DIRECTOR STATE INSURANCE vs BASUDEV PRASAD GUPTA

THIS appeal under Sec. 15 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 ("the Act" herein) is directed against the order dated 11.10.1991 passed by the District Forum, Jaipur in Complainant Case No. 261/91. By the order under challenge the opposite party was directed to pay Rs. 5,615/- within one month and in. case the amount is not paid within one month the opposite party-appellant was made liable to pay interest @ 18% p.a. The appeal was presented on 3.2.1992 by Shri S.P. Singh, Deputy Director, Insurance and General Provident Fund against the order dated 11.10.1991. It was not accompanied by a certified copy of the order appealed against as required by Rule 8(3) of the Consumer Protection (Rajasthan) Rules, 1987. With the memo of appeal, a photo stat copy was submitted. The appeal was accompanied by an application for condonation of delay under Sec. 15 of the Act read with Rule 8(4) of the aforesaid Rules supported by affidavit of Shri S.P. Singh, Deputy Director, State Insurance Office reported that as the certified copy of the order was not submitted it has been presented after 85 days of the expiry of period of limitation. Mr. S.C. Mittal, learned Counsel for the appellant was heard on the question of belated presentation of the appeal. He has cited 1987 (2) SCC 107. We proceed to examine whether delay in presenting the appeal should be condoned or not. Sec. 15 of the Act is as follows:- "15. Appeal. Any person aggrieved by an order made by the District Forum may prefer an appeal against such order to the State Commission within a period of thirty days from the date of the order, in such form and manner as may be prescribed : Provided that the State Commission may entertain an appeal after the expiry of the said period of thirty days if it is satisfied that there was sufficient cause for not filing it within that period."

THE photostat copy of the order shows that it was countersigned by the Officer-in-charge, Copying Department on 19.10.1991. It has been stated in the application that the order under appeal was pronounced on 11.10.1991 but the copy of the order was not made available to the Officer-in-charge. However, the Officer-in-charge apprised about the fate of the case to the Additional Director, State Insurance on 25.10.91. THE Additional Director wrote to the Finance Department, Government of Rajasthan, Jaipur on 11.10.1991(7). THE Finance Department referred the matter to the Department and after the decision by the Law Department, the Director, Stat Insurance filed the appeal against the order of the District Forum on 3.2.1992. It has been prayed that the entire period from 25.10.1991 to the date of the filing may be taken as the time spent in processing the case at various levels and so delay may be condoned. Proviso to Sec. 15 of the Act is pari materia with Sec. 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963. Nothing has been stated by the Officer-in-charge as to when the certified copy was delivered. THE fact remains that the photostat copy of the certified copy of the order appealed against was submitted with the memo of appeal and it appears to have been countersigned on 19.10.1991. It will be proper to reproduce paras 2, 3, 4, 5 & 6 of the application which are supported by affidavit of Shri S.P. Singh, Deputy Director, State Insurance. "2. That the Officer-in-charge of case, however, apprised the Additional Director, State Insurance about the facts of the case vide letter dated 25.10.1991. That the Additional Director, State Insurance in his turn wrote to the Finance Department, Govt, of Rajasthan, Jaipur on 11.10.1991.

That the Finance Department, referred the matter to the Law Department and after their decision informed the Director, State Insurance to file appeal against the order of the District Forum.

THAT the Director, State Insurance wrote to the Additional Director who ultimately asked the Officer-in-charge to file appeal. That the entire period from 25.10.1991 to uptodate has been spent up in processing the case of various levels of the State Insurance, Finance and Law Department". 3. The Crucial words used in the proviso to Sec. 15 are "sufficient cause" and "satisfied". These words have also been used in Sec. 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963. It is thus clear that proviso to Sec. 15 of the Act has to be given the same meaning which has been attributed thereto over a long line of precedents under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 and it predecessor statute of 1908. It was held in Ramlal and Others v. Rewa Coal Fields Ltd. AIR 1962 SC 361 as under: "...The context seems to suggest that "within such period" means within the period which ends with the last date of limitation pre-, scribed. In other words, in all cases failing under Sec. 5 what the party has to show is why he did not file an appeal on the last day of limitation prescribed. That may inevitably mean that the party will have to show sufficient cause not only for not filing the appeal on the last day but to explain the delay made thereafter day by day. In other words, in showing sufficient cause for condoning the delay the party may be called upon to explain for the whole of the delay covered by the period between the last day prescribed for filing the appeal and the day on which the appeal is filed..."

The Supreme Court in Bikram Dass v. Financial Commissioner and Others AIR 1977 SC 2221 has succinctly held as under:- "Section 5 of the Limitation Act is a hard taskmaster and judicial interpretation has encased it within a narrow compass. A large majority of case-law grown around Sec. 5, its highlights being that one ought not easily to take away a right which has accrued to a party by lapse of time and that therefore a litigant who is not vigilant about his rights must explain every day''s delay..."

Keeping these two authorities in view if we analyse paras 2 to 6 reproduced hereinabove it is clear that nothing has been stated in these paras in regard to the period taken for obtaining the concurrence of the Finance Department as well as the Department of Legal Affairs. These paras are vague and not sufficient to explain the delay caused, for, it was incumbent in the appellant to satisfy the State Commission in regard to the sufficient cause envisaged by proviso to Sec. 15 of the Act. In State of West Bengal v. The Administrator, Howarah Municipality and Others AIR 1972 SC 7 it was laid down as under:- "Mr. D. Muhkerji, learned Counsel for the first respondent is certainly well-founded in his contention that the expression "sufficient cause" cannot be construed too liberally, merely because the party in default is the Government. It is no doubt true that whether it is a Government or a private party, the provisions of law applicable are the same, unless the statute itself makes any distinction..."

From the above it is manifest that even a much larger bigger body like the State, be it the Central Govt. or the State Govt. is on no different footing than the private litigant for the purpose of condonation of delay against the bar of limitation. In the Bihar State Board of Religious Trust v. Rameshrey Prasad Choudhary (AIR 1977 Patna 272) it was held that the Bihar State Board of Religious Trust was not entitled to any different treatment than a private party. An autonomous Board or a Corporation being a much smaller and a compact body would obviously be even on a lower footing vis-a-vis the Central Government or the State Government. It is not entitled to any different treatment than a private party. Shri S.C. Mittal learned Counsel for the appellant has placed strong reliance on 1987 (2) SCC 107 which is a Division Bench Judgment consisting of two honourable Judges of the Supreme Court. One of the question involved in that case was about the application for condonation of delay made by the State Government. In para 3 of the report while considering the question it was held that the expression "sufficient cause" employed by the legislature is adequately elastic to enable the Courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which subserves the ends of justice that being the life urpose for the existence of the institution of Courts and that a liberal approach in the matters instituted in the Supreme Court should be made. It laid down certain principles which have been enumerated at page 108. Our attention was drawn to principle No, 5 mentioned therein. The expression "sufficient cause" has to be construed liberally, this is well sealed.

THE principal question with which we are concerned is whether the appellant has succeeded in making out a sufficient cause to our satisfaction on the basis of the averments made in paras 2 to 6 of the application supported by affidavit. In the light of the principles laid down by the Supreme Court it is settled beyond cavil that it is incumbent on the appellant to explain each day''s delay beyond the terminus line of the prescribed period of limitation. The opposite party-appellant does not have even a semblance of a case for condonation, on its own showing, a delay of as many as 85 days which was required to be explained day by day. Far from doing so, there does not seem to be even an attempt to conform to the law. The relevant averments made in paras 2 to 6 are totally cryptic and bald to explain the delay of 85 days. It needs to be noticed that in the application it has not been averred as to when the prescribed period of limitation expired and the facts or factors from that point till the date of the filing of the appeal. An omnibus version that in the processing of the appeal, the same could not be filed within limitation has been made which cannot advance the case of the appellant. Similar view was taken by us in Rajasthan State Insurance & G.P.F. Department, Bima Bhawan, Bani Park, Jaipur v. Shri Radhey Shyam Goyal (Appeals no. 121 & 125/91 decided on 27.8.1991). The appellant Department does not seem to be aware of the strict requirements of law herein and the burden it has to discharge to avail the benefit of condonation both under Sec. 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 or the proviso to Sec. 15 of the Act. For the foregoing reasons there is no merit in the application for condonation of delay in the appeal and it is dismissed. Inevitably the appeal has to be dismissed because of the bar of limitation. Appeal dismissed.