Puran Chand vs Jagdish Lal and Another

R.S. Pathak, C.J.—The facts of the case have already been set out in the judgment of D.B. Lal, J. In view of the importance of the questions raised, I should like to state my own reasons.

A question of far reaching importance is whether upon the facts of the present case the Respondents can be said to satisfy the provisions of Clauses (a) and (b) of sub-paragraph (i) of paragraph (a) of Sub-section (3) of Section 13 of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949. The Respondents, who are two brothers, live in rented accommodation with their families. They purchased the premises in dispute and applied for eviction of the Petitioner. The Appellate authority, Shri Onkar Nath, has made an order of eviction on the ground that the rented accommodation occupied by the Respondents and their families is insufficient for all of them and that the premises in dispute are required for accommodating one of the brothers and his family.

Section 13 of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act provides for the eviction of a tenant. u/s 13(3)(a)(i) a landlord may apply to the Controller for an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession, in the case of a residential building, if:-

(a) he requires it for his own occupation,

(b) he is not occupying another residential building in the urban area concerned, and

(c) he has not vacated such a building without sufficient cause after the commencement of this Act in the said urban area.

The controversy between the parties revolves around the true construction of Clauses (a) and (b). The Petitioner says that if the landlord is already occupying another residential building in the urban area concerned, Clause (b) debars him from possession of the building applied for, and it is wholly immaterial that the accommodation occupied by the landlord is insufficient for his needs. The Petitioner also says that Clause (a) contemplates the occupation of the building applied for by the entire body of landlords and not merely by one or some of them alone. The validity of the two contentions is stoutly contested by the Respondent. And on this, therefore, two points arise for consideration:

(1) Is the insufficiency of the rented accommodation in regard to the landlord''s needs a relevant consideration when applying Clause (b) that the landlord should not be occupying another residential building in the urban area concerned?

(2) Can it be said within the meaning of Clause (a) that the Respondents require the premises in dispute for their own occupation if one of them alone will be accommodated in the premises?

In every case of statutory construction the well established rule is to construe the provision so as to give effect to the object underlying it, having regard to the context in which the provision is framed and the limitations implied in the language in which it is expressed. The provision forms part of the context, and its meaning is controlled accordingly. It is for this reason that every "definition" section of a statute is expressly made subordinate to the context, thereby acknowledging the paramountcy of contextual considerations.

What is the object with which Section 13(3)(a)(i) of the Act has been enacted? A landlord is entitled to the possession of a residential building if he require it for his own occupation. A landlord, even as definec in the extensive sense set out in Section 2(c) of the Act can be said to enjoy certain rights in relation to the building. He enjoys those rights either as the owner or, in certain cases, on behalf of the owner or even as a tenant who has sub-let the accommodation. They are property rights, and one of them is the right to possession. By virtue of what may be broadly described as "control of rent and eviction" legislation, the right to possession inhering in the landlord has been made the subject of legislative regulation, and restrictions have been placed upon the enjoyment of that right. Nonetheless, the legislature recognises that in certain cases the landlord should be permitted possession of the building, and one of those cases is the kind for which Section 13(3)(a)(i) provides. If a landlord requires the building for his own occupation he is entitled to its possession. That object provides the central principle for construing the statutory provision. Now, it is not in every case that possession may be allowed to the landlord. If, as Clause (b) indicates, he is occupying another residential building in the urban area concerned, he will not be entitled to possession. What is the extent of this deprivation? In every case, is the mere circumstance that he is occupying another residential building sufficient by itself to debar him from possession? The restriction imposed by Clause (b) must be construed reasonably. The right to possession of property is a fundamental right guaranteed to the owner by Article 19(1)(J) of the Constitution, and any restriction imposed on the exercise of that right must be reasonable, in view of Article 19(5) of the Constitution. An excessive invasion of the right will invalidate the statutory provision which provides for such invasion. It may possibly be that a landlord should be debarred from the possession of his own building if he is already occupying another building which answers his need although I express no opinion here as to that. But it will fall wholly beyond the bounds of reason if a landlord seeking possession of his own building is denied it merely because he occupies another building even though the latter has become wholly insufficient for his needs. It is not uncommon that a man occupying a rented building finds after a period of time that such personal factors as marriage and children or an improved standard of living with increasing affluence necessitates his occupying larger and more appropriate accommodation. The circumstances of a person do not necessarily continue to be same with the passage of time. So long as the circumstances relative to his need for accommodation remain the same the legislature debars him from charging over from one building to another. But on circumstances altering there may be a clear case making necessary the occupation of a more appropriate building. That, in my opinion, is the reasonable construction which can be put on Clause (b). It is well settled that a statute should be so construed as to uphold its constitutional validity if that can reasonably be done, and in my opinion, if the construction to which I am persuaded is given to Clause (b) of Section 13(3)(a)(i), it will protect its constitutional validity. I have observed above that for the purpose of construing a statute regard must be had to the context, and a construction divorced from the context is liable to be misleading. The construction of statutes enacted under a written constitution must properly take into account not merely the context conveyed by the provisions of the statute but must also have regard to the constitutional frame-work within which all [legislation must be shaped. Viewed in this light, it seems clear to me that Clause (b) of Section 13(3)(a)(i) intends a residential building which is sufficient for the needs of the landlord and on that account debars him from seeking possession of the building of which he is landlord.

