National Studios vs Mrs. Prema Kalyanasundaram

S.S. Subramani, J.—All these Revision Petitions are filed by various tenants occupying different portions of the building possession of which

is sought to be recovered by the landlady on two grounds, namely, (1) that the building is required bona fide for her own occupation, and (2) that

the building requires demolition and reconstruction to suit her convenience. It is said that the landlady and her husband are practising advocates,

and now they are living together in a rented premises at Mylapore. The said premises is used both for residential and non residential purposes, i.e.,

for their residence and also for running advocate''s office. It is further said that their landlord has requested them to vacate the premises as per

letter dated 10-5-1992. It is further averred that both the landlady and her husband have no other building of their own and they are under threat

of eviction, and therefore, they require the Schedule mentioned building for their own occupation, so that they can occupy the same, after

demolishing it and putting up a new construction, making it suitable for their residence-cum-office. It is said that there is a vacant space on the rear

side of the schedule building wherein, after new construction, the same can be used as an advocate''s office. A lawyer''s notice was issued

demanding vacant possession. But the demand was not complied with, and that necessitated the filing of the Eviction Petitions.

Even though the tenants and landlady are same, against each tenant, two eviction petitions are filed, one on the ground of bona fide occupation

and the other on the ground that the building requires demolition and reconstruction. The relief in the petition under Sec. 14(1) (b) is more or less

the same in all the petitions. It is said thus:

It is, therefore, prayed that this Honourable Court may be pleased to order eviction of the respondent from the portion in his occupation at No.

84/1, R.K. Mutt Road, Mandaveli, Madras-28, more particularly described in the Schedule hereunder for demolition and reconstruction for the

purpose of her occupation and for running her husband''s office as an Advocate and directing the respondent to quit and deliver to the petitioner

vacant possession of the said premises, directing the respondent to pay the costs of this petition, and pass such further or other orders as this

Hon''ble Court may deem fit to pass in the circumstances of the case.

In the petition under Sec.10(3) (a) (iii) of the Act, the relief prayed for reads thus:-

It is therefore prayed that this Hon''ble Court may be pleased to order eviction of the Respondent from the portion in his occupation at No. 84/1,

R.K. Mutt Road, Mandaveli Madras-28, more particularly described in the Schedule hereunder for the purpose of her own occupation and the

running of her husband''s office as an Advocate and directing the Respondent to quit and deliver to the petitioner vacant possession of the said

premises, directing the Respondent to pay the costs of this petition and pass such further or other orders as this Hon''ble Court may deem fit to

pass in the circumstances of the case.

All the petitions were tried together, and, by a common order, eviction was allowed both on the ground that the building required demolition and

reconstruction, and also on the ground that the same is required for own occupation of the landlady, and for the said purpose, Rent Controller

believed the evidence of P.W.1, husband of the landlady, and P.W.2 Engineer. As documentary evidence, Exs.A-1 to A-27 were marked. All the

tenants were examined. They examined an Engineer also. As documentary evidence, Exs.R-1 to R-26 were marked.

The Rent Controller found that the petitioners as well as her husband are occupying rented premises, and, as evidenced by Ex.A-2, the

landlady''s landlord has requested them to vacate. It is further found that the landlady and her husband have no other building of their own. They

need the schedule building for their own occupation, after making suitable changes in the existing building. The Rent Controller relied on Exs.A-15

and A-17 to come to the conclusion that the landlady is occupying only a rented premises. The Rent Controller also took note of the fact that none

of the tenants seriously disputed the landlady''s version that she and her husband are residing in a rented premises. Even though various tenants

contended that profession of an advocate is not ''business'' and, therefore, for the purpose of own occupation, i.e., for running an advocate''s

office, eviction cannot be granted, the said contention was negatived holding that the profession of advocate is a business, and landlady is not

disqualified from getting possession. It was also found that the claim is bonafide, and there is no oblique motive on the part of the landlady in

seeking eviction.

The contention of the tenants that prior to the filing of the eviction petitions, there was some misunderstanding between them which resulted in

the disconnection of electricity was negatived, and the Rent Controller further held that litigation between landlord and tenants did not disqualify the

landlady from getting possession, nor will the prior litigation have any bearing to militate against the bonafide claim of the landlady.

In so far as the contention that the building requires demolition and reconstruction is concerned, Rent Controller found that even though the

entire building is not to be demolished to the ground, giving a new shape to the existing building will amount to demolition and reconstruction. It

was further found that for the purpose of demolition and reconstruction, the entire building must be in the possession of the landlady. Other grounds

under Sec. 14(1) (b) of the Act were also found to be satisfied, i.e., they have got sufficient funds, and they have obtained plan and licence, etc. All

the Eviction Petitions were allowed.

