Major (Retd.) P.I. Morada vs Shri S.D. Bakshi

R.S. Pathak, C.J.—I agree with my learned brother that the Revision Petition should be dismissed with costs.

u/s 13(3)(a)(i) of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 a landlord may apply to the Controller for an order directing the tenant to put him in possession in the case of a residential building if-

(a) he requires it for his own occupation,

(b) he is not occupying another residential building in the Urban area concerned; and

(c) he has not vacated a building without sufficient cause alter the commencement of this Act, in the said urban area....

The Petitioner contends that inasmuch as the Respondent landlord is occupying a portion of Grange Villa, Simla it cannot be said that he is not occupying another residential building within the meaning of Section 13(3)(a)(i)(b) of the Act. The contention is without substance. A ''building'' has been defined by Section 2(a) as "any building or part of a building let for any purpose...." clearly, in order that, Section 13(3)(a)(i) should apply it must be a building or part of a building which is let. Whether it is let must be determined by reference to the point of time when the landlord makes the application u/s 13(3)(a)(i). The accommodation in Grange Villa in occupation of the Respondent landlord cannot be said to be a ''building'' for the purposes of Section 13(3)(a)(i)(b). When a landlord is in occupation of a building or part of a building, owned by him it is not correct to say that he is occupying a "building" as defined by the Act. I am in agreement with what has been said in Sant Ram Dass Raj v. Karamchand AIR 1963 PH 1, Reliance was placed by the Petitioner on Ram Kishan Dass v. Goverdhan Dass 1960 PLR 670, That case was concerned with a non-residential building and if it can be construed to lay down any principle applicable to the present ease 1 would respectfully differ from the view taken there. In my opinion, the condition set out in Section 13(3)(a)(i) is satisfied.

On the question whether the Respondent requires the accommodation for his own occupation, there are the concurrent findings of the Controller and the appellate authority in favour of the Respondent. They have found that the accommodation was required bona fide by the Respondent for his own occupation, and after examining the material on the record I am satisfied that they are right. That is the only reasonable conclusion to which one can arrive when regard is had to the circumstances in which the Respondent is placed, the needs of his family and the limited accommodation in his possession.

Accordingly, I would dismiss the revision petition with costs.

Chet Ram Thakur, J.—Shri S.D. Bakshi is the owner of the building known as Grange Villa, Simla. He had let out one portion of this building to Shri P.L. Morada in January, 1967, on an annual rent of Rs. 800 payable in two equal half yearly instalments. A portion of this building was let out to one Shri S.S. Man. In October, 1970, when Shri Bakshi, who was then still employed in the Punjab and Haryana High Court, moved an application u/s 13(2) and 13(3)(a) of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 (hereinafter called the Act). Shri Bakshi was due to retire from service with effect from 12th December, 1970 and thereafter he intended to settle at Simla along with his family, consisting of his wife and seven grown up educated children. He has no other residential building available at Simla, thus he sought the eviction of the tenants on the ground that he required the premises for his own occupation. He also served a notice on Shri S.S. Man, to vacate the premises in his possession and which he accordingly did.

Shri P.L. Morada, who is a Petitioner in this Court and was a Respondent before the Rent Controller (hereinafter to be termed as the Petitioner) opposed the claim of the Respondent (Petitioner before the Rent Controller) for eviction. The learned Rent Controller found that the requirement of the Petitioner seemed to be bona fide and that he required the premises for his personal occupation and accordingly passed an order in favour of the Respondent, against the Petitioner to vacate the premises and deliver the possession of the same to the Respondent within three months from the date of the order, which was passed on 22nd March, 1972.

The Petitioner went in appeal and the appellate authority affirmed the order of the Rent Controller and dismissed the appeal.

The Petitioner, therefore, came up in revision u/s 15(5) of the Act before this Court. It was urged by the counsel on behalf of the Petitioner that a landlord is not entitled to vacant possession, unless he satisfies certain conditions. The conditions as mentioned in Clause (a)(i) of Sub-section (3) of Section 13 of the Act must co-exist before the landlord can succeed in evicting the tenant and that his claim must be bona fide. The conditions on which the landlord has to satisfy the Court are:

(a) he requires it for his own occupation;

(b) he is not occupying another residential building; and

(c) he has not vacated such a building without sufficient cause. According to the learned Counsel if the landlord is having a part of a building in his possession, it is another building in the occupation of the landlord and so the condition contained in Section 13(3)(a)(i)(b) is not satisfied. It is admitted by the Respondent also that Shri Man has vacated a portion of Unbuilding and that the landlord is occupying the same. Now we have to see whether the Respondent has not been able to satisfy the requirement of Sub-section (3)(a)(i)(b). Clause (i)(b) mentions that he is not occupying another building in the urban area concerned. A building has been defined in Section 2(a) of the Act as:

(a) ''building'' means any building or part of a building let for any purpose whether being actually used for that purpose or not, including any land, godown, out-houses, or furniture let therewith but does not include a room in a hotel, hotel or boarding house.