Even if we were to find a solution to the question from the statutory provision itself, it is apparent that when Clause (a) speaks of the landlord requiring the building it gives expression to the need of the landlord for that building; thereby, the building assumes a specific definition in relation to the landlords'' needs. Then turning to Clause (b) it will be noted that it refers to '' "another residential building". The legislature has advisedly used the word "another". It implies a building which can be favourably compared with the building contemplated in Clause (a). From the context in which Clauses (a) and (b) are placed the irresistible inference is that the comparison between the two buildings must relate to the need of the landlord. It is a need reflected in Clause (a). In truth, Clause (b) is merely a proviso which only abridges or limits the scope of Clause (a); it does not nullify it altogether.

It is said, following the observations of the Supreme Court in Attar Singh Vs. Inder Kumar, that all the conditions contained in the clauses of Section 13(3)(a)(i) should be read together and considered cumulatively. I agree, but I am unable to read anything there which detracts from the construction of Clause (b) to which I have come. I am of the view that when Clause (b) speaks of another residential building, it refers to a building which fulfils the needs of the landlord in the same way substantially as the building applied for would. I am fortified in this conclusion by the view taken by the Punjab High Court in Sant Ram Das Raj Kalka Vs. Karam Chand Mangal Ram, .

Reference may now be made to the cases cited before us. The Petitioner has cited Dr. Mohammad Ibrahim Vs. Syed Ahmed Khan and Another, , Ram Kishan Dass and Ors. v. Gordhan Dass and Anr 1960 P.L.R. 670 and Eknath Bhanudas Utane v. Shankar Rao Deorao Judge and Anr. 1971 R C R 635. In the first case, the Madras High Court held that a person must be deemed to be occupying a residential building if the members of his family including dependants reside in the building with his permission although physically he himself might not be residing therein, and that the test is whether if he desires he cannot at any time go to reside in it. This case does not seem to afford any assistance to the Petitioner. In the second case, the Punjab High Court, besides holding that all the three grounds enumerated in Section 13(3)(a)(i) must co-exist before the landlord can succeed in evicting the tenant and that the claim to possession by the landlord must be bona fide, proceeded further to lay down that a landlord is not entitled to the possession of his building even if the building occupied by him is insufficient for the purpose of his business. To the same effect is the view expressed in the third case, which was decided by the Bombay High Court. With great respect to the learned Judges, I find myself unable to agree.

Our attention was drawn to Harwant Kaur and Ors v. Harinam Sankirtan Mandal (Regd.) Yamuna Nagar through its President 1972 RCR 662 and Hari Krishan Daroga v. Arjan Singh 1973 R C R 721. In the first of the two cases the point was a different one. The Court was called upon to consider whether the expression "occupation" in Section 13(3)(a)(i) was synonymous with "residential". It was assumed in that case that a landlord could apply for possession of his building if his need was not satisfied with the building occupied by him. In the second case, the learned Judge of the Punjab and Haryana High Court construed Section 13(3)(a)(i)(b) to mean that a landlord is debarred if he is already in occupation of another residential building in his own right as owner thereof. It is not necessary for the purpose of this case to consider whether Section 13(3)(a)(i)(b) refers to a building owned by the landlord. We have before us a case where Clause (b) is invoked in respect of rented accommodation occupied by the Respondents. For that reason, Major (Retd.) P.L. Morada v. Shri S.D. Bakshi I.L.R 1973 . (HP) 219, Chattar Singh v. Messrs Jamboo Parshad 1965 P.L.R. 87 and Lt. Col. Michel A.R. Skinner and Ors. v. The Municipal Committee, Hansi and Ors. 1969 P.L.R. 205, need not be considered.

