T. Narayana vs The State of Andhra and Others

Subba Rao, C.J.—Writ Appeal No. 18 of 1956. This is an appeal -against the judgment of our learned brother Krishna Rao, J. dismissing an application filed by the Appellant under Article 220 of the Constitution of India to set aside the Order of the Government of Andhra made u/s 64-A of the Motor Vehicles Act.

The Appellant is a motor transport operator plying four stage carriages on various routes in the Kurnool District. Pursuant to the notification issued by the Regional Transport Authority, Kurnool, calling for applications for the grant of a permit of the route Kurnool Velgode, he applied for a permit along with 23 others. On 26th March, 1955, the Regional Transport Authority granted him a permit on the said route in preference to the other applicants. The appeal filed by the aggrieved persons was dismissed by the Central Read Traffic Board. But the Government of Andhra set aside that Order on 30th January, 1956 and remitted the case to the Regional Transport Authority for fresh disposal according to law. The Appellant filed an application under Article 220 of the Constitution of India to set aside that order.

The main ground of attack against the Order of the Government is that the Government, in interfering u/s 64-A of the Act. exceeded its jurisdiction in taking into consideration extraneous matters not found in the records submitted to it by the Subordinate Tribunals. To appreciate this contention, some more facts may be stated. The regional Transport Authority, in preferring the Appellant to others, had taken into consideration three facts (i) his record was comparatively better, (ii) he was operating two un-remunerative services in Kurnool city and (iii) ho had all facilities to give proper service to the public. The Central Road Trafficc Board, in confirming that Order, had borne in mind the following circumstances (i) All the four Appellants before the Board had sector qualification but the 2nd Appellant (6th Respondent herein) and the Respondent (Appellant herein) had major sector qualification of 43 miles, (ii) though the fact that the 2nd Appellant (6th Respondent herein) had been operating two unremunerative services in Kurnool city was an irrelevant consideration, there are other reasons for preferring him, (iii) both Appellant 2 (6th Respondent herein) and the Respondent (Appellant herein) were'' residents at one of the termini of the route and (iv) the Respondent (Appellant herein) had a somewhat better history-sheet than the 2nd Appellant (6th Respondent). It is clear from that order that the Appellant before us was nreferred in a competition between him and the 6th Respondent on the ground that, though both of them had equal qualifications, his record was better than that of the other. On appeal, the Government set aside the order on two grounds (i) The Regional Transport Authority was "wrong in taking into consideration the fact of the operation by the Appellant of two unremunerative services in Kurnool city and (ii) certain offences relating to the Appellant''s services were not brought to the notice of*the Regional Transport Authority.

It is not disputed that the offences for which the Appellant is alleged to have been convicted were for the first time brought to the notice of the Government and the said convictions were not disclosed in the records of either the Central Road Traffic Board or the Regional Transport Authority. On the aforesaid facts, it is contended that the Government has no power u/s 64-A of the Act to take into consideration for the first time new facts that were not found in the records of the Subordinate Tribunals. Section 64-A reads:

The Provincial Government may, of its own motion or on application made to it, call for the records of any order passed or proceeding taken under this. Chapter by any authority or officer subordinate to it, for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the legality, regularity or propriety of such order or proceeding and after examining such records may pass such order in reference thereto as it thinks fit.

The Revisional jurisdiction conferred on the Government under this section is limited by its express provisions. The section lays down not only the scope of its jurisdiction but also the manner of its exercise. The Government can interfere with the orders of the Subordinate Tribunals only on the ground of illegality, irregularity or impropriety of such orders. It can exercise that limited jurisdiction either on an application made to it or suo motu. In either case, it calls for the records of any order passed or proceeding taken by any authority or officer subordinate to it for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the legality, regularity or propriety of such order or proceeding and after examining such records, may pass such order in reference thereto as it thinks fit.

The Government can, therefore, satisfy itself as to the legality, regularity or propriety of such an order after examining the records, sent to it by Subordinate Tribunals. The section either expressly or by necessary implication does not empower the Government to travel beyond the record and set aside the order of an authority subordinate to it on facts not apparent from the record. We, therefore, agree with the learned Counsel contention that the Government was not justified in taking into consideration facts that were brought to its notice for the first time.

But, the Government in setting aside the Order of the Central Road Traffic Board has given as its main reason the fact that the Regional Transport Authority had taken into consideration the operation by the Appellant of unremunerative services in Kurnool city. This is certainly a relevant circumstance which the Government can take into consideration for setting aside the Order of the Central Road Traffic Board.

But the learned Counsel argues that it is not an inflexible rule of law that whenever a Tribunal relies upon an inadmissible ground, the entire order is vitiated by it, if there are other valid grounds to sustain it and, in support of that argument, reliance is placed upon the judgment "of a Division Bench of this Court, of which one of us was a member, in M. Ramayya Vs. State of Andhra re-presented by the Secretary, Public Works and Trans port Department and Others The Division Bench observed at page 222 thus:

Even if one of such reason is bad, it does not necessarily follow in all cases that the order is vitiated. If several reasons are given in support of an order, some of which, are bad and some of which are good it depends upon the facts of each case, whether the order can be sustained on the reasons which are good. It does not necessarily follow that because the order contains some bad reasons, the entire order mast be set aside.

