Narayanaswami Vellalar vs Rangaswamy Konar and Others

Ismail, J.—The first Defendant in Original Suit No. 176 of 1966 on the file of the Court of the District Munsif of Thanjavur, who succeeded before the trial Court, but lost before the first Appellate Court, is the Appellant before this Court. The suit was instituted by the Respondents herein for a permanent injunction restraining the Appellant from interfering with their possession of the suit property on the basis that they were entitled to the same. The plaint merely stated that the suit property, known as Thammakkan Manthappu originally belonged to one Thammakkan alias Dharma Konar and his brother Malaya Konar; that it is comprised in paimash No. 146; that Thammakkan died as a bachelor and the Appellant and one Vaithi Konar were the descendants of Melaya Konar; that the Respondents and the said Vaithi Konar had been in possession and enjoyment of the suit property, paying kist therefor; that the said Vaithi Konar sold his rights to the second Defendant in the suit under a registered deed, dated 23rd December 1947, but the second Defendant was not actively enjoying any portion of the suit property; that while so, the Appellant herein appeared to have purchased the suit property from one Seshadri Iyer on 10th March 1965; that Seshadri Iyer had no right, title or interest in the suit property; and that taking advantage of the alleged purchase, the Appellant herein was threatening to interfere with the possession of the Respondents and that occasioned the present suit. The Appellant on the other hand, contended that the suit property was not comprised in paimash No. 146 and it did not belong to Thammakkan and Malaya Konar and that the Appellant had no right, title or interest in the suit property. His positive case was that the suit property was situate in Zamin Sundampatti Village which belonged to the said Seshadri Iyer and after the Zamin was taken over under the provisions of the Madras Act XXVI of 1948 (The Madras Estates Abolition and on version into Ryotwari Act) hereinafter referred to as the Act, Seshadri Iyer applied for a ryotwari patta and got a patta for the suit property and some other properties and therefore, Seshadri Iyer, the vendor of the Appellant, alone had title to the suit property and by purchase the Appellant became entitled to the same. As I have pointed out already, the plaint itself did not make any reference whatever to the property being situate in the erstwhile estate taken over under the provisions of the Act. However, during the course of the trial, the Respondents herein patta forward their claim to the property solely on the basis of the suit property being a ryoti land and they being ryots in respect thereof. In view of this controversy between the parties one of the questions which the trial Court had to decide was, whether the decision of the authorities constituted under the Act that the suit land was private or pannai land of the landholder and, therefore, Seshadri Iyer was entitled to a patta in respect thereof, was final, the correctness of which was not liable to be challenged in a Civil Court. In this context, it must be pointed out that Seshadri Iyer claimed a ryotwari patta in respect of the suit property and on his claim having been rejected by the Assistant Settlement Officer, he preferred an appeal to the Estate Abolition Tribunal, Vellore, and that Tribunal by its order, dated 14th August 1957, marked as exhibit B-3 in these proceedings held that the suit property was pannai land of the landholder and Seshadri Iyer was entitled to a ryotwari patta under the provisions of the Act. It is against the background of these facts, the learned District Munsif, who tried the suit came to the conclusion that exhibit B-3 made it conclusive that the suit land was a private land and therefore, Seshadri Iyer as the landholder of the estate was entitled to a ryotwari patta in respect thereof and consequently the Respondents herein had no title to the suit property. He also me to the conclusion that the Respondents had not established their possession of the suit property so as to warrant the grant of an injunction in their favour. The learned District Munsif was also not satisfied as to the identity of the property itself. As I have pointed out already, the plaint proceeded on the basis that the suit property was comprised in paimash exhibit 146, while the Appellant contended that it was comprised in paimash No. 1289 and the corresponding survey number after survey was effected pursuant to the Act was S. No. 65/3, The suit was dismissed by the learned District Munsif on 28th July 1967, on the basis of the findings referred to above. The Respondents herein preferred an appeal to the learned Subordinate Judge of Thanjavur, who on 5th February 1969 in Appeal Suit. No. 110 of 1968 allowed the appeal, reversed the conclusion of the learned District Munsif and decreed the suit instituted by the Respondents herein. The learned Subordinate Judge took the view that the Respondents had established their title to the suit property and that the land being a waste land, the presumption that possession follows title must beinvoked and, therefore, the Respondents were entitled to the relief they had prayed for. It is the correctness of this conclusion of the learned Subordinate Judge that is challenged before me in the present second appeal by the first Defendant in the suit.