The Petitioner then urges that in case Clause (b) of Section 13(3)(a)(i) was intended to operate as a bar only if the building occupied by the landlord satisfied the needs of the landlord in the same way as the building applied for, the legislature would have used the expression "such" to qualify the expression "residential building" therein, so as to indicate a similarity between the two buildings. We are referred to Section 13(3)(a)(ii)(b). Section 13(3)(a)(ii) entitles a landlord to apply for possession of rented land if he requires it for his own use and he is not occupying in the urban area concerned for the purpose of his business any other "such rented land". Now the word "such" employed here defines the land by reference to the purpose for which it is applied, that is the purpose of the landlord''s business. That is plainly how the Supreme Court understood the provision in Attar Singh (supra) when it observed:

But as the provision stands, the landlord cannot get possession of rented land merely by saying that he requires it "for his own use" (whatever may be the use to which he may put it after getting possession of it); he has also to show before he can get possession firstly, that he is not occupying in the urban area concerned for the purpose of his business any other such rented land. If (for example) he is in possession of any other rented land in the urban area concerned for the purpose of his business he cannot ask for eviction of his tenant from his rented land even though the rented land of which he may be in possession for the purpose of his business may not be his own land and he may only be a tenant of that land.

The expression "such" has not been used with reference to any concept of spatial adequacy.

The Petitioner also points out that where the legislature intended to permit possession of a building by the landlord unfettered by any condition it employed language accordingly. Our attention is invited to Section 13(3)(a)(i-a), which provides that if the landlord is a member of the Armed Forces of the Union of India and requires his residential building for the occupation of his family he is entitled to possession on production of a certificate of the prescribed authority referred to in Section 7 of the Indian Soldiers (Litigation) Act, 1925 that he is serving under special conditions within the meaning of Section 3 of that Act. That provision provides for an exceptional case, where account has been taken of the difficulties experienced by members of the Armed Forces in looking after their families when serving under the special conditions set out in Section 3 of the Indian Soldiers (Litigation) Act. Because of those difficulties, legislative policy has provided a concession to such a landlord from the controlling conditions of Section 13(3)(a)(i). However, the circumstance that such concession has been provided to a special class of landlord by Section 13(3)(a)(i-a) does in no way affect the construction which must properly be put on Clauses (a) and (b) of Section 13(3)(a)(i).

We have also been taken through the history of the enactment from the provisions of the Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1941 as it was originally framed, through its changes during the years until it assumed its present shape. The Rent and Eviction Acts of other States have also been placed before us. The submission of the Petitioner is that legislative policy with passing time set itself more and more in favour of the tenant. That may be so. But the task before the Court still is whether legislative policy has proceeded so far as to deny to the landlord the possession of his building if his needs are not satisfied by the building of which he is in present occupation. Whatever the legislative policy, its content and the measure of its expression must be discovered from the provisions of the statute itself.

In my opinion, the construction to be put on Clauses (a) and (b) of Section 13(3)(a)(i) of the Act is that a landlord is entitled to the possession of a residential building if he requires it for his own occupation and he is not occupying other residential building in the urban area concerned which already fulfils his needs in the same manner and to the same extent as the building of which he seeks possession.

Learned Counsel for the Respondents has enumerated a long line of decisions laying down substantially the same proposition and has invoked the doctrine of stare devises. In the view that I have taken on the merits of the question I do not think it necessary to consider that submission.

The second point which arises in this case is whether the benefit of Section 13(3)(a)(i) of the Act is available to the Respondents if one of them alone proposes to occupy the building applied for. The contention for the Petitioner is that the benefit can be availed of only if both the Respondents propose to change over to the building. Now, when Clause (a) of Section 13(3)(a)(i) speaks of the landlord requiring the building "for his own occupation", the emphasis here is not on occupation by the entire body of landlords but on their occupation as distinguished from that of another person. In other words, what Clause (a) contemplates is that the building applied for must be required by the landlord, and not for the occupation of somebody other that the landlord. Upon careful consideration, it seems to me that Clause (a) cannot be construed to mean that the entire body of landlords should move over to the building applied for. It is sufficient that one or some only of the entire body of the landlords intend to occupy the building.

