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Judgment
Regard being had to the similitude in the controversy involved in the present cases, the miscellaneous petitions were analogously heard and by a
common order, they are being disposed of by this Court. Facts of M.P. No.49/2018 are narrated hereunder.
Present petition has been filed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India by Nagar Palika Parishad, Nagda through its Chief Municipal Officer
being aggrieved by the award dated 26.04.2017 (annexure P-1) passed in case No.103/15 of the Industrial Dispute Act.
Facts of the case reveal that the respondent No.2, who is working as a daily wager preferred an application under Section 33 (C)(2) of the
Industrial Dispute Act, 1947 and claimed difference of salary w.e.f. 01.09.2014 to 31.01.2015. The claim of the workman was based upon rules
framed by the State Government. In exercise of powers conferred by the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution of India, the Governor of Madhya
Pradesh has framed rules in respect of daily wagers known as M.P. Daily Wages Employees (Conditions of Service ) Rules, 2013 and the Rules are
undisputedly applicable to daily wagers working in various local bodies. The rules were framed by the State Government keeping in view the judgment
delivered by the Apex Court in the case of Secretary, State of Karnataka and others vs. Uma Devi 2006 (4) SCC 1 and those daily wagers, who were
not given the benefit of regularisation were given Rs.1500/- per month after completion of 10 years of service. The daily wagers, who have completed
10 years and less than 20 years were entitled for Rs.1500/- and those daily wagers who have worked for less than 20 years were entitled for
Rs.2500/- per month as additional emoluments in addition to their daily wages.
The respondent, in the present case, Ashok was appointed on 01.06.1997 as held by the labour court and after completion of 10 years of service, he
has been held entitled for grant of additional emolument in light of the circular dated 06.09.2008 @ Rs.500/- per month and after 30.05.2013 @
Rs.1500/- per month. The benefit awarded to the workman in the present case and to an identically placed workman in connected case is based upon
the statutory provision as contained under the Rules of 2013, which came into force w.e.f. 30.05.2013 and prior to 30.05.2013, the circular dated
06.09.2008 was in force granting Rs.500/- per month after completion of 10 years of service.
The workman on an affidavit has stated that he was an employee w.e.f. 01.06.1997 as Pump Operator and nothing prevented the employer to place
on record, the muster roll before the labour court. Based upon the evidence adduced by the parties, in the considered opinion of this Court, the labour
court has rightly passed by the order impugned in the present petition. There is no error apparent on the face of the record warranting interference by
this Court. Section 33 (C)(2) of the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947 reads as under:-
“(2) Where any workman is entitled to receive from the employer any money or any benefit which is capable of being computed in terms of money
and if any question arises as to the amount of money due or as to the amount at which such benefit should be computed, then the question may,
subject to any rules that may be made under this Act, be decided by such Labour Court as may be specified in this behalf by the appropriate
Government; within a period not exceeding three months:]
Provided that where the presiding officer of a Labour Court considers it necessary or expedient so to do, he may, for reasons to be recorded in
writing, extend such period by such further period as he may think fit.] â€
The aforesaid statutory provision entitles the workman to claim difference of salary and the difference of salary has already been quantified on
account of circular issued by the State Government 06.09.2008 and also taking into account, the statutory rules framed by the State Government
known as M.P. Daily Wages Employees (Conditions of Service ) Rules, 2013 and therefore, this Court does not find any reason to interfere with the
order passed by the labour court.
The Apex Court in the case of Shalini Shyam Shetty Vs. Rajendra Shankar Patil reported in 2010 (8) SCC 329 in paragraph 49 held as under:-
On an analysis of the aforesaid decisions of this Court, the following principles on the exercise of High Court's jurisdiction under Article 227 of
the Constitution may be formulated:
(a) A petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is different from a petition under Article 227. The mode of exercise of power by High Court under
these two Articles is also different.
(b) In any event, a petition under Article 227 cannot be called a writ petition. The history of the conferment of writ jurisdiction on High Courts is
substantially different from the history of conferment of the power of Superintendence on the High Courts under Article 227 and have been discussed
above.
(c) High Courts cannot, on the drop of a hat, in exercise of its power of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution, interfere with the
orders of tribunals or Courts inferior to it. Nor can it, in exercise of this power, act as a Court of appeal over the orders of Court or tribunal
subordinate to it. In cases where an alternative statutory mode of redressal has been provided, that would also operate as a restrain on the exercise of
this power by the High Court.
(d) The parameters of interference by High Courts in exercise of its power of superintendence have been repeatedly laid down by this Court. In this
regard the High Court must be guided by the principles laid down by the Constitution Bench of this Court in Waryam Singh (supra) and the principles
in Waryam Singh (supra) have been repeatedly followed by subsequent Constitution Benches and various other decisions of this Court. Â
(e) According to the ratio in Waryam Singh (supra), followed in subsequent cases, the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction of superintendence can
interfere in order only to keep the tribunals and Courts subordinate to it, 'within the bounds of their authority'.
(f) In order to ensure that law is followed by such tribunals and Courts by exercising jurisdiction which is vested in them and by not declining to
exercise the jurisdiction which is vested in them.
(g) Apart from the situations pointed in (e) and (f), High Court can interfere in exercise of its power of superintendence when there has been a patent
perversity in the orders of tribunals and Courts subordinate to it or where there has been a gross and manifest failure of justice or the basic principles
of natural justice have been flouted.
(h) In exercise of its power of superintendence High Court cannot interfere to correct mere errors of law or fact or just because another view than
the one taken by the tribunals or Courts subordinate to it, is a possible view. In other words the jurisdiction has to be very sparingly exercised.
(i) High Court's power of superintendence under Article 227 cannot be curtailed by any statute. It has been declared a part of the basic structure of
the Constitution by the Constitution Bench of this Court in the case of L. Chandra Kumar vs. Union of India & others, reported in (1997) 3 SCC 261
and therefore abridgement by a Constitutional amendment is also very doubtful.
(j) It may be true that a statutory amendment of a rather cognate provision, like Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code by the Civil Procedure Code
(Amendment) Act, 1999 does not and cannot cut down the ambit of High Court's power under Article 227. At the same time, it must be remembered
that such statutory amendment does not correspondingly expand the High Court's jurisdiction of superintendence under Article 227.
(k) The power is discretionary and has to be exercised on equitable principle. In an appropriate case, the power can be exercised suo motu.
(l) On a proper appreciation of the wide and unfettered power of the High Court under Article 227, it transpires that the main object of this Article is
to keep strict administrative and judicial control by the High Court on the administration of justice within its territory.
(m) The object of superintendence, both administrative and judicial, is to maintain efficiency, smooth and orderly functioning of the entire machinery of
justice in such a way as it does not bring it into any disrepute. The power of interference under this Article is to be kept to the minimum to ensure that
the wheel of justice does not come to a halt and the fountain of justice remains pure and unpolluted in order to maintain public confidence in the
functioning of the tribunals and Courts subordinate to High Court.
(n) This reserve and exceptional power of judicial intervention is not to be exercised just for grant of relief in individual cases but should be directed
for promotion of public confidence in the administration of justice in the larger public interest whereas Article 226 is meant for protection of individual
grievance. Therefore, the power under Article 227 may be unfettered but its exercise is subject to high degree of judicial discipline pointed out above.
(o) An improper and a frequent exercise of this power will be counter-productive and will divest this extraordinary power of its strength and vitality.
Resultantly, this Court does not find any reason to interfere with the impugned order passed by the trial court as the same does not suffer from any
illegality, perversity or jurisdictional error. The writ petitions are, accordingly, dismissed.