NATIONAL INSURANCE COMPANY LIMITED-/ vs DALJEET SINGH-/Non-applicant

MS. Rumnita Mittal, Member-This order shall govern the disposal of application dated 25.8.2000 filed by the appellant/applicant along with the above mentioned appeal for condonation of delay in filing the present appeal. The brief facts, relevant for the disposal of the present application are, that the complaint, filed by the respondent Shri Daljeet Singh under Section 12 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (hereinafter referred to as the Act), before the District Forum was decided vide order dated 4.5.2000, whereby the said complaint filed by the respondent was allowed with the directions to the appellant to pay to the respondent a sum of Rs. 63,988/- together with interest @ 12% from the date of reporting the loss i.e. 10.8.1998 till the date of payment, as well as Rs. 2,500/- as cost of litigation.

THE appellant being aggrieved by the aforesaid order has filed the present appeal along with an application for condonation of delay. On 30.5.2003 it was prayed by the learned Counsel for the respondent that before deciding the appeal on merits, the application of the appellant for condonation of delay be disposed of first. Accordingly with the consent of both the parties we have heard the arguments advanced in respect of the abovesaid application. In order to decide the present application for condonation of delay, we may first refer to Section 15 of Act, which is being reproduced below : "15. Appeal-Any person aggrieved by an order made by the District Forum may prefer an appeal against such order to the State Commission within a period of thirty days from the date of the order, in such form and manner as may be prescribed : Provided that the State Commission may entertain an appeal after the expiry of the said period of thirty days if it is satisfied that there was sufficient cause for not filing it within that period."

The above proviso to Section 15 of the Act, thus, lays down that ''sufficient cause'' needs to be shown, before this Commission can exercise its powers to condone the delay. In the context ''sufficient cause'' would mean a cause which would justify the delay and inability of the appellant in filing the appeal within time. However, in the present case the impugned order is dated 4.5.2000 and a certified copy as per averment of the appellant in its application for condonation of delay was probably received by the appellant on 19/20.6.2000 whereas the present appeal has been filed on 26.8.2000. The reason assigned by the appellant/applicant in its application for condonation of delay is as under : "3. That the Branch Office of the Insurance Company searched the file and forwarded the same on 9.8.2000 to their Divisional Office who deals with the legal matters and the Divisional Office forwarded the same matter to their Regional Office as the matters pertaining to filing the appeal before the Hon''ble State Commission are being dealt by the Regional Office. 4. That the delay of 37 days in filing the appeal is neither intentional nor deliberate but caused due to above said reasons."

THUS, it is apparent on a perusal of the abovesaid application that neither the relevant dates on which the file was forwarded to the various branches of the appellant Insurance Company have been mentioned nor any cogent reason for condoning the delay of 37 days in filing the present appeal has been assigned. In fact it reflects a sad saga of the apathy, red tapism and inefficiency prevailing in the departments of the appellant Insurance Company. Mere shuttling of the files from one branch to another and that too after considerable delay does not constitute ''sufficient cause'' under the Act in order to enable us to condone the delay of about 37 days. In the circumstances, we are not inclined to condone the delay in filing the present appeal as no ''sufficient cause'' as per the requirements of proviso to Section 15 of the Act has been assigned for the delay. In our above views, we are fortified by a decision of the Hon''ble National Commission in the case of Vice Chairman, Delhi Development Authority v. O.P. Gauba, reported as III (1995) CPJ 18 (NC)=1986-96 Consumer 2731 (NS), which squarely covers the present application of the appellant for condonation of delay, it was held : "The appeal by DDA has been filed delayed by 38 days and is accompanied by an application for condonation of delay supported by an affidavit. It is stated therein that the copy of the order dated 10.3.1993 does not appear to have been received by DDA and so a copy of the order was obtained on 8.4.1993. The grounds for delay are given because the order had to be examined from all aspects and at various levels before a decision to file this appeal could be given. In our views this does not constitute a valid and sufficient cause for the exercise of our discretion to condone the delay. Proof of sufficient cause is a condition precedent for the exercise of discretion. It was the duty of the DDA to establish as to how the matter was dealt with at all levels and each day''s delay had to be satisfactorily explained. Inter office consultation for prolonged periods cannot constitute sufficient cause for condonation of delay. The delay cannot be condoned as a matter of generosity because the process of working in DDA has resulted in the delay. The application for condonation of delay is dismissed and consequently the appeal is dismissed as barred by time."

(Emphasis supplied) In another decision the Hon''ble Supreme Court in the case P.K. Ramachandran v. State of Kerala & Anr., reported as AIR 1998 SC has held : "The High Court does not appear to have examined the reply filed by the appellant as reference to the same is conspicuous by its absence from the order. We are not satisfied that in the facts and circumstances of this case, any explanation, much less a reasonable or satisfactory one had been offered by the respondent-State for condonation of the inordinate delay of 565 days. Law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribe and the Courts have no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. The discretion exercised by the High Court was, thus, neither proper nor judicious. The order condoning the delay cannot be sustained." (Emphasis supplied)

THE Hon''ble High Court of Jammu & Kashmir in the case of State of Jammu and Kashmir v. Smt. Ram Kali, reported as AIR 1987 Jammu & Kashmir 71, while considering the question whether the norms for condonation of delay should be different for Govt. or a Statutory Body as compared to an individual, has held : "THE delay in this case has accrued as the matter was referred to the Law Department and the office of the Executive Engineer, Chenani Hydel Project who is dealing with the case and the Govt. office such as, Law Department etc. were also at Srinagar and the matter being in rotation through proper channels took time. In our opinion, the above said explanation without mentioning the specific days and the reason for delay explaining each day of delay is no cause at all much less a sufficient cause for condonation of delay in filing the revision or an appeal within the meaning of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. We are, therefore, in full agreement with the ratio of authority of the Andhra Pradesh High Court, AIR 1973 AP 43 (supra) and hold that no exception is made for the Government in the matter of condonation of delay which is not satisfactorily explained in terms of the Act."

(Emphasis supplied) On similar grounds for condonation of delay, as stated in the condonation application in the present case, we have in our earlier decision in the case of Delhi Development Authority v. R.C. Jain, reported as I (2000) CPJ 141, relying upon the decision of National Commission in the case of Marial Francis Ajijia & Anr. v. Rev. Fr. R. Ratichgar, reported as II (1994) CPJ 108 (NC), held that mere procedural delay does not constitute sufficient cause in order to exercise our discretion. Therefore, in view of the above discussion, we are of the opinion that there is no ''sufficient cause'' for condoning the delay in filing the present appeal and consequently the application of the appellant for condonation of delay is liable to be dismissed. The same is dismissed accordingly. With the dismissal of the application for condonation of delay, the present appeal, filed by the appellant is also liable to be dismissed as being barred by time. Accordingly, the same is also dismissed. However, in the circumstances of the case the parties are left to bear their own costs.

THE present application dated 25.8.2000, as well as, the main appeal bearing No. A-1962/2000 are disposed of in above mentioned terms. Application and Appeal dismissed.