Learned Counsel for the Petitioner has invited our attention to the second proviso to Section 13(3)(a) which provides that where a landlord has obtained possession of a residential building under the provisions of Section 13(3)(a)(i) he shall not be entitled to apply again under that provision for the possession of another building of the same class. It is urged that if one or some only of the entire body of landlords is allowed occupation of the building applied for and it is not necessary for the entire body of landlords to satisfy that requirement, then those among the landlords who remain behind will be barred from applying subsequently for possession. While considering such a case, it is important to remind ourselves that when the legislature imposes a bar such as that contained in the second proviso to Section 13(3)(a) it is intended that a reasonable construction should be placed on the bar. The second proviso is open to the reasonable construction that so long as the same circumstances continue as existed when the application u/s 13(3)(a) was made, no application for possession of any other building of the same class will be maintainable. If the circumstances change, the bar contained in the second proviso cannot come into play. The landlords'' need is the central theme of Section 13(3)(a) and so long as that need remains the same, the context in which Section 13(3)(a) must be applied also remains the same. It is in that defined context that the second proviso operates. But if the landlord''s need undergoes a change, the context also metamorphoses and a different set of conditions comes into existence for the operation of Section 13(3)(a). In that event, the second proviso cannot be invoked. It cannot relate to a situation which no longer exists.

In my opinion, there is nothing to prevent one or some only of a body of landlords from seeking possession u/s 13(3)(a)(i) of a building. Such occupation must, for the purpose of Section 13(3)(a)(i) be construed as a necessary requirement on the part of all of them. I am supported in this view by Vir Bhan v. Avtar Krishan etc. 1962 P.L.R. 1185, Madan Gopal Sehgal v. Om Parkash 1965 P.L.R. 97 and John Tinson and Co. Ltd., Simla v. Shri Amar Chand Sood and Anr. 1971 RC R 33.

The next question is whether the accommodation of which the Respondents seek possession can be said to satisfy the needs of the Respondents any better than the accommodation presently occupied. Even assuming that the extent of the accommodation is the same, there can be no reason to doubt that the needs of both the brothers and their respective families are satisfied if one of them with his family moves over to the premises in dispute.

It is next contended that the Respondents did not specifically plead in the application that they were not occupying another residential building in the urban area concerned and as Clause (b), which incorporates this condition, had to be satisfied by the Respondents, their application for possession should have been dismissed. Even assuming that the Respondents omitted to include a pleading in terms of Clause (b), the record before us discloses that the Petitioner cannot be said to have been taken by surprise or prejudiced in any manner because of such omission. The parties were aware of the nature and extent of the controversy between them and that it is apparent from the evidence adduced respectively by them. The contention has no force and must be rejected. Reference may be made to Nagubai Ammal and Others Vs. B. Shama Rao and Others, , Nedunuri Kameswaramma Vs. Sampati Subba Rao, , and Ganda Singh and Others Vs. Ram Narain Singh,

Finally, the Petitioner contends that the appeal before the Appellate authority has been decided by Shri Onkar Nath, describing himself as District Judge, Mahasu and not as the Appellate authority under the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act. The contention proceeds on a pure technicality. It is not disputed that Shri Onkar Nath was conferred the powers of an Appellate authority under the Act. That being so, his judgment and order must be attributed to that jurisdiction. The mere style in which he signed the judgment cannot effect the nature of the jurisdiction to which his deliberations must be ascribed. A contention such as the Petitioner''s was raised in Jaswant Ram v. B. D. Sharma 1968 P.L.R. 105, and Messrs Lachman Dass Sain Ditta Mal v. Hanuwant Dass Sud 1968 P.L.R. 174, and was repelled.

The revision petition fails and is dismissed with costs, which I assess at Rs. 150/-.

D.B. Lal, J.

This revision petition u/s 15(5) of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 (hereinafter to be referred as the Act) is directed against the order of the Appellate authority reversing, on appeal, the decision of the Rent Controller, Solan, whereby a petition u/s 13(3)(a)(i) of the Act filed by Jagdish Lal and Mohan Lal landlords of premises known as No. 461/5 situate in Ganj Bazar, Solan was dismissed.

