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Judgment
Bakthavatsalam, J.—These batch of cases involve a common and vital issue in the matter of selection of candidates for admission into
professional courses in the various colleges in the State of Tamil Nadu for the academic year 1993-94. The question that has been mooted for our
consideration in all these cases is about the validity of the stipulation made that the improvement marks obtained in the first appearance only in the
qualifying examination will be considered for the purpose of selection. Except in respect of two cases, the Petitioners are aspirants to join the
Professional Enginering Courses. De hors the different nature of prayers found in all these writ petitions, the sum and substance of the claim
pertains to a challenge to G.O. Ms. No. 471, Education, dated 14.5.1993 and Clause 2.2 (iv) of the Instructions to candidates issued by the Anna
University in respect of Tamil Nadu Professional Courses Entrance Examinations, 1993 (Engineering, Medicine, Agriculture and Vetrinary). The
said clause reads as hereunder:
(iv) Number of Attempts to pass and pass and Number of Improvement: For the purpose of qualifying Examination marks the maximum number of
attempts to pass and maximum number of improvement for admission to all the courses coming under Engineering are as follows:
CommunityMaximum Maximum
number of number of
attempts to improvement
pass
Three One
Scheduled
Castes/
Scheduled
Tribes
All other Two One
communities
While considering the number of improvement, it will be by the number of times the candidate has taken the improvement examination, For
example, if a candidate has taken improvement in Mathematics once and in Physics on a later occasion, it will be counted as two improvements.
On the other hand, if a candidate has taken Mathematics and Physics in an improvement examination and he/she has not taken any more
improvement examination on later occasion, the number of improvement will now be taken as one.
While furnishing the marks obtained in the qualifying examination, candidates can avail the benefit limited to the first improvement examination
alone.
The Government Order in G.O. Ms. No. 471, Education, dated 14.5.1993, directed the taking into account only one and that too the first
improvement examination marks. It is common knowledge and there is no controversy over the position that admissions to professional courses in
Colleges under the control of the Government are governed by the policy of selection issued every year by the Government. When the
Government passed similar orders on 3.6.1991 in respect of selections to Medical Courses for the Academic year 1991-92 writ petitions were
filed challenging the same. Ramalingam, J. before whom those writ petitions came up for hearing found that the said Government Order was a
special one for medical courses and would prevail over the general order in G.O. Ms. No. 1457, dated 7.10.1989, that the said Government
Order was not a promise by the Respondents that the improvement examination marks would be taken into consideration for admission to medical
courses and that there was no discrimination involved in confining consideration to the first improvement marks for medical admission whereas, for
other technical institutions both improvement examination marks were taken into consideration. Appeals were filed in W.A. Nos. 1004 etc. of
1991 by the unsuccessful Petitioners before a Division Bench and in the decision reported in 1993 Writ Law Reporter, 189 (Suseela v. Secretary,
Coordination Committee Office, Kilpauk Medical College Hospital Campus), it was held by the Division Bench that since the field was occupied
by Section 35 of the Tamil Nadu Dr. M.G.R. Medical University Act, 1987 the authority competent to prescribe any qualifying examination was
Dr. M.G.R. Medical University and such conditions have to be prescribed by the Regulations framed by the competent body of the University. At
the same time the Division Bench also held that the view that the learned single judge has expressed on the question of alleged discrimination or the
special provision made for Medical admission, but for the lack of authority behind the Government Order was correct and proper and they say so
with respect.
Subsequent to the above decision of the Division Bench, Section 35A was inserted by the Tamil Nadu Act 20 of 1992 to the extent that
notwithstanding anything contained in Section 35 or in any other provisions of the Act, the Government shall be the Competent Authority to select
and admit candidates in respect of seats under the control or within the quota of Government in Government or Private colleges respectively and
the Government may also specify, by general or special order the policy, guidelines, method, and procedure for selection of candidates for
admission, in respect of such seats, referred to supra. When the restriction in respect of taking into account for purposes of selection, the marks
obtained in the first improvement examination was incorporated in the scheme for admissions to the subsequent academic years, the very same
issue was raised on the basis of the Division Bench judgment reported in 1993 WLR 189 (supra). Those writ petitions came up before us for
consideration in W.P. Nos. 11031 of 1993 etc., and we repelled the challenge in view of the insertion of Section 35A to the Medical University
Act, which set right even the lacuna pointed out by the Division Bench on the ground of the theory of occupied field and want of authority behind
the Government Order when such order was passed on 3.6.1991. A similar challenge in respect of selections for B. Sc. (Nursing Course) also
came to be rejected by us in W.P. No. 11055 of 1993 on 30.7.1993.
