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Judgment
V.B. Gupta, J.—The present appeal u/s 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (for short as the "Act") has been filed against the award dated 28.04.94, passed by Sh. S.L. Khanna, Motor Accident Claims Tribunal (for short as "Tribunal"), Delhi.
The accident which gave rise to the present appeal above, took place on 4th October, 1980 at about 3 a.m., when the deceased, Badri Prasad was sleeping near the main Mathura Road at Badarpur in front of his office where he used to keep stocks of stone dust, badarpur and rohri. A truck bearing No. USD 7636 being driven by Respondent No. 1, Sh. KaliCharan came from Mathura road and was going inside the badarpur and rohri stock via a bye lane. KaliCharan was driving the truck in a rash and negligent manner and lost control of the vehicle as he neared the place where the deceased was sleeping. The truck suddenly and abruptly swerved towards extreme right and over ran the cot on which Sh. Badri Prasad was sleeping. Deceased Badri Prasad was removed to Holy Family Hospital which was nearest hospital with serious injuries on his chest. His ribs had been fractured. Deceased Badri Prasad, however, could not survive the injuries and died on 30-10-80.
The legal heirs of deceased Badri Prasad which include his widow Smt. Vidyawati, four sons and one daughter, filed petition u/s 110A of the Act seeking compensation.
Vide impugned judgment, the Tribunal awarded the compensation of Rs. 1,35,000/- along with the interest @ 6% per annum from the date of filing of the petition till realization.
It has been contended by Ld. Counsel for the Appellants that the Tribunal should have applied the multiplier of 15 instead of 10. The compensation for loss of consortium to his wife has not been granted without stating any reason. It is further submitted that deduction of 1/4th of the annual income of the deceased towards his personal expenses was improper. The Appellants were entitled to a minimum interest of 18% per annum, in the facts and circumstances of the case.
Ld. Counsel for the appellants has relied upon a decision of Apex Court in Sarla Dixit and Ors. v. Balwant Yadav and Ors. 1 (2004)ACC 396.
On the other hand, it has been contended by learned counsel for the Respondents that since deceased was 55 years old, the Tribunal had rightly adopted the multiplier of 10. Further, the income of the deceased was rightly taken as Rs. 1500/- per month by the Tribunal as stated by the Appellant herself in her statement. So the compensation awarded is just and no ground for enhancement is made out.
Deceased Badri Prasad was aged 55 years at the time of accident and he was running his own business of stone dust and as his wife has stated, he was earning something between Rs. 1,500/- to Rs. 2,000/- per month.
In Sarla Dixit(supra), the Apex Court has observed as under;
It is necessary to reiterate that the multiplier method is logically sound and legally well-established. There are some cases which have proceeded to determine the compensation on the basis of aggregating the entire future earnings for over the period the life expectancy was lost, deducted a percentage there from towards uncertainties of future life and awarded the resulting sum as compensation. This is clearly unscientific. For instance, if the deceased was. say 25 years of age at the time of death and the life expectancy is 70 years, this method would multiply the loss of dependency for 45 years - virtually adopting a multiplier of 45 - and even if one-third or one-fourth is deducted there from towards the uncertainties of future life and for immediate lump sum payment, the effective multiplier would be between 30 and 34. This is wholly impermissible. We are, aware that some decisions of the High Courts and of this Court as well have arrived at compensation on some such basis. These decisions cannot be said to have laid down a settled principle. They are merely instances of particular awards in individual cases. The proper method of computation is the multiplier-method. A departure, except in exceptional and extraordinary cases, would introduce inconsistency of principle, lack of uniformity and an element of unpredictability for the assessment of compensation. Some judgments of the High Courts have justified a departure from the multiplier method on the ground that Section 110-B of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 insofar as it envisages the compensation to be ''just'', the statutory determination of a ''just'' compensation would unshackle the exercise from any rigid formula. It must be borne in mind that the multiplier method is the accepted method of ensuring a ''just'' compensation which will make for uniformity and certainty of the awards. We disapprove these decisions of the High Courts which have taken a contrary view. We indicate that the multiplier method is the appropriate method, a departure from which can only be justified in rare and extraordinary circumstances and very exceptional cases.
Further, the Court has observed;
So far as the adoption of the proper multiplier is concerned, it was observed that the future prospects of advancement in life and career should also be sounded in terms of money to augment the multiplicand. While the chance of the multiplier is determined by two factors, namely, the rate of interest appropriate to a stable economy and the age of the deceased or of the claimant whichever is higher, the ascertainment of the multiplicand is a more difficult exercise. Indeed, many factors have to be put into the scales to evaluate the contingencies of the future. All contingencies of the future need not necessarily be baneful.
As regard the contention of applying appropriate multiplier is concerned, the Tribunal held:
The deceased was 55 years of age and he would have continued active business at least till the age of 65 years. The petitioners thus reasonably could expect dependency from the deceased for at least next 10 years. The multiplier of 10 should be applied in the present case to arrive at just and fair compensation.
Keeping in view, the age of the deceased which was 55 years, the multiplier of 10 as adopted by the Tribunal is just.
Further, the income of the deceased as stated by Smt. Vidyawati, wife of the deceased was between Rs. 1500/- to Rs. 2000/- per month. However, there is no documentary evidence to this effect. Therefore, the Tribunal has rightly taken the income of the deceased as Rs. 1500/-.
As far as the numbers of dependents on the deceased are concerned, there is no dispute that he had as many as six dependents which included his widow, four sons and one daughter.
In a plethora of cases, the Apex Court and various High Courts have held that 1/3rd amount of the income should be deducted towards self-expenses of the deceased.
In New India Assurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Charlie and Another, , the Apex Court has observed as under;
What would be the percentage of deduction for personal expenditure cannot be governed by any rigid rule or formula by universal application. It would depend upon circumstances of each case. In the instant case the claimant was nearly 37 years of age and was married. Therefore, as rightly contended by learned counsel for the appellant, 1/3rd deduction has to be made for personal expenditure.
It is difficult to visualize that a person getting such a meager salary would spend a major part of it upon himself, leaving his dependents at the verge of starvation. Considering the poor strata of society to which the unfortunate deceased belonged, it must be presumed that he was spending the bare minimum upon himself and utilizing its maximum portion for the upkeep of his wife and five children.
Thus, taking into consideration number of dependents and the meager salary which the deceased was earning, the Tribunal has rightly deducted 1/4th of the annual income towards personal expenses.
Even assuming for arguments sake that the Tribunal has not awarded towards loss of consortium to the wife, but it should not be lost sight of the fact that the Tribunal also has deducted 1/4th of the income of the deceased towards his personal expenses, in spite of 1/3rd which is reasonable.
As regards the award of interest @ 6% per annum, the Tribunal held:
Ordinarily simple interest @ 12% p.a. is allowed but in the present case petitioners took considerable long time to conclude the proceedings. I, Therefore, allow simple interest @ 6% p.a. on the awarded amount from the date of filing of the petition till realization.
In view of cogent reasoning given by the learned Tribunal, I do not find any justification for increasing the interest to 18% p.a.
Accordingly, no infirmity can be found with the order of learned Tribunal and the compensation awarded by the Tribunal is just and reasonable. The present appeal is, Therefore, dismissed.
No order as to costs.