The Respondent-landlords contended before the Rent Controller that the premises in dispute were purchased by them in December, 1968 as the accommodation already in their occupation was insufficient and they required the disputed premises for their own occupation. Besides seeking possession u/s 13(3)(a)(i), it was also pleaded that the tenant Puran Chand had not paid the rent and fell in arrears which was additional ground for his ejectment. Subsequently, the arrears of rent were paid and the plea regarding thereto was withdrawn. The parties joined the issue essentially on the requirement of the landlords u/s 13(3)(a)(i) of the Act. Evidence was adduced before the learned Rent Controller, and Jagdish Lal landlord, besides giving his own statement, produced two witnesses Chuni Lal (P.W. 1) and Malak Ram (P.W. 2). All the three witnesses stated that the disputed premises consisted of two small rooms, one kitchen, one store and one latrine, which was hardly sufficient for the residence of the two brother-landlords who were cooking their meals separately. The family of jagdish Lal consists of his wife and four children, while that of Mohan Lal consists of his wife and three children. Some of the children are of school-going age. The landlords who are Respondents in these proceedings are living in another rented building which is almost similar in accommodation as compared to the disputed one. Obviously the accommodation in their occupation is insufficient and hence they seek the ejectment of the tenant from the disputed building which is required by them for their own occupation. As against the three witnesses produced by the Respondent-landlords, the tenant gave his own statement and his main contention before the learned Rent Controller was that the disputed building is as much insufficient for the need of the landlords as the building already in their occupation is, and hence they do not improve their convenience in any manner by seeking ejectment of the tenant from the disputed building. It was also contended before the learned Rent Controller that the need of the landlords was not bona fide because the wife of Jagdish Lal had purchased a house 7 or 8 years ago which she rented to some tenants. If the landlords felt inadequacy of accommodation for themselves, they could have occupied that house as well. These pleas of the tenant prevailed upon the learned Rent Controller and he dismissed the petition. The landlords thereafter came in appeal before the Appellate authority who has reversed the decision of the Rent Controller. The learned Appellate authority has held that the accommodation in occupation of the Respondent-landlords is inadequate for their needs and one of them will shift in the disputed building and hence it was held that the disputed building is required by the landlords for their own occupation. Therefore, the learned Appellate authority has made an order for the eviction of the Petitioner-tenant from the disputed building. He has felt aggrieved of the order and has preferred this revision.

The learned Counsel for the Petitioner-tenant pressed on my attention a preliminary objection that the pleadings filed before the Rent Controller did not set out conditions (a), (b) and (c) of Section 13(3)(a)(i) and as such no amount of evidence could be led to substantiate any of such conditions. Besides that, contended the learned Counsel, the petition itself should have failed for want of necessary pleadings. To meet this argument, it may be stated at the outset that para (4) of the petition gave the following narration:

(4) That the Petitioners do not own any other premises, nor they have vacated or rented any other premises within the limits of municipal limits of Solan.

The plea contained in the aforesaid para (4) decidedly embraced, substantially, conditions (b) and (c), although the narration was not made with that much exactitude and precision which was needed. Apart from this, both the parties knew very well as to what points were at issue between them and none was prejudiced, because they were afforded ample opportunity to meet such points of dispute. The parties led evidence with pointed reference to conditions (a), (b) and (c) and the authorities below did decide these issues on merit between them. Evidence let in on issues on which the parties actually went to trial should not be made the foundation for decision of another and different issue, which was not present to the minds of the parties and on which they had no opportunity of adducing evidence. But this rule has no application to a case where parties go to a trial with knowledge that a particular question is in issue, though no specific issue has been framed thereon, and adduce evidence relating thereto see: Nagubai Ammal and Others Vs. B. Shama Rao and Others, In the circumstances, the inevitable conclusion would be that the absence of the pleading with as such Petitioner as was required in this case was a mere irregularity which resulted in no prejudice to the tenant.

Another facet of argument is supported by several authorities which go to say that it is not even necessary to mention the satutory conditions (a), (b) or (c) of Section 13(3)(a)(i) because each party was expected to know the law as laid down and must be deemed to have pleaded or controverted the pleas arising out of such law. At any rate, the absence of pleading any of the conditions (a), (b) and (c) would not be fatal to the petition. In Shri Krishan Lal Seth v. Shrimati Pritam Kumari 1961 P.L.R. 865 a Division Bench of Punjab High Court held that in a petition u/s 13(3) of the Act it is not necessary for the landlord to restate the statutory conditions set out in paras (b) and (c) of Sub-clause (i) of Clause (a) of Section 13(3). This decision was followed in the same High Court in Dev Raj v. Tilak Raj Dharam Pal etc. 1973 CL J 557. In that case it was found that the landlord had not stated in the petition that he was not occupying another residential building in the urban area concerned and that he had not vacated such a building without sufficient cause after the commencement of the Act in the said urban area. It was held that under the law it was not necessary to mention these conditions in the petition and as such the petition could not be thrown out. There are two more cases of Delhi High Court of which one relates to Himachal Pradesh, which deal with a similar question. In H.N. Bhasin v. Chamba Mall 1970 Rent Control Reporter 840, a learned Judge of Delhi High Court expressed a doubt if specific pleadings as to the conditions laid down in Section 13(3)(a)(i) would be necessary. The learned Judge was considering as to whether in the absence of such specific pleadings the evidence produced before the authority was at all admissible. In that case, however, it was found that such evidence was produced without objection from either side and hence the absence of specific pleading was not considered fatal. The doubt expressed by the learned Judge was subsequently confirmed in favour of the landlord in Johan Tinson and Co. Ltd. Simla v. Shri Amar Chand Sood and Anr. 1971 RCR 33. The learned Judge noticed the argument of the counsel in that case that the landlord had not averred in terms of Section 13(3)(a)(i) of the Act and so his petition should be dismissed. After referring to H.N. Bhasin v. Chamba Mall (supra), the learned Judge held that specific pleading was not required and the absence of such pleading would not be fatal to the petition. It is, therefore, evident that this preliminary objection raised by the Petitioner-tenant would not be sustainable. Firstly, there was a pleading containing conditions (b) and (c) although it lacked the required details, and secondly, the absence of such a specific pleading could not be fatal to the petition. Besides all this, the Petitioner-tenant knew fairly well as to what the landlords were pleading and sufficient opportunity was given to him to adduce evidence. The Petitioner-tenant was not prejudiced in any manner and he joined issue on such pleas without demur before the authorities below.