Having regard to the settled position of law, the Learned Counsel appearing in the writ petitions adopted different line of challenge to the
provision engrafted in Clause 2.2 (iv) of the Instructions to Candidates issued by the Anna University while conducting the Entrance Examinations
for the current Academic Year. Mrs. Nalini Chidambaram, learned senior counsel appearing for some of the Petitioners, contended that in the
absence of any provision like Section 35A of the Tamil Nadu Dr. M.G.R. Medical University Act, 1987 is the Acts governing the other
Universities and as the provisions of the Acts governing the other Universities stand at present, the University is the competent Authority for
prescribing qualifications or eligibility criteria for admission into any course for awarding degrees or diploma in their areas and consequently the
orders of the Government or the stipulation made by the Anna University on the basis of the Government orders, which only conducts the entrance
examination restricting the taking into account of the improvement marks to the first improvement performance alone, is bad in law. Reliance in this
regard has been placed upon the ratio of the decision of the Division Bench of this Court reported in 1993 W.L.R. 189 (supra). It is also stated
that in the absence of a statutory provisions the Government cannot assume supremacy over the University without, for that matter at any rate,
issuing any directions to the Universities as contemplated in the respective University Acts and the procedure adopted, therefore, is arbitrary, and
unreasonable. It is also the contention of the learned senior counsel that eligibility for admission or ''consideration for selection'' are differences
assumed without distinction and, therefore, the Government cannot justify the stipulation as within its competency. In other words, the submission is
that the stipulation under challenge also partakes the nature of eligibility criteria only. Finally, it was contended that so long the Government through
one of its departments, conduct examination permitting students to take improvement examinations, more than once in respect of a course and
make the students participate in them by spending their time and energy, it is not open to the Government to go behind the marks secured in such
examinations and confine consideration to the marks obtained in the First Improvement performance alone in the matter of selection for admissions,
to professional courses in the State. Reliance is placed on the principle of promissory estoppel in this regard.
Mr. R. Gandhi, learned senior Counsel appearing for some of the Petitioners vehemently contended invoking the principle of ''legitimate
expectation'' that the privilege of improving one''s performance and taking into account the same while considering the selection of candidates for
admission to professional courses, once given, cannot be taken away without prior notice to those who will be affected. The learned Senior
Counsel further contended that the Government which by their previous conduct allowed the students to spend their time and energy in undertaking
improvement examinations as per the scheme governing therefor, cannot suddenly go back and deny the benefits arising out of such improvement
examinations permitted to be taken and doing so even without sufficient opportunity to represent by those affected would be unreasonable and
arbitrary. Reliance was placed upon the decisions reported in Munindra Kumar and others Vs. Rajiv Govil and others, and Navjyoti Coo-Group
Housing Society etc. Vs. Union of India and Others, in support of his claim.
Mr. C. Selvarai, Learned Counsel appearing for some of the Petitioners, contended that there cannot be any dichotomy between entitlement for
admission and eligibility for selection and the issue relating to the taking into account of the improvement marks has to be treated as pertaining to
the field of eligibility and merely to the arena of selection. Clause 10 of the Statutes of the Anna University as incorporated in Schedule II to the
Anna University Act, 1978, was relied upon to contend that the academic council alone had the power to make regulations regarding the
admission of students to the University and the number of students to be admitted and not the Government. Mr. R. Muthukumaraswamy, Learned
Counsel appearing for some of the Petitioners, while adopting the line of submission of the two learned Senior Counsel, contended that the
Petitioners are entitled to relief on the basis of the principle of ''legitimate expectation'' and relied upon the decisions reported in Indian Aluminium
Company Limited and another Vs. Karnataka Electricity Board and others, and Navjyoti Coo-Group Housing Society etc. Vs. Union of India and
Others, . According to the Learned Counsel, the established practice of taking into account the performance in more than one improvement
examination will, by itself amount to an implied representations giving room for a reasonable expectation. It is also further contended that ''one
improvement'' or first improvement has to be computed with reference to the attempt in the subject concerned and not otherwise. In substance, the
plea of the Learned Counsel is that if in one attempt one subject alone is undertaken for improvement, such attempt should be considered to be
one or first improvement for that subject and that the candidate cannot be considered to have made second attempt or performance while
undertaking improvement examination for the first time in the other subject which he has not undertaken in the first appearance The Learned
Counsel appearing for the other writ Petitioners adopted the arguments of the Learned Counsel referred to above.