Even though the tenants challenged the matter before the Appellate Authority, the Appellate Authority also confirmed all the findings.

It is concurrent findings of the Authorities below that are challenged in these Revision Petitions.

Within the limits of Sec.25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, I have to consider whether the Orders of the

Authorities below are in any way illegal, improper or irregular.

For the said purpose, I am not expected to re-appreciate the evidence. The Appellate Authority, as the final Court of fact, has also

appreciated the evidence. Naturally, the burden is on the revision petitioners to prove that the Orders of the Authorities below are without any

material.

The main point that is stressed by learned counsel for the revision petitioners is that the petitions are for bona fide own use. At the same time, it

is said that they want to make use of the same after reconstruction. If reconstruction is not possible under Sec. 14(1)(b) of the Act, naturally, the

claim of bona fide occupation also goes. It is further stressed that the building as it stands cannot be made use of for the purpose of their own

occupation. So, when the bona fide occupation is inter-connected with reconstruction, and, if reconstruction is not legally and factually possible,

the claim for own occupation also falls to the ground.

Under the Rent Control Act, a landlord is entitled to get eviction of the tenants on various grounds. Under the Tamil Nadu Act, if it is a non-

residential building, a claim for own occupation is possible, if the landlord or the person for whose occupation the building is required is carrying on

business and is not having any building of his own, and the application for eviction is also filed with bona fides. Another ground for eviction was,

landlady requires the demised premises for immediate demolition and reconstruction. Both these grounds are mutually exclusive.

Merely because reconstruction is not possible, whether that will take away the ground of eviction on the ground of bona fide requirement for

own occupation also? If both the grounds are mutually exclusive, I do not think the argument of the learned counsel for the revision petitioners

merits any consideration.

It is settled law that if the claim for bona fide own occupation is found, the question whether the landlady is going to make use of the same

building or whether she will use it after remodeling it, or repairing it, or whether she will use the ground alone, is not the concern of the tenant. Law

does not insist that the landlord should make use of the building for his own purpose. It is the bona fide of the landlord that is in question, and not

whether how he is going to use in future.

As early as in the decision reported in (1965) 1 S.C.W.R. 167 (Ramniklal Pitambardas Mehta v. Indradaman Amratial Shah), this question

has been considered by the Apex Court. That was a case under the Bombay (Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates) Control Act. In that case,

their Lordships held thus;

...Once the landlord establishes that he bona fide requires the premises for his occupation, he is entitled to recover possession of it from tenant in

view of the provisions of Sub-cl.(g) of S. 13(1) irrespective of the fact whether he would occupy the premises without making any alteration to

them or after making the necessary alterations. Demolition of the existing building and subsequent erection of a new building are only intermediate

steps in order to make the building fit for occupation by the landlord. ''Occupation'' of the premises in Cl.(g) does not necessarily refer to

occupation as residence. The owner can occupy a place by making use of it in any manner. If the plaintiffs on getting possession start their work of

demolition within the prescribed period, they would have occupied the premises in order to erect a building fit for their occupation. The provisions

of cl. (hh) cannot possibly apply to the case where a landlord reasonably and bona fide requires the premises for his own occupation even if he had

to demolish premises and to erect a new building on them. The provisions of cl. (hh) apply to cases where the landlord does not require the

premises for his own occupation, but requires them for erecting a new building which is to be let out to tenants.

The said decision was followed by the Supreme Court in Jai Kishan Vs. Mumtaz Begum,

Similar is the case reported in Radhey Shyam and Others Vs. Kalyan Mal, That was a case under the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation

Control Act. Sec.12(1) of that Act dealt with both bona fide own occupation and also occupation after repairs or alternation. Eviction order was

passed on both the grounds. The validity of the said order was challenged before the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court said:

Where the order of eviction is based really and substantially only under S. 12(1) (f) of the Act i.e., on the ground of bona fide requirement of the

landlord, the fact that S. 12(1) (h) which envisages eviction of tenant on ground of effecting either repairs or alterations is also mentioned in the

order does not make the order of eviction purely one under S.12(1) (h). Consequently, S.18 will not be attracted and it would not be obligatory

on the part of the landlord to provide accommodation of equal extent to the tenants in the new building to be constructed by him.

The decision reported in Arya Samaj, Sagar and Others Vs. Pinjamal and Another, was also in respect of a case under the Madhya Pradesh

Rent Control Act. In paragraph 3 of the judgment, their Lordships said that ''the mere fact that the landlord intended to make alterations in the

house either on account of his sweet will or on account of absolute necessity in view of the condition of the house, would not affect the question of

his requiring the house bonafide and reasonably for his occupation, when he had proved his need for occupying the house. Nothing further need be

proved''.

