MAHANAGAR TELEPHONE NIGAM LTD. vs SITA RAM GOEL

THE present appeal has been filed assailing the order of District Forum-I, Tis Hazari, Delhi, dated 31.5.1999 passed in Complaint Case No. 248/1997 entitled - Shri Sita Ram Goel v. M.T.N.L.

THE relevant facts, in brief, are that the telephone, bearing No. 7511844, installed at the premises of the respondent, remained out of order for the period from 12.10.1995 to 6.12.1995 and despite repeated complaints, the same was not made functional. In the meanwhile, the respondent received a bill for Rs. 1,199/- for the billing cycle 1.11.1995 to 31.12.1995. It was alleged in the complaint filed by the respondent that as against the above demand the average bills in respect of the said telephone had never exceeded Rs. 450/-. Accordingly, the respondent filed a complaint before the District Forum praying for directions to the appellant to issue a revised bill together with compensation and cost. The appellant in its reply/written version filed before the District Forum admitted the fact that the FNMR reflected that there was a spurt in the calls made during the period 15.11.1995 to 30.11.1995 and had accordingly, giving the benefit of doubt to the respondent, afforded him rebate of 600 calls. As such, there being no deficiency in service on the part of the appellant, the complaint, filed by the respondent, was liable to be dismissed with costs. The learned District Forum, vide impugned order, allowed the complaint and directed the appellant to prepare a revised bill in respect of the telephone in question for the period 1.11.1995 to 31.12.1995 affording a rebate of 700 calls instead of 600 calls, to the respondent and since the bill for the said period had already been paid by the respondent, the amount for 700 calls was directed to be refunded to the respondent together with Rs. 1,000/- as compensation and Rs. 500/- as costs.

Aggrieved by the aforesaid order, the appellant MTNL has approached this Commission by filing the instant appeal.

WE have carefully perused the documents/material on record, as well as have heard the arguments advanced on behalf of both the parties. In the first instance, it has been pointed out that the present appeal, filed by the appellant, is barred by limitation as the same has not been preferred within the statutory period of 30 days as provided under Section 15 of the Act. The appeal, filed by the appellant, is accompanied by an application for condonation of delay and the reason assigned for delay is that the copy of the impugned order was received by the appellant on 9.6.1999 and sent to the Legal Department on 19.7.1999 and thereafter the concerned file had to pass through the hands of various officers for taking a decision for filing an appeal and as such it took about 20 days to get the necessary approval and thereafter the appeal was filed on 2.8.1999. In terms of proviso to Section 15 of the Act, the appellant had to show ''sufficient cause'' for not filing the appeal within time. In the instant case, the reason assigned for the delay of about 53 days does not constitute ''sufficient cause'' as has been held by the Hon''ble National Commission in case entitled Vice-Chairman, Delhi Development Authority v. O.P. Gauba, reported as III (1995) CPJ 18 (NC)=1986-96 CONSUMER 2731 (NS), which squarely covers the present application of the appellant for condonation of delay. In the above said case the Hon''ble National Commission has held : "The appeal by DDA has been filed, delayed by 38 days and is accompanied by an application for condonation of delay supported by an affidavit. It is stated therein that the copy of the order dated 10.3.1993 does not appear to have been received by DDA and so a copy of the order was obtained on 8.4.1993. The grounds for delay are given because the order had to be examined from all aspects and at various levels before a decision to file this appeal could be given. In our views this does not constitute a valid and sufficient cause for the exercise of our discretion to condone the delay. Proof of sufficient cause is a condition precedent for the exercise of discretion. It was the duty of the DDA to establish as to how the matter was dealt with at all levels and each day''s delay had to be satisfactorily explained. Inter-office consultation for prolonged periods cannot constitute sufficient cause for condonation of delay. The delay cannot be condoned as a matter of generosity because the process of working in DDA has resulted in the delay. The application for condonation of delay is dismissed and consequently the appeal is dismissed as barred by time."

(Emphasis supplied) In view of the above said decision, the delay in filing the present appeal, by the appellant cannot be condoned and, therefore, the application seeking condonation of delay in filing the present appeal is hereby rejected.

THE present appeal filed by the appellant besides being barred by limitation is devoid of substance on merits also because it is contended on behalf of the appellant that the learned District Forum had erred in holding that the respondent was entitled to a rebate of 700 calls instead of 600 calls as afforded by the appellant but the appellant MTNL has not disclosed the basis for computing the rebate of 600 calls whereas the learned District Forum has specified in the impugned order that the bill in question was in respect of 789 calls and as per the FNMR the average calls in a fortnight did not exceed 86 calls and, therefore, the rebate should have been for about 700 calls on the basis of the previous average of calls made in respect of the telephone in question. It is also admitted on the part of the appellant, that on a complaint made by the respondent that his telephone had remained non-functional during the period from 1.11.1995 to 31.12.1995, the appellant had afforded a rebate of 600 calls to the respondent, as such the deficiency in service on the part of the appellant is apparent and, accordingly, the amount of compensation of Rs. 1,000/- together with Rs. 500/- as costs awarded by the District Forum vide impugned order is fully justified in the circumstances. Accordingly, we do not find any infirmity in the impugned order so as to call for any interference in the same in exercise of our appellate jurisdiction in consequence, the present appeal, filed by the appellant, is dismissed as being barred by time and also on merits. However, in the circumstances, the parties are left to bear their own costs. The present appeal, filed by the appellant, stands disposed of in above terms. Appeal dismissed.