DELHI VIDYUT BOARD vs Suraj Bhan

THE present appeal, filed by the appellant, under Section 15 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (hereinafter referred to as ''the Act''), is directed against order dated 26.4.1999, passed by District Forum No.-I in Complaint Case No. 932/96-entitled Shri Suraj Bhan v. THE Assistant Finance Officer, DESU & Anr.

THE facts, relevant for the disposal of the present appeal, briefly stated, are that the respondent filed a complaint under Section 12 of the Act before the District Forum, averring that the respondent had occupied premises, bearing No. 2695, Plot No. 11, Sadar Thana Road, Delhi on rental basis w.e.f. 25.12.1988. As the abovesaid premises, taken on rent, by the respondent, had no electric connection, the respondent applied for an electric connection and a sum of Rs. 750/- was deposited by the respondent with the appellant on 25.1.1989. THE case of the respondent, before the District Forum, was that though meter was installed on 16.3.1989 but the respondent did not receive any bill for the consumption of electricity despite repeated request till May, 1996. It was stated that in May, 1996, the respondent received 1st bill for electricity consumption in respect of abovesaid meter amounting to Rs. 2,43,100/- for the consumption of 90,940 units. THE grievance of the respondent in the complaint filed by him before the District Forum, in nutshell, was that the bill received by him, from the appellant D.V.B., was highly inflated/excessive. In the complaint, filed by the respondent, before the District Forum, it was prayed that the bill in question be quashed; the supply of energy be not disconnected till the dispute is finally decided; that the respondent be issued a bill for the actual consumption and the appellant be directed to send the bills regularly. THE respondent also claimed compensation to the extent of Rs. 15,000/- and litigation expenses to the extent of Rs. 7,200/-. The claim of the respondent/complainant, in the District Forum, was contested by the appellant, who filed a written statement. The stand, taken by the appellant, before District Forum, was that the delay in issuing the bill in respect of the meter in question was due to the fact that the appellant had switched over the system of issuing electricity bills from manual to computerised ones and the particulars of the meter in question could not be feeded in the computer in time as a result of which, the bill could not be issued in time. It was also stated that bill for May, 1996 was as per readings recorded in the meter. It was contended in the written statement that on a representation made by the respondent, the Inspector of the appellant, visited the premises on 13.6.1996 and found that the meter was moving in right direction. It was stated that the bill was correct and the complaint, filed by the respondent, was liable to be dismissed.

The learned District Forum, vide impugned order, has held that appellant guilty of deficiency in service and has directed that the bill for the period from 1989 to May, 1996, be revised on the basis of average reading of the meter or on the basis of minimum guarantee amount whichever is more. It was also directed that in the revised bill, no LPC charges would be added. The respondent was given the liberty to make the payment of the revised bill in 7 equal monthly instalments and the 1st instalment was payable within one month of the receipt of the revised bill and till the revision of the electricity bill, in terms of the above order, the electricity of the respondent was not to be disconnected.

FEELING aggrieved, the appellant has preferred the present appeal under Section 15 of the Act. We have heard the learned Counsel for the appellant at length on the question of admission of the present appeal and have also carefully gone through the documents/material on record. The order, being impugned in the present proceedings, was passed by the learned District Forum on 26.4.1999. In terms of the provisions contained in Section 15 of the Act, the present appeal, should have been filed within a period of 30 days from the date of order. However, proviso to the above section provides that the State Commission may entertain an appeal even after the expiry of abovesaid period of 30 days, if the Commission is satisfied that there was ''Sufficient cause'' for not filing the same within the abovesaid period. Admittedly, the present appeal has not been filed by the appellant within the prescribed period of 30 days. The same has been filed on 7.9.1999. Alongwith appeal, the appellant has also filed an application seeking condonation of delay in filing the appeal. On 14.12.1999, an additional affidavit, detailing therein the so called additional reasons for not filing the appeal in time, has been filed. In the abovesaid application, seeking condonation of delay, in filing the appeal, it is stated that certified true copy of the order, being impugned in the present proceedings, was received in the office of the appellant on 4.5.1999. In the abovesaid application, it is stated that after receiving the certified true copy of the order from the District Forum-I on 4.5.1999, the file was brought back to the Legal Department for appropriate action on 6.5.1999. Thereafter, the file was sent to the AFO and was received back in the Legal Department on 25.5.1999 for the purpose of filing the appeal. On 31.5.1999, the file was handed over to the concerned Lawyer for filing the appeal. As already stated, the present appeal has been filed on 7.9.1999. From 31.5.1999 to 7.9.1999, no satisfactory explanation for delay, has been given. The only reason assigned is that, in the month of June, 1999 the Courts observed summer vacations and the Lawyers were out of station during summer vacations and therefore the appeal could not be filed.

