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Judgment
Satyanarayana Raju, J.—This is an appeal against the judgment of our learned brother, Umamaheswaram J., dismissing a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, for the issue of a writ of Certiorari to quash the order of the Government of Andhra, in G. O. Nt. No. 131, Public Works and Transport Department, dated 14-2-1955.
The Appellant is a transport operator. There was a vacancy consequent on the cancellation of the permit of a bus on the route Kunavaram to Dumme-Sudem in the Agency area of die East Godavari District. The Secretary of the Regional Transport Authority, East Godavari, called for applications. The Appellant was one of the mine applicants for the grant of a permit on the said route.
The Regional Transport Authority of East Godavari selected the Appellant in preference \\ f f to the other applicants. The reasons for his selection are stated in the proceedings of the meeting of the Regional Transport Authority, East Godavari, held on 26-5-1954, thus: "... No. 3 is actually on the route on a temporary permit operating efficiently without any complaint. He is a fleet owner with a workshop at Rajahmundry with 2 idle buses. This is an agency route reuniting an operator with a spare or idle bus to keep the service uninterrupted. Therefore he is preferred to the rest and is given a permit. No. 2 (Respondent) who is the only agency operator has no spare bus and has no workshop facilities. Therefore his cast is rejected along with the remaining applicants,"
Against this order of the Regional Transport Authority, three of the applicants for the grant of a permit on the route in question, .including the Respondent, preferred appeals to. the Central head Traffic Board, Andhra, at Guntur. The Central Road Traffic Board by its proceedings dated 27-10-1954 set aside the order of the Regional Transport Authority granting the permit to tho Appellant and directed the permit to be given to. the Respondent The reasons given by the Board for its order are as follows:
There are three applicants in this case. A-l and A-2 reside in places away from the route in question and normally a person residing in the Agency area and operating other services there could have'' been preferred. A-3 is such a person residing at Bhadrachalam and is an existing operator covering a sector of 17 miles on the route in question whereas Respondent resides at Rajahmundry. A-3''s reevrd is also clean. He has only 2 permits. The Respondent is residing at Rajahmundry and he is not any where near the route in question. In tire circui8*V stances it would appear that A-3 has the best claimant among all for the grant of the permit and further grant of this permit would enable him to build an economic fleet.
Against the order of the Central Traffic Board, the Appellant preferred a revision the Government u/s 64-A, Motor Vehicle A In G. O. Rt. No. 131 dated 14-2-1955, the Government rejected the revision petition filed by the Appellant. The material portion of the order of the Government in question runs thus:
The Government have examined the cane'' with reference to the revision petition cited the wew presentation of the Respondent, the connected w>L cords and the history sheets of the operators. Sri X Ljjj Ramayya states that the Central Road Traffic failed to recognise his claims for the permit were duly taken into account by the Regional Transport Authority. He contends that for operating route in an agency tract which is fit for traffic for months in a year, a fleet owner like him with sp buses is better suited, than Sri K. Kondala Rao we has neither a spare bus nor a workshop. He haj urged that he had operated on the route already a temporary permit efficiently and therefore ho be preferred.
Mere running a vehicle on the route on a tempo-permit does not by itself constitute a sufficient Jcation for the grant of a pucca permit. The Petitioner is living at Rajahmundry far away from route and the fact that he has a workshop and ire buses at Rajahmundry does not make for eili-incy of operation on this route which is in the jency area. Further he is already an operator of it of five buses.
The reasons which weighed wilii (lie Central ad Traffic Board in preferring Sri Kondala Rao ie, that he is an operator covering a sector of 17 lies of the route in question with his residence at ladrachalam which is on the route ami has clean lord and that as he was having only two permits, ie grant of a third permit to him would go towards aiding up an economic fleet.
The Government therefore consider that the resident was preferred to the Petitioner by the Ccn-Road Traffic Board for good and sufficient and that there is no case for interference with orders of the Central Road Traffic Board in grant-permit to the Respondent. The revision petition therefore rejected.
