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Judgment
4 paragraphs · 899 wordsThese are two petitions for the issue OF a writ of certiorari and have been ably and Keenly contested. The Petitioners are two tenants and they have been directed by the Rent Controller to vacate the ground and the first floor respectively of the house occupied by them. The learned Advocates for the Petitioners have emphasized that the grounds on which the Rent Controller directed the vacating of the house are not approved of by the appeal (SIC) authority and the grounds on which he maintained the order of eviction are contrary to natural justice. These are: that the big house occupied by the Respondent, Sugra Begum, has been given on rent by her to the University which is a good cause; that Sugra Begum''s sons are minors and that she has to pay a staggering sum of thirteen lakhs of rupees towards arrears of Income Tax. The learned advocates argued that these grounds do not justify the order of eviction passed by the appellate authority as they do not come within the meaning of "reasonable cause" of Rent Control Order,1353 F. They argued further that all these grounds were the allied personal knowledge of the appellate authority; they formed the part of the record and their clients were not given a chance to rebut them;
(SIC) that therefore, as no evidence was allowed, they cannot form part of the record and the (SIC) should issue to set aside the order given in such a manner.
In reply the learned Advocate, Mr. Ramgopal referred to the marginally cited cases Raj Krishna v. Section K. Shaw and Brothers (SIC)115; Mohsinali Mahomedali and Others Vs. The State of Bombay, ; Bhagwan Das Vs. Janak Lal Thakur and Others, ; Kiron (SIC) v. Kalidas Chatterjee ILR (1943) Cal (3) (SIC) argued that in his submission no writ of (SIC) can lie because both the Controller (SIC) the appellate authority have jurisdiction; (SIC) there is nothing to show that the jurisdiction on was wrongly assumed or exercised and on the authority of these cases this Court should not interfere even though the rules of evidence were not adhered to. He argued further that the Evidence Act applies only to judicial proceedings and it has been held that the Controller and the appellate authority over (SIC) executive and non-judicial officers; that (SIC) Hyderabad Rent Control Order, expressly (SIC) that the Controller should be satisfied (SIC) hearing the parties and there is no rc-(SIC) to the recording of evidence; and that (SIC) record evidence, therefore, does not (SIC) Jurisdiction. The learned Advocate (SIC) by emphasizing again that juristic-(SIC) the Controller and the appellate author- (SIC)quite clear, this Court should not (SIC)
3.We have carefully considered these arguments of the learned advocate for the Respondent. We are, however, of the opinion that the writ should issue; for in the first place, errors apparent on the face of the proceedings are always treated as errors of jurisdiction for the purpose of quashing by issue of a writ of certiorari, vide Krishnaswamy Iyer v. Mohan Lal Binjani 1948 LJ 559. The use of personal knowledge in the order is evidently an error of this kind. Again even though the Rent Controller or the Appellate authority may have jurisdiction, yet as held by this Court in Yakub Ali v. The Additional Collector, Hyderabad ILR (1952) Hyd 679. "The Rent Controller while deciding the question of ''reasonableness'' under R. 8 (e) should take into consideration every circumstance that might affect the interests of the landlord or of the tenant in the premises. The Court should weigh such hardship with due regard to the needs of both the tenant and the landlord." It appears to us that due regard was not paid to the interests of the parties. Admittedly the Respondent is getting a good rent for her house which she has vacated. She wants the house occupied by the Petitioners for her own occupation and to save herself from the high rent she is paying for another house, which she has rented in Narayanguda. It is not denied that during the pendency of the proceedings with the Controller, another house of the Respondent fell vacant and she did not choose to occupy it. It is denied also that the objects of the Kent Control Order, 1353 F. are that there should neither be unreasonable evictions for profiteering by rent-racketing. In the prevalent scarcity of houses, this cannot be in the public interest the above circumstances will show that the Respondent having one of her houses vacant did not choose to occupy it. This conduct cannot be deemed to be reasonable. Similarly, it is not denied that she has rented her big bungalow on a very good rent and the professed reason why she wants the Petitioners to quit is that because of this letting, she needs their house. This also in a way smacks of rent-racketing. In the circumstances, there does not appear to be good or sufficient reason as contemplated by Section 8 of the Rent Control Order. We are loath to prefer our opinion in such cases; but it appears, to us that the learned Controller and the appellate authority have wrongly exercised their jurisdiction and, therefore, a writ of certiorari lies. We thus allow these petitions. A copy of this order should be made in the other file. We make no order as to costs.
