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Judgment
Balasubrahmanyan, J.—These three appeals have been brought before us u/s 30 of Tamil Nadu Act XXX of 1963, Sri Varadarajaperumal
Temple of Pollachi by its managing trustee is the Appellant in all the appeals. The temple was the grantee of a minor inam comprising lands bearing
old S. Nos. 173 and 175 of the total extent of 19.58 acres in Pollachi village. The grant was made by the Poligar of Ramapatnam. The terms of the
original grant are not available, but the inam fair register shows that it was a devadayam religious inam of a permanent character given rent free for
the support of the temple. The inam was confirmed in the year 1863 under title deed No. 161. On the abolition of the minor inam under Tamil
Nadu Act XXX of 1963 the Settlement Tahsildar No. II, Gobichettipalayam, initiated an enquiry for the purpose of issue of ryotwari patta. The
Respondent 1 and 2 in S.T.A. No. 174 of 1974 were in possession of a 4 acres 2,700/ sft., in T.S. No. 256/3. The 1st Respondent in S.T.A.
Nos. 181 and 210 of 1974 was in possession of T.S. No. 254/20 of the extent of 0.25345 sft., and T.S. No. 256/7 of the extent of 2 acres and
25,114 sft. All of them appeared before the Settlement Tahsildar and asked for ryotwari patta to be issued in their favour in regard to the lands in
their respective possession. They claimed that the temple hid lost possession of the inam lands soon after the grant. According to them, the lands
were alienated by one Poosari Thirumalai Ayan--a person in whose name the Inam Commissioner had conferred the grant. No sale deed by this
individual, however, was produced by the Respondents before the Settlement Tahsildar at the time of the enquiry. Instead, they produced a
partition deed dated 17th February, 1888 between three members of a joint family, by name Kuppanna Mudaliar, Marianna Mudaliar and
Likshmana Mudaliar. These individuals were grandsons of one Kuppanna Mudaliar. The recitals in this partition deed were relied on by the
Respondents to show that long prior to the partition in the year 1888, the family of Kuppanna Mudaliar had been in exclusive possession and
enjoyment of the inam lands. The Respondents also produced a number of subsequent documents to show how they and their predecessors in-title
had purchased portions of the lands from the dividing members to whom they were allotted under the partition deed. The Settlement Thasildar held
that the partition deed relied on by the Respondents could, by no means, be regarded as a sale by the inamdar of the lands in question.
Nevertheless, taking note of the subsequent sale deeds under which the Respondents traced their immediate title to the respective town survey
numbers and taking note of the fact that after purchase they were in continuous possession of the lands for more than 12 years before 1st April
1960, the Settlement Tahsildar proceeded to issue ryotwari patta to the Respondents purporting to do so u/s 8(2)(i)(b) of the Act subject to the
terms and conditions contained therein. The record shows that before the Settlement Tahsildar the Respondents had agreed to pay the
Government Twenty-times the excess of the fair rent for the lands over the land revenue, as a condition of obtaining ryotwari patta. Nevertheless,
they appealed against the Settlement Tahsildar''s order, objecting to the stipulation that they should pay compensation to the Government. They
urged that they were entitled to the grant of ryotwari patta without any strings attached. They put their claim u/s 8(1) of the Act contending that the
temple had no title to the melvaram interest and they alone were rightfully entitled to the kudiwaram interest and consequently to the issue of
ryotwari patta on the abolition of the minor inam.
The minor inams Tribunal (Principal Subordinate Judge, Coimbatore) held that the grant in favour of the temple was not an iruvaram inam. It
gave three reasons. In the first place, it relied on the circumstances that the inam to the temple Was granted by a Poligar who himself in all
probability, possessed only, a melvaram interest in the lands. Secondly, it took note of the recitals in the partition deed of 1888 to show that
Kuppanna Mudaliar and his ancestors had been enjoying the lands. Lastly, the inam fair register referred to some boris deductions, in 1926 and
1927 of a portion of the inam-lands which were compulsorily acquired by the Government for public purposes. The Tribunal accordingly allowed
the Respondents'' appeals modifying the order of the Settlement Tahsildar and directing the patta to be granted to the Respondents u/s 8(1) of the
Act.