It is this order of the Government that was subject-matter of the Writ Petn. No. 76 of 1955 pidhra) (A), which was dismissed by Umamaheam J., on 23-8-1955. The learned Judge held it the authorities considered the rival claims of the Appellant and the Respondent and came to the con-lion that in the interests of the public it was ad-ible to grant the permit to the Respondent and t there is no error on the face of the record which rants an interference under Article 226 of the Constitution
Before dealing with the contentions of the ed counsel for the Appellant, it will be useful notice the decided cases which have considered scope of the powers of the Government under [64-A, Motor Vehicles Act and the powers of the Court under Article 226 of the Constitution.
Section 64-A, Motor Vehicles Act reads thus:
The Provincial Government may, of its own ton or on application made to it, call for the roof any order passed or proceedings taken under Chapter by any authority or officer subordinate for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the ty, regularity or propriety of such order or prong and after examining such records, may pass order in reference thereto as it thinks fit.
In the Post-Constitution era, applications Article 226 of the Constitution with regard to the it of transport permits have frequently come up before the High Courts and the Supreme Court. of us (My Lord, the Chief Justice), as a Judge ie Madras High Court considered the scope of [$4-A, Motor Vehicles Act and the limits of inter-ice of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution with the orders of the Government under said section in innumerable writs and evolved in principles.
In - ''Thiruvengadam v. State of Madras'', il 2 Mad LJ 31 (Al), he considered the scope he words "legality, regularity or propriety", in Section 64-A of the Act and held as follows: The word ''legality'' is a well-known term which require elucidation. Orders of Subordinate Tribunals contravening express provisions of law, their legal conclusions on proved facts, their constructions of documents which are the foundations of claims, their findings based upon no evidence or irrelevant evidence and similar other errors of law can be rectified by the superior tribunal under that head.
The meaning to be attached to the word ''regularity'' is also free from any doubt. It deals with the procedure prescribed. II: a Tribunal''s finding is vitiated by any irregular procedure, it is liable, to be set aside by the authority exercising revisional jurisdiction. But (lie word ''propriety'' is not susceptible of exact definition. It is something which is neither illegal nor irrelegular.
An order contravening the principles of natural justice is vitiated by impropriety. An order of an inferior Tribunal may be set aside on the ground of impropriety if it contravenes the principles of natural justice, or is otherwise inequitable or manifestly unjust...... The Government in exercising revisional jurisdiction must act judicially and cannot take ex-traneoxis circumstances into consideration.
In - ''Maruthanayagam v. The State of Madras 1951 2 Mad LJ 36 (B) he observed as follows:
Where the order of the Government setting aside the order of the Central Road Traffic Board on the ground that it was not proper and that there was little justification for the Central Road Traffic Board to interfere with the discretion of the Regional Road Transport Authority, such order ''ex facie'' does not disclose the reasons that operated on the mind of the Government in setting aside the order of tiro inferior Tribunal", and that the High Court can interfere under Article 226.
In -- V. Natesa Pillai Vs. Central Road Traffic Board and Another, (C) he held that the Regional Transport Authority, in the exercise of its original jurisdiction and the Central Road Traffic Board and the Government in discharge of their appellate and revisional jurisdictions are bound to act judicially.
In - A. Vedachala Mudaliar Vs. The State of Madras and Another, (D) he held that the order of a tribunal exercising judicial functions should ''ex facie'' show reasons in a succinct form for setting aside the orders of the subordinate tribunals, and that to say that an order is illegal or improper or irregular is a mechanical repetition of the words in S. 64-A, Motor Vehicles Act and is not a judicial disposal of the Revision Petition.
In - ''Thathathiri Mudaliar v. State of Madras 1952 1 Mad LJ (SN) 17 (E) he held that the Government has no power u/s 64-A, Motor Vehicles Act to set aside an order without calling for the records and examining them.