Mr. P. Shanmugham, learned Special Government Pleader for Education, while traversing the various contentions raised on behalf of the
Petitioners, submitted that the State Government was well within its rights in laying down the norms and criteria for selection of candidates for
admission from out of the candidates possessing the required eligibility criteria in the qualifying examination. This, the learned Special Government
Pleader contended, was also essential having regard to the limited number of seats available as against the large umber of candidates satisfying the
eligibility criteria and that such a power has been conserved in the State Government by this Court as well as the Supreme Court of India on more
than one occasion and consequently there are no merits in the contentions to the contrary. It was also contended for the Respondents that the
question of taking into account the improvement marks obtained as one of the consideration or confining such consideration to one or more than
one of such improvement performance is a matter of policy purely within the discretion of the authority empowered to select the candidates and
there are no rights vested in the candidates to either have such improvement performance to be taken into account or make a claim for more than
one of such performance being taken into account. As a matter of principle, there can be no comparison of the performance of the candidates who
clear all subjects at one examination creditably with those who clear subjects by installments or improve their performance in one or more attempts
either for passing the examination or for improving their performance. The very taking into account of the marks obtained in the first improvement
performance is itself, therefore, a concession shown to such category of candidates and there is therefore no right in such candidate to insist that
the same privilege should be extended to those who improve. So far as the claim made on the basis of the principle of legitimate expectation is
concerned, it was contended for the Respondents that there is no room or scope for applying the said principle in favour of the Petitioners and that
de hors any legal or other valid basis for such an expectation, Courts cannot countenance claims and grant relief in respect of any and every one of
the so called expectation. With reference to the claim that ''one attempt'' or ''first improvement performance'' has to be viewed subject wise and
not attempt-wise, it has been contended for the Respondents that a similar claim has already been repelled by this Court in earlier cases and
accepting such a claim would amount to conferring undue premium on students, which is unintended by the very scheme itself. Reliance was also
placed in support of the stand taken for the Respondents upon the decisions in W.P. Nos. 10016 of 1993, dated 26-7-1993, 10802 and 15171
of 1992, dated 12.11.1992, W.P. No. 17638 of 1992, dated 12-11-1992,
Food Corporation of India Vs. M/s. Kamdhenu Cattle Feed Industries, ;
Government of Andhra Pradesh and others Vs. HEH the Nizam VIII of Hyderabad, ;
A.J. Yoy v. Government of Tamil Nadu and two Ors. 1992 2 LW 18;
Karthik Kumar v. The Anna University rep. by its Vice-Chancellor 100 L.W. 1001 (D.B.);
State of Andhra Pradesh and Another Vs. Lavu Narendranath and Others etc., ;
State of Madhya Pradesh and Another Vs. Kumari Nivedita Jain and Others, ;
Dr. Ambesh Kumar Vs. Principal, L.L.R.M. Medical College, Meerut and Others, and State of Tamil Nadu rep. by its Secretary to Govt., Health
and Family Welfare Department, Madras-9 v. Thinumuruga Kirupanantha Variyar Thavathiru Sundara Swamigal Medical Educational and
Charitable Trust, Salem rep. by its Chairman and 1387 of 1991, dated 30-4-1993).