I may mention one thing immediately, and that is, there is a direct decision of this Court which covers the present controversy fully and completely and on the basis of that decision, the suit instituted by the Respondents herein ought to have been dismissed. That is the decision of Kailasam J. in Ratnasabapathy v. Sannasi Ambalagaran (1966) 1 M.L.J. 190. That was also a case in which the Plaintiffs claimed title to the property on the basis of the determination of the suit property as a pannai land under the provisions of the Act, while the Defendants put forward a contention that the land was not a private land, that patta was granted to the zamindar without the knowledge of the Defendants and that no proper notice was published in the village. The learned Judge held that having regard to the hierarchy of judicial Tribunals provided for determination of question of title and right to ryotwari patta under the Act and the scheme of the Act and its provisions it should be held that the decisions of the officers and Tribunals under the Act on matters specifically entrusted to their decision, would be final and the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts would be barred; and the decision of the Settlement Officer regarding the nature of the land and the grant of patta u/s 15 of the Act is final and conclusive and a civil Court in a suit for possession of mense profits is not entitled to go into that question. Barring the difference that in the present case it is the Appellant, as the Defendant who put forward the claim that the land had been determined to be a private land and the Respondents instituted the suit for an injunction in substance there is no difference between the controversy that has arisen in the present case and the controversy that was resolved by the learned Judge in the above case and, therefore, the decision of the learned Judge is directly in point and against the Respondents herein. The curious thing is, the learned Subordinate Judge himself noticed this decision. None the less he had thoroughly misconceived the scope of the enquiry before him and went into the question of title as if the land was not situate in an estate and its nature had not been determined by the authorities constituted under the Act. The learned Subordinate Judge, in addition to referring ^to the decision of Kailasam J., referred to above, also referred to three other decisions of this Court, namely, Krishnaswami Thevar v. Perumal Konar (1961) 1 M.L.J. 168 Sanjeevi Naicker v. Shanmugha Udayar (1965) 2 M.L.J. 204 and Kulandaiswami Madurai and Others Vs. Murugayya Madurar and Others, and took the view that the cumulative effect of the above decisions would lead to the conclusion that while the Tribunal was competent to grant patta and to that end might find who was lawfully entitled to the patta, it did not and could not pretend or profess to adjudicate title to the suit property. To say the least, such an inference sought to be drawn from the decisions referred to by the learned Subordinate Judge is simply perverse. As far as the judgment of Kailasam J., is concerned, it is directly and categorically on the point that once the Settlement Officer and the Tribunal u/s 15 of the Act have come to the conclusion that the land is a private land and the landholder is entitled to a ryotwari patta in respect thereof, civil Courts have no jurisdiction to go into the question. The two other decisions, namely, Parasmal Chordia Vs. Rajalakshmi Ammal and Another, and Sanjeevi Naicker v. Shanmuga Udayar (1965) 2 M.L.J. 204 did not deal with the determination of the character of the land u/s 15 of the Act, but dealt with the grant of ryotwari patta in respect of a ryotwari land. The last of the decisions namely, Kulandaiswami Madurai and Others Vs. Murugayya Madurar and Others, did not deal with the determination u/s 15 of the Act, but dealt with the grant of a ryotwari patta u/s 11 of the Act and the scope of Section 56 of the Act before its amendment. Therefore, with reference to the controversy between the parties before the learned Subordinate Judge the only decision relevant to the point was that of Kailasam, J. already referred to and the learned Subordinate Judge was in duty bound to follow that decision and on the basis of that decision to have dismissed the suit. If there is nothing more, on this simple ground I should have allowed the second appeal and set aside the judgment and decree of the learned Subordinate Judge and restored those of the learned District Munsif.

However, Mr. V. Vedantachari, learned Counsel for the Respondents, sought to argue before me that the decision of Kailasam, J., required reconsideration, since certain aspects having a material bearing on the question were not placed before the Court when the learned Judge rendered his decision in the reported case. I have listened to the very elaborate arguments of Mr. V. Vedantachari and I have given my careful consideration to those arguments. But I am unable to hold that the decision of Kailasam J, requires any reconsideration from any point of view.

Before I deal with the arguments of Mr. V. Vedantachari it is necessary to refer very briefly to the salient provisions of the Act. I am referring to the same only briefly for the simple reason that in every one of the decisions which had occasion to deal with such a question, the summary and substance of almost all the provisions of the Act have been set out. As the preamble to the Act indicates, the object of the Act was to repeal the permanent settlement, to acquire the rights of landholders in permanently settled and certain other estates in the State and to introduce ryotwari settlement in such estates. This object was sought to be achieved by extinguishing the rights of all the parties in and over an estate and by granting or recognizing the specified or enumerated rights contemplated by the statute itself.

Section 3 of the Act, which is the most important section, deals with the consequences flowing from the issue of a notification under the Act in respect of an estate. Clause (b) of Section 3 deals with the vesting of an estate and according to that provision, the entire estate shall stand transferred to the Government and vest in them free of all encumbrances. Clause (c) of Section 3 provides that all rights and interests created in or over the estate before the notified date by the principal or any other landholder, shall as against the Government cease and determine. Clause (d) of Section 3 is as follows:

the Government may, after removing any obstruction that may be offered, forthwith take possession of the estate, and all accounts, registers, pattas, muchilikas, maps, plans and other documents relating to the estate which the Government may require for the administration thereof:

Provided that the Government shall not dispossess any person of any land in the estate in respect of which they consider that he is prima facie entitled to a ryotwari patta:

(i) If such person is a ryot, pending the decisions of the Settlement Officer as to whether he is actually entitled to such patta;

(ii) If such person is a landholder, pending the decision of the Settlement Officer and the Tribunal on appeal, if any, to it as to whether he is actually entitled to such patta.

Clause (a) of Section 3 provides that the principal or any other landholder and any other person, whose rights stand transferred under Clause (b) or cease and determine under Clause (c), shall be entitled only to such rights and privileges as are recognized or conferred on him by or under this Act. Clause (f) of Section 3 is to the effect that the relationship of landholder and ryot, shall, as between them, be extinguished. Section 3 of the Act provides for the constitution of Tribunals and Sub-section (4) thereof states that every Tribunal shall have the same powers as are vested in a Civil Court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, when trying a suit or when hearing an appeal. Section 11 states that every ryot in an estate shall, with effect on and from the notified date, be entitled to a ryotwari patta in respect of all ryoti lands which, immediately before the notified date, were properly included or ought to have been properly included in his holding and which are not either lanka lands or lands in respect of which a landholder or some other person is entitled to a ryotwari patta under any other provision of the Act. Sections 12, 13 and 14 deal with rights of landholder to a ryotwari patta. Section 12 states that in the case of a Zamindari estate, the landholder shall, with effect on and from the notified date, be entitled to a ryotwari patta in respect of the land described therein. Section 13 deals with the right of a landholder to a ryotwari patta in an inam estate. Section 14 deals with the right of a landholder to a ryotwari patta in respect of lands in an under-tenure estate. Having thus conferred a right to a ryotwari patta under Sections 12 to 14 on a landholder in respect of lands situate in the three categories of estates referred to therein, Section 15 provides the machinery for determining the entitlement of the landholder, to such ryotwari patta. Section 15 is important and the same is extracted in full.

