Mahendra Kumar Jain vs Dharamchand Jain

G.C. Gupta, J.

This is defendant''s revision u/s 23E of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as ''the Act'') against the order of ejectment passed by the Rent Controlling Authority, Katni on 29-5-1984.

The applicant is in occupation of the suit premises and has been paying rent to the non-applicant since 1983. It appears that the suit house belonged to a Trust and was purchased by the non-applicant in the year 1982 and intimation of the purchase was given to the petitioner who started paying rent as aforesaid. On 4-7-1983, the non-applicant served a notice through his Lawyer on the applicant intimating that the suit premises was in a dilapidated condition and needs its urgent repairs. However, the notice was not pursued further. On 20-2-1984 the present suit on the ground of "bona fide need" was filed before the Rent Controlling Authority, Katni. The learned Authority granted leave to the applicant to defend action and consequently the applicant filed not only his written-statement but also examined witnesses. On consideration of oral and documentary evidence on record the learned Authority passed the impugned order of ejectment.

The impugned order is assailed on the ground that the conclusion of the Authority regarding existing bona fide need of the non-applicant is a perverse conclusion liable Co be set-aside by this Court in exercise of revisional jurisdiction. It is also submitted that the non-applicant was required to prove not only the bona fide need but also that he was the owner of the suit premises which he had failed to prove. It is further submitted that the Rent Controlling Authority was not authorised to act as such. The last submission is that the provisions incorporated in the Act by amendment in 1983 are void being contrary to provisions of Article 14 of the Constitution.

As far as the constitutionality of the Act is concerned the same need not detain us long as the matter is covered by a decision of the Supreme Court in Kewal Singh Vs. Smt. Lajwanti, wherein the Supreme Court has considered a parallel provision in Delhi Kent Control Act, 1958. The Delhi Act also provides a summary procedure for eviction of tenants in case the landlord requires the premises bond fide for his personal occupation. The said provision was challenged as discriminatory before the Supreme Court. The attack was, however, repelled by holding that the classification of tenants was a reasonable classification and was neither discriminatory nor is arbitrary. It was also held that even though summary procedure has been evolved the tenant is afforded to full opportunity to defend himself. Since the provisions in our Act are almost identical, it must be held that the Act is immune from attack on the ground of unconstitutionality. The aforesaid decision of the Supreme Court has been followed in Ravi Dutt Sharma Vs. Ratan Lal Bhargava, and may therefore by taken to be the settled law. The learned counsel for the applicant, however, wanted to distinguish the said judgment on the ground that before the amendment of our Act in 1983 the power to pass an eviction order was with the Civil Court. But the said power has now been taken away from the judiciary and given to an Executive Officer. This according to the learned counsel violates directive principles of State Policy which provides for an independent judiciary, in Article 50 of the Constitution. Even if the provision is taken to be contrary to Article 50 of the Constitution, it is not sufficient to render the same unconstitutional. It is well-settled that breach of directive principles by itself is not sufficient to invalidate an otherwise good law. The submission of the applicant about the unconstitutionality of the Act must therefore be rejected.

As far as the submission regarding appointment of the Authority under the Act is concerned, the same deserves to be rejected on the short ground that no such objection has ever been raised. Indeed, the applicant has submitted to the jurisdiction of the Authority without any objection and hence cannot be permitted to now turn back and challenge the jurisdiction particularly when the final order has gone against him.

The serious submission, however, appears to be regarding the correctness of finding about the bona fide need. Before this Court can appreciate the submission of the learned counsel, it must ascertain its own jurisdiction in the matter. A revisional jurisdiction, particularly u/s 115, CPC is a limited jurisdiction and does not extend to examining the correctness or otherwise of the finding. The present revision, however, is filed u/s 23E of the Act which authorises the High Court to satisfy itself as to the legality, propriety or correctness of an order passed by the Rent Controlling Authority. These words are apparently of wider magnitude and scope. In Kewal Singh''s case (supra) the Supreme Court has considered a similar provision in Delhi Rent Control Act and has held that "The highest court. of the State has been given a wide power of revision where the said Court can examine the case of the tenant and the landlord and the validity of the order passed by the Controller." In Delhi Rent Control Act the powers of the High Court are limited to examining if an order passed by the Controller is according to law. The wordings of our law are not only different but wider than Delhi Act and hence it must be held that this Court''s powers of revision do not suffer from limitations u/s 115, C.P.C. This view is also supported by an earlier decision of the Supreme Court in Hari Shankar v. Girdharilal Chowdhary AIR 1963 S.C. 698. Clearly, therefore, this Court while exercising its revisional jurisdiction has the power to look into the correctness of the finding regarding bona fide need of the landlord. This is, however, not to say that in examining the correctness of the finding this Court would Act as a Court of appeal and reappreciate evidence to come to its own conclusion. That is how the present provision will have to be distinguished from appellate powers.

The submission of the learned counsel for the applicant that there is no bona fide need may now be examined. The submission is based on the fact that in the notice dated 4-7-1983, the landlord had not mentioned any bona fide personal need and has rested his case on the ground of dilapidated condition of the house and needs for reconstruction. It is true that a notice dated 4-7-1983 was served by the non-applicant and did not contain any demand based on personal need of the landlord. This however is not of such consequence as the condition of the house is not in dispute and the notice itself was neither filed before the Rent Controlling Authority nor any defence based on the said notice was taken. Then it cannot be said that two needs i.e. need for reconstruction and the need for bona fide requirement cannot co-exist. Simply because the notice did not mention personal need it cannot be assumed that the need is really non-existing in spite of the fact pointing otherwise;

The evidence on record clearly justifies the conclusion reached by the Rent Controlling Authority. It was the submission of the applicant that the non-applicant landlord has 7 rooms in his possession on the ground floor and first floor of the house and he therefore needs no further accommodation. It is not denied that the non-applicant landlord does not live on the ground floor and is utilizing the same for, carrying on his business. It is also not denied that there are 7 members in the family of the Landlord and they live in two rooms on the first floor which even according to the applicant measures 12'' x 10''. It is true that besides the two rooms there is a kitchen and verandah on the first floor but that by itself does hot add to the available living accommodation. The tenanted premise is situated on the first floor by the side of the accommodation of the landlord and hence its suitability cannot also be doubted. In view of these admitted facts the landlord will have 4 rooms available to him for his residential purpose in case the applicant is required to vacate the tenanted premises. Making available four rooms for a family of seven cannot be said to be either arbitrary or unjust decision. Apparently, therefore, the finding is not only correct but also proper.

In view of the discussion aforesaid, the revision fails and is dismissed without any orders as to costs.