Komrusetti Agayya and Another vs Sub-judge and Another

Srinivasachari, J.

1.This is an application for the issue of a Writ of Certiorari directed against the order of the Subordinate Judge, Secunderabad, as the appellate authority in proceedings under the House Rent Control. The applicants before us applied to the Rent Controller, Secunderabad, for the eviction of their tenant, Respondent 2, on the ground that the house was required by them for their use and occupation. The Petitioners averred that they were residing at a place "called ''Laknawara'' in Sangareddy; that they had to leave the place on account of the fear of communists and that they had been driven to the necessity of having to settle down permanently in Secunderabad and eke out their livelihood. The Petitioners averred that they required their house which was in occupation of Respondent 2 for their own use to enable them to carry on business there. They said that they purchased the suit-property purposely with a view to settling down in Secunderabad and carrying on business there. It was also stated in the petition that when purchasing the property they were assured by the vendors that they would be given vacant possession of the premises and accordingly the tenant, who was in occupation of the premises, was asked to execute an agreement in favour of the. Petitioners undertaking to vacate the premises within one month from the date of the agreement. According to them, they were entitled to eject the tenant both by reason of the fact that they required the premises for their own use and occupation and also on account of the fact that he had undertaken to vacate the premises within a month from the date of the rental agreement.

The tenant, while admitting the execution of the rental agreement, contended that the document was executed by him in ignorance of its contents. He slated that it was represented to him that the paper contained only a rental agreement and he was wholly unaware that in the rental agreement there was a condition that the premises would be vacated within a month from the date of the execution of the document. In fact, he emphatically denied having ever undertaken to vacate the premises within a month. The Rent Controller after examining the evidence came to the conclusion that the Petitioners had failed to show sufficient cause for the eviction of the Respondent. The landlords appealed to the Sub-Judge, Secunderabad, and the Sub-Judge dismissed the appeal holding that the landlords had not been able to establish that the tenant undertook to vacate the premises within a month. Against this order of the Sub-Judge the landlords have now come before this Court seeking to quash the order of the appellate authority under Article 226 of the Constitution.

In order to exercise our powers under Art. 226 of the Constitution, the essential conditions are-

a. it must be shown that the authority passing the order had no jurisdiction to enquire into the matter or that he had exceeded the jurisdiction vested in him, or

b. that there has been a violation of the principles of natural justice.

The learned Counsel for the Petitioners urged before us that the Sub-Judge failed to bestow any thought on the main ground on which the landlords sought eviction of the tenant, viz., that the house was required for their use and occupation. A perusal of the order of the Sub-Judge would show that he has as a matter of fact not considered this aspect of the case. He has based his order upon the other contention raised by the landlords, namely, that the tenant was estopped from contending that he could not be ejected by reason of the fact that he undertook in the rental agreement (Exhibit P. 1) to vacate the premises within one month. This contention of the landlords was an alternative contention wherein they raised the plea of estoppel as against the tenant. We find that the Sub-Judge has discussed in detail about this plea of the landlords and has come to the conclusion that on the evidence this plea could not be sustained. It would appear from the application before the Rent Controller that the landlords based their case for eviction on the ground of their requirement. This they sought to establish by evidence. Petitioner 1 and Lakdawala, the vendor went into the box and deposed about their need for occupation of the house, but we find from a perusal of the order of the Sub-Judge that there is not a word mentioned about this plea. Indeed, he has not even alluded to the evidence that was led in this behalf. It was urged by the learned Advocate for the Respondent that it was not necessary for the Sub-Judge to deal with every ground. raised by the landlord and that he could very well dispose of the case on any one of the grounds, if the matter could be disposed of without reference to the other grounds. We feel that this argument cannot be sustained. It would appear that the main ground and the basis for the application for eviction was the requirement of the house by the landlords for their own use and occupation. The plea of estoppel was only by way of an additional ground, that is to say that the landlords were entitled to evict the tenant in view of the undertaking given by the tenant. The primary ground was the requirement Of the landlords alone. When that was the primary ground, the Sub-Judge could not have disposed of the case on the alternative plea. It was open to him to go into the primary ground and come to a conclusion one way or the other. He might not have believed the evidence of the landlords and come to the same conclusion as he has done now. But as stated already, there is not a word said about it in the judgment of the Court of appeal. The Rent Controller also omitted to give a finding on the question of landlords'' necessity. This, in our opinion, amounts in law to a failure or a dereliction of the duty on the part of the Rent Controller and the Sub-Judge. In this connection, it is scarcely necessary to stress the well known rule that where a case is set up by one party and there is evidence led in support of such case, the failure of the presiding officer to bestow any thought or to consider the matter, would be rewarded as a dereliction of duty. The High Court has ample powers under Art. 227 of the Constitution to have the defect rectified, vide � Parry and Co. Ltd. Vs. Commercial Employees'' Association, Madras, .

We, therefore, sot aside the order of the appellate authority and remand the case to the Sub-Judge, Secunderabad, with the direction that he do go into the question about the requirement of the landlords for the occupation of the suit premises and decide the case ''de novo'' according to law. The Petitioners will be entitled to the costs of this Writ petition, which is assessed at Rs. 50/- (rupees fifty).