The sheet anchor of challenge for the Petitioners on the ground of want of authority in the Government is the decision of the Division Bench
reported in 1993 W.L.R. 189 (supra). In the said decision G.O. Ms. No. 811, Health and Family Welfare, dated 3-6-1991 which stipulated that
improvement marks obtained in the first appearance only in the qualifying examination will be considered for selection was considered to have the
tendency of entering into the field occupied by Section 35 read with Sections 43 and 44 of the Tamil Nadu Dr. M.G.R. Medical University Act,
1987 and therefore beyond the executive power of the State Government. Deriving inspiration from the same reliance is placed before us on the
provisions contained in Section 36 of the Madras University Act, Section 35 of the Madurai-Kamaraj University Act and Section 6 and Clause 10
of Schedule II to the Anna University Act and Bharathidasan University Act to contend that those provisions are similar only to Section 35 of the
Medical University Act which was the subject matter of consideration in the decision of the Division Bench. While highlighting the fact that there is
no provision in the above enactments on par with Section 35A of the Medical University Act, the Learned Counsel sought to drive home the
challenge made on the ground that the Government could not restrict the consideration to the improvement marks obtained in the first appearance
only. Per contra, it is contended for the Government that the prescription by the Government has nothing to do with the alteration of eligibility
criteria for purposes of admission of students to a course of study or training in a college or university or an approved institution of the University
but really concerned with the selection of the students who are so qualified for being admitted against the limited number of seats available in the
professional courses on the basis of assessment of their merit and this dichotomy which was well recognised by this Court and the Supreme Court
for long was not at all under the consideration in the decision of the Division Bench and therefore the said decision cannot come to the rescue of
the Petitioners. In the decision in State of Andhra Pradesh and Another Vs. Lavu Narendranath and Others etc., , the question as to whether the
Government can prescribe a test for admission into professional courses came up for consideration and it was held as follows:
The Government which runs the colleges has the right to make a selection out of a large number of candidates and for this purpose they can
prescribe a test of their own which is not against any law. The University Act merely prescribes a minimum qualification for entry into the higher
courses of study. The provisions of Law do not make incumbent upon the Government to make their selection in accordance with the marks
obtained by the applicant candidates at the qualifying examination. Merely because the Government tried to supplement the eligibility rule by a
written test in subject with which the candidates were already familiar, their action cannot be impeached. The test prescribed by the Government
must be considered in the light of a second hurdle for the purpose of a screening to find out who, of all the candidates applying, should be admited
and who should be rejected. Merely because the University has made regulations regarding the admission of students to its degree courses it does
not mean that any one who had passed the qualifying examination is to be entitled to admissions to such courses of study.
In D.N. Chanchala Ors. Vs. The State of Mysore and Others, while dealding with a challenge to the Mysore Medical colleges (Selection for
Admission) Rules, 1970, the Supreme Court held as follows:
We propose to deal with these submissions in the order in which they were placed before us by counsel. As seen earlier, there are two sets of
provisions dealing with the teaching of medical courses. The first consists of Ordinances of the Universities and the second consists of the rules
framed by the Government for selection of candidates for admission to the pre-professional/B. Sc. part I leading to M.B.B.S degree. The
Ordinances framed by the three Universities are made under the different Universities Acts setting up those Universities and under the powers
reserved to them under them. These Ordinances are made for the purposes set out in those Acts and for carrying out those purposes. I One of
such purposes would be the maintenance of certain academic standards in the various faculties taught in the colleges affiliated to the Universities.
For the purposes of maintaining such standards the Universities lay down certain minimum qualification for eligibility for entrance in those facilities.
These Ordinances and Regulations made under the Acts lay down the minimum qualifications required for eligibility and are not to be confused with
rules of admission. A candidate may have the minimum qualification so as to make him eligible for entrance in a particular faculty. That does not
mean that his being eligible necessarily makes him entitled to admission in that faculty for admission can only be commensurate with the number of
available seats in such a faculty.
The medical colleges in question are not University colleges but have been set up and are being maintained by the State Government from out of
public funds. Since they are affiliated to one or the other of the three Universities, the Government cannot frame Rules or act inconsistantly with the
Ordinances or the Regulations of the Universities laying down standards of eligibility, It is nobody''s case that the Government has made rules
which are in any way inconsistant with the Rules for eligibilitv laid down in such ordinances and regulations.
(Emphasis supplied (sic))
In R. Chitralekha and Another Vs. State of Mysore and Others, , the Supreme Court has held that so long as the order of the Government lays
down a relevant objective criteria and entrusts the business of selection to qualified persons, the Courts cannot obviously have any say in the
matter. In Dr. Ambesh Kumar Vs. Principal, L.L.R.M. Medical College, Meerut and Others, while considering the Regulations made by Indian
Medical Council and the eligibility qualification laid down by the Supreme Court therein, for consideration to admission to post graduate courses in
medical colleges, the Supreme Court has held that the order of the State Government merely provides an additional eligibility qualification and that
it does not mean that it encroached upon power of Central Legislature or Central Government to make orders in regard to matters provided in
Entry 66 of List I of Schedule 7. While adverting to the above decision, though in considering the legality of the Government stipulating a 50% cut
off marks for admission to Post Graduate courses in medicine the same view was reaffirmed in State of Uttar Pradesh and others Vs. Dr. Anupam
Gupta, etc., and Justice K. Ramaswamy of the Supreme Court speaking for the Division Bench held as follows:
In Dr. Ambesh Kumar v. Principal LLRM Medical College, Meerut, this Court upheld the Government''s power Under Article 162 and held that
where the number of seats for admission to various post- graduate courses both degree and diploma, are limited and large number of candidates
undoubtedly apply for admission to those courses of study, an order laying down qualifications for candidates to be eligible for being considered
for selection for admission to the said courses on the basis of merit specified by the regulation cannot be said to be in conflict with the regulation of
All India Medical Council Act. It does not encroach upon the standard prescribed by the Statutory Regulations. Laying down further qualifications
of eligibility, promotes and furthers the standard in the institutions.
