NARESH JASWAL vs Delhi Vidyut Board

THE present appeal, filed by the appellant, under Section 15 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (hereinafter referred to as ''the Act'') is directed against order dated 9.6.2000, passed by District Forum No. III in Complaint Case No. 3326/99 - entitled Sh. Naresh Jaswal v. THE Executive Engineer, Delhi Vidyut Board & Anr.

THE facts, relevant for the disposal of the present appeal briefly stated are that the appellant had filed a complaint under Section 12 of the Act, before the District Forum averring that the appellant was in possession of the ground floor of premises No. D-30, Subhash Marg, J.J. Colony, Raghubir Nagar, New Delhi as a tenant since 1985. It was stated in the complaint that the meter for supply of electricity in the abovesaid premises of the appellant was installed in the premises, not in the possession of the appellant but in the possession of the landlord of the appellant. THE premises where the meter was installed, generally remained locked and as such, meter reading could not be taken regularly. THE supply of electricity to the premises of appellant was disconnected from the meter by the landlord on 24.11.1999 regarding which the appellant also lodged a separate report with the Authorities of the police. In the complaint, filed by the appellant, before the District Forum it was prayed that the respondent/DVB be directed to instal the meter in question in the premises in the possession of the appellant and to transfer the connection in his name. The claim of the appellant in the District Forum was resisted by the respondent. The stand taken by the respondent before the District Forum was that no payment of electricity dues had been made by the appellant after August, 1990 and the electricity supply in question has been disconnected due to non-payment of dues.

The learned District Forum vide impugned order has held that as the electricity supply has been disconnected by the landlord of the appellant the respondent is not liable to restore the supply of electricity. It has been held by the learned District Forum that there was no deficiency in service on the part of the respondent and the complaint by the appellant has been rejected on the above grounds.

FEELING aggrieved, the appellant has preferred the present appeal under Section 15 of the Act. We have heard the Authorised Representative of the appellant at length on the question of admission of the present appeal and have also carefully gone through the documents/material on record. The order, being impugned in the present proceedings, was passed by the learned District Forum on 9.6.2000. In terms of the provisions contained in Section 15 of the Act, the present appeal should have been filed within a period of thirty days from the date of the order. However, proviso to the above section provides that the State Commission may entertain an appeal even after the expiry of the abovesaid period of thirty days, if it is satisfied that there was ''sufficient cause'' for not filing the same within the abovesaid period.

THE words ''sufficient cause'', occurring in proviso to Section 15 of the Act are of utmost significance. As per settled law, culled out from various judicial decisions, the above expression ''sufficient cause'' though deserves to receive a liberal construction, yet, a just and equitable balance has to be maintained between the right secured by the respondent as a result of the expiry of the prescribed period of limitation and the injustice of depriving the appellant of adjudication to his grievances on the merits of his appeal for causes beyond his reasonable control, which means the cause is bona fide and beyond the control of the appellant. Though no hard and fast line can be drawn as to what affords ''sufficient cause'' in a given case, yet, again as per settled law, any cause which prevents a person from approaching the Court within time is ''sufficient cause''. In doing so, it is the test of a reasonable man in normal circumstances which has to be applied. Admittedly, the present appeal has not been filed by the appellant within the prescribed period of thirty days. The same has been filed much after the prescribed period of thirty days on 25.7.2000. No application seeking condonation of delay, showing ''sufficient cause'' for not filing the appeal in time has been filed by the appellant. The present appeal, filed by the appellant, is, therefore, barred by limitation and is liable to be dismissed on the above ground alone. The present appeal, filed by the appellant, besides being barred by limitation is also devoid of substance on merits. During the course of arguments, the Authorised Representative of the appellant was fair enough to admit that the electricity connection in question, supplying electricity to the premises of the appellant, was not in the name of the appellant but was in the name of one Sh. Makhan Lal, landlord of the appellant. It was further stated by him that the landlord of the appellant had disconnected supply of electricity to the premises of the appellant on 24.11.1999 regarding which the appellant had made a complaint to the concerned police Authorities on 10.12.1999. A copy of the complaint, stated to have been made by the appellant to the Authorities of the police is at page 10 of the paper book. On a perusal of the same, it is apparent that the dispute in question is a dispute primarily between the landlord and tenant. In the presence of the above facts, the learned District Forum was fully justified in holding that there was no deficiency in service on the part of the respondent/DVB.

THUS viewed from all angles, the present appeal, filed by the appelant, is devoid of substance. The same merits dismissal. Accordingly, the same is dismissed in limine with no order as to costs. Appeal dismissed in limine.