being no objection to it and no injustice caused to anyone in treating this appeal as a revision, we are treating it as a revision. It must not be forgotten that the power of this commission in exercising its revisional jurisdiction under Section 17(b) of the Act is strictly restricted to the question of jurisdiction. WE have perused the impugned order. There is no error of jurisdiction nor has the District Forum acted in exercise of jurisdiction illegally or material irregularity while passing the impugned order. The case of the revision petitioner, therefore, deserves to be dismissed on this ground. This revision petition thus fails and is dismissed.
NO order as to costs. Petition dismissed.
