High CourtsSingle Bench(2008) 05 DEL CK 0003

Smt. Munni Devi, Shri Tek Chand alias Rattan and Smt. Barfi vs Sh. Kali Charan and Others

Delhi High Court · Decided on 21 May 2008

HON’BLE JUDGES
Vidya Bhushan Gupta, J
RESULT
Dismissed
CASE NUMBER
FAO No. 190 of 1994

AI Structured Summary

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Judgment

24 paragraphs · 1,618 words

V.B. Gupta, J.—The present appeal u/s 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act,1988 (for short as the "Act") has been filed against the award dated 28.04.94, passed by Sh. S.L. Khanna, Motor Accident Claims Tribunal (for short as "Tribunal"), Delhi.

2.

The accident which gave rise to the present appeal took place on 4th October, 1980 at about 3 a.m., when the deceased, Sh. Vidya Ram was sleeping near the main Mathura Road at Badarpur in front of his office where he used to keep stocks of stone dust, badarpur and rohri. A truck bearing No. USD 7636 being driven by Respondent No. 1, Sh. KaliCharan came from Mathura road and was going inside the Badarpur and rohri (stone dust) stock via a bye lane. KaliCharan was driving the truck in a rash and negligent manner and lost control of the vehicle as he neared the place where the deceased was sleeping. The truck suddenly and abruptly swerved towards extreme right and over ran the cot on which one Badri Prasad was sleeping after it crushed the deceased, Sh. Vidya Ram under its front wheels who was sleeping on the heep of stone dust near by. Deceased Vidya Ram breathed his last at the spot.

3.

Vide impugned judgment, the Tribunal awarded the compensation of Rs. 1,54,000/- along with the interest @ 6% per annum from the date of filing of the petition till realization.

4.

It has been contended by Ld. Counsel for the Appellants that the Tribunal has erred in applying the multiplier of 20 only. The deceased was only 23 years old and thus, the Tribunal should have applied the multiplier of 40. The compensation for loss of consortium to his wife at Rs. 10,000/- is on a very lower side. It is further submitted that the deceased was only 23 years of age and was earning Rs. 600/- per month, while studying in final year of his graduation. The deceased after his graduation would have earned minimum of Rs. 2,500/- to Rs. 3,000/- per month, thus the Tribunal should have taken note of the prospective earnings of deceased. The Appellants were entitled to a minimum interest of 18% per annum, in the facts and circumstances of the case.

5.

Ld. Counsel for the appellants has relied upon a decision of Apex Court in Sarla Dixit and Ors. v. Balwant Yadav and Ors. 1(2004)ACC 396 .

6.

On the other hand, it has been contended by the learned counsel for the Respondents that the multiplier of 20 was rightly adopted in this case by the Tribunal, keeping in view the age of deceased which was 23 years. Even as per Second Schedule of the Act, the multiplier for the age above 20 years but not exceeding 25 years is 17. Moreover, the Tribunal has not deducted 1/3rd amount towards personal expenses. Thus, the compensation awarded by the Tribunal is just and fair and already on the higher side. Therefore, no enhancement is required and the present appeal should be dismissed.

7.

Deceased Vidya Ram was aged 23 years at the time of accident and he was earning Rs. 600/- per month as stated by father, Sh. TekChand of the deceased. The said statement has not been challenged by the Respondents as far as earning capacity of deceased is concerned.

8.

In Sarla Dixit(supra), the Apex Court has observed as under;

It is necessary to reiterate that the multiplier method is logically sound and legally well-established. There are some cases which have proceeded to determine the compensation on the basis of aggregating the entire future earnings for over the period the life expectancy was lost, deducted a percentage there from towards uncertainties of future life and awarded the resulting sum as compensation. This is clearly unscientific. For instance, if the deceased was. say 25 years of age at the time of death and the life expectancy is 70 years, this method would multiply the loss of dependency for 45 years - virtually adopting a multiplier of 45 - and even if one-third or one-fourth is deducted there from towards the uncertainties of future life and for immediate lump sum payment, the effective multiplier would be between 30 and 34. This is wholly impermissible. We are, aware that some decisions of the High Courts and of this Court as well have arrived at compensation on some such basis. These decisions cannot be said to have laid down a settled principle. They are merely instances of particular awards in individual cases. The proper method of computation is the multiplier-method. A departure, except in exceptional and extraordinary cases, would introduce inconsistency of principle, lack of uniformity and an element of unpredictability for the assessment of compensation. Some judgments of the High Courts have justified a departure from the multiplier method on the ground that Section 110-B of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 insofar as it envisages the compensation to be ''just'', the statutory determination of a ''just'' compensation would unshackle the exercise from any rigid formula. It must be borne in mind that the multiplier method is the accepted method of ensuring a ''just'' compensation which will make for uniformity and certainty of the awards. We disapprove these decisions of the High Courts which have taken a contrary view. We indicate that the multiplier method is the appropriate method, a departure from which can only be justified in rare and extraordinary circumstances and very exceptional cases.

Further, the Court has observed;

So far as the adoption of the proper multiplier is concerned, it was observed that the future prospects of advancement in life and career should also be sounded in terms of money to augment the multiplicand. While the chance of the multiplier is determined by two factors, namely, the rate of interest appropriate to a stable economy and the age of the deceased or of the claimant whichever is higher, the ascertainment of the multiplicand is a more difficult exercise. Indeed, many factors have to be put into the scales to evaluate the contingencies of the future. All contingencies of the future need not necessarily be baneful.

9.

The deceased was 23 years of age at the time of occurrence of the accident and he was survived by his widow and his parents. The Tribunal has observed in the impugned judgment that;

Though the Supreme Court in a recent judgment delivered on 6.1.93 in the case of General Manager, Kerala State Road Transport Corporation v. Mrs. Sushma Thomas etc. observed that ordinarily multiplier should not exceed 16 yet in the present case I feel that multiplier of at least 20 should be applied as the widow of the deceased was only 20 years of age at the time of death of deceased and she has long life ahead of her. Smt. Munni devi is a illiterate lady having no other source of income. I, Therefore, feel that multiplier of 20 years should be applied in this case.

10.

Taking in view the age of the deceased, the appropriate multiplier of 17 as laid down in the Second Schedule of the Act should have been applied but the Tribunal has already taken a very liberal view by adopting the multiplier of 20.

11.

The Apex Court has taken a view in catena of judgments that the multiplier as laid down in the Second Schedule of the Act can be deviated only under exceptional circumstances otherwise normally the same acts as a safeguard. Therefore, I do not find any infirmity in the impugned award so far as the said multiplier of 20 is concerned.

12.

Regarding the future prospects, the same cannot be granted unless there is evidence to this effect on record. There was no proof of educational qualification of deceased on record to show that deceased was doing graduation. Therefore, in view of Bijoy Kumar Dugar Vs. Bidyadhar Dutta and Others, , the contention regarding the future prospects is rejected.

13.

The judgment cited by Counsel for the Appellants Sarla Dixit (supra) is not applicable to the facts of the present case as in that case, the evidence showed that the deceased was a Captain in the Army and he was qualified for promotion to the rank of a Major at the time of his death whereas, in the present case no evidence regarding the education or future prospects of the deceased is on record.

14.

Further, the Second Schedule of the Act laid down certain specific amounts payable against general damages in the case of death such as for Loss of Consortium, if beneficiary is the spouse. the amount laid down is Rs. 5,000/-. In the present case, the Tribunal has already granted Rs. 10,000/- towards loss of consortium, which under any circumstances is on much higher side. Thus, I do not find any ground to interfere with the decision of the Tribunal in this regard.

15.

As regards the award of interest @ 6% per annum, the Tribunal held:

Ordinarily simple interest @ 12% p.a. is allowed but in the present case petitioners took considerable long time to conclude the proceedings. I, Therefore, allow simple interest @ 6% p.a. on the awarded amount from the date of filing of the petition till realization.

16.

In view of cogent reasoning given by the learned Tribunal, I do not find any justification for increasing the interest to 18% p.a.

17.

Thus, I do not find any infirmity or illegality in the impugned judgment of the learned Tribunal and no ground is made out for enhancing the award passed in this case. The compensation amount awarded by learned Tribunal is just and fair.

18.

The present appeal is thus not maintainable and is dismissed.

19.

No order as to costs.