After consideration of the law declared in the above catena of cases of the Supreme Court, we have upheld the power of the Government to
prescribe a scheme containing norms, guidelines and criteria providing for selection of students for admission for a large pol of eligible candidates
(vide: W.P. Nos. 10016 etc. of 1993 dt. 26-7-1993 in Voice (Consumer Care) Council rep. by its Trustee M.T. Nathan, Madras-24 v. State of
Tamil Nadu). In yet another decision of ours dated 30-7-1993 in W.P. No. 11055 of 1993 dated 30-7-1993 (B.P. Admapriya and 14 Ors. v.
State of Tamil Nadu and Ors.), we had an occasion to construe the scope of Section 35 of the Medical University Act and express our view as
hereunder:
The next contention that remains to be conceded is that in the absence of a specific order u/s 35A of the Act, a mere administrative order passed
by the State Government cannot have a binding force and provide sufficient basis or authority for the Anna University to lay down different norms
in the prospectus. Attractive though this plea may look like, we are of the view that there is absolutely no merit in the same. Section 35 of the
Medical University merely mandates that no person shall be admitted to a course of study or tranining in a college or University or laboratory or an
approved institution and to appear for any examination held by the University for conferring any degree, diploma or other distinction, unless he had
passed the qualifying examination prescribed therefor by the University and fulfils such other conditions as may be prescribed by the regulations.
The above provision has no concern with the actual selection to the limited number of seats available for admission from out of the eligible
candidates.
Having regard to the mandate of Article 141 of the Constitution of India, we are obliged to follow and apply the ratio of the decision of the
Supreme Court in preference to any decisions of any other Court. Thus viewed and considered, we are of the view that there is no inconsistancy
or super-imposition of the State Government Orders relating to selection upon any provisions of the Tamil Nadu Dr. M.G.R. Medical University
Act, 1989 or encroachment upon the field already said to be occupied by the various provisions of the Act relating to the several Universities,
referred to supra. The order of the Government really concern and touch upon a subject and matter which is not really covered or governed by the
provisions already found in the Acts of the Universities referred to above and they operate on different areas and fields and do not come into
conflict with each other. The claim that the question of taking into account one or more of the improvement performances in the matter of selection
also form part of the eligibility criteria has no substance. The provision for taking improvement examination in the Higher Secondary or other
courses is not the concern of the University and it was only a concession accorded by the Government and therefore the Government is entitled to
stipulate that for selection of candidates for admission, merit-wise, one attempt or first appearance will alone be taken into account or that no
attempt will be taken into account. In substance, the impugned orders are only supplementary in the matter of assessment of the real worth or merit
of the candidates concerned and clamouring for selection for admission as against the limited number of seats available in the various professional
colleges in the State.
The claim that the restriction is unreasonable or arbitrary or discriminatory has not/only been rejected by S. Ramalingam, J., but the Division
Bench also specifically referred to and approved the conclusions of the learned single Judge on the other grounds of challenge. When indisputably
the selection for admission to the professional colleges in the State have to be merit oriented, it is open to the State Government to restrict the
choice of such selection among candidates who have passed the qualifying examination in eligibility courses at the first attempt and in one
examination or such of those who have improved their performance in the first appearance of the permissible attempts of improvement
examination. As a matter of principle, it will be axiomatic that the performance of candidates who clear the subjects by instalments or improve their
position by subsequent attempts cannot be equated or compared with the performance of the candidates who clear all the subjects at one
examination. The decision to take into account at least the first performance by way of improvement itself is a matter of concession and pertains to
the policy of the Government and cannot be claimed as a matter of right. It is all the more so when such claim is in respect of second performance
by way of improvement and the candidates have no legally protected rights for any such claim. Being a concession by itself, it is for the
Government alone to consider the terms and conditions subject to which it will ensure in favour of a candidate. We have taken a similar view in
W.P. Nos. 10802 and 15171 of 1992 dated 12-11-1992. The stipulation is a consideration very much relevant and germane in assessing the
relative merits of the contesting candidates and therefore, cannot be said to be either an irrelevant or extreqneous consideration. Consequently we
see no merit in the challenge to the stipulation in question, on the other ground as well.