AS already stated, there is a statutory provision enabling the Commission to entertain the appeal even after the expiry of the statutory period, prescribed for filing the appeal, provided the appellant satisfies that there was ''sufficient cause'' for not filing the same within time. The words ''sufficient cause'', occurring in proviso to Section 15 of the ''Act'', are of utmost significance. AS per settled Law, culled out from various judicial decisions, the above expression, ''sufficient cause'' though deserves to receive a liberal construction, yet, a just and equitable balance has to be maintained between the right secured by the respondent as a result of the expiry of the prescribed period limitation and the injustice of depriving the appellant of adjudication of his grievances on the merits of appeal for causes beyond his reasonable control, which means the cause is bona fide and beyond the control of the appellant. Though, no hard and fast line can be drawn as to what affords ''sufficient cause'' in given case, yet again, as per settled Law any cause which prevents a person from approaching the Court within time, is ''sufficient cause''. In doing so, it is the test of a reasonable man in normal circumstances which has to be applied. If the above criterion is applied to the present case, it is noticed that the application seeking condonation of delay in filing the present appeal miserably fails to meet the above requirement because as per appellant''s own case, certified true copy of the order being impugned in the present proceedings, was received in the office of the appellant on 4.5.1999 and a decision to file an appeal in the present case was taken on 25.5.1999. Not only this, the file in question was handed over to the concerned Lawyer on 31.5.1999 for the purposes of filing the appeal. Thereafter, no satisfactory explanation for the delay is forthcoming from the appellant. It is inter alia stated that in the month of June till the 1st week of July, the Courts observed summer vacations and the Lawyers were out of station. The above plea, taken by the appellant, is not at all tenable in the facts and circumstances of the present case because in the first place, the Foras, constituted under the Act do not observe any summer vacations and the office of the Commission functioned throughout the months June and July, 1999 on all working days. Secondly, all the Courts in Union Territory of Delhi, after summer vacations, had reopened in the 1st week of July, 1999. If really, the cause was, as stated in the application, in that event too, the present appeal should have been filed, soon after the re-opening of the Courts in the second work of July, 1999. The same, as already stated, has been filed in the month of September, 1999 (on 7.9.1999). In the presence of the above facts and position explained above, in our opinion, whatever liberal interpretation might be put on the words ''sufficient cause'', it would be impossible for us to hold that there was no negligence or want of bona fides on the part of the appellant. In our opinion, the appellant, in the given facts, has miserably failed to show ''sufficient cause'' for condoning the delay in filing the present appeal and therefore the application, seeking condonation of delay in filing the present appeal, is hereby rejected.

THE present appeal, filed by the appellant, besides being barred by limitation, is also devoid of substance on merits because it has been held by the learned District Forum that for nearly seven long years, no electricity bill was given to the respondent by the appellant. THE learned District Forum, also refused to accept the plea of the appellant that the delay in sending the electricity bill was due to switching over the billing system from manual to computer and it has been held that the same (abnormal delay) is in contravention of the provisions of Rule 25(a) of the conditions of supply of DESU. It has also been held by the District Forum that prima facie, there was fault in the meter which gave a reading of average consumption of electricity of 42 units per day because in the subsequent period, the bills raised between July, 1996 to May, 1997 indicated the consumption of not more that 20 units in two months. On the basis of the above facts, it has been held by the learned District Forum that, there was deficiency in service on the part of the appellant and on the basis of the above findings, the learned District Forum has passed the impugned order.

IN our opinion, in the given facts, no fault can be found with the above findings of the District Forum. The same suffers from no infirmity so as to call for any interference by this Commission in exercise of its appellate powers. The present appeal, filed by the appellant, is devoid of substance and accordingly, the same is dismissed in limine with no order as to costs. Appeal dismissed.