High CourtsDivision Bench(1918) 01 MAD CK 0019

Muthu Karau Vena Alagappa Chettiar and Others vs Kanakasabai Pillai and Others

Madras High Court · Decided on 10 January 1918 · Citation: 45 Ind. Cas. 689 : (1918) 7 LW 563

HON’BLE JUDGES
Sadasiva Aiyar, J · Oldfield, J

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Judgment

17 paragraphs · 388 words
1.

This appeal can be disposed of with reference to only one of the grounds taken, that the lower Appellate Court erred in its decision in favour of

plaintiff''s right to proceed by suit. The 1st defendant was under obligation, under Exhibit Al, a compromise decree, to endorse certain promissory

notes in plaintiff''s favour and to execute a power-of-attorney and do other things within a fixed time. He did not comply with his obligation; and

plaintiff, instead of compelling him to do so by process under Order XXI, Rule 34 or 32, has now sued him and the present appellants, certain

trustees alleged to be in possession of his property, for damages on the ground that the notes are now time-barred and worthless.

2.

The lower Appellate Court has held that such a suit will lie on the strength of certain authorities, of which (to mention only those in which Section

47 of the CPC of 1908 was pleaded) Saratmani Debee v. Bata Krishna 35 12 C.W.N. 614. was decided in special circumstances and Rolintavita

Mama Amma v. Kolintavita Haji Kandi 17 M.L.J. 543. and Quamzal Huda v. Kumud Nath 7 Ind. Cas. 248. dealt with causes of action arising

subsequently to, and independently of, the decree. Here the cause of action is not that the notes are barred, but that 1st Defendant failed to comply

with the decree and enable plaintiff to sue on them, before they became so barred; and the authorities referred to are not in point. In the absence of

authority, we are not prepared to accept the proposition involved in plaintiff''s contention that a judgment-debtor, who does not voluntarily satisfy a

decree, commits an actionable wrong, for which the decree-holder can recover compensation by separate suit. Taking this view, we must hold that

the suit is not sustainable.

3.

We have been asked, in the alternative, to treat the plaint, as an execution petition and to allow the plaintiff to recover damages under Order

XXI, Rule 32. But, apart from any objections to such execution on its merits, we are not, in view of the delay, after which this relief has been

claimed, and the course of the litigation, prepared to use our discretion to do so.

4.

The result is that the appeal is allowed, the suit being dismissed with costs throughout.