Mohinder Kaur vs Rana Joginder Singh

S.S. Sodhi J.

In a suit for preemption, the plaintiffs asserted a superior right of preemption on the ground that they were the sons of the vendorSmt. Satya Vati and the brothers of the other vendorVinod Kumar and further that they were the cosherers in the land too. When all the evidence had been led and the case was at the stage of arguments, with limitation for the filing of a fresh suit long having expired since then, an amendment of the plaint was sought to take up the plea "that, Smt. Satya Vati, vendor, defendant No. 2 who is the stepmother of the plaintiffs, succeeded to her share in the suit land through her husband, that is, inherited the same from her husbandSh. Gobinder Singh". In other words, the claim for preemption was sought to be put forth under Section 15(2)(b) of the Punjab Preemtpion Act, 1913 (hereinafter called `the Act"). The trial Court clearly fell in error in allowing this amendment.

It is now well settled that in a suit for preemption where the superior right of preemption is founded upon Section 15(2)(b) of the Act, all the necessary facts, as would bring the case under that provision of law, must be specifically pleaded and that too within the period of limitation for the filing of the suit. In this behalf two judgments of this Court deserve mention. The first being Dalip Singh v. Uttam Singh, 1970 PLJ 776, where it was held that the plaintiff, in a preemption suit, who relies on Section 15(2)(b) of the Act, must plead the necessary facts as contemplated therein; merely pleading that the plaintiff had a right of preemption under Section 15 of the Act, was not enough. In the other case, Shanker Singh v. Chanan Singh, 1968 Curr. L.J. 363, it was held that the specific ground on which the preferential right of preemption is claimed, must be specifically pleaded in the suit and that too within the period of limitation. The right which accrues to the vendee to defeat the plaintiff''s claim, as not coming within the statutory provision upon which reliance is placed, cannot be allowed to be defeated by amendment of the plaint after the period of limitation for the filing of the suit has expired.

Considered in this light, there can be no escape from the conclusion that the trial Court erred in allowing the amendment whereby it permitted the plaintiff to putforth the necessary pleas to bring the case under Section 15(2)(b) of the Act and that too after the period of limitation had expired. The impugned order of the trial Court is accordingly set aside. The defendantvendee shall be entitled to her costs in this petition. Counsel fee Rs. 300/.