A Division Bench of the Madras High Court consisting of Rajamannar C. J., and Venkatarama Aiyar J., affirmed these principles in - C.S.S. Motor Service, Tenkasi and Others Vs. The State of Madras and Another, (F). They held that the grant or refusal of permits by the transport authorities in all its stages including S. 64-A is a judicial Act. After an exhaustive review of the authorities, the learned Judges summed up their conclusions at page 914 (of Mad rf) (at p. 294 of AIR) as follows:
The citizens have a right to ply motor vehicles on public pathways and that is a business which is protected by Article 19(g). 2. Any infringement of that right can be justified only if it falls within the scope of Article 19(6). 3. Sections 42, 43-A, Section 47(1), els. (a), (b), (d) and (f), Section 48(a) and (b) and Section 64-A, Motor Vehicles Act are valid. Section 47(l)(e) is in part valid and Section 47(l)(e) is wholly void. 4. The grant or refusal of permits by the transport authorities in all its stages including Section 64-A is a judicial act. 5. The Provincial Government should frame rules laying down the principles on which the selection from among the applicants is to be made and such rules must be, as required by Article 19(6), reasonable and in the interests of the public. 6. The rules so laid down should be followed by all transport authorities including the Government acting u/s 64-A without any discrimination. 7. The decisions of the transport authorities granting or refusing to grant permits are liable to be reviewed by the Courts and set aside if they are unreasonable, arbitrary or discriminatory.
In - Veerappa Pillai Vs. Raman and Raman Ltd. and Others, (G), their Lordships of the Supreme Court have stated the principles relating to the powers of the Government u/s 64-A, Motor Vehicles Act and the powers of interference by the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution with the orders of the Government u/s 64-A. Their Lordships stated as follows:
Such writs as are referred to ,in Article 226 are obviously intended to enable the High Court to issue them in grave cases where the subordinate tribunals or bodies or officers act wholly without jurisdiction, or in excess of it, or in violation of the principles of natural justice, or refuse to exercise a jurisdiction Vested in them, or there is an error apparent on the face of the record, and such act, omission, error, or excess has resulted in manifest injustice.
However extensive the jurisdiction may be, it seems to us that it is not so wide or large as to enable the High Court to convert itself into a Court of appeal and examine for itself the correctness of the decisions impugned and decide what is the proper view to be taken or the order to be made.
The Motor Vehicles Act is a'' statute which creates new rights and liabilities and prescribes an elaborate procedure for their regulation. No one is entitled to a permit as of right even if he satisfies all the prescribed conditions. The grant of a permit is entirely within the discretion of the transport authorities and naturally depends on several circumstances which have to be taken into account. The Regional Transport Authority and the Provincial Transport Authority are entrusted u/s 42 with this power. They may be described as administrative bodies exercising quasi-judicial functions in the matter of the grant of permits.
Under Rule 3 of the Madras Motor Vehicles Rules, the Regional Transport Authority is called the Road Traffic Board and the Provincial Transport Authority is called the Central Road Traffic Board. These bodies or authorities are constituted by the Provincial Government. The matters which are to be .taken into account in granting or refusing a stage carriage permit are specified in Section 47. By delegation under Rule 134-A the Secretary of the Road Traffic Board may exercise certain powers as regards the grant or refusal of stage carriage permits and under R. 136'' there is an appeal to the Board from these orders.
Similar, powers of delegation are vested in the Secretary to tire Central Board and an appeal lies to the Central Board under R. 148(1). From an original order of the Road Traffic Board there is an appeal to the Central Board and from the original order of the Central Board to the Government, vide Rr. 147 and 148. An amendment introduced by the Madras Act 20 of 1948 and found as S. 64-A in the Act vests a power of revision in the Provincial Cov-eminent.
Besides this specific provision, there is a general. provision in S. 43-A that the Provincial Government jweigh with the may issue such" orders and directions of a general, refusal of a st; character as it may consider necessary to the Provied to the matterseial Transport Authority or Regional Transport B Act. They can Authority in respect of any matter relating to roaijjwhich is extran transport; and suoh transport authority shall girtilihe matters-me effect to all such orders and directions. There is |; The exercise therefore, the regular hierarchy of administrative bodies established to deal with the regulation tf. tribunals must transport by means of motor vehicles.
Thus we have before us a complete and prefixed orders, in parties affected are satisfied and u/s 64-A substitute its of pies or opinion skies scheme for regulating the issue of permits, pro-; viding what matters are to be taken into consideration as relevant, and prescribing appeals and revisions from subordinate bodies to higher authorities The remedies for the redress of grievances or the correction of errors are found in the statute itself aui it is to these remedies that resort must generally the had. As observed already, the issue or refusal of mils is solely within the discretion of the transport authorities and it is not a matter of right.