We agree with the aforesaid observations. It is a question of fact in each case whether having regard to the facts of that case, the order is vitiated by its reliance upon an inadmissible ground. That question essentially was within the jurisdiction of the Government and the Government, having regard to the circumstances of the present case, held that the Order of the Regional Transport Authority was vitiated by its reliance upon an inadmissible ground. We cannot say that the reason given by the Government Is irrelevant or invalid.

That apart, we do not think this is a fit I case for the High Court to invoke its extraordinary jurisdiction to quash an order which is just in the circumstances of this case.

The appeal fails and is dismissed but without costs.

Writ Appeal No. 17 of 1956.- This is an appeal against the Order of our learned brother Krishna Rao J., dismissing an application filed by the Appellant under Article 228 of the Con-situation of India to quash the Order of the Government of Andhra dismissing the revision petition filed by him to the Government against the Order of the Central Road Traffic Board.

The Appellant in this case is the same as the Appellant in the connected appeal we have just now disposed of.

The Regional Transport Authority at a meeting held on 26th March, 1955, while granting him a permit on the Kurnool-Velgode route, rejected his application for a permit on the route Velgode-Kurnool. When he preferred an appeal along with the other unsuccessful applicants, it was dismissed by the Central Road Traffic Board. He did not fare better before the Government.

It is contended before u:; that the Tribunals did not give him a permit on the route Velgode-Kurnool on the ground that he was given a permit on the route Kurnool-Velgode and the Government, having set aside the Order of the Central Road Traffic Board giving him a permit on Kurnool-Velgode route, went wrong in dismissing his revision to the converse route. To put it differently, his argument is that the reason for refusing him a permit on the route Velgode-Kurnool no longer held good when the permit issued in his favour, was cancelled. The question, therefore, is whether the Appellant was not given a permit on that route only on the ground that he was given a permit on the converse route.

As the argument is based upon the reasons given by the Tribunals in refusing to give him the permit in question, it will be convenient to read the relevant portion of the order Of the Regional Transport Authority:

No. 12 has three permits. He is already granted one permit on the route Kurnool-Velgode and granting this permit also would amount to total monopoly on the route Kurnool-Velgode. We consider that monopoly of the entire route will not be in the public interest and does not induce efficiency. Hence his application is rejected. Then the question is among Nos. 1, 7, 13 and 14, Nos. 7 and 13 do not have experience on this route. Hence their applications are rejected. No. 1 operates 18 miles on the route while No. 14 operates 43 miles and the record of No. 1 is very .toad (Sept.) 1957 Andh. Pra. D.F./25 Even in 1954 he, has" six suspensions and, therefore, we consider that he is not a suitable person who can give proper service to the public. Hence, his application is rejected. No. 14 is operating 43 miles on the same route and has good experience of the route. He has also the facilities for running efficiently. His record is comparatively better. He has only one punishment in 1954 for the offence committed in 1953 and we are of the opinion that granting him the permit would be in the best interests of the public. Accordingly, the permit is granted to No. 14.

It is clear from this order that No. 12, who is the Appellant before us, was excluded from the field of competition only on the ground that he was given a permit on the-route Kurnool-Velgode and after excluding him the rights of the other applicants inter se were considered by the Regional Transport Authority. On appeal, the Central Road Traffic Board made the following order:

This is an appeal against the Order of the Regional Transport Authority, Kurnool, granting a permit to the Respondent on the route Velgode to Kurnool. The only Appellant in this case is the Respondent who was granted a permit on the route Kurnool to Velgode by the Regional Transport Authority, Kurnool. In as much as the grant in that case has not been disturbed and he was also subsequently granted a permit on the route Kurnool to Markapur, he has now become a fleet owner and, therefore, has no reason to claim the present permit.

The Respondent is in the transport field for several years, and has apparently been carrying on his business quite efficiently. He also has sector qualifications to the extent of 43 miles and in the circumstances, I can see no reason for disturbing the grant.

It is also apparent from this order that no real attempt was made to weigh the comparative merits of the two applicants but the Appellant was not given the permit for the reasons mentioned by the Regional Transport Authority. On revision the Government only considered the qualifications of the Respondent. No doubt, the Government stated that the Appellant had failed to show that his claims were superior to those of the Respondent. But there was no consideration) of the comparative merits with a view to prefer one to the other.

The Government had ignored the fact that both the Tribunals excluded the Appellant only on the ground that he was given a permit for the connected route and that Government itself set aside the order issuing a permit to him for that route. The order of the Government in the circumstances is inconsistent with that made in the connected writ. Both cannot stand together for the Appellant was not given a permit because he was given a permit for the other route.

The order of the Government is. therefore, quashed and the proceedings in connection with this permit are also remitted to the Regional Transport Authority for fresh enquiry. The appeal is allowed but, in the circumstances, without costs.