One of the Learned Counsel raised a plea that the first appearance for improvement examination has to be computed with reference to the
appearance or attempt in the subject concerned meaning thereby that if a candidate has attempted one or more subjects in one examination and the
other or balance of subjects in other examinations, each one of such appearance, would constitute first appearance in that particular subjects or
papers which alone have been undertaken in each one of such examination. We are afraid we cannot countenance any such plea. As a matter of
fact, when a similar plea has been raised by some of the unsuccessful candidates during the last academic year and in W.P. No. 17638 of 1992
dated 12-11-1992 (S. Prabhakaran v. The State of Tamil Nadu and Ors.), we he rejected such a plea. Even that apart in the Instructions to the
Candidates applying for B.E. Course Admissions for 1993, (in Clause 2, 3 Note 2) it has been stated as here-under:
Numbers of appearances permitted for passing the qualifying Examination and the maximum number of improvement appearances permitted are
shown in the Table below:
CommunityMaximum number of Maximum
AppearancespermittedNo. Total
Appearances
Allowed
For Improvement
passing
SC/ST 3 1 4
Others 2 1 3
Note: The first improvement marks alone will be taken into account.
In the light of the said stipulation, subject to which the Petitioners concerned applied and undertook the entrance examination, it is not permissible
for them to turn around and claim a different benefit in derogation of the express stipulations contained to the contra. We may also notice at this
stage that the Petitioners have not shown the said stipulation to be violative of any provisions of law and no such plea has also been raised. As a
matter of fact, the impugned Clause in the instructions to candidates issued by the Anna University Viz., 2.2(IV) is to the same effect as that of the
notification issued by the Government department of Technical Education. Further, if the claim of the Petitioners as above is countenanced, it will
amount to not only defeating the very object and purpose of such a restriction but would encourage less meritorious students gaining admission
over those of proven merit. It would also amount to an illogical reading of the Clause otherwise designed with a laudable object resulting in absurd
results. Consequently, we cannot accept the claim made on behalf of some of the Petitioners in this respect as well as in respect of the manner in
which the first appearance of the improvement has to be determined. The construction to be placed should accord with the stipulation contained in
the impugned Clause itself and not otherwise, as claimed for the Petitioners.
We are unable to accept the plea taken by Mr. R. Gandhi learned Senior Counsel that the stipulation in Clause 2, 3 (Note 2) in the
Notification by the Department of Technical Education and the application form prescribed therefor under column No. 10(c) have the effect of
supporting the claim made on behalf of the Petitioners. As rightly pointed out for the Respondents the information about the first and second
improvement appearances have been sought for only to ensure that the candidate docs not even unwittingly furnish the second improvement mark
as first improvement mark on an understanding of his own of the clauses in the Instructions and that no error in this regard creep into the actual
consideration for selection. The relevant Clauses referred to supra make it clear without allowing any room for any doubt whatsoever that the
marks obtained in the first improvement examination (the same being calculated as explained in the very Clause) alone would be taken up for
consideration in the matter of selection of candidates for admission.
The doctrine of legitimate expectation which was pressed into aid by the Learned Counsel appearing for the Petitioners remains next to be
considered. According to the Learned Counsel, the established practice till last year in permitting the taking into consideration the second
improvement marks will amount to an implied representation giving rise to a reasonable expectation and that the privilege once given cannot be
taken away without notice to the persons who will be affected thereby. It was also contended that the State Government encourage the students to
undertake a second improvement examination and thereafter, it is not open to the State represented by another department to deny the benefits of
such an examination undertaken after spending considerable time and energy. In support thereof, the decisions reported in Navjyoti Coo-Group
Housing Society etc. Vs. Union of India and Others, and Food Corporation of India Vs. M/s. Kamdhenu Cattle Feed Industries, were relied
upon. The decision in Navjothi Co-operative Group Housing Society''s Case (Supra which considered the principle of ''legitimate expectation''
was a case where the Court was concerned with the allotment of land to Group Housing Societies by the Delhi Development Authority on the
principle of ''first come first served'' appearing in Rule 6 (vi) of the Delhi Development Authority (Disposal of Development Nazul Land) Rules,
1981. The criteria as per the Rule was allotment of land to Group Housing Societies on the basis of seniority in registration and not on the basis of
the date of approval of the final list of members of the society as indicated in the subsequent memorandum dated 20-1-1990. Since the principle
prior to the said date guiding the allotment had always been the date of registration, the Court was pleased to countenance the claim on the basis of
legitimate expectation. It was also in that context, the Court thought fit to opine the need for giving a reasonable opportunity to make
representations by the parties who already submitted their applications and whose applications were pending and who may be affected by the
change to come in the consistent past policy. The cases on hand can have no comparison with such a situation. The relevant policy relating to the
admissions during a particular year has always been laid down every year and there is hardly any scope for any one claiming to be reasonably or
legally affected by the Scheme notified every year in respect of admissions for that year only. In the decision reported in Food Corporation of India
Vs. M/s. Kamdhenu Cattle Feed Industries, the Court while considering the principle of ''legitimate expectation'' has observed as hereunder:
The mere reasonable or legitimate expectation of a citizen, in such a situation, may not by itself be a distinct enforceable right, but failure to