In the appeals before us filed by the temple against the decision of the Tribunal, Mr. A. Ramanathan, arguing for the temple relied, first and
foremost, on Section 44 of Act and contended that the Tribunal had overlooked the presumption that the grant in favour of the temple should be
held to have included not merely the melvaram in the land but also the kudivaram. learned Counsel urged that the Tribunal was not justified in
taking the view that the grant was of melvaram alone, merely from the circumstances that it was granted by a Poligar. Even the other two
circumstances relied on by the Tribunal were not, according to learned Counsel, enough to displace the statutory presumption in favour of the
temple u/s 44.
Mr. M.R. Narayanaswami, appearing for the Respondents, did not seek to support the order under appeal on any of the reasons that weighed
with the Tribunal. He took a some what novel position to urge that even assuming that the original grant to the temple was an iruvarana inam, yet
the Respondents and their predecessors-in-interest must be held to have acquired title to the Kudivaram interest by prescription He referred to the
documents in the case, including the earliest partition deed as furnishing evidence to show that the lands had not beer in the possessor of the temple
at all ever prior to 1888 and that they were under exclusive and uninterrupted possession of the Respondents. On this basis, learned Counsel urged
that the Respondents were entitled to ryotwari patta u/s 8(1) of the Act. He referred in this connection to a decision of a Division bench of this
Court reported in Sree Bhagavathi Amman Temple and others Vs. Krishna Goundar and Others, . The inam which figured in that case was a
Sarvadumbala inam. At the time of the Inam confirmation, the said lands were under tenants. They had been let into possession by the pujari on a
kandayam basis. The question before the Bench was whether the tenant owned the kudivaram interest in the lands. On a construction of the Inam
Statement and the extract from the Inam Fair Registrar, the Bench held that the original grant to the temple was of the Land itself and not merely of
the melvaram interest therein. The tenants in occupation, however, had put forward an alternative case to the effect that they had prescribed title to
the kudivaram interest against the temple by being in continuous and uninterrupted possession and by asserting absolute ownership thereof as
against the temple. On behalf of the temple, however, it was contended that an assertion of animus pertinent to the absolute ownership of the land
may not be relevant for prescribing title by adverse possession in regard to kudivaram interest alone. The Bench rejected his contention of the
temple on the bread grounds that even persons prescribing title by adverse possession to kudivaram interest clone were kept to describe their title
in their documents as absolute. On the question of onus, the Bench observed that it was for the tenants to establish that they had acquired title to
the kudivaram by prescriptive possession. On the facts before them, the Bench held that the tenants had sufficiently discharged that burden.
Mr. Narayanaswami heavily relied on the above decision and urged that as in the case before the Division Bench, so too in the present case,
there was evidence of continuous and uninterrupted possession by the Respondents on the basis of which it must had held that they prescribed title
as against the temple in regard to the kudivaram interest. We are unable to agree with Mr. Narayanaswami''s contentions. The decision of this
Court in Sree Bhagavathi Amman Temple and others Vs. Krishna Goundar and Others, it may be pointed out, was rendered at a time when, and
in a case where, the Court did not have to deal with a statute like the Tamil Nadu (Abolition of Minor Inams and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act,
1963. But sitting as an appellate Tribunal constituted under the Act, we are bound to render a decision in accordance with its provisions. Besides,
the case before us fairly calls for their interpretation and application. What is more, as respects the matters covered by the Act, it must be held to
be a complete and exclusive code in itself.