From the definition of the building it is quite apparent that it is intended to apply only to the demised premises and not to the premises in occupation of a landlord. The learned Counsel contends that the portion which is in the occupation of the landlord in that very building, a portion of which is let out to the Petitioner, is a building within the meaning of Section 2(a) of the Act and as such the requirement of Sub-section (3)(a)(i)(b) is not fully satisfied and he placed reliance on Ram Kishan Dass and Ors. v. Gordhan Dass and Anr. 1960 PLR 670, This authority, no doubt, says that building includes a part of the building. But it may be mentioned that this authority does not apply to the facts of the present case, because in that; case it was not a residential building but it was a non-residential building which is covered by Section 13(3)(a)(ii) of the Act. To me, it appears, that a building as defined u/s 2(a) of the Act is only the building or a part of the building which is let for any purpose and not a building or any portion which is not let out. This view finds support from a Full Bench authority of the Punjab High Court in Sant Ram Das Raj Kalka v. Karam Chand Mangal Ram AIR 1963 Pun 1 , In this case, Ram Kishan Dass and Ors. case (supra) was also considered but was not followed. The contention of the learned Counsel on behalf of the Petitioner is that the view taken in the aforesaid case was not a correct view. According to him the Court has to construe the meaning of a statute according to its plain and natural meaning without adding any word to it. He contends that the plain reading of the word ''building'' as defined in the Act would mean a portion of the building let out or which is in the occupation of the landlord. If a landlord has got a portion of the building in his occupation, then this is the plain meaning of the word ''building'' that he is in possession or occupation of another building and that will not satisfy the condition laid down in Section 13(3)(a)(i)(b) of the Act. Further that the Court should not be concerned if such an interpretation results in hardship and inconvenience to the landlord. The meaning of the word ''building'' is quite plain, according to him, and he relies on Abdul Wahid Khan Habibullah Khan and Others Vs. Deputy Director of Consolidation, Jaunpur and Others, , Re In Re: Lloyds Bank Limited, and Movi Mercantile Bank Ltd., by Official The Morvi Mercantile Bank Ltd. and Another Vs. Union of India (UOI), , The observations made in the last authority by their Lordships of the Supreme Court are as under:

To the argument that there will be a possible inconvenience and hardship to merchants if a particular practice is not judicially recognised, the answer is that the argument from inconvenience and hardship is a dangerous one and is only admissible to construction where the meaning of the statute is obscure. Where the meaning of a statute is clear and explicit, if any hardship and inconvenience is left, it is for the Parliament to take appropriate steps to amend the law and not for the Court to legislate under the guise of interpretation.

To the similar effect is the ratio in the other two authorities. This principle enunciated in these authorities cannot be pressed into service in the present case, inasmuch as the language of the statute is not ambiguous nor the Court had in any way given a different interpretation to the word ''building'' as the word ''building'' as defined in the Act is not capable of two interpretations. The plain reading of the definition reveals that only building or a part of the building which is let out would be a building for the purposes of the Act. A portion of building not let out or any building not let out or is in the occupation of the landowner himself cannot be governed under the definition of the word ''building'' as given in the Act. Therefore, it follows that a landlord in the occupation of a part of the building of which the other part is let out cannot be said to be in occupation of another building and in view of this, there is no question of putting a different interpretation, which is not intended by the legislature and these authorities for this matter will not be applicable to the facts of the present case.

Further, it is borne out from Lt. Col. Micheal A.R. Skinner and Ors. v. The Municipal Committee Hansi and Ors. 1969 PLR 205 which says that it is plain from a mere reading of the provisions of Section 4(1) of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act that the Rent Controller has no jurisdiction to fix the fair rent of any premises which do not fall within the expression "building" or "rented land" and such fair rent can be fixed only on an application of a tenant or landlord of a "building or rented land". Fair rent cannot be fixed of a building or apart of a building which is not let out and which has all along been and continues to be in the possession and occupation of the owner himself. Such a building or part of a building may, however, become a "building" within the meaning of Section 2(a) of the Act if and when it is let out and then the provisions of Sections 4, 5 and 6 of the Act would straightaway apply to it. Thus it is clear that the portion of the building which is in the occupation of the landlord cannot be termed as a building so as to say that the Respondent has got another building in his occupation. This view further finds support from Chatter Singh v. Messrs Jamboo Parshad 1965 PLR 87, Therefore, it is wrong to say that the Respondent has got another building in his occupation in the urban area.