consider and give due weight to it may render the decision arbitrary, and this is how the requirement of due consideration of a legitimate
expectation forms part of the principle of non arbitrariness, a necessary concomitant of the rule of law. Every legitimate expectation is a relevant
factor requiring due consideration in a fair decision-making process. Whether the expectation of the claimant is reasonable or legitimate in the
context is a question of fact in each case. Whenever the question arises, it is to be determined not according to the claimant''s perception but in
larger public interest wherein other more important considerations may outweigh that would otherwise have been the legitimate expectation of the
claimant. A bona fide decision of the public authority reached in this manner would satisfy the requirement of non arbitrariness and withstand
judicial scrutiny. The doctrine of legitimate expectation gets assimilated in the rule of law and operates in our legal system in this manner and to this
extent.
In the decision of the Supreme Court in Union of India and others Vs. Hindustan Development Corpn. and others, K. Jayachandra Reddy
who spoke for the Court in an instructive and most illuminating judgment on the doctrine of ''legitimate expectation'' has meticulously dealt with the
origin of the doctrine, its development at stages as well as the inevetable limitations inherent in the concept itself, after reviewing the entire case law
on the subject. The learned Judge while concluding held as hereunder:
Legitimate expectations may come in various forms and owe their existence to different kind of circumstances and it is not possible to give an
exhaustive list in the context of vast and fast expansion of the governmental activities. They shift and change so fast that the start of our list would
be obsolete before we reached the middle. By and large they arise in cases of promotions which are in normal course expected, though not
guaranteed by way of a statutory right in cases of contracts, distribution of largess by the Government and in somewhat similar situations. For
instance discretionary grant of licences, permits or the like carry with it a reasonable expectation, though not a legal right to renewal or non-
revocation, but to summarily disappoint that expectation may be seen as unfair without the expectant person being heard. But there again the Court
has to see whether it was done as a policy or in the public interest either by way of G.O. rule or by way of a legislation. If that be so, a decision
denying a legitimate expectation based on such grounds does not qualify for interference unless he is a given case, the decision or action taken
amounts to an abuse of power. Therefore, the limitation is extremely confined and if the according of natural justice does not condition the exercise
of the power, the concept of legitimate expectation can have no role to play and the Court must not usurp the discretion of the public authority
which is empowered to take the decisions under law and the Court is expected to apply an objective standard which leaves to the deciding
authority the full range of choice which the Legislature is presumed to have intended. Even in a case where the decision is left entirely to the
discretion of the deciding authority without any such legal bounds and if the decision is taken fairly and objectively, the Court will not interfere on
the ground of procedural fairness to a person whose interest based on legitimate expectation might be affected. For instance, if an authority who
has full discretion to grant a licence prefers an existing licence holder to a new applicant, the decision cannot be interfered with on the ground of
legitimate expectation entertained by the new applicant applying the principles of natural justice. It can therefore be seen that legitimate expectation
can at the most be one of the grounds which may give rise to judicial review but the granting of relief is very much limited. It would thus appear that
there are stronger reasons as to why the legitimate expectation should not be substantively protected than the reasons as to why it should be
protected. In other words, such a legal obligation exists whenever the case supporting the same in terms of legal principles of different sorts is
stronger than the case against it. As observed in Attorney General for New South Wales case, to strike down the exercise of administrative power
solely on the ground of avoiding the disappointment of the legitimate expectations of an individual would be set the courts adrift on a featureless sea
of pragmatism More-over, the notion of a legitimate expectation (falling short of a legal right) is too nebulous to form a basis for invalidating the
exercise of a power when its exercise otherwise accords with law."" If a denial of legitimate expectation in a given case amounts to denial of right
guaranteed or is arbitrary, discriminatory, unfair or biased, gross abuse of power or violation of principles of natural justice, the same can be
questioned on the well-known grounds attracting Article 14 but a claim based on mere legitimate expectation without anything more cannot ipso
facto give a right to invoke these principles. It can be one of the grounds to consider but the Court must lift the veil and see whether the decision is
violative of these principles warranting interference. It depends very much on the facts and the recognised general principles of administrative law
applicable to such facts and the concept of legitimate expectation which is the latest recruit to a long list of concepts fashioned by the Courts for the
review of administrative action, must be restricted to the general legal limitations applicable and binding the manner of the future exercise of
administrative power in a particular case. It follows that the concept of legitimate expectation is ""not the key which unlocks the treasury of natural
justice and it ought not to unlock the gates which shuts the court out of review on the merits"", particularly when the element of speculation and
uncertainty is inherent in that very concept. As cautioned in Attorney General for New South Wales case the courts should restrain themselves and
restrict such claims duly to the legal limitations. It is a well-meant caution. Otherwise, a resourceful litigant having vested interests in contract,
licences etc. can successfully indulge in getting welfare activities mandated by directive principles thwarted to further his own interests. The caution,
particularly in the changing scenario, becomes all the more important.