15.(1) The Settlement Officer shall examine the nature and history of all lands in respect of which the landholder claims ryotwari patta under Sections 12. 13 or 14, as the case may be, and decide in respect of which land the claims should be allowed.

2(a) Against a decision of the Settlement Officer under Sub-section (1), the Government may, within one year from the commencement of the Madras. Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari Amendment Act, 1954, or from the date of the decision which ever is later, and any person aggrieved by such decision may, within two months from the said date, appeal to the Tribunal

Provided that the Tribunal, may, in its discretion allow further time not exceeding six months for the filing of any such appeal:

Provided further that the Tribunal may, in its discretion, entertain and appeal by the Government at any time it if appears to the Tribunal that the decision of the Settlement Officer was vitiated by fraud or by mistake of fact.

(b) The decision of the Tribunal on any such appeal shall be final and not be liable to be questioned in any Court of law.

There are only two other sections to which attention must be drawn, though they are not directly in point. They are Section 64-A and Section 64-C. Section 64-A (1) provides that the decision of a Tribunal or Special Tribunal in any proceeding under this Act, or of a Judge of the High Court hearing a case u/s 51(2), on any matter falling within its or his jurisdiction shall be binding on the parties thereto and persons claiming under them, in any suit or proceeding in a Civil Court in so far as such matter is in issue between the parties or persons foresaid in such suit or proceeding. Sub-section (2) of Section 64-A states that the decision of a Civil Court (not being a Court of a District Munsif or a Court of Small Causes) on any matter falling within its jurisdiction shall be binding on the parties thereto and persons claiming under them in any proceeding under this Act before a Tribunal or special Tribunal, or a judge of the High Court u/s 51(2), in as far as such matter is in issue between the parties or persons aforesaid in such proceeding. Section 64-C is as follows:

64-C (1) Any order passed by the Government or other authority under this Act in respect of matters to be determined for the purposes of this Act shall, subject only to any appeal or revision provided by or under this Act, be final.

(2) No such order shall be liable to be questioned in any court of law.

Simply as a matter of construction, without any reference to any decided cases, it will follow that Section 15(1) of the Act vests exclusive jurisdiction in the Settlement Officer to examine the nature and history of all lands in respect of which the landholder claims ryotwari patta under Sections 12, 13 or 14, as the case may be and to decide in respect of which lands should be allowed. The jurisdiction of the Tribunal on appeal will be coextensive with that of the Settlement Officer u/s 15(1) and therefore the Tribunal also has got identical jurisdiction to examine the nature and history of all the lands in respect of which the land-holder claims ryotwari patta and to decide in respect of which lands the claim should be allowed. Then comes the crucial provision, namely, Clause (b) of Sub-section (2) of Section 15. It provides in express and unambiguous language that the decision of the Tribunal on any such appeal shall be final and not be liable to be questioned in any Court of law. When the section refers to the decision of the Tribunal, that must be correlated to the obligation and the jurisdiction of the Tribunal or the settlement officer, as contemplated by Section 15(1), namely, to examine the nature and history of all lands in respect of which, the landholder claims ryotwari patta and to decide in respect of which lands the claim should be allowed. Therefore, the decision rendered by the Settlement Officer and the Tribunal, as a result of the examination of the nature and history of the land as to its character and the decision as to in respect of which and, the landholder will be entitled to a patta, are on matters entrusted to the exclusive jurisdiction of the Settlement Officer and the Tribunal. The decision contemplated in Section 15(2)(b) of the Act refers to the determination of these questions entrusted to its exclusive jurisdiction and such determination has been rendered final in specific and unqualified terms by that section. The language of Section 15(2)(b) as it stands is absolute and unqualified and does not admit of any exception or qualification.

It is against the background of these statutory provisions, the controversy raised before me has to be considered. Mr. Vedantachari, learned Counsel for the Respondents, approached the question from two different angles. According to him the finality contemplated by Section 15(2)(b) of the Act is for the purpose of the Act and it has nothing whatever to do with the question of title, when it is raised in a Civil Court. The second aspect of the argument of the learned Counsel is that the rights to ryotwari patta recognized by Sections 12, 13 and 14 are not now rights conferred by the statute and they are merely a recognition of the pre-existing rights which could be enforced under common law and with reference to the enforcement of such a right, the special mechinery provided under the Act cannot be said to be an exclusive mechinery and therefore, the jurisdiction of the civil Courts has not been excluded. Now, I shall examine these two aspects of the arguments of the learned Counsel.