The further question canvassed is that the Respondent requires the same for his personal use. In this regard we have to see whether the claim of the Respondent is a bona fide or a genuine one. Admittedly he has got a portion of the building in his occupation after it was vacated by Shri Man, and he had also retained a room for himself while he had let out these two portions, since 1967, while he was still in service and he had been coming to Simla only on week ends. Now that he has retired and he intends residing at Simla, therefore, we have to look to the requirement of the Respondent keeping regard to the number of family members, his social status and his way of living, etc. The learned Counsel for the Petitioner has contended that the approach of the landlord should not be subjective but it should be objective with regard to his requirement. The learned Counsel for the Petitioner has referred to a number of cases to show what is a bona fide requirement of a landlord and how it is to be determined. In Hemangini Mitra Vs. M.B. Mukherjee, it had been laid down-- "Although the bona fide requirement u/s 11(f) of the West Bengal Act 38 of 1948 implies a reasonable requirement, yet the reasonable requirement under the Act of 1948 to constitute a bona fide requirement is not exactly the same reasonable requirement as is necessary under the West Bengal Act 17 of 1950. 8.12(h), in view of the explanation put in by the legislature. The explanation had to be put in because that is not the ordinary explanation of reasonable requirement. Where the family of the landlord being a large one he requires and must have more accommodation, it is the element of must haveness or insistent need which determines bona fide requirement". In Bhogilal M. Davay Vs. S.R. Subramania Iyer, , the term "bona fide requires" connotes something more than desire to have something and much less than absolute necessity. However, the landlord must have a genuine present need of the building for his occupation. The question of bona fide is a question of fact. Then in determining whether it is reasonable to make an order for possession, the Court is entitled to and is bound to take into consideration every circumstance that may affect the interest of the landlord or that of the tenant including financial hardship which would be inflicted on the tenant if an order for possession were made. It is for the tenant to prove that hardship on him would be so great that an order for possession ought not to be granted. In Girja Debi and Another Vs. The Rent Control and Eviction Officer and Others, also the scope of the words "bona fide needed for his own personal occupation" fell to be considered and it was held that the word meant that the landlord has a genuine need for occupying the building for himself. The authority, Munsi Ran v. Sain Dass AIR 1959 J&K 87, is under the Jammu and Kashmir Houses and Rents Control Act, where there is an explanation attached to the section for ejectment of the tenant which is quite unlike the one in our Act, therefore, this authority need not be considered. In Gunmala Devi v. Kishori Lal 1972 RCJ Del 575, also it was considered as to what bona fide requirement of the landlord constitutes. In Porkrakutty v. Attached Velappil Mammad AIR 1954 Mad 381, also the meaning of the word "bona fide" was considered and it was held that in order to satisfy the requirement of the law, namely, "the claim of the landlord is bona fide", the landlord must show that he has a genuine present need of the building for his occupation.

The principle that has been enunciated in all these authorities relied upon by the learned Counsel for the Petitioner is that a bona fide requirement means the present genuine need of the landlord, keeping in view his social status, the number of family members and his standard of living, etc. To the same effect the learned Counsel for the Respondent has also cited some authorities. The first authority is Bishan Singh v. Ram Parkash 1965 CriLJ 803, In this it was held that the question of the requirement of the landlord has in this connection to be looked at from a practical point of view and in the background of our social conditions; and the expression "his own occupation" does not call for an unreasonably narrow dogmatic or technical legalistic approach; provided of course the claim of the landlord is genuine, honest and in good faith, not inspired by a collateral or an oblique motive. The second authority is Shri Panju Mal and Ors. v. Shrimati S.L. Keshwani and Ors. 1969 RCR Del 204 in which the scope of the expression "bona fide" fell to be considered and it was held therein that for the purpose of bona fide requirement of the landlord all relevant facts and circumstances including his status, position and social obligations have to be taken into account as reasonably influencing the individual landlord''s requirements.

The Rent Controller as also the appellate authority have both on the appraisal of the evidence on the record come to a concurrent finding that the landlord has got a bona fide or a genuine need so as to require the premises for his own use as the present accommodation keeping in view the number of the family members of the landlord, his social status, his mode of living and the ages of his children, who are unmarried and are living in the same house, is quite insufficient. It is, as a matter of fact, for the landlord himself to know his requirement and he is the sole judge of his needs and not the Rent Controller or the tenant. The Rent Controller has simply to see whether that requirement which has been urged by the landlord for eviction of his tenant is genuine or a bona fide, and once he comes to the conclusion that the requirement has been fully established to be genuine and bona fide, he has no option but to pass an order of eviction against the tenant, no matter it may cause hardship to the tenant. Hence agreeing with the Rent Controller as well as the appellate authority, we hold that the requirement of the landlord is genuine and the order of the appellate authority, therefore, does not call for any interference.

It has been urged by the learned Counsel for the Petitioner that the scope of a revision petition u/s 15(5) of the Act was wider than a revision u/s 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. There is no doubt that the High Court u/s 15(5) can entertain and interfere in a revision petition on the ground of illegality or impropriety, but before the High Court can interfere it must be shown how the order is illegal and improper. In the instant case, the Petitioner has not been able to make out any case of any illegality or impropriety committed by either the Rent Controller or the appellate authority in making the order. They have fully appraised the evidence and come to a concurrent finding of fact and, therefore, such a decision does not call for any interference in revision. Hence this point also fails.

The Petitioner had urged that no bona fide requirement had been proved, but it is wrong to say that the landlord had failed to establish his bona fide requirement. Both the Courts below have given a concurrent finding on this question of fact and, therefore, the petition fails and the same is hereby dismissed with costs.