Indeed, Section 3(a) of the Act enacts in so many words, that with effect from the appointed day all previous enactments applicable to minor inams
be deemed to have been repealed. The same section under clause (e) further declares that the inamdar and any other person whose rights stand
transferred under the Act shall be entitled only to such rights and privileges as are conferred or recognised by the Act. Chapter III of the Act deals
with the issue of ryotwari patta on the abolition of the minor inams. Section 8(1) enacts a general rule to the effect that ryotwari patta shall issue to
the person who, immediately before the abolition of the minor inam, was entitled to the kudivaram. Section 8(2) enacts a set of special provisions,
especially intended for grant or ryotwari patta in regard to iruvaram religious inams granted for the support of religious institutions. The normal rule
in the case of such iruvaram religious inams would seem to be to grant the patta to the religious institution itself. But there is an exception to the rule,
and it operates in cases where the institution concerned has parted with both title and possession by way of sale-These exceptional cases are
further subdivided into two categories. To the first category belongs a case whew the land has been sold by the religious institution and the
purchaser or his successor-in-interest has been holding and possessing the same for more than twelve years continuously, although not for more
than sixty years, from 1st April 1960. In such a case, the purchaser or his successor-in-interest shall be entitled to ryotwari patta for the land,
subject to the condition that he pays the Government an amount equal to twenty times the excess of the fair rent over the land revenue actually
payable. Where, however, the purchaser has purchased an iruvaram inam land from a religious institution more than sixty years before 1st April
and he had and his successors-in-interest have been in possession of the same for a continuous period of sixty years from such date, then the
purchaser or his successor-in-interest shall be absolutely entitled to ryotwari patta without being required to make any payment therefore to the
Government. This is the second category of exception under Section, 8(2) of the Act.
In view of the special statutory scheme outline above for grant of ryotwari patta in regard to iruvaram lands of religiously minor inams, it would
be a misapplication of the doctrine of precedent to seek to decide the present case calling for the interpretation and application of those statutory
provisions on the basis of any decision laid, down by Courts of co-ordinate jurisdiction or even by higher authority on the law as it stood before
the statute came into force. We, therefore, do not regard Sree Bhagavathi Amman Temple and others Vs. Krishna Goundar and Others, in any
way binding on us in the determination of the question before us in this case.
The matter, therefore, will have to be decided by us strictly within the four corners of the Act. Be fore the Tribunal, although not before the
Settlement'' Tahsildar the Respondents put their case squarely u/s 8(1). They claimed that Section 8(2) did not apply to the case. This was
because, according to them, the grant in favour of the temple was of the melvaram alone. Although the Tribunal persuaded itself to accept this
contention and record a finding to that effect, we are satisfied that the reasonings on which the Tribunal''s decision are founded are untenable. We
do not accept the Tribunal''s view that the grant to the temple, being a grant from a Poligar, could only have been of the melvaram. This is based on
a general assumption that Ploigars, as a class and without exception did not possess both the varams in the lands which they held an assumption for
which no basis in law or history has been placed before us. Nor was the Tribunal right in treating partition deed entered into between the
Respondent''s predecessors-in-interest as providing evidence of the terms of the original grant, in the absence of the original inam grant, We must
also reject the other reasoning of the Tribunal based on certain boris deductions entered on the register by reason of the Government''s acquisition
of a portion of the lands in question. We have, therefore, no hesitation in rejecting the Tribunal''s conclusion that the grant in favour of the temple
was of melvaram alone. It is true that the temple is not in a position to produce its original grant. Nor are the terms of the grant clear from the
extract from the Inam Fair Register. All the same, the Temple is entitled in such a situation, to rely on the statuary presumption u/s 44 of the Act. In
view of this position, and on the materials on record, we must hold that the Respondents have not succeeded in dislodging that presumption. It
follows from this that for the purpose of considering the issue of grant of patta in respect of the lands in question the Temple must be held to be the
owner of both the varams. This at once, renders Section 8(2) applicable. By the same token, Section 8(1) is ruled out from consideration, that is
because Section 8(1), in terms would have operation only subject to the provisions of sub-Section (2).
Mr. Narayanaswami''s contention on behalf of the Respondents is that the language of Section 8(1) is quite apt to cover their case. He referred
to the words every person lawfully entitled to the Kudivaram in any land immediately before the appointed day, whether such person is an inamdar
or not. He submitted that en the overwhelming documentary evidence produced by the Respondents, they and their predecessors must be held to
have been in continuous and uninterrupted possession of the lands right from 1888, if not from an anterior date. He further pointed out that there
was no evidence at all show what the Temple at any time bad possession of the, lands or had asserted its right to possession either against the
Respondents or against their predecessors in title. In the circumstances, learned Counsel urged that the Respondents must he held to have acquired
title by adverse possession as against the temple, in regard to the Kudivaram interest in the lands. According to learned Counsel, as persons who
had acquired title to kudivaram by prescription, the Respondents must be regarded as persons lawfully entitled to the kudivaram within the meaning
of Section 8(1).
For the purpose of examining the legal submission made by Mr. Narayanaswami, we may assume that the Respondents have in fact been in
possession for sufficiently long to have prescribed title by adverse possession under the general law relating to limitation and prescription. Even so,
the question would be whether that would bring the Respondents within the class of persons who are lawfully entitled to kudivaram within the
meaning of Section 8(1), According to learned Counsel a person, even though not the inamdar, might become entitled under the law to the
kudivaram interest by prescription, if he were in continuous uninterrupted possession of that interest adversely to the owner of the kudivaram.
The law relating to acquisition of title by prescription or adverse possession is now declared by Section 27 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1963.
The Section says that at the determination of the period limited, under the Limitation Act to any person for instituting the suit for possession of any
property, his light to such property shall be extinguished. Referring to the corresponding provisions of Section 28 of the Indian Limitation Act,
1908, the Privy Council observed in Mohammed Mumtazali v. Mohan Singh 501. A. 202 that they
...were not referred to and are not aware of any other Section which would have the effect of extinguishing a right of property which is vested in
one person and transferring it by mere lapse of time to the person actually in possession.
Mr. Narayanaswami''s contention as we understood it, would appear to be that while construing the phrase any person lawfully entitled to
kudivaram in Section 8(l) of Tamil Nadu Act XXX of 1963, the Court must include therein persons successfully chiming requisition of title by
adverse possess ion. We are unable to accept his contention. It is not his case that Section 8(1), on its own terms, either expressly or impliedly
enacts any rule of prescriptive title to kudivaram interest. What falls to be considered in this case, then, would be the question whether Section 27
of the Limitation Act has application and can be read into Section8(1) of Tamil Nadu Act XXX of 1963, as urged before us.
As we mentioned earlier ,the whole purpose of Tamil Nadu Act XXX of 1963 was to abolish the minor inams in the State and introduce the
ryotwari settlement in their place. The scheme of the Act, in its operative provisions, was so contrived to effectuate this desired legislative
objective. One of the objects being abolition of the minor inams, it was necessary for the legislature first to do away with the rights and obligations,
powers and privileges that were in vogue under the pre-exacting system, which it was decided to destroy. Understandably enough therefore,
Section 3(a) explicity declares, inter alia, that as and from the appointed day, the Tamil Nadu Act XXX of 1963 alone shall be applicable to the
minor inams and that any other existing law on the subject shall be deemed to be repealed. Section 3(c) declares that all rights created by the
inamdar in or over his inam before the appointed day shall cease and determine as against the Government. Section 3(g), which is important for the
present discussion, lays down that:
any rights and privileges which may have accrued in the minor inam to any person before the appointed day against the inamdar shall cease and
determine and shall not be enforceable against the Government or against the inamdar and every such persons shall be entitled only to such rights
and privileges as are recognised or conferred on him, by or under this Act.
It is in the context of these previsions that the statutory machinery for the introduction of the ryotwari settlement and the grant of ryotwari patta
should be considered.
In our considered opinion, the claim, as put forward by the Respondents cannot lie in view of the clear provisions of Section 3(g) of the Act.
While Section 3(c) destroys the rights created by the inamdar himself in or over his inam, Section 3(g) applies to rights which had accrued to any
person against the inamdar and puts an end to all such rights and interests which had accrued before the appointed day. Title by adverse
possession, obviously does not fall u/s 3(1), but the language of Section 3(g) apply covers it. Acquisition of title to the Kudivaram by prescription
or adverse possession must, in in our view, be held to answer the description accrual of rights against the inamdar occurring in Section 3(g) of the
Act. Two results flow from this position. In the first place, such right as might have accrued to the Respondents against the Temple cease to exist.
Secondly in the place of these accrued rights which have ceased to exist, nothing would be recognised by the law excepting such rights as are
conferred or recognised under the Act itself. It follows there fore, that the Respondents could not rely on their so sailed prescriptive title which
accrued to them as against the temple as a foundation for claiming ryotwari patta u/s 8(1) of the Act.
There is yet another consideration. In our view the very scheme of Sections 8 rules out of the recognition of prescriptive title to Kudivaram
right in a religious inam. We have earlier referred to the terms of Section 8(1) to the effect that its provisions are subject to the provisions of Sub-
section (2). Section 8(2) reiterates the same overriding effect in its opening words, Notwithstanding anything contained in Sub-section (1)...Section
8(2) as we have noted earlier, is a special provision in the matter of grant of ryotwari patta specially designed for iruvaram religious inams. Section
8(2) has two clauses, clause (i) and clause (ii). Under the scheme of the sub-section, clause (ii) would apply only where clause (i) does not apply.
Clause (i) has two sub-clauses, (a) and (b). They are in the following terms:
8 (2)(i) where the land has been transferred by way of sale and the transferee or his heir, assignee, legal representative or person deriving rights
through him had been in exclusive possession of such land:
(a) for a continuous period c f sixty years immediately before the 1st day of April, 1960, such person shall, with effect on and from the appointed
day, be entitled to a ryotwari patta in respect of that land;
(b) for a continuous period of twelve years immediately before the 1st day of April, 1960, such person shall, with effect on and from the appointed
day, be entitled to a ryotwari patta if he pays a consideration to the Government in such manner and in such number of instalments as may be
prescribed an amount equal to twenty times the difference between the fair rent in respect of such land determined in accordance with the
provisions contained in the Schedule and the land revenue due on such land.
These two sub-clauses contemplate that ryotwari patta in an iruvaram minor inam of a religious institution would be denied to that institution and
would be granted to any other person only in cases where that other person is able to establish two things; (i) that he had obtained a transfer of the
land from the religious institution by way of sale; and (ii) that he had been in uninterrupted possession of the land for a period of sixty years or
twelve years, as the case may be immediately before 1st April 1960. Both the conditions, the transfer by sale as well as the continuous possession,
must be fulfilled in order that the said provision may be relied on. In Marimuthu v. K.K. Sri Sankaranarayanaswami Temple 87 L.W. 652 it was
held that where a religious or charitable inam land had been alienated, but possession was not proved as provided in Clause (i) of Sub-section (2)
of Section 8, the alliance will not be entitled to patta. In a case where, such as the present, persons claim kudivaram interest solely on the basis of
adverse possession, Section 8(2)(i)(a) or (b) cannot, obviously apply. The fact that these provisions require not merely long possession, but also a
right derived from actual transfer of title by purchase as the foundation of the claim shows that the legislative intention was not to recognise, for the
purposes of the Act, any claim to ryotwari patta on the basis, merely, of adverse possession.
To sum up, on the very language of the provisions of Section 8(1), read in the context of Section 8(2), Respondents cannot ask for a ryotwari
patta in their favour. The expression lawfully entitled to the Kudviaram occurring in Section 8(1) would only be applicable to cases where the
person claiming to be entitled to ryotwari patta is in a position to show that he was entitled to the kudivaram interest under the very terms of the
grant of the inam. On the terms of Section 8(1) an inamdar who is the grantee of both the varams would certainly be entitled to the kudivaram
interest. So too would be a person holding land as a kudivaramdar under an inamdar the grant to whom is of the melwaram alone. In cases where
the grantee is of both the varams and is, in additions religious institution, Section. 8(1) cannot apply, because of the special provisions under Sub-
section (2). We have already referred to the provisions of Section 8(2)(i) clauses (a) and (b). Section 8(2)(ii) provides for those cases which are
not covered by Section 8(2)(i)(a) and (b) clause (ii), in other words, provides for all cases of iruvaram religious, in as much in which there have
been no transfer by way of sale of the land and the transferee is not in possession at all or is in possession for less than twelve years continuously
prior to 1st January 1960. In the case of such lands, it is categorically enacted that the ryotwari patta has got to be granted only to the religious
institution and to no other persons. In Marimuthu v. K.K. Sri Sankaranarayanaswami Temple 87 L.W. 652 it has been held that if either of the
provisions in clause (a) or (b), is not satisfied, then under clause (ii) of Section 8(2) the Tribunal will have to grant patta to the institution itself. To
the same effect is an unreported decision of this Bench dated 15th March 1976 in S.T.A. No. 66 of 1973. In that case, Sri Sandhi Vinayagar
Devasthanam, Tirunelveli, was the grantee of a Devadhayam Inam Grant consisting of both the varams. It was found as a fact that the lands were,
however, in the possession and enjoyment of the Respondents. But, it was also found that there was no sale of the land en the basis of which
possession was claimed within 60 years or within 12 years before 1st April 1960 in favour of the Respondents or their predecessors-in-interest. In
the circumstances, the Bench held that Section 8(2)(ii) being applicable, the religious institution cannot be deprived of a patta. It was observed that
a reading of that sub-section itself would show that the application should succeed and the relief prayed for by him had to be granted.
In view of the above legal position, we have no doubt whatever that in this case it is the Appellant temple that should get the ryotwari patta in
regard to the lands in question. There can be no question at all that Section 8(2)(ii) applies to the temple in regard to these lands. We have already
held the grant in the temple�s favour to be iruveram lands, and although the possession may not be with he temple for over 12 years or even 60
years, the persons in possession have not been able to make out that their possession and those of their predecessors in title are derived from a
transfer of title by the temple by way of sale. It follows that Section 8(2)(i) does not apply. Thus, the residuary provision in Section 8(2)(ii) clearly
applies and the temple would be exclusively entitled to the patta. We hold accordingly.
Mr. Narayanaswami, learned Counsel for the Respondents however, raised a question of the ambit of this Court''s jurisdiction in this appeal to
direct a grant of ryotwari patta in favour of the Appellant. He recalled how all the earlier proceedings had gone on in this case. He pointed out that
the Settlement Tahsildar had granted the patta to the Respondents u/s 8(2)(i)(b) and no appeal was filed by the Appellant against the decision of
the settlement Tahsildar. He further pointed out that it was in the appeal filed by the Respondents against the order of the settlement Tahsildar that
the Tribunal had granted the ryotwari patta to the Respondents u/s 8(1). In these circumstances even if the appeal by the Appellant Temple against
the Tribunal''s appellate order should be allowed that would not enable the Appellant to press a claim in the appeal before this Court for the issue
of a ryotwari patta in its own favour u/s 8(2)(ii) considering that the decision of the Settlement Officer in. the first instance granting the patta to the
Respondents u/s 8(2) had become final as against the Appellant. Mr. Narayanaswami submitted that, in these circumstances, this Court will not
have jurisdiction to reverse the decision of the Settlement Tahsildar and grant ryotwari patta in favour of the Temple.
We are not impressed with this argument. In the first place, we must remember that we are not sitting here in Letters Patent Appeal, but only
as an appellate Tribunal specially constituted by virtue of the special provisions of Section 30 of Tamil Nadu Act XXX of 1963. The entire scheme
and structure of the Act as well as the purpose of constituting the authorities and functionaries under the act is to effectively administer the
provisions of this Act and to carry out the principal objective of introduction of ryotwari settlements in the place of the minor inams in the State. In
this context, therefore, we do not think that the rules of procedure applicable to trial of suits in courts of first instance and the entertainment of
appeals against decrees and orders of Courts of first instance provided under the CPC can at all be regarded as applicable to proceedings under
the Act. Mr. Narayanaswami, referred to Section 30(3) of the Act which lays down that the Special Appellate Tribunal shall, subject to the
provisions of Section 47-A, have the same powers as are vested in a Civil Court under the CPC 1908 (Central Act V of 1908) when hearing an
appeal. He also referred us to Section 46 of the Act which provides that any order passed by any officer, the Government or other authority or
any decision of the Tribunal or the Special Appellate Tribunal under this Act in respect of matters to be determined for the purposes of this Act
shall, subject only to any appeal or revision provided under this Act be final. But, we do not regard these provisions in the Act as in any way
restricting or limiting our powers as an appellate Tribunal to determine finally and effectively the question of issue of ryotwari patta or any other
matter that may come before us in appeal. Section 46 itself indicates that the orders to be passed by the Special Tribunals and Appellate Tribunal
shall not be liable to be questioned in a Court of law, thereby implying that while acting u/s 30 the High Court does net function as a Court of law.
As for Section 30(3) of the Act, we do not see how it can restrict the scope of the appeal before the Special Appellate Tribunal. Even under the
Civil Procedure Cede, Order 41, Rule 33 clearly provides that the Appellate Court shall have power to pass any decree and make any order
which ought to have been passed or made, and to pass or make such further or other decree or order as the case may require, and this power may
be exercised by the Court notwithstanding that the appeal is as to part only of the decree and may be exercised in favour of all or any of the
Respondents or parties, and although such Respondents or parties may not have filed any appeal or objection. See Kok Singh v. Smt. Deokabai
(1976) 1 S.C.W.R. 135 and Giasi Ram and Others Vs. Ramjilal and Others, In the case last cited, the Supreme Court construed the expression
which ought to have been passed occurring in Order XLI, Rule 33 of the CPC as meaning what ought in law to have been passed. From this they
deduced the principle that if the appellate Court is of the view that any decree which ought in law to have been passed was in fact not passed by
the Court below, it may pass or make such further or other decree or order as the justice of the case may require. They held that even if the
Respondent did not file any appeal from the decree of the trial Court, that was no bar to the High Court passing a decree in favour of the
Respondent for the enforcement of the charge.
We believe that the same principles apply with greater force in matters which arise before us u/s 30 of Tamil Nadu Act XXX of 1963.
Whenever an appeal is filed in this Special Appellate Tribunal what is brought before us is not merely the particular subject of appeal which the
Appellant prefers to draw up in the various grounds in his appeal memorandum, but the entire proceedings out of which the order under appeal
emanates. That is because this Court is acting as a Special Appellate Tribunal appointed for the express purpose of acting as a Court of last resort
in the matter of adjudicating on the rights of parties in the light of the relevant provisions of the Act. In this view, therefore, we do not feel any
constraint whatever in going into and examining the correctness of the order made in the first instance by the Settlement Tahsildar, and pass what
Would be the proper order in the circumstances of the case.
On the view we hold of the facts of this case and applying the law on the basis of our construction of the relevant provisions of the Act, we
hold that the Settlement Tahsildar had not properly instructed himself in the law when he proceeded to consider the question of issue of patta u/s
8(2)(i)(b) of the Act. He assumed that the Respondents Were claiming rights to ryotwari patta as transferees from the Appellant-temple, when this
was not the case at all. Either he had misunderstood the question or he had assumed that the Respondents had obtained the transfer from the
temple. In either case, his decision cannot stand, for not only in Section 8(2)(i) clear on the point but even the decided authorities show that the
transfer spoken of by Section 8(2)(i) is a transfer by the religious institution.
In Marimuthu v. K.K. Sri Sankaranarayanaswami Temple 87 L.W. 652 it has been observed:
The alienation should have been made by the inamdar and the transferee or his heir, assignee, legal representative or person deriving rights through
him should have beep in exclusive possession for the period provided by Clause (a) or Clause (b).
Having clearly found that the order of the settlement Tahsildar was not in accordance with law, we do not see any other course open to us as
the final Appellate Tribunal but to set it aside. Not to do so would be to perpetuate an illegality. We, accordingly, allow the appeals, set aside the
orders of the Settlement Tahsildar and direct him to grant ryotwari patta to the Appellant in respect of the lands which are the subject-matter of
these appeals viz., T.S. No. 256/1 of the extent of 4 acres 2700 sft., T.S. No.254/20 of the extent of 0.25,345 sft., and T.S. No. 256/7 of the
extent of 2 acres (25,114 sft.) in Pollachi Town. In the circumstances of the case there Will be no order as to costs.