Before doing so, one point that has to be borne in mind is that even Section 9, Code of Civil Procedure, contemplates the bar of jurisdiction of a civil Court either expressly or by necessary implication. Therefore, the jurisdiction of a Civil Court need not necessarily always be barred only by express provisions in the statute, though in this particular case, there is such an express provision. As far as the first aspect of the arguments of the learned Counsel is concerned, I am unable to see what exactly is the purpose of the Act for which finality has been provided in Section 15(2)(b). In this context it may be of interest to note the language of Section 64-C(1) and the language of Section 15(2)(b). Section 64-C(1) refers to, matters to be determined for the purpose of this Act. Whils no such limiting expression occurs in Section 15(2)(b) of the Act. Assuming that even in the absence of such a limiting expression, Section 15(2)(b) had to be construed as only having an application to matters to be determined for the purpose of the Act, I am unable to see what exactly is the purpose of the Act apart from the determination of the character of the land and pieces and parcels of lands to which a landholder is entitled to a ryotwari patta. The contention of Mr. Vedantachari is that Section 22 of the Act provides for settlement, just like in the case of a ryotwari area, and it is for the purpose of effecting that settlement, the decision contemplated by Section 15 has to be arrived at incidentally and therefore the determination as to the character of land cannot be said to be for the purpose of the Act and consequently it cannot be said to be final. I am unable to see any substance in this argument. Ryotwari settlement has nothing whatever to do with the character of the land as private or ryoti. On the other hand it has got every thing to do with the classification of the soil with reference to the rates of assessment that may be provided for different classes of lands having regard to their nature, as wet, dry or manavari, and having regard to the irrigation facilities available. But the question whether a land is a private land--a ryoti land has absolutely no relevancy whatever for effecting a ryotwari settlement and for the purpose of imposing the rate of assessment depending upon the classification or tharam of the soil. Therefore, I am unable to agree with the learned Counsel that the determination whether a land is private or ryoti is only incidental to effecting a ryotwari sellttement and in itself is not the determination of a question entrusted to the exclusive jurisdiction of the authorities concerned. An extension of this argument is that the exclusive jurisdiction of the Settlement Officer and that of the Tribunal u/s 15 is merely to grant a ryotwari patta. As a matter of fact, an examination of the provisions of the Act will show that there is not a single section dealing with the grant of a ryotwari patta. All that the provisions of the Act deal with is the entitlement to a ryotwari patta and its determination. The grant of ryotwari patta being merely a consequential act following the determination of the right of the person to obtain a patta in respect of particular lands, it is more or leas in the nature of a decree following a judgment and the decision that is contemplated by Section 15 is the judgment and not the decree which must necessarily follow and flow from the determination as to the entitlement of the land holder to a ryotwari patta in respect of particular lands-Therefore, the scope and ambit of Section 15 of the Act make it absolutely and abundantly clear that the jurisdiction conferred on the Settlement Officer and the Tribunal is for the purpose of ascertaining and determining the nature and history of the land and for determining the entitlement of the land holder to a ryotwari patta in respect of such land and the grant of ryotwari patta as such is totally outside the scope of that section that being a mechanical action not involving determination of any question. The determination itself has been provided for only u/s 15. Therefore, I am unable to agree with the contention of the learned Counsel that the finality contemplated by Section 15(2)(b) is only for the purpose of the Act in the sense that it is only for the purpose of granting a ryotwari patta and not for determining the character of the land as such.

With regard to the second aspect of the arguments, the learned Counsel on both sides covered very elaborate grounds. If the point is directly in issue, certainly I shall have to consider the arguments in detail and in extenso. But the point arises only incidentally. The argument is that the right to ryotwari patta not being a statutory right granted for the first time in the Act itself and the right to obtain a ryotwari patta being a pre-existing right preserved by the Act, the machinery provided by the Act cannot be said to be an exclusive machinery so as to oust the jurisdiction of the civil Courts. To put it in other words, the arguments is that the vesting provision, namely, Section 3(b) of the Act does not vest the entire estate including ryoti and private lands in the estate in the Government, it preserves ryoti lands with ryots and pannai or private lands with the landholders and only land other than these will vest in the Government and ''there fore'' Section 15 cannot be said to be a special machinery created by the statute for the purpose of working out the right granted for the first time by the statute. In support of the contention that the vesting provision is not so comprehensive or full as to includesor take in even ryoti and private lands, the learned Counsel relied on several decisions of this Court.

The first and the earliest is that of a Bench of this Court in Civil Miscellaneous Petition No. 8017, 7812 of 1950, etc.--Raja Rao Sngnana Kumaran and 2 Ors. v. The State of Madras by Revenue Secretary Government of Madras, in which the Bench held that the ownership of the lands (private lands subject to assessment was) with the Zamindar.

In Seethalakshmi v. Krishnaswami (1961) 2 M.L.J. 285 another Bench of this Court also took the view that the ownership of the private lands continued with the erstwhile zamindar.

In state of Madras v. Parisutha Nadar (1961) 1 M.L.J. 87 another Bench of this Court also took the same view holding that the Act does not creat new rights of ownership and the grant of ryotwari patta under the Act is not a conferment of rights by way of grant or conveyance and the obtaining of ryotwari patta by the persons entitled to such patta under the Act can ''if at all'' be only in recognition of preexisting rights of ownership.

The decision in Civil Miscellaneous Petition No. 8017 of 1950 etc., referred to already and the decision in Seethalakshmi v. Krishnaswami (1961) 1 M.L.J. 87 were followed by another Bench of this Court in Mustafa v. Udayanachi Ammal 80 L.W. 424 where the Bench held:

In the Madras Act as we have already pointed out, Section 3(B) and (d) and Sections 12 to 14 read together show that the intention of the Legislature is not merely not to disturb the person in possession of which they are prima facie entitled to ryotwari patta, but also they shall, as a matter of right, be entitled to patta on and from the date of the notification and taking over of the state, though of course it is subject to determination of the character of the land as pannai or private, as the case may be.

The Bench also followed two Full Bench judge ments of the Patna High Court in Mahanth Sukhdeo Das and Another Vs. Kashi Prasad Tiwari and Others, and Sidheshwar Prasad Singh and Others Vs. Ram Saroop Singh and Others, .

In Writ Appeal 14 of 65 and Writ Appeal 112 of 1965. The State of Madras by Secretary, Revenue Department and another--Appellant in bothvs. Alagiriswamy Naicker--Respondent in Writ Appeal 74 of 6--Papala Jakkamma Naicker--Respondent in Writ appeal 112 of 65 Writ appeal 14 and of 112 of 1965 and 384 and 533 of 1969 another Bench of this Court also took the view that the ryoti lands did not vest in the State pursuant to the vesting provision namely Section 3(b) of the Act.

