Master Karam Chand vs Gurprit Singh and Another

Dua, J.—This case reminds me of the difficulties of a landlord which start after securing an order for eviction even when such an order has been obtained with the free and willing consent of the tenant.

According to the common case of the parties, Shri Gurprit Singh and his brother Gurbhajnik Singh secured an order of ejectment against Shri Karam Chand in respect of their rented land and building as far back as 30th May, 1955, more than 10 years ago. The order was passed on a compromise according to which Shri Karam Chand was allowed a period of five years to Vacate the premises. Proceedings for ejectment had been pending for about one year before the compromise was effected. There is, of course, nothing on the record to show as to what were the grounds on which eviction proceedings were initiated. It was, however, provided by the terms of the compromise that at the time of actual eviction, the market value of three rooms, a verandah, a shed and a garage constructed by the tenant would be got assessed from a building expert and the landlord would then have the option of either paying the market value and taking possession thereof or allowing the tenant to remove the material in case the price was considered by him to be excessive. Before the expiration of the period of five years, the landlord served a notice dated 2nd "May, 1960, calling upon the tenant to have the market value assessed. An application for execution was presented on 27th January, 1961 which means several months after the expiry of five years. The tenant curiously enough appeared and objected to his eviction. Several objections were raised but I am only concerned with those which have been agitated before me. The first objection which has been most seriously pressed is that no order on the basis of compromise could be made by the Kent Controller ordering eviction of the tenant and, therefore, the order sought to be executed is ultra vires and indeed, a nullity. This precise objection, it is worth-nothing, was not raised in the objections preferred by the tenant, nor was it contained in the grounds of appeal to the Appellate Authority. This is the finding of the Appellate Authority, though this view is contested by the tenant appellant. Shri Munjral has read put to me objection No. 3 from his objection petition, but I am unable to read this ground to mean that the order of the Rent Controller passed on compromise is without jurisdiction and a nullity because it is not based on grounds on which ejectment is permissible under the Rent Control Act. Indeed, it is this aspect which is sought to be emphasised by the learned counsel before me. Objection No. 3 gives reasons for the plea of the order of ejectment to be that the tenant had built some structure on the site in question and that the cost of the construction had to be paid by the decree-holder to the judgment-debtor and further that the Rent Controller had no jurisdiction to entertain and hold the proceedings. Quite clearly, this plea can by no means be construed to justify the argument now sought to be developed. In the grounds of appeal also before the Appellate authority, I have not been shown any precise ground covering this argument. This general challenge to the jurisdiction of the Rent Controller is, in my opinion, unavailing.

But this apart, even otherwise, there is no merit in the objection. u/s 13 of the Rent Restriction Act (E.P. Urban Rent Restriction Act III of 1949), a tenant it is not to be evicted from the, building or rented land in dispossession in execution of a decree except in accordance with the provisions of this Act or in pursuance of an order made u/s 13 of the Rent Act of 1947, as subsequently amended. Now an application was apparently presented under the Act of 1949 and an order for eviction made, though passed on a compromise. In pursuance of that order, the tenant has actually remained in possession ever-since May, 1955 and indeed he is still in possession. If the tenant who was a party to that order, was desirous of questioning its excitability on the ground that the Rent Controller had no inherent jurisdiction to pass it, then it was, in my opinion, incumbent on him to raise the necessary objection on that score and to bring on the present record material for substantiating the objection that the impugned order was without jurisdiction and, therefore, a nullity non-est. Merely pleading that the impugned order was without jurisdiction did not by itself cast any onus on the landlord to establish affirmatively that the said order was truly in accordance with the provisions of the Act of 1949. The principal argument raised by Shri Munjral in this Court is concentrated on the submission that once the tenant questioned however baldly, the legality of the order of eviction made in 1955, it became incumbent on the landlord to place all necessary material before the executing Court to establish the legality of the order, and failure on his part to do so rendered the order of eviction in executable. For this sweeping submission, there seems to be no authority, and indeed neither any principle nor any precedent has been brought to my notice in its support.

