MURARI LAL vs Delhi Vidyut Board

THE present appeal, filed by the appellant under Section 15 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (hereinafter referred to as the Act), is directed against order dated 31.3.2003, passed by District Forum (East), Saini Enclave, Delhi in Complaint Case No. 138/2002- entitled Shri Murari Lal v. THE Chairman, Delhi Vidyut Board.

THE facts, relevant for the disposal of the above-mentioned appeal lie in a narrow compass. THE appellant Shri Murari Lal had filed a complaint under Section 12 of the Act before the District Forum alleging deficiency in service on the part of the respondent/DVB. THE grievance of the appellant in the complaint, filed by him, before the District Forum in nutshell was that wrong/inflated bills for the consumption of electricity had been issued by the respondent/DVB. The learned District Forum vide impugned order has allowed the complaint, filed by the appellant, and has directed that revised bills be issued by the respondent/DVB and payment made by the appellant be adjusted in the revised bills. The learned District Forum has also directed that payment of the amount due and payable by the appellant as per the revised bills be accepted from the appellant in five equal monthly instalments. The learned District Forum has also awarded a compensation of Rs. 1,000/- and litigation expenses amounting to Rs. 250/-.

Not feeling satisfied with the relief granted by the District Forum vide impugned order, the appellant has preferred the present appeal under Section 15 of the Act.

WE have heard the appellant at length on the question of admission of the present appeal and have also carefully gone through the documents/material on record. During the course of arguments the only contention being advanced by the appellant is that the amount of compensation granted to him by the District Forum is inadequate and that the appellant instead of being awarded a compensation of Rs. 1,000/- only should have been awarded a compensation of Rs. 10,000/- to be paid by the respondent/DVB. Insofar as the above contention being advanced by the appellant, the position is that relief to a ''consumer'' by a redressal agency, established under the Act, can be granted only in terms of Section 14 of the Act. Clause (d) of Sub-section (1) of Section 14 of the Act deals with compensation that can be awarded to a ''consumer'' by a redressal agency established under the Act. The above said provision of the Act reads as under : "(d) to pay such amounts as may be awarded by it as compensation to the Consumer for any loss or injury suffered by the consumer due to the negligence of the opposite party." On a plain reading of the above provisions of the Act, it is apparent that a ''consumer'' may be awarded compensation for any loss or injury suffered by the ''consumer'' due to the negligence of the opposite party. The Hon''ble National Commission in a recent decision - in case Standard Chartered Grindlays Bank Ltd. v. H.B. Impex Pvt. Ltd., reported as 2002 CTJ 106 (CP) (NCDRC), has held in clear-cut terms that where a consumer sues for damages, the loss he suffered as a result of breach of contract, must not be too remote and a distinction has to be drawn between normal and abnormal or unusual loss. In other words, a consumer, in terms of the above provisions, can be compensated only for normal loss and not for any abnormal or unusual or remote loss. With a view to satisfy ourselves, we have put a specific query to the appellant, asking him to satisfy us as to how the relief granted to the appellant by the District Forum can be treated or termed as inadequate in terms of the provisions of Clause (d) of Sub-section (1) of Section 14 of the Act. No satisfactory reply could be given by the appellant to our above query. No other point is urged or pressed before us by the appellant.

IN our opinion, in the given facts, no fault can be found with the findings of the learned District Forum. The order being impugned in the present proceedings is a well reasoned order which suffers from no infirmity, so as to call for any interference by this Commission in exercise of its appellate powers. The present appeal, filed by the appellant is, therefore, devoid of substance. The same merits dismissal. Accordingly, the same is dismissed in limine with no orders as to costs. Appeal dismissed.