As against these decisions, Mr. R. Kesava Iyengar, learned Counsel for the Appellant, pointed out that there is another series of decisions of this Court itself holding that the vesting is entire, comprehensive and absolute inclusive of the private lands as well as ryoti lands and the grant of rights to ryotwari patta is not by way of recognition of a pre-existing right but by way of a regrant made after assuming ownership of the entirety of the estate in the Government. For this purpose he relied on the following decisions.

The first decision relied on by the learned Counsel for the Appellant is Zamindar of Ettayapuram v. State of Madras (1955) 1 M.L.J. 264 where also a Bench of this Court held that the scheme of the Act is clear that u/s 3, with effect on and from the notified date, the entire estate notified stands transferred to the Government and vests in them free of all encumbrances and this vesting is not conditional.

The next decision relied on is State of Madrasd v. Karuppiah Ambalam (1959) 1 M.L.J. 185 where Ramachandra Ayyar J., as he then was, held that the provision contained in Section 3(d) did not in any way derogate the absolute vesting of the title in the Government or create any title in the person in possession of the property and to the learned Judge it was clear that in respect of lands in a village taken over by the Government under the Abolition Act, there Was no ownership by any private individual till that person obtained ryotwari patta from the Government. The learned Judge made it specific by stating that the title of the ryot thereafter would be only by virtue of a grant made by Government, although such grant is regulated by the statute.

The same view was taken by yet another Bench of this Court in the State of Madras v. Kamokshiya Pillai. (1990) 1 M.L.J. 6276.

In The State of Madras Vs. A. Chockalingam Chettiar, Anantanarayananan, J., as he then was, held that that the effect of Section 3 is to vest the entire estate in the Government including ryoti lands, pannai lands, buildings and every other kind of interest except as specifically saved under the provisions of the Act, is a proposition beyond contraversive or dispute.

Similar was the view taken by another Bench of this Court in Zamindar of Ettaapuram v. Panchayat Board (1962) 2 M.L.J. 372.

However, Mr. Kesava Iyengar went a step further and according to him even the series of decisions of this Court relied on by Mr. Vadantachari must be deemed to have been ever-ruled or considered no longer good law in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in the two recent cases. One is the decision of the Supreme Court in Shivashankar Prasad Shah and Others Vs. Baikunth Nath Singh and Others, . In that case, the Supreme Court had to consider the effect of the vesting provision under the Bihar Land Reforms Act (XXX of 1950). While considering that question the Supreme Court observed:

Reading Sections 3, 4 and 6 together, it follows that all Estates notified u/s 3 vest in the state free of all encumbrances. The quondam proprietors and tenure-holders of those estates lose all interests in those Estates. As propirtors they retain no interest in respect of them whatever. But in respect of the lands enumerated in Section 6 the state settled on them the rights of raiyats. Though in fact the vesting of the Estates and the deemed settlement of raiyat''s right in respect of certain classes of lands included in the Estates took place simultaneously, in law the two must be treated as different transactions; first there was a vesting of the Estates in the State absolutely, and free of all encumbrances. Then followed the deemed settlement by the state of raiyat''s rights on the quondam proprietors. Therefore in law it would not be correct to say that what vested in the state are only these interests not coming within sections.

While coming to this conclusion, the Supreme Court over-ruled the decision of the majority of the Full Bench of the Patna High Court in Sidheshwar Prasad Singh and Others Vs. Ram Saroop Singh and Others, referred to already and approved the dissenting judgment of Kamala Sahai, J. in that decision.

The relevancy of the above decision arises for the reason that the Bench of this Court in Mustafa v. Udayanachiammal 80 L.W. 424 relied on the very decision of the Full Bench of the Patna High Court in Sidheshwar Prasad Singh and Others Vs. Ram Saroop Singh and Others, . The argument of Mr. Kesava Iyengar, is, once that Full Bench decision of the Patna High Court had been over-ruled, the decision of this Court which followed that decision also must be deemed to have been overruled. It is in this context necessary to refer to the earlier decision of the Supreme Court in Rana Sheo Ambar Singh Vs. Allahabad Bank Ltd., Allahabad, . That case considered the effect of the vesting provisions in the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act (I of 1951). That decision was considered by the Patna High Court in the Full Bench decision referred to above Sidheshwar Prasad Singh and Others Vs. Ram Saroop Singh and Others, as well as by this Court in M. Muhammed Mustafa Marakayar v. Udayanachiammal 80 L.W. 424 but it was distinguished on the ground that it was based on the particular language of the statutory provision contained in the U.P. Act. However in the decision of the Supreme Court in Shivashankar Prasad Shah and Others Vs. Baikunth Nath Singh and Others, the Supreme Court did not hold that its earlier decision was anything special having regard to the language contained in the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act. That was confirmed by the latest decision of the Supreme Court in Mst. Jamshed Jahan Begum and Others Vs. Lakhan Lal and Others, which also deal with the effect of then vesting provision in the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reformrs Act 1950 (I of 1951) and the Supreme Court came to the conclusion that the vesting was absolute.

As I have pointed out already, it is not necessary for the purpose of disposal of this second appeal to express any final opinion whether the vestinging is absolute or it is exclusive of the ryoti lands in respect ot which ryots are entitled to a ryotwari patta or pannai lands in respect of which landholders are entitled to a ryotwari patta, for the simple reason that the said question does not arise directly for decision in this case. Mr. Vedantachari relied on the proposition for which he contended merely as a step for his further argument that since the right to obtain a ryotwar patta is not a new right created by the statute, the remedy provided by the statute cannot be said to be in exclusive remedy so as to take away the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts. For the purpose of dealing with this argument, I am assuming that the vesting is not absolute and it is exclusive of the ryoti lands and private lands. The question is, what is the consequence of the limited vesting on the point under consideration. In my view, even where a new right is not created and it is the old right that is recognised, still it is open to the Legislature by express provision to exclude the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts and to compel the parties to go to the Special Tribunals created under the statute. As a matter of fact, when a special right is created and a special remedy is provided for, the very fact of the right being special and there being a specified remedy and forum will lead to the inference that there is an exclusion of the jurisdiction of the Civil Court by implication. On the other hand, even with regard to the recognition of an existing right, certainly it is open to the Legislature to exclude the jurisdiction of the civil Courts of the land and to compel the parties resort to by the statute, by making an express provision in this behalf. This position has been recognised by the Supreme Court in Kamala Mills Ltd. Vs. State of Bombay, , the Supreme Court has observed:

Whenever it is urged before a civil court that its jurisdiction is excluded either expressly or by necessary implication to entertain claims of a civil nature, the court naturally feels inclined to consider whether the remedy afforded by an alternative provision prescribed by a special statute is sufficient or adequate. In cases where the exclusion of the civil courts jurisdiction is expressly provided for, the consideration as to the scheme of the statute in question and the adequacy or the sufficiency of the remedies provided for by it may be relevant but cannot be decisive. But where exclusion is pleaded as a matter of necessary implication, such considerations would be very important, and in conceivable circumstances might even become decisive. If it appears that a statute creates a special right or a liability and provides for the determination of the right and liability to be dealt with by tribunals specially constituted in that behalf and it further lays down that all questions about the said right nad liability shall be determined by the tribunals so constituted, it becomes pertinent to enquire whether remedies normally associated with actions in civil courts are prescribed in the said statute or not.

It is in view of this situation Mr. Kesava Iyengar relied on the rules framed by the Government as to the manner of the conduct of enquiry by the Settlement Officer as well as the Tribunal. The Government have made elaborate rule in this behalf. Rule 2(a) of the Rules framed u/s 67 read with Section 15 of the Act, requires a land holder to apply to the Settlement Officer in writing for the grant of a ryotwari patta. Rule 3(1) requires the settlement Officer to cause a notice of the application requiring all persons who have any objection to the landholder''s claim being allowed, to file before the settlement Officer Statement of objections, if any, and to fix the date and place of enquiry. It also provides that the notice aforesaid shall be published (i) by affixture in the village Chavadi or if there is no village Chavadi, in some other conspicuous public place in the village; (ii) by beat of tom-tom in the village } and (iii) by affixture on the notice board of the office of the Settlement Officer. Rule 4 states that the date of enquiry shall not be earlier than fifteen days from the date of publication of the notice under Rule 3. When an appeal is preferred to the Tribunal against the order of the settlement officer, Rule 8(a) requires the Tribuual to cause a notice to be published in the manner prescribed in Rule 3(2) requirings persons all who have applied to the Settlement Officer u/s 15(1) or filed statements before him in the course of the enquiry under that section to appear before it. Mr. Kesava Iyengar''s argument ii that the scheme of the Act along with the rules makes it absolutely clear that the enquiry by the Settlement Officer and the Tribunal contemplated by Section 15 of the Act is intended to be an effective enquiry, giving every opportunity to every person who may conceivably have an interest in the land to appear before the Settlement Officer and the Tribunal and put forward his objections. Therefore, even the test pointed out by the Supreme Court in the decision referred to above is satisfied in this particular case.

Apart from this, as I have pointed out already, once the language of the statute is clear, specific and unambiguous and does not admit of any exception or qualification, there is no escape from the consequences flowing from the statutory provisions.

The House of Lords in Smith v. East Elloe Rural District Council (1956) A.C. 736, 750 had occasion to consider paragraph 16 of Part IV of Schedule I to the Acquisition of Land (Authorization Procedure) Act, 1946 making a compulsory purchase order final and not being liable to be questioned in any legal proceedings whatsoever. Dealing with that statutory provision, Viscount Simonds observed.

My Lords, I think that any one bred in the tradition of the law is likely to regard with little sympathy legislative provisions for ousting the jurisdiction of the court, whether in order that the subject may be deprived altogether of remedy or in order that his grievance may be remitted to some other Tribunal. But it is our plain duty to give the words of an Act their proper meaning and, for my part I find it quite impossible to qualify the words of the paragraph in the manner suggested. It may be that the legislature had not in mind the possibility of an order being made by a local authority in bad faith or even the possibility of an order made in good faith being mistakenly capriciously or wantonly challenged. This is a matter of speculation. What is abundantly clear is that words are used which are wide enough to cover any kind of challenge which any aggrieved person may think fit to make. I cannot think of any wider words Any addition would be more tautology.

I have more than once referred to the wide language of Section 15(2)(b) of the Act and in the light of the language of the specific statutory provision I am unable to see my way to accept the argument of Mr. Vedantachari that simply because the right to ryotwari patta is not a new right, but a recognition of a pre-existing right, the remedy of civil Court should not be deemed to have been barred and the amplitude of the provisions contained in Section 15(2) should not be curtailed or out down to that extent.

As a refinement of this part of the argument, the learned Counsel drew my attention to the language contained in Section 9(6) of the Act, which section had been subsequently omitted. The language of Section 9(6) as it stood was.

Every decision of the Tribunal and subiect to such decision, every decision of the Settlement Officer under this section shall be binding on all persons claiming an interest in any land in the village not withstanding that any such person has net preferred any application or filed any statement or adduced any evidence or appeared or participated in the proceedings before the Settlement Officer or the Tribunal, as the case may be.

Similar is the language of Section 7(4) of the Madras Estates (Supplementary) Act, 1956. I am unable to derive any assistance from the language of these statutory provisions by way of jurisdiction for cutting down the amplitude of the provision contained in Section 15(2)(b) of the Act. Even these provisions were not present in these, still there was finality attached to the decisions by some other sub-sections of these stautory provisions themselves For instance, Section 9(4)(e) as it originally stood provided that the decision of the Tribunal under that sub-section shall be final and not be liable to be questioned in any Court of law. It might be that Section 9(6) was intended to meet the particular contingency or was enacted out of abundant caution, but certainly was not intended to qualify or cut down in any way the amplitude of the provision contained in Section 9(4)(c).