Similar is the case reported in K.A. Anthappai Vs. C. Ahammed, . It was a case coming under the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control)

Act. In paragraph 10, at page 1700, it was held that ''The claim of the landlord that he needs the building bona fide for his personal occupation

cannot be negatived on the ground that the building requires repairs and alternations before the landlord can occupy the same''. Thereafter, their

Lordships approved the decision of the Kerala High Court reported in 1987-1-Ker. L.T. 671 (Devaky v. Krishnakutty) wherein it was held thus:-

...Once the landlord establishes that he bona fide requires the building for his occupation or the occupation of any member of his family, he can

recover possession of the building from the tenant irrespective of the fact whether he would occupy the same which or without making any

alternations.

Thereafter, the Supreme Court said thus:-

We are in agreement with this view which is in consonance with the decision of this Court in Ramnikal Pitambardas Mehta Vs. Indradaman

Amratlal Sheth,

Our High Court had occasion to consider a similar question in the decision reported in 1989-II-MLJ 469 - 1989-2-L.W. 25 (Nandan

Brothers and others v. Kamaladevi Chandak and others), and M. Srinivasan, J., as he then was, has held (at page 472) thus:-

...If the Controller is satisfied that the claim of the landlord is bona fide, he shall make an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession

of the building. It is not necessary to refer to the other parts of the Section. Thus, under S. 10(3) (a) (iii) of the Act, there is no reference whatever

to the condition of the building. The Section does not prescribe that a landlord who has obtained possession of the building under the sub-section

shall not in any manner alter the superstructure, or effect such modification as may be required to suit his convenience. Once the landlord gets

possession of the building under the said sub-section, he is entitled as the owner thereof to make such alternations or modifications as necessary for

his purposes....

The Kerala High Court had occasion to consider a similar question in the decision reported in (1965) 1 Ker L R 323 (P. A. Mohammed

Kannu v. H.A. Asanar Kunjii), wherein, K.K. Mathew, J., as he then was, has held (at page 325) thus:-

If the petitioner bonafide needed the building for his own occupation - and the finding of the Rent Control Court is that he so needed it, - the

petitioner was entitled to recover possession of the building notwithstanding the fact that he has to demolish the present building and reconstruct it

for the purpose of such occupation. The fact that the building requires reconstruction for the purpose of occupation does not mean that the

petitioner, does not require it for his own occupation. In other words the purpose of the occupation may be such that building may have to be

demolished and reconstructed; that does not mean that the landlord''s claim is not under S. 11(3). In fact the appellate and the revisional authorities

assumed that the need of the petitioner was bona fide, but because he abandoned his claim under Sec. 11 (4) they thought that the petitioner was

not entitled to claim recovery of possession under Sec. 11 (3). This view seems to be not correct....

In that case, landlord moved an application for eviction on the ground of bona fide occupation and for reconstruction. Pending enquiry, he did not

pursue the ground of reconstruction. The Authorities were of the view that if the building could not be reconstructed, the ground of bonafide own

occupation will also go. While deciding the correctness of such a finding by the Authorities below, the learned judge held as extracted supra.

In 1969 K.L.T. 133 (Saradha v. Kumaran), the question was, whether the landlord was entitled to get eviction on the ground of bona fide

requirement for own use, namely, to demolish the building and make use of the site as a passage. The learned judge who decided the case, held

that was also a case coming within the claim of bonafide own use. It is was reiterated that once the building is obtained, it is for the landlord to

decide as to whether he must make use of the same building, or whether he should use it as a passage alone. It was held thus:-

...The conversion of the existing building into a pathway for the use of the landlord is a need covered by S. 11 (3) of the Act.(which deals with

bonafide own occupation).

To the same effect is the decision reported in 1980 K.L.T. 951 (Das Naik v. Narayanan). In that case, the Court held thus:-

S. 11(4) (iv) provides an independent ground for eviction depending on the condition of the building, the need to reconstruct and the ability of the

landlord to do so; it is distinct from and unrelated to the need for own occupation under S. 11 (3). But that does not mean that the two are

mutually exclusive. If the application for eviction is under S. 11(4) (iv) alone, the landlord''s need for own occupation has no relevance; but if it is

under both S. 11(3) and S. 11(4) (iv), the circumstance that the building requires reconstruction for the purpose of own occupation docs not affect

or later the bonafide nature of the landlord''s need under S. 11(3).