The second question that was presented for determination is somewhat important. The learned Counsel argued that the bare fact of the landlords having occupied another residential building in the urban area concerned, disqualifies them from seeking eviction under condition (a) of Section 13(3)(a)(i). Similarly, the learned Counsel argued that if either of the conditions (b) and (c) is not satisfied, the landlord would not be given the relief under condition (a) and the petition must fail. In other words, according to learned Counsel, adequacy or inadequacy of another residential building occupied by the landlord would not be a pertinent question to be gone into and the mere fact that he is in occupation of any such residential building or the mere fact that he has vacated any such building without sufficient cause, would be a ground to refuse eviction on the plea under condition (a) of Section 13(3)(a)(i). In my opinion, such a plea of the learned Counsel is devoid of any merit. It is fairly well settled that the conditions (a), (b) and (c) of Section 13(3)(a)(i) are to be read together and they are not mutually exclusive. The question as to whether a landlord requires a residential building for his own occupation, in turn depends upon further questions as to whether he is occupying another residential building sufficient to his needs or that he had vacated such a building without sufficient cause so that his requirement for the building in question is not bonafide. All the three conditions, therefore, must be read together and only thereafter a decision can be arrived at, as to whether the landlord requires the disputed building for his own occupation. From this point of view, it goes without saying that adequacy or otherwise of the residential building already occupied by the landlord would be a very pertinent factor to be gone into. If the fact of bare occupation by the landlord of any other residential building, howsoever inadequate it may be for him, is considered ground to reject the petition, condition (a) is rendered superfluous. There is a string of authorities in favour of this view.

This controversy was noticed for the first time in Sant Ram Das Raj Kalka Vs. Karam Chand Mangal Ram, and a Full Bench of that Court held that where a landlord establishes that he has made his application for eviction of his tenant in good faith and that he requires the premises for his own occupation and further that the premises already in his occupation do not meet his requirements and needs, he is entitled to evict his tenant u/s 13(3)(a)(i) of the Act. The word "requires" as used in condition (a) of the Act involves something more than a mere wish and it has in it an element of need to an extent at least. Such a need should in fact exist and should obviously be commensurate with his circumstances, such as the size of his family, his social status, social habits and style of living. In order to arrive at a conclusion in this regard, the adequacy of the accommodation already in his occupation would be an essential factor to be considered. The learned Judges further notice that the expression "another" is used in the Section and not "any" or "any other", which means that such another building has got to meet the requirement of the landlord. The object of Section 13(3)(a)(i) of the Act is to give protection to a tenant against arbitrary and whimsical eviction by a landlord and at the same time to ensure that the landlord has his requirements fulfilled by asking for his own occupation a residential building under his tenant. In Attar Singh Vs. Inder Kumar, their Lordships considered a similar situation. The argument was that conditions (a), (b) and (c) of Sub-clause (ii) of Section 13(3)(a) are mutually exclusive and the absence of one would disqualify ejectment from rented land. It was held that all the conditions are to be read together and only thereafter the need of the landlord would be ascertained for eviction from a rented land for which a finding was required as to whether the land was needed for his own use. As conditions (a), (b) and (c) of Sub-clause (i) are the same in pari meteria as conditions given in Sub-clause (ii) are, this decision would be an authority to hold that all the conditions (a), (b) and (c) of Clause (i) have to be considered cumulatively in order to arrive at the decision regarding the need of the landlord for the disputed residential building.