Apart from this, I am not aware of any Principe of construction which authorizes the cutting down the effect of express words in a particular statutory provision in the light of the language contained in some other provision either in the same statute or in different statutes. The only provision which is identical with Section 15(2)(b) of the Act as it now stands is the provision contained in Section 10(3)(b) of the Act. Section 10 provides the machinery for determination of the date on which an under-tenure estate was created. The initial jurisdiction is vested in the Settlement Officer and against the decision of the Settlement Officer, an appeal is provided to the Tribunal. Section 10(3)(b) states that the decision of the Tribunal on any such appeal shall be final and not be liable to be questioned in any Court of law. Therefore, having regard to the wide language of Section 15(2)(b) of the Act I am unable to accept the argument of Mr. Vedantachari in this behalf.

The next argument sought to be advanced by Mr. Vedantachari is with reference to the language contained in Section 64-A and Section 64-C of the Act Section 64-C of the Act cannot have any reference to the decision of the Tribunal, because the language that is used therein is, any order passed by the Government or other authority under this Act. On the other hand, Section 64-A(1) expressly refers to the decision of a Tribunal. Therefore, if at all the order of the Tribunal in the present case can be brought under any other provision, it can only be u/s 64-A(l). But having regard to the specific and express provision contained in Section 15(2)(b), that section has to be considered to be a special provision and Section 64-A (1) has to be considered to be a general provision and the principle, the special excludes the general will come into operation, and it is Section 15(2)(b) which alone will be of relevance in the person context. Therefore, Mr. Vedantachari cannot derive any assistance with reference to the language contained in 64-A (1) of the Act. Apart from this, the provision embodied in Section 15(2)(b) of the Act regarding the finality of the orders of the Tribunal had been in the statute from the very beginning, while Section 64-A was introduced only by the amending Act, 1951. To accept the argument of Mr. Vedantachari that to an order of the Tribunal made u/s 15, it is Section 64-A that applies, is to hold that by the introduction of Section 64-A the existing provision regarding the finality of the orders of the Tribunal u/s 15 had been repealed by implication or had been rendered useless and purposeless. Certainly such a construction cannot be adopted. Therefore, the only reasonable way of understanding Section 64-A is that it has no application to the orders of the Tribunal under specified sections of the Act for which express provision have been made separately rendering them final.

The last argument of Mr. Vedantachari is based on the analogy of the provisions contained in Section 189 of the Madras Estates Land Act (I of 1908) and the decisions of this Court arising therefrom. As has been held by the Privy Council in Secretary of State v. Mask and Co. 67 I.A. 222

decision on other (statutory provision are not of material assistance, except in so far as general principles of construction are laid down.

The language of Section 189 of the Madras Estates Land Act (I of 1908) is entirely different from the language of Section 15 of the Act. In the Madras Estates Land Act, 1908, a totally different scheme was adopted. The Schedule to that Act under part A enumerates certain suits for certain specific reliefs triable by Collector. Under Part B, the Schedule enumerates certain applications for certain specific reliefs to be disposed of by a District Collector or Collector. Thus having identified particular suit or application Section 189(1) provided that a District Collector or Collector hearing suits or applications of the nature specified in parts A and B of the Schedule and the Board of Revenue or the District Collector exercising appellate or revisional jurisdiction therefrom shall hear and determine such suits or applications or exercise such jurisdiction as a Revenue Court, and that no civil Court in the exercise of its original is diction shall take cognizance of any dispute or matter in respect of which such suit or application might be brought or made. It is against the background of this provision, Sub-section (3) of that section provided:

189(3) The decision of a Revenue Court or of an appellate or revisional authority in any suit or pro-ceding under this Act on a matter falling within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Revenue Court shall be binding on the parties thereto and persons claiming under them, in any suit or proceeding in a Civil Court in which such matter may be in issue between them.

Thus, it will be seen that suits or applications for particular reliefs are enumerated and the statute provides that they are exclusively triable by the Revenue Court concerned. When the Revenue Court tries or disposes of such suits or applications, falling within the enumerated category, its decision thereof shall be final and be binding on the Civil Court. There fore, if a particular suit does not fall within the enumerated category as described in the Schedule, the section itself will have no application. It is against this background the decision rendered on this section will have to be appreciated. One of the applications enumerated in Part B of the Schedule is an application for commutation of rent u/s 40 of the Madras Estates Land Act, 1908. One of the suits enumerated in Part A of the Schedule is a suit to obtain a patta u/s 55 of the Madras Estates Land Act, 1908 and there is also reference to another suit to enforce acceptance of patta u/s 56. When the decision of the Revenue Court on such an application or a suit was sought to be put forth as a bar to a suit in a civil Court for determination of the question as to the title to the land or occupancy right, a Bench of this Court in Appa Rao v. Gurraju I.L.R Mad. 859 held that Section 189(3) of the Madras Estates Land Act, 1908, did not constitute the decisions of the Revenue Courts, on an issue as to title to land or occupancy rights therein arising incidentally in suits to enforce the acceptance of pattas which are cognizable exclusively by such Courts, resjudicata in a subsequent suit in a civil court instituted by the landlord for rejectment of the tenant from such land. Dealing with the question, Spenser J. pointed out:

Next it is argued that since, in such suits, the Collector is bound by the provisions of Section 57 to first inquire whether the Defendant is bound to accept a patta and secondly, whether the patta tendered is a proper one, and since in Section 51 the local description and extent of the land, and all special terms by which the parties are to be bound are some of the details to be contained in the patta, a Civil Court is precluded from going into the question whether a ryot, who was previously a party to suits far acceptance of patta, has occupancy rights in any portion of the land in that patta. I think the District Munsif has given the correct answer to this arguments in paragraph 11 of his judgment. He says:

in deciding the propriety of the terms of as patta the question of the Defendants''...Occupancy rights does no doubt arise for incidental decision but it cannot be said that it arises so directly and substantially for decision that the decision thereon by a Revenue Court can be said to be resjudicata in a subsequent ejectment suit in a Civil Court where the question may again directly and substantially crop.