So far as the cases on hand are concerned, the order of the Government in G.O. Ms. No. 1457, Education, dated 7.10.1989 provided for the
candidates who have passed the Higher Secondary Examinations being allowed to improve their performance in subjects in which they have
already passed subject to certain terms and conditions of which one being that candidates can apply and appear for improving their performance in
one or more subjects within the group already offered two times only. This is part of the scheme of the Government made for the award of the
Higher Secondary Course Certificates which was introduced in the academic year 1978-79. The need for such a provision was felt with the
Central Board of Secondary Education and other Boards of Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka and Kerala allowing the candidates to appear for
improving their marks in Higher Secondary Examinations. There can be no controversy over the fact that this has relevance only to the School
Education and the students completing their School Education for obtaining a certificate or improving their performance at that stage.
We are now concerned in the cases before us, the question of selection of candidates among those eligible candidates for admission to the
various professional courses in the State in view of the limited number of seats available, strictly on the basis of merit. It is not also in controversy
and at the expense of repetition, it could be reiterated that for each year, the Government approves a scheme for selection before inviting
applications for selection of candidates for admission during that particular academic year. When that be the position, to claim any right or for any
relief on the basis of a so called ''legitimate expectation'' in the next following year to say the least, is a far-fetched move which is neither
permissible in law nor based on any legally acceptable grounds. The prefix ''legitimate'' itself is sufficient to indicate the nature of expectation and
the expectation which merits consideration by Courts will take its colour and also would be conditioned upon the prefix ''legitimate''. Consequently,
it is hot that every expectation that would enure to the benefit of a claimant before Court to base a claim for relief. Instead, it should be a legitimate
expectation in that an expectation conserved or preserved and protected in law. Judged by the above standards and norms, the claim on behalf of
the Petitioners will not stand even a cursory scrutiny of the Courts to be countenance fair conferring any rights. As already held by us in the earlier
part of this Order, there can be no comparison of a student who has completed his Higher Secondary Course in instalments or improved his
position by availing an improvement scheme with that of a student who has cleared all the subjects at one examination creditably and meritoriously.
The very provision for taking into account the improvement performance also in assessing the merit of the candidates itself is a concession shown
and if the State, in its wisdom, and -as a matter of policy imposes certain restrictions and conditions like the one confining such consideration of
improvement marks to those obtained in the first performance only, it is only for this Court to embark upon an enquiry on the desirability or
otherwise of the condition particularly when such condition has relevance in securing the selection of most meritorious candidates for being
admitted to the limited number of seats available in the professional colleges in the State. Having regard to the fact that the practice throughout has
been for the Government to decide every year the scheme end as well as the norms for admission of candidates during that particular academic
year, we are unable to persuade ourselves to accept the claim that there was any representation made by the department of the Government
amounting to a representation for any future year so as to provide a reasonable or even a remote possibility of a claim of legitimate expectation in
the students clamouring for admission for the academic year 1993-94. The claim based on the doctrine of legitimate expectation'' does not, on the
facts of these cases, merit acceptance in our hands and therefore shall stand rejected.
For all the reasons stated above, we do not see any merit in any of the contentions urged on behalf of the Petitioners. The writ petitions,
therefore, fail and shall stand dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.