In Nanak Chand v. Inderjit and Ors. 1969 R C R 887 the Supreme Court was asked to reconsider Sant Ram Des Raj v. Karam Chand Mangal Ram (supra). Full Bench decision of Punjab High Court and their Lordships refused to reconsider that decision, obviously holding it to be correct. That was again a case under the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949. It was contended that the High Court had no jurisdiction to go into the question of insufficiency of accommodation already in occupation of the landlord and the Supreme Court decided that the High Court could very well enter into that question because all the conditions laid down u/s 13(3)(a)(i) are to be read together and only thereafter the need of the landlord can be ascertained. After that decision of the Supreme Court, two more cases came before the Punjab High Court and in both these cases it was held that the adequacy of accommodation already in occupation of the landlord would be a relevant factor to be considered. The cases are: Smt. HarwantKaur and Ors. v. Harinam Sankirtan Mandal, Yamuna Nagar 1972 RCR 662, and Jai Ram v. Ram Partap 1973 R C R 717, In this connection reliance was placed on behalf of the landlords on Hari Krishan Daroga v. Arjan Singh 1973 Rent Control Reporter 721, but, with respects to the learned Judge, I do not subscribe to the view taken by him. The learned Judge was dealing with a petition u/s 13(3)(a)(i) and the landlord was residing in a rented house and wanted his own house to be vacated by the tenant. It was held that the meaning of expression "occupation of another residential building" was, that the other residential building must be occupied by him in his own right and not as tenant of somebody else. The reasoning availed of by the learned Judge was that the landlord was likely to be evicted from such rented building and he was at the mercy of his own landlord. Therefore, he could not be stated to be in occupation of another residential building. As I have already stated, with respects, I do not agree with this view of the learned Judge. The other building in occupation might be of the landlord himself or rented with him. If such another building is adequate to his needs, he would be occupying another residential building under condition (b) and it will be held that he does not require the disputed building for his own occupation.

The last case which need be referred in this series is of Himachal Pradesh, which is John Tinson and Co. Ltd. Simla v. Shri Amar Chand Sood (supra). The landlord was occupying rented premises and wanted possession of his own premises. The adequacy of rented premises to fulfil the needs of the landlord was considered and he was held entitled to evict the tenant occupying his own premises.

Thus there is no force in the contention of the learned Counsel for the Petitioner-tenant that the condition (b) or (c) is required to be individually fulfilled before the landlord can seek the relief under condition (a) of Section 13(3)(a)(i). In fact, all the conditions are to be considered cumulatively and the mere fact that the landlord is in occupation of a rented building which is inadequate to his needs will not deprive him of occupying the residential building which is under his tenant. The evidence, in this connection, that was adduced by the parties was carefully considered by the Appellate authority and there is no ground for this Court to take a different view. The residential building in occupation of the Respondent-landlords is inadequate to their needs and one of them will shift to the residential building in dispute, and in this manner the landlords require the disputed building for their own occupation.

The learned Counsel then naturally drifted to another argument which related to the averment made in the petition that both the landlords would shift to the new accommodation, although subsequently this averment was modified, as evidence was tendered and accepted, that only one landlord will shift to the new accommodation. The learned Counsel submitted that the need of the landlords could not be split up and either both of them remain in the building already in their occupation or both of them shift to the new building sought to be evicted. In my opinion, the learned Counsel is again wrong when he seeks his contention on any such ground. The words used are "for his own occupation" which do not necessarily mean that the entire body of landlords must vacate the building already in occupation and shift to the new building sought to be evicted. If that is so, in case they are occupying their own building either they leave it vacant or rent it out, and in case they are occupying rented building they must vacate it in favour of their own landlord. Such a contingency is never contemplated in the Act. There may be a case where the tenant-landlord is bound under the terms of tenancy contract not to vacate the premises. What will he do in such a situation? Apart from this, by no stretch of imagination it can be considered that the Act wanted to perpetuate the inconvenience of the landlord who is made either to occupy a building inadequate to his needs or vacate it and occupy other building again inadequate to his needs. If one of the landlords vacates the building and occupies the new one, he gives a relief to the other landlord similarly as he gets relief for himself. In such a situation it may even be held that both the landlords require the new building for their own occupation. The expression "occupation" as has been held does not mean actual physical possession by both the landlords. The need of one landlord has been held to be the need of all of them.

In Madan Gopal Sehgal v. Om Parkash 1965 P.L.R. 97, a learned Judge of Punjab High Court was considering the case of joint landlords and requirement of one landlord was considered sufficient for a petition for ejectment filed by them. If one of the landlords needed the accommodation for his bona fide residence, that was considered the need of all of the landlords and the eviction petition was held maintainable. Again, in John Tinson and Co. Ltd. Simla v. Shri Amar Chand Sood (supra) which is a case from Himachal Pradesh, this very question arose and the need of one landlord was considered sufficient. It was held that the requirement of one of the landlords would mean the requirement on the part of all the landlords. The ratio of these two decisions can very well be availed of in the present case. If one of the landlords can be accommodated in the new building, that would satisfy the need of both of them, and this circumstance would not be fatal to the petition.