The conclusion of the learned Judge was, the prior decision having been a decision upon an includental question as to occupancy rights, and not a matter falling within the exclusive jurisdiction of a Revenue Court, is not binding on the Civil Court u/s 189(3), although it did not arise in a suit to enforce acceptance of pattas which was exclusively cognizable by a Revenue Court.

However, this judgment was not followed by another Bench of this Court in Raja Rajeswara Sethupathi v. Muthudayan ILR Mad. 332. In View of the conflict, the matter came to be considered by a Full Bench in Siwaminathan v. Asan Muhammad ILR (1947) Mad. 505. But the Full Bench did not go into the conflict and left it as it was. The matter ultimately came to be considered by another Full Bench of this Court in Venkatarama Rao v. Venkayya (1954) 2 M.L.J. 1 (F.B.). This Full Bench agreed with the decision in Appa Rao v. Gurraju ILR 43 Mad. 859 and over-ruled the decision in Raja Rajeswara Sethupathi v. Muthudayan I.L.R.Mad. 332. In so doing, after referring to the language of Section 189(3) of the Land Act, 1908, the Full Bench pointed out:

Therefore, it is clear that it is only in respect of such disputes or matters as are covered by the suits or applications pacified in Section 189(1) that the Revenue Court can be said to have exclusive jurisdiction, that is, jurisdiction to the exclusion of a Civil Court.

The Bench concluded:

We agree with the inter pratation of Section 189(3) of the Madras Estates Land Act adopted by successive Bench decisions already mention d above, namely, that it is only in respect of disputes or matters exclusively within the jurisdiction of a Revenue Court that it decision would be binding on the parties in a subsequent civil proceeding and not its decision on incidental disputes or matters which arise in the course of adjudicating on the disputes and matters falling exclusively within its jurisdiction.

This decision also does not support Mr. Vedantachari''s case. The ratio laid down by the Full Bench is that the binding nature will have reference to the matter entrusted to the exclusive jurisdiction of the special Tribunal and will not cover any incidental determination. Therefore, applying that principle the question for consideration will be, when the settlement Officer or the Tribunal acts u/s 15 of the Act and determines that a particular piece of land is a private land, is it a determination on an incidental question or is it a determination on a question which had been entrusted to the exclusive jurisdiction of the Settlement Officer or the Tribunal. If it is a determination on an incidental question, there must be something else which is primary to which this question is incidental, which has been entrusted to the exclusive jurisdiction of the Settlement Officer or the Tribunal. I am unable to see from the scheme of the Act any other primary matter entrusted to the determination of the Settlement Officer or the Tribunal to which the determination of the character of the land as private land can be said to be an incidental one. As I have pointed out already, there had been some loose argument that the primary jurisdiction encrusted to the Settlement Officer, and the Tribunal is the grant of patta and the determination whether a particular piece of land is private or not is incidental to the exercise of that primary jurisdiction. I have also expressed my opinion that there is no substance in this argument, because there cannot be a ryotwari patta in the vacoum and the patta must be relatable to a particular piece of land and the grant of patta is merely a mechanical act flowing from the decision as to the character of the land and the particular piece of land in respect of which the claim of the landholder should be allowed. Once that decision has been arrived at, the grant or issue of patta is simply a matter of course consequent on that decision and therefore the physical or mechanical act of granting patta cannot be said to be the primary matter entrusted to the exclusive jurisdiction of the Settlement Officer or the Tribunal to which determination of the character of the land can be said to be an incidentals one. On the other hand, the language of Section 15(1) of the Act require the Settlement Officer to examine the nature and history of the land and to decide in respect of which land the landholder will be entitled to a patta and the scheme of the Act makes it indisputably clear that the determination of the character of the land as well as the determination of the entitlement of the land holder to a ryotwari patta in respect of a particular piece of land are primary matters entrusted to the exclusive jurisdiction of the Settlement Officer and the Tribunal and therefore the decision rendered by them in that behalf acquires the finality contemplated by Section 15(2)(b) of the Act and such decisions become unimpeachable in any Civil Court.

Under these circumstances I do not have any hesitation whatever in coming to the conclusion that the decision of Kailasam J, does not require any reconsideration, and having regard to the language of Section 15(2)(b) of the Act and scheme of the Act, no other conclusion is possible.

Once the decision of the Tribunal that the suit land is pannai land of the landholder, namely the vendor of the Appellant stands, the suit of the Respondents must necessarily fail. This consequence flows from the reason that the Respondents did not put forward any competing claim of title to the suit property as pannai land and their claim was only in the capacity of ryots to a ryoti land. Once the determination of the Tribunal that the suit land is a pannai land becomes final, the claim of title put forward by the Respondents must necessarily fail.

As far as possession of the suit property is concerned. I have already mentioned that the learned Subordinate Judge applied the presumption that possession follows title on the basis that even the Appellant had admitted that the land was a waste land. Once the Respondents are not entitled to claim title to the suit land, certainly the said presumption will not be of any avail to them and therefore they could not get even the injunction.

Under these circumstances, the second appeal is allowed and the judgment and decree of the learned Subordinate Judge dated 5th February 1969 in Appeal Suit No. 110 of 1968 are set aside and those of the learned. District Munsif, dated, 28th July 1967 in Original Suit No. 176 of 1966 are restored. There will be no order as to costs. No leave.