The State of Madhya Pradesh vs Jaipal Singh

B.D. Rathi, J.—Heard on I.A. No. 27231/12, which is an application u/s 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of delay. As per office note, the leave application is barred by 13 days.

Considering the reasons assigned therein, the I.A. is allowed and the delay in preferring the application for leave to appeal is hereby condoned.

Heard on admission.

This application for grant of leave to appeal has been preferred u/s 378(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter referred to as "the Code") being aggrieved with the judgment dated 18/07/2012 passed by XIII Additional Sessions Judge, Bhopal, in Sessions Trial No. 765/2011, whereby respondent has been acquitted of the offences punishable under Sections 363, 366 & 376 of the Indian Penal Code ("IPC" for short).

Prosecution case, in brief, is that upon a false promise of marriage, on 13/7/11 respondent took her to Village Tikariya and persistently subjected her to sexual intercourse for a period of two months. The aforesaid information was given by the prosecutrix when she was recovered from the custody of respondent, pursuant to investigation into missing person report lodged by brother of prosecutrix. After investigation, charge-sheet was filed.

Learned Government Advocate submitted that the trial Court had not properly appreciated the evidence on record and the judgment of acquittal deserved to be interfered with.

Having regard to the arguments advanced by learned Government Advocate, we have perused the impugned judgment.

After appreciation of age-related evidence on record, the trial Court found that on the date of incident the prosecutrix was more than 18 years of age. Trial Court also found that the prosecutrix was not kidnapped for the purpose of committing rape and had extensively travelled, at her own accord, with the respondent to Mandla and Bhopal, and, accordingly inferred that she was a consenting party.

We agree with the findings recorded by the trial Court that prosecution has failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt.

It is well settled that the judgment of acquittal should not be disturbed unless the conclusions drawn on the basis of evidence brought on record are found to be grossly unreasonable or manifestly perverse or palpably unsustainable.

Taking into consideration the reasons assigned on the face of evidence on record establishing the aforesaid facts and circumstances, the view taken by the learned trial Court was apparently a possible view. As such, no interference is called for with the judgment of acquittal in question. The application, being devoid of merit and substance, stands dismissed.