In fact, the averment made in the petition would not give a cause to Petitioner-tenant to defeat the very right of eviction. If such averment was subsequently modified and Jagdish Lal (P.W. 3) stated that one of them will shift in the new accommodation, that may be a circumstance to judge the merit of the averment made in the petition. It could be argued that the factual position was altered and hence that would go to affect the credibility of the witness. Nevertheless, the Appellate authority considered the factual position and despite the alteration made to the averment in the petition, decided in favour of the landlords. This Court cannot take exception to this finding of fact. Any departure in the averment does not go to the root of the case and will have no bearing on the very right of the landlord seeking the eviction of the tenant. The expression "occupation" has also been subject-matter of several decisions. In Dr. Mohd. Ibrahim v. Syed Ahmed Khan AIR 1950 Mad 556, which was a case under the Madras Act, it was held that a person must be deemed to be occupying a residential building at the time of an application for eviction if any of the members of his family including dependants reside in the building with his permission and on his account, though physically he himself might not be residing therein. The test is whether if he desires he cannot at any time go to reside in it. In the instant case also, there is a mutual settlement between the two landlords and any one of them can go and reside in the disputed building at any point of time. In Smt. Harwant Kaur and Ors. v. Harinam Sankirtan Mandal; Yamuna Nagar (supra) also, the learned Judge observed that occupation does not mean residence. In that case a building was needed for running a school and that was considered occupation by the landlord, although actual residence was not to be there. At any rate, it is easy to infer that the disputed building is required by both the landlords inasmuch as one of them will occupy it to give convenience to the other who shall continue occupying the other building.

It is evident, the building sought to be occupied belongs to the Respondent-landlords and they can alter that building to their advantage. Apart from this, the disputed building is really the upper-flat of their own shop and it would be more convenient for anyone of them to occupy it, which will facilitate their business, The learned Counsel for the Petitioner-tenant pressed on my attention the second proviso to Section 13(3)(a), which says that the landlord once he applies for eviction under Clause (i) will not be entitled to apply again under the said clause for possession of any other building. The argument was reinforced by saying that the disqualification will be suffered by both the landlords and therefore both of them, and not singly, should be asked to occupy the new building. In case only one of them can conveniently occupy it, the petition must fail on that ground. The argument is devoid of merit. As I have already held, the need of one landlord will be the need of both of them. The occupation by one would be in lieu of the requirement of occupation by both as that will fulfil the need of both. Therefore, let there be a disqualification to both the landlords. They will be amenable to such a disqualification under the second proviso. Therefore, this contention put forward by the learned Counsel also fails.

It is true that over all this, the Respondent-landlords have to prove bona fide claim for possession, and to my mind, they have succeeded in proving the same. The fact that the wife of Jagdish Lal possessed a house which she rented out 7 or 8 years ago would not be material. Firstly, the house did not belong to any of the landlords, and secondly, the condition regarding need in the family was not so pressing 7 or 8 years ago as it seems to be now. Some children are born and some have grown to school-going age. Therefore, the needs have altered and on the date of the filing of the petition the two landlords stand in dire necessity of occupying the disputed building.

In the last, it was argued that the Appellate authority designated itself as District Judge while deciding the appeal filed against the decision of the Rent Controller. This misdescription in the designation would be of no avail. In Jaswant Ram v. B.D. Sharma 1968 P.L.R. 105, and Messrs Lachman Dass Sain Ditta Mal v. Shri Hanuwant Dass Sud 1968 P.L.R. 174, it is held that any misdescription in the designate ion would be of no avail particularly when the same officer occupies both the posts of District Judge and of the Appellate authority.

For these reasons, it is not difficult to hold that the approach of the learned Appellate authority is not open to exception and the conclusion reached by it would be unassailable. The Respondent-landlords are entitled to evict the Petitioner-tenant, as they require the disputed residential building for their own occupation and they fulfil the conditions (a) and (b) of Section 13(3)(a)(i) of the Act.

The revision petition is, therefore, without any force and is dismissed, with costs to the Respondents.

Counsel fee to be assessed at Rs. 150/-.

For the reasons contained in our respective judgments the revision petition is dismissed with costs which are assessed at Rs. 150/-.