In the High Court of Andhra this question has boon recently considered by Viswanatha Sastru and Bhunasunkai-aiu, J, in - ''Kesawa Jlao v, . SuMw Raju'', Writ Appeal No. 71 of 1954 (Andhra) considering the words "legality, regularity or pi-j-priety", in S. 64-A of the Act, die learned Judge stated thus:
Legality'' and ''regularity'' are well-undcrstuod terms and well-recognised grounds of judicial ferenco on an appeal or revision. An order is illegal if it is opposed to any enactment or any rule have; the force of law. It is irregular if the poured, followed is in violation of the principles of natural justice and fair play.
The term ''propriety'' is, however, of wide in port and there might be honest differences of opinion about the ''propriety'' of an order even though it conformity with law and within the powers of lb authority making the order .... If, after due consideration, the Government has taken a decision this matter it is not for us to investigate the relate merits or soundness of one point of view as against the other.
Relying on the observations of Frank J., in - ''Railroad Commission of Texas v. Rowan Nichols Oil Co. (1940) 84 L Ed 1368 Q), Gt proceeded to state thus:
If the Government in coming to its "mclw$$6& in a revision u/s 64-A of die Act had into account facts or circumstances irrelevant far consideration of the question before it or had fluenced by extraneous considerations in reaching decision or if the order of the Government was fide or biased in any manner, it would be the of this Court to quash the order of the Govern-lent. So long as the Government exercises its power u/s 64-A ''bona fide'' and for the purpose for which the power has been conferred, we cannot sub-Acute our own notions and opinions for the policies opinions on which the Government acted and quash the order of the Government as being in ex-is of its powers.
We are in entire agreement with "the observations of the learned Judges.
The principles which have emerged from a consideration of decided cases of the Madras High Court, die Supreme Court and our- own High Court "ay be stated thus: The considerations which should weigh with the transport authorities in the grant or refusal of a stage carriage permit must be germane to the matters mentioned in S. 47, Motor Vehicles Act. They cannot take, into consideration anything which is extraneous or irrelevant or not germane to ''the matters mentioned in Section47.
The exercise of the power by the Government fniust be ''bona fide'' and unbiased. The orders of the (tribunals must ''ex facie'' disclose the reasons which leratcd on them in granting or refusing a permit.
orders must be passed after due notice to the arties affected thereby. If the aforesaid conditions satisfied and the Government exercises its power u/s 64-A ''bona fide'', the High Court will not substitute its own notions and opinions for the polices or opinions of the Government.
We will deal with the contentious of the unseal for the Appellant in the light of the foregoing well-established principles. The order of (lie [Central Road Traffic Board has been confirmed by Government. The Central Road Traffic Board appeal, and the Government on revision, have Jven the following reasons for granting the permit-favour of tile Respondent: (1) He is an operator ivering a sector of 17 miles on the route in question. (2) He is a resident of Bhadrachalam which if; on the route. (3) He has a clean record. (4) The t of a third permit would enable him to build an economic fleet.
Counsel for the Appellant contends that first and the last reasons are bad in law. He imits that in C.S.S. Motor Service, Tenkasi and Others Vs. The State of Madras and Another, (F) Rajamannar C. J., and atarama Aiyar J., held that with reference to 17(l)(c) the .factor to be considered is not when the existing operators will suffer by competition whether the extension of the service will be in ''ests of the public, and therefore Section 47(l)(c) in as it provides that the effect of the service used upon the existing service should be taken account, will not be legal. They further held Clause (c) of Section 47(1) is invalid as not being in the rests of the public but of permit-holder. Those clauses provide as follows:
47(1). A Regional Transport Authority shall, in ding whether to grant or refuse a stage carriage it, have regard to the following matters, namely.
(c) the adequacy of existing road passenger isport service between the places to be served, (d) the fares charged by those services and the effect upon those services of the service proposed;
(e) the operation by the applicant of other transport services and in particular of unremunerative services in- conjunction with remunerative services ....
He therefore contends that the reason No. (4) which gives preference to the Respondent is not based on the preferred operator rendering better .service'' to the public but that the grant of a permit would be in his interest and that therefore the said reason cannot be sustained. He relied upon a decision of Rajagopala Ayyangar J., in W. P. No. 893 of 1952 (Mad) (J) on the file of the Madras High Court in support of this contention.