In a recent Bench decision reported in 1995(2) Ker L T 763 (George Varghese v. Ammini Cherian), K.T. Thomas, J., as he then was, held

that when the landlady filed eviction petition on the ground of bona fide use and also on the ground of demolition and reconstruction, if it is

ultimately found that the claim of bona fide own use is genuine ground, the Court need not proceed to consider further whether there is any need

for reconstruction. But their Lordships said that if the ground for bona fide own occupation is found against, there may be necessity to consider the

later ground when that, ground is also pressed into service. In paragraph 5 of the judgment, it was held thus:-

Be that as it may, should the Rent Control Court or the Appellate Authority have considered the legal position relating to Sec. 11 (4) (vi) of the

Act in the present case at all. Here what the landlady wants is eviction of the tenant for demolishing the building to put up a new building on the site

for accommodating her son who is dependent on her. That precisely forms the ground covered by Sec.11 (3) of the Act i.e., the landlord bona fide

needs the building for his own occupation or for the occupation by any member of his family dependent on him. Merely because the landlady said

that a new building has to be put up in the place of the existing structure does not transpose the ground to Sec. 11 (4) (iv) of the Act. In the context

of Sec. 11 (3) of the Act the landlady would have stated formally as to how she would make use of the building after eviction. In the same context

she has also said about the proposal to put up a new building in the place of the old one. When a landlord applies for eviction on two grounds -

one under Sec.11(3) and the other under S. 11 (4) (iv) of the Act. Rent Control Court can stop with the finding that the ground under S. 11(3) has

been made out. In such a situation there is no need to proceed further to the consideration of the other ground. Of course, if the former ground is

found against the landlord, there may arise the necessity to consider the latter ground, when that ground is pressed into service....

(Emphasis supplied)

In view of this settled position of law, the legal ground put forward by learned Senior Counsel for revision petitioners has to be rejected.

Now I will come to the factual findings arrived by the Authorities below. The landlady has stated that she requires the building for her own

occupation Her dependent husband is having an advocate''s office. Both of them are living in a rented house, and are using the same for residence

and for running their office. It is also their case that as per Ex.A-2 notice, their landlord want them to surrender the building. Further

correspondence also shows that the landlord was pursuing the request for surrender. It was in those circumstances, the present petitions were filed.

Before the Rent Controller, a contention was taken that the advocate''s office is not a business and, therefore, eviction of non-residential premises

is not possible.

Rent Controller rejected the contention on the basis of the decision reported in S. Mohan Lal Vs. R. Kondiah, wherein their Lordships said

that the practice carried on by an advocate in relation to his profession can be said to be ''business''. The said decision was followed by the

Supreme Court in a recent decision reported in Dr Jess Raphael Vs. K.L. Regina Joseph (Mrs), wherein, the question raised was, whether a

doctor''s profession is ''business''. While considering the same, their Lordships accepted the meaning of ''business'' as stated in Black''s Law

Dictionary, 6th Edn., at page 198 wherein ''business'' was defined as under:-

Business.-- Employment, occupation, profession, or commercial activity engaged in for gain or livelihood. Activity or enterprise for gain, benefit,

advantage or livelihood.

In view of the two decisions of the Supreme Court (referred to supra), Learned Senior Counsel for the revision petitioners was not serious in his

contention that advocate''s profession is not ''business''. Therefore, the contention raised on that ground cannot stand.

A further contention was put forward that even though under Ex.A-2, a letter was sent by the landlord of the respondent herein, P.W.1 has

admitted that his landlord is not insisting that they should vacate the building. It is true, P.W.1 has stated in his evidence that after Ex.A-2, no

subsequent correspondence was sent to the landlady in this case, and the urgency which was there previously has now ceased, and, therefore, they

did not press for eviction. Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the revision petitioners submitted that this subsequent event will have to be taken

into consideration.

I do not think such a contention will have any relevance, nor can any lack of bonafide be inferred on that ground.

It is said that it is a human instinct that one must live under his own roof. It is a basic necessity. In a decision of the Kerala High Court reported

in 1984 Kerala Law Times 290 (Secretary, Thevara Co-op- Consumer Stores Ltd, v. Jose), the landlord was residing with his uncle. He wanted

to get married and reside in his own house. He sought for eviction. While considering the same, in paragraph 10 of the Reports, it was said thus:-

...A feeling that one is under his own roof, and as of right, is a comforting one duly recognised and protected by taw and legal institutions. Even if

one need not be apprehensive that a close relation like a father or mother, brother or sister may not drive him out of the house owned by any of

them, the need felt by the individual to have a separate establishment is a perfectly justified one....

In this case, both the landlady and her husband have been residing in a rented house for the last more than 25 years. In the later half of their

life, they want to occupy their own house and set up practice. They have no other building of their own. Therefore, it cannot be said that their

requirement is lacking in good faith. Merely because, the landlord of the respondent herein (landlady) has not sought for immediate eviction, it

cannot be said that the tenants can insist that their landlady should continue to be in the rented building. It is not a question of urgency of vacating

the rