MAHANAGAR TELEPHONE NIGAM LTD. vs PRATAP SINGH RANA

THE present appeal, filed by the appellant, under Section 15 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (hereinafter referred to as ''the Act'') is directed against order dated 11.6.1999, passed by the District Forum-III in Complaint Case No. 1434/98-entitled Shri Pratap Singh Rana v. THE Chief General Manager, Mahanagar Telephone Nigam Limited.

THE facts, relevant for the disposal of the present appeal, briefly stated are that the respondent, a subscriber in respect of telephone No. 5567999, filed a complaint under Section 12 of the Act, before the District Forum, alleging that the bills received by him in respect of the above mentioned telephone connection for the billing cycles 1.10.1995, 1.12.1995 and 1.2.1996 were excessive, false and inflated. It was stated that the abovesaid telephone had been disconnected illegally by the appellant. In the above said complaint, it was prayed by the respondent that the appellant be directed to restore the telephone and not to charge any rent after the date of disconnection i.e. 12.3.1996. THE respondent also claimed a sum of Rs. 20,000/- as compensation and cost of litigation. The claim of the respondent in the District Forum was contested by the appellant. The stand taken by the appellant was that there was no discrepancy in the bills in question and that the bills issued to the respondent were correct. It was also stated that the case of the respondent with regard to the defect in the bills, was got investigated by the appellant and it was found that there was no defect in the bills and the respondent was informed accordingly.

The learned District Forum, vide order, being impugned in the present proceedings, has allowed the complaint, quashed the bills in question and directed the appellant to raise fresh bills, charging only for 450 calls per billing cycle. The appellant was also directed not to charge any rent after 1.4.1996. The respondent was also awarded cost of litigation, amounting to Rs. 1,000/- to be paid by the appellant.

FEELING aggrieved, the appellant has preferred the present appeal under Section 15 of the Act. We have heard the learned Counsel for the appellant at length on the question of admission of the present appeal and have also carefully gone through the documents/material on record. The order, being impugned in the present proceedings, was passed by the learned District Forum on 11.6.1999. In terms of the provisions contained in Section 15 of the Act, the present appeal should have been filed within a period of 30 days from the date of the order. However, proviso to above section provides that the State Commission may entertain an appeal even after the expiry of the abovesaid period of 30 days if it is satisfied that there was sufficient cause for not filing the same within the abovesaid period. Admittedly, the present appeal has not been filed by the appellant within the prescribed period of 30 days. The same has been filed on 30th November, 1999. Alongwith the appeal, the appellant has also filed an application, seeking condonation of delay in filing the appeal. In the abovesaid application, seeking condonation of delay in filing the present appeal, it is stated that the copy of the impugned order was received by the appellant on 10th September, 1999. It is stated that delay in filing the appeal has occurred on account of "elaborate procedural exercises involved in the appellant''s Department".

AS already stated, there is a statutory provision enabling the Commission to entertain the appeal even after the expiry of statutory period, prescribed for filing an appeal, provided the appellant satisfies that there was sufficient cause for not filing the same within time. The words ''sufficient cause'', appearing in proviso to Section 15 of the Act, are of utmost significance. AS per settled law, culled out from various judicial decisions, the above expression ''sufficient cause'', though deserves to receive a liberal construction, yet a just and equitable balance has to be maintained between the right secured by the respondent as result of the expiry of the prescribed period of limitation and the injustice of depriving the appellant of adjudication of his grievances on the merits of his appeal for causes beyond his reasonable control, which means that the cause is bona fide and beyond the control of the appellant. Though no hard and fast line can be drawn as to what affords ''sufficient cause'' in a given case yet again as per settled law any cause which prevents a person from approaching the Court within time is sufficient cause. In doing so, it is the test of a reasonable man in normal circumstances which was to be applied. If the above criterion is applied to the present case it is noticed that the application seeking condonation of delay in filing the present appeal miserably fails to meet the above requirement because as per appellant''s own case a copy of the order, being impugned in the present proceedings, was received by the appellant on 10th September, 1999. The present appeal, as already stated, has been filed much afterwards on 30th November, 1999. In our opinion, as a matter of fact, there is no satisfactory explanation for the inordinate delay caused in the matter except a bald statement made in para 5 of the application that the delay in filing the appeal is on account of elaborate procedural exercise involved in the department of the appellant. In the presence of the above facts and the position explained above, in our opinion, whatever liberal interpretation might be put on the words ''sufficient cause'' it would be impossible for us to hold that there was no negligence or want of bona fides on the part of the appellant. In our opinion, the appellant, in the given facts, has miserably failed to show ''sufficient cause'' for condoning the delay and, therefore, the application seeking condonation of delay in filing the appeal is hereby rejected. The present appeal, filed by the appellant, besides being barred by limitation is also devoid of substance on merits because on the basis of material on record, it is apparent that the number of calls in the billing cycles for 1.10.1995, 1.12.1995 and 1.2.1996 indicate an abnormal upward trend. As against the average of 414 calls, the billing cycle for 1.10.1995 shows the number of calls as 1182; billing cycle for 1.12.1995 shows number of calls as 2135 and billing cycle for 1.2.1996 shows the number of calls as 1510. It is an admitted fact that the telephone in question is not having STD/ISD facility. In the presence of the above facts, more particularly the fact that the telephone in question is not having any STD/ISD facility, there does not appear any justification for sudden spurt in the number of calls in respect of the abovesaid telephone.

ON a perusal of the impugned order, it is further apparent that the respondent made repeated representations to the appellant about his grievances. However, the stand of the appellant is that the matter was investigated. The learned District Forum in the impugned order has observed that in response to the representations/complaints of the respondent only a cyclostyled reply was sent stating therein that the matter had been thoroughly investigated and no defect was found. It has been observed by the learned District Forum that no proper investigation had been made and a routine cyclostyled reply was sent to the respondent.

ON the basis of the above facts, it has been held by the learned District Forum that the bills in question were inflated and excessive and the learned District Forum has passed the order being impugned in the present proceedings. In our opinion, the findings recorded by the learned District Forum, in the given facts, suffer from no infirmity so as to call for any interference by this Commission in exercise of its appellate powers. The present appeal, filed by the appellant is devoid of substance and accordingly, the same is dismissed in limine with no order as to cost. Appeal dismissed.