Rajagopala Ayyangar J., followed the decision in C.S.S. Motor Service, Tenkasi and Others Vs. The State of Madras and Another, (F) which laid down that the preference between operators ought to be grounded on the preferred operator rendering better service to the public and not for the reason that the grant of permit would be in his interests. We do not think that the reason given in the instant c ease, namely, that the grant of the third permit to the Respondent would help him in building up of an economic fleet is conceived in the interests of the operator and not in the xmbJic interests. A person who can build up an economic fleet will be in a position to render belter and satisfactory service to the public and therefore it may bo in the public interests to help him to build up an economic licet.
Coming to reason No. (2), counsel for the Appellant contended that the fact that the person is an existing operator having a permit in respect of a portion of the route in question is not a ground to the grant of permits and should not be taken into account and that therefore the order of the Government is vitiated. We consider that the fact that the Respondent is an existing operator in respect of a part of the route in question is not an extraneous or irrelevant consideration.
We are supported in this view by a decision of Rajamannar C. J., and Vcnkatarama Ayyar J. in ''Veerappa Pillai v. Rathnaswami Nadar 1953 1 Mad LJ (SN) 46 (K). There the learned Judge held that it should be a material consideration to take into account that the Appellant has experience of a particular route over which the stage carriage has to be run and that such a consideration is not out of place in deciding to whom, in the interest of the public, the stage carriage permit should be granted; that S. 47 does not prescribe rules for selection when there are several applicants for the grant of a stage carriage permit, and that therefore, in making the selection the authorities ought to be guided by what is for the benefit of the public.
Counsel for the Appellant concedes that the reason that the Respondent has a clean record is a material ground for preferring him to the other applicants. We are of opinion that the further reason in awarding the permit in favour of the Respondent, that he is a resident of Bhadrachalam, which is on the route in question, while the Appellant is a resident of Rajahmundry, a place far away from the route in question, is neither an irrelevant nor an improper consideration.
Mr. Babul Reddy contends that where Tribunals gave several reasons, some of which are bad, and it is impossible to predicate which reason effectively operated on the mind of the Tribunals the order must be set aside. In support of this contention he relied upon a decision of Rajamannar C. J., and Somasundaram J., in - ''Tanjore Motor Traders Ltd. v. Narayanaswami Naidu 68 Mad LW (SN) 58 (WA No 35 of 1955) (L). In this case we have come to the conclusion that die reasons given by the Central Road Traffic Board in preferring the Respondent, which were confirmed by the Government in revision, are none of them bad.
Even if one of such reasons is bad, it does not necessarily follow in all cases that die order is vitiated. If several reasons are given in support of an order, some of which are bad and some of which are good, it depends upon the facts of each case whether the order can be sustained on the reasons which are good. It does not necessarily follow that because the order contains some bad reasons, die entire order must be set aside.
Lasdy, Mr. Babul Reddy contended that a perusal of die several orders passed by the transport authorities which are the subject matters of writ petitions filed in the High Court, disclose an absolute lack of consistency on the part of the transport authorities, that there is no fixity in the principles adopted and uniformity in their application. In several cases the same reasons are given, so the argument proceeds, in reaching contrary conclusions.
It is not proper for the Tribunals to apply two different and opposing principles at the same time, one to one applicant, and the other to another, without assigning proper and convincing reasons for such differentiation. Whatever principles are adopted as the criterion for making the selection among the applicants, it is necessary that they should apply them uniformly and without differentiation. This, of course, does not prevent the State from altering its rules from time to time when as a result of experience it discovers that they require to be altered in the interests of the public.
As has been pointed out in ''C.S.S. Motor Service v. State of Madras (F)'' what is necessary is that at any given time there should be one sot of rules and regulations governing die disposal of all applications. There should not be two different and opposing principles both in operation at the same time, one being applied to one applicant and the other to the other. In other words, the criteria that are applied must rKtJbe with reference to particular applicants but generally with reference to all applicants.
In the view we have taken, the order of Umamaheswararn J., must be confirmed and this appeal dismissed with costs. Advocate''s fee Rs. 100/-.