High CourtsDivision Bench

Ku. Priyanka vs The State of Madhya Pradesh

Madhya Pradesh High Court · Decided on 13 August 2013 · Citation: (2013) 08 MP CK 0215

HON’BLE JUDGES
B.D. Rathi, J · Ajit Singh, J
ACTS & SECTIONS REFERRED
Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (CrPC) — Section 372 · Limitation Act, 1963 — Section 5 · Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) — Section 366, 376
RESULT
Dismissed
CASE NUMBER
Criminal A. No. 1558 of 2011
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Judgment

11 paragraphs · 572 words

B.D. Rathi, J.—Heard on I.A. No. 14213/11, which is an application u/s 5 of the Limitation Act, for condonation of delay preferring this appeal. As per Office note, the appeal is barred by 12 days.

2.

Considering the reasons assigned therein, the I.A. is allowed and the delay is hereby condoned.

3.

Heard on admission.

4.

This appeal has been preferred u/s 372 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter referred to as "the Code") being aggrieved with the judgment dated 26/04/11 passed by IV Additional Sessions Judge, Jabalpur, in Sessions Trial No. 368/10, whereby respondent no. 2 Monu alias Pradeep Rajak has been acquitted of the offences punishable under Sections 366 & 376 of the Indian Penal Code ("IPC" for short).

5.

Prosecution case, in brief, is that complainant Shakunbai lodged a report that on 26/03/2010 prosecutrix had gone to Bhitoni for appearing in an examination. When in the evening she did not return, then on 27/03/2010 missing report was lodged at police station Shahpura on which crime No. 06/2010 was registered. During investigation, the prosecutrix was recovered, her statement was recorded, crime was registered against respondent no. 2 and after investigation charge-sheet was filed.

6.

Learned counsel for the appellant and learned Government Advocate submitted that the trial Court had erred in appreciating the evidence on record and the judgment of acquittal deserved to be interfered with.

7.

Having regard to the arguments advanced by the parties, record of the trial Court was perused.

8.

After taking into consideration the entire evidence on record, it was found by the trial Court that prosecution had deliberately suppressed the documents regarding age of the prosecutrix. As per the evidence of Dr. Bhavna Mishra (PW9), who had examined the prosecutrix, she was 17 1/2 year old. To confirm her age, she had advised for ossification test but the prosecution did not get the same conducted. In such circumstances, it was held by the trial Court that the prosecutrix was not below 18 years of age. Trial Court also found that as per the evidence of Ku. Diksha (PW2), Ku. Roshni (PW3), Shakun Bai (PW5) and maternal uncle of prosecutrix Ramesh Kumar (PW4), the prosecutrix was seen going on a Motorcycle with respondent no. 2 from a busy thoroughfare without offering any resistance. It was also found from the cross-examination of prosecutrix (PW1) that she had extensively traveled with respondent no. 2 to Nagpurgaon and Lahatgaon at her own accord and had not disclosed about the incident to anybody despite having sufficient opportunity. Besides this, medical evidence revealed that the prosecutrix was habitual of sexual intercourse and no external or internal injury was noticed on her body. In the aforesaid premises, the trial Court held that the prosecution had failed to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt.

9.

We agree with the findings recorded by the trial Court.

10.

It is well settled that the judgment of acquittal should not be disturbed unless the conclusions drawn on the basis of evidence brought on record are found to be grossly unreasonable or manifestly perverse or palpably unsustainable.

11.

Taking into consideration the reasons assigned on the face of evidence on record establishing the aforesaid facts and circumstances, the view taken by the learned trial Court was apparently a possible view. As such, no interference is called for with the order of acquittal in question. The appeal, being devoid of merit and substance, stands dismissed.