The appellant''s learned counsel has cited Chaman Lal Beri v. Gian Chand Behl (1964) 66 P.L.R. 823; in which, according to him, the earlier case law has been noticed. In fairness to the counsel, it must be conceded that he has not taken time in going through the earlier decisions. Relying on Chaman Lal Beri''s case (supra), he has argued that it was incumbent on the Court below to consider and to come to its own conclusion whether a not the grounds on which the compromise was arrived at, which is now sought to be executed, fell within the purview of section 13 of the Rent Act so as to confer jurisdiction on the Rent Controller to pass the impugned order. The reported decision, in my view, is of no assistance to the appellant on the facts and circumstances of the present case. In the reported case on appeal from an order rejecting an application for ejectment, the parties had entered into a compromise where by some period of time was granted to the tenant for vacating the premises. In the mean time the tenant appears to have threatened that he would not vacate the premises and would instead plead inexcusability of the compromise order after the expiry of the period allowed to the tenant. The landlord thereupon applied to the Appellate Authority to dispose of his appeal on the merits, provided the Authority took the view that the compromise order was without jurisdiction. The Appellate Authority did not accede to this prayer and also declined to adjudicate or the validity of the compromise. It was in these circumstances that this Court set aside the order of the Appellate Authority and remitted the case back to it with a direction to decide the question of the validity of the compromise order and to adjudicate on the rights of the parties, in accordance with law. It is quite clear that the decision cited does not help the appellant. Indeed, the ratio of some of the decided cases if erred to therein goes against the appellant''s submission.

The true legal position seems to me to be this. It is a question to be decided in each case whether or not an order of eviction based on compromise is in accordance with the provisions of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act. Such an order cannot, as a matter of law, be held to be in executable merely because it is based on compromise, for, in certain circumstances admission by a tenant of relevant facts pleaded by the landlord might well by itself constitute very good evidence or legal material in proof of the landlord''s allegations. The necessary presumption of legality of an order made by a judicial Tribunal has to be displaced by the party seeking to assail its legality; the onus is somewhat heavier on a person who is a consenting party to that order and is, therefore, as a general rule bound by it. In the absence of any material suggesting fundamental invalidity of the compromise, the order based thereon must be considered valid and enforceable; it must ordinarily be presumed that the Controller while passing the order satisfied himself that the order was in accordance with the provisions of section 13 of the Rent Act. Indeed, in such circumstances, the order is supposed to bind the parties even on general principles of res judicata, and in this connection cases of fixation of fair rent on compromise must, for obvious reasons, be distinguished from cases of compromise orders of ejectment. And then, the tenant having enjoyed full benefit of the compromise order to the prejudice of the landlord, I entertain extreme doubt if it can be open to him to plead that the compromise order is not binding on him, and on this ground to resist its execution, after fully reaping its fruits. An order made u/s 13 of the East Punjab Rent Act is executable as if it were a decree of a Civil Court, as provided by section 17. This deeming provision must carry with it the general rule that the executing Court cannot go behind the decree to be executed, and it is so even if the decree be based on compromise, unless of course, the decree is clearly shown to have been made by the Court entirely lacking in jurisdiction over the subject-matter or the parties or that the compromise itself is fundamentally infirm, in which case it can not be enforced by the Court. Nothing cogent and convincing has been urged on behalf of the appellant and no principle or precedent has been brought to my notice which would justify disagreement with and therefore reversal of the order of the Court below. This appeal is thus wholly unmeritorious.

I must before closing point out that justice is on human boon which is universally demanded in all human societies. Indeed, the quality of a political setup is largely measured in terms of the quality of justice which the people generally get under it; indeed, liberty itself is a reflection of the concept of justice. Our Constitution has thus rightly given the most honored place to justice. But justice is not automatically done by establishing Courts of justice and by enacting must laws. What is more important is that those who administer justice must conscientiously discharge their duties and functions with a due sales of responsibility, keeping in view, among other considerations, the will-known saying that justice delayed is justice denied. Such delayed justice has a tendency to give rise to feelings of discontent among the suitor, which must in the end disagreeably react on our system. This is a situation which should never be allowed to arise and every Indian, whatever his station in life, must endeavour to avoid such a result. Those whose duty it is to administer justice have, of course, a special responsibility in this respect, for it is their solemn duty to counter, in accordant with law, all unreasonable attempts to prolong the final determination controversies. It is, therefore, necessary, that delays like what has been caused in the present case must not be allowed to sully the fair name of justice in this Republic.

Without pursuing the matter any further, I would dismiss this appeal with costs and direct that in execution of the order of eviction, whatever further proceedings have to be taken should be taken with due dispatch and without any unreasonable delay; if possible, the case should be finally concluded within four months so that the landlord who Was entitled to get possession of his premises in June, 1980, reaps the fruits of the order in his favour without further avoidable delay.