State of Madhya Pradesh vs Prabhulal

S.C. Sharma, J.—The petitioner before this Court State of M.P. and its functionaries being aggrieved by order dt. 3.5.2011 passed by the Labour Court Ujjain M.P. as well as order dt. 28.6.2013 passed by the Industrial Court Indore has filed this present writ petition.

The facts of the case reveal that the respondent workmen in question was discontinued the present petitioners and being aggrieved by his discontinuance he preferred an application under Section 31 of the M.P.I.R. Act read with Section 25 of the Industrial Dispute Act. The application preferred by the workmen was allowed on 5.5.2005 and the Labour Court has directed reinstatement of workmen without back wages. Workmen, submitted his joining pursuant to order dt. 5.5.2005 on 7.5.2005. However, his joining was not accepted and he was not permitted to work by the employer, the present petitioners. The workmen in question later on preferred an application under Section 61, 62 read with Section 108 of the M.P. Industrial Relations Act, 1960 and claimed back wages for the period w.e.f. 5.5.2005 to 31.8.2009. Workmen filed an affidavit stating therein categorically that he submitted his joining, however, his joining was not accepted by the Department and the Labour Court has allowed the application preferred by the workmen directing payment of back wages in question.

This Court has carefully gone through the order dt. 3.5.2011 the same reveals that one Rajeev Shukla was produced as a witness by the department who was working on the post of Assistant Engineer. Rajeev Shukla in his cross-examination has admitted that the workmen had submitted his joining on 7.5.2005 meaning thereby inspite of the joining the working was not given the wages. He was finally permitted joining only after 31.8.2009. The statement on record produced by the parties and the documents scanned by the Labour Court establishes that it was the employee who has not permitted the workman to work inspite of the order dt. 5.5.2005 and in these circumstances, application preferred by the workmen under Section 61, 62 read with Section 108 of the M.P. Industrial Relations Act, 1960 has been allowed. The order passed by the Labour Court was subjected to judicial scrutiny before the Industrial Court and on 28.6.2013 the Industrial Court has affirmed the order passed by the Labour Court. In the light of the aforesaid this Court is of the considered opinion that no case for interference in exercise of writ jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is made out in the matter.

The Apex Court in the case of Shalini Shyam Shetty and Another Vs. Rajendra Shankar Patil, has held as under:-

On an analysis of the aforesaid decisions of this Court, the following principles on the exercise of High Court''s jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution may be formulated:

(a) A petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is different from a petition under Article 227. The mode of exercise of power by High Court under these two Articles is also different.

(b) In any event, a petition under Article 227 cannot be called a writ petition. The history of the conferment of writ jurisdiction on High Courts is substantially different from the history of conferment of the power of Superintendence on the High Courts under Article 227 and have been discussed above.

(c) High Courts cannot, on the drop of a hat, in exercise of its power of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution, interfere with the orders of tribunals or Courts inferior to it. Nor can it, in exercise of this power, act as a Court of appeal over the orders of Court or tribunal subordinate to it. In cases where an alternative statutory mode of redressal has been provided, that would also operate as a restrain on the exercise of this power by the High Court.

(d) The parameters of interference by High Courts in exercise of its power of superintendence have been repeatedly laid down by this Court. In this regard the High Court must be guided by the principles laid down by the Constitution Bench of this Court in Waryam Singh (supra) and the principles in Waryam Singh (supra) have been repeatedly followed by subsequent Constitution Benches and various other decisions of this Court.

(e) According to the ratio in Waryam Singh (supra), followed in subsequent cases, the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction of superintendence can interfere in order only to keep the tribunals and Courts subordinate to it, `within the bounds of their authority''.

(f) In order to ensure that law is followed by such tribunals and Courts by exercising jurisdiction which is vested in them and by not declining to exercise the jurisdiction which is vested in them.

(g) Apart from the situations pointed in (e) and (f), High Court can interfere in exercise of its power of superintendence when there has been a patent perversity in the orders of tribunals and Courts subordinate to it or where there has been a gross and manifest failure of justice or the basic principles of natural justice have been flouted.

(h) In exercise of its power of superintendence High Court cannot interfere to correct mere errors of law or fact or just because another view than the one taken by the tribunals or Courts subordinate to it, is a possible view. In other words the jurisdiction has to be very sparingly exercised.

(i) High Court''s power of superintendence under Article 227 cannot be curtailed by any statute. It has been declared a part of the basic structure of the Constitution by the Constitution Bench of this Court in the case of L. Chandra Kumar Vs. Union of India and others, and therefore abridgement by a Constitutional amendment is also very doubtful.

(j) It may be true that a statutory amendment of a rather cognate provision, like Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code by the Civil Procedure Code (Amendment) Act, 1999 does not and cannot cut down the ambit of High Court''s power under Article 227. At the same time, it must be remembered that such statutory amendment does not correspondingly expand the High Court''s jurisdiction of superintendence under Article 227.

(k) The power is discretionary and has to be exercised on equitable principle. In an appropriate case, the power can be exercised suo motu.

(l) On a proper appreciation of the wide and unfettered power of the High Court under Article 227, it transpires that the main object of this Article is to keep strict administrative and judicial control by the High Court on the administration of justice within its territory.

(m) The object of superintendence, both administrative and judicial, is to maintain efficiency, smooth and orderly functioning of the entire machinery of justice in such a way as it does not bring it into any disrepute. The power of interference under this Article is to be kept to the minimum to ensure that the wheel of justice does not come to a halt and the fountain of justice remains pure and unpolluted in order to maintain public confidence in the functioning of the tribunals and Courts subordinate to High Court.

6 (n) This reserve and exceptional power of judicial intervention is not to be exercised just for grant of relief in individual cases but should be directed for promotion of public confidence in the administration of justice in the larger public interest whereas Article 226 is meant for protection of individual grievance. Therefore, the power under Article 227 may be unfettered but its exercise is subject to high degree of judicial discipline pointed out above.

(o) An improper and a frequent exercise of this power will be counterproductive and will divest this extraordinary power of its strength and vitality.

In the light of the aforesaid judgment delivered by the apex Court, this Court is of the considered opinion that the orders of the Courts below does not suffer from any patent illegality nor any jurisdictional error has been committed by the Courts below. Accordingly, the admission is declined.