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Judgment
Raju, J.—The above appeal has been filed u/s 30 of the Tamil Nadir Minor Inams (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, 1963 (30
of 1963).
The lands in question were granted for the support of the pagoda of Varadaraja Perumal at Nathakadayar and the grant was permanently
confirmed in T.D. No. 2478 so long as the pagoda was well kept up. After the coming into force of Tamil Nadu Act 30 of 1963, the Settlement
Tahsildar No. IV, Erode, took up enquiry and consideration of claims and by his proceedings dated 9.9.1970, passed an order allowing ryotwari
patta in favour of the 1st respondent temple. The appellants, who are present enjoyers, aggrieved by the said order, filed an appeal before the
Minor Inams Tribunal, Coimbatore (Sub Court) and the Tribunal, while setting aside the order of the Settlement Tahsildar, remitted the case for
fresh enquiry and disposal in the light of the observations contained in its order. It is seen from the proceedings of the Settlement Tahsildar,
Coimbatore, that the scope of enquiry was confined to consider the effect of the documents filed at the appellate stage and to pass appropriate
orders. The Settlement Thasildhar appears to have followed the procedure of issuing public notice, as also individual notice to all interested parties,
as required under the Rules. Oral evidence was let in by the claimants and after considering the evidence on record, the Settlement Tahsildar,
Coimbatore, by his order dated 4.7.1973, directed garnet of ryotwari patta in respect of the lands to the appellants in the manner set out in detail
in the schedule to the order, specifying the different extents in favour of different claimants. Aggrieved, the 1st respondent temple filed an appeal in
C.M.A. No. 23 of 1978 before the Minor Inams Tribunal, Erode (Principal Sub Court, Erode). The learned Tribunal, by his order dated
20.4.1983, has set aside the order of the Settlement Tahsildar and allowed patta in favour of the temple. In coming to such a conclusion, the
Tribunal placed reliance upon the judgment of this Court in Kalivaradaraja Perumal Koil, Pollachi v. K.S.J. Raju Chettiar, 1978 (91) L.W. 142.
Aggrieved, the party claimants have filed the above appeal.
Mr. S. Gopalaratnam, learned Counsel appearing for the appellants, placed strong reliance upon a latest pronouncement of the Supreme Court
in 1997 - 2 - LW 323 (SC) to contend that the presumption u/s 44 of the Act 30 of 1963 was a rebuttable one, and that being so, the appellants
have produced sufficient materials and substantiated their claims that they were always owners of kudivaram and the temple was only holding
melvaram interest and consequently the Tribunal ought not to have interfered with the orders of the Settlement Tahsildar and disturbed the ryotwari
patta granted in favour of the appellants. The 1st respondent temple, though was served with notice, has not chosen to engage any counsel to
contest the claim. Therefore, it becomes necessary to consider the legality and tenability of the submissions on behalf of the appellants and the
challenge made to the order of the Tribunal in this appeal.
We have carefully considered the submissions of learned counsel for the appellants. In 1997 - 2 - LW 323 (SC) , their Lordships of the Apex
Court were dealing with the claim of a temple, which was the appellant before the Supreme Court under the very Tamil Nadu Act 30 of 1963,
which is under consideration in this appeal. No doubt it was held therein that Section 44, though enacts a presumption that when it relates to the
Inam granted for the benefit of the religious, educational or charitable institution or granted to any individual for rendering service to a religious,
educational or charitable institution or for the purpose of rendering any other service, it shall be presumed, unless the contrary is proved, that the
Inam consists not merely of a grant of the melvaram in the land but also the kudivaram therein. It is only a rebuttable presumption that when the
grant was in favour of the religious institution or the individual rendering service to the religious institution, the appellant Institution and the individual
have both the melvaram and kudivaram interest therein. Their Lordships of the apex Court also observed that in spite of the same, the said
presumption can be rebutted by contra evidence by the person claiming kudivaram interest in the land. As a matter of fact, in dealing with the
merits of the claim in that case, it was held that the revenue and other records produced in the case before the Apex Court clearly indicated that
the appellant Devasthanam had conferred kudivaram right in favour of the respondents and that what was collected from them was only a kist
(revenue) and it is not by way of rent from them in exercising kudivaram right of the appellant Devasthanam.
The question that looms large for consideration in this appeal is as to whether the presumption enacted u/s 44 of the Tamil Nadu Act 30 of 1963
has been rebutted by the appellants by production of sufficient materials in support thereof. Learned counsel for the appellants in his endeavour to
claim that such rebuttal has been made successfully would invite our attention to the materials adverted to in paragraph 3 of the order of the
Settlement Tahsildar, Coimbatore and contend that the findings recorded by the Settlement Tahsildar, relying upon the recitals in the usufructuary
mortgage deeds said to have been marked as Exs. A18 to A20 and A22 of the years 1900 and before, go to show that Kudivaram was with the
present enjoyers and their predecessorin-title. It is on that basis, learned counsel for the appellants by drawing inspiration from the findings of the
Settlement Tahsildar, submitted that the grant in favour of the temple consisted only of melvaram. The Minor Inams Tribunal, per contra, was of the
view that the statutory presumption has not been successfully rebutted or dislodged by the appellants herein by showing that the appellants and
their predecessor in interest owned or held kudivaram interest in the lands in question. As noticed earlier, in coming to such a conclusion, reliance
has also been placed on an earlier Division Bench judgment of this Court and the learned counsel would strenuously urge that in the light of the
latter decision of the Supreme Court, the order of the Tribunal cannot be sustained and that of the Settlement Tahsildar has to be restored.
The materials produced in the case before us and which carried conviction with the Settlement Tahsildar was the recitals in the usufructuary
mortgage deeds said to have been executed between private parties. It is not the case of the appellants that the temple was party to or in any way
connected with those documents. Merely because the mortgagors in those documents of the year 1900 and before, chose to assert that they were
granted kudivaram interest by the Devasthanam, it cannot be readily presumed in the absence of production of any such patta, or record
recognizing such interest in the appellants or their predecessors in interest. The Settlement Tahsildar, in our view, has considered the entire claim
and readily chose to presume the grant of such interest to dislodge the statutory presumption for the mere asking without analysing the credibility of
the materials or the binding nature of the same on the rival claimants, particularly the Institution. In our view, there can be no comparison of the
facts of this case with the case, which was considered by the Apex Court, where as noticed earlier, there was a clear finding by the Tribunal and
the Tahsildar that the occupants claimants were shown to have been granted by the appellant Devasthanam itself, kudivaram rights. The materials
relied upon in this case, cannot, in our view be sufficient in law to draw an inference about the temple having parted with its kudivaram right or the
valid acquisition of kudivaram right by the claimants appellants in this case. For all these reasons, we are of the view that the order of the Tribunal
does not suffer from any infirmity, warranting our interference. The appeal shall, therefore, stand dismissed. No costs.
By now it is well settled that any person aggrieved is always entitled to project his claims and vindicate his rights before the competent civil
court. Accordingly the appellants shall be at liberty to vindicate their rights, if any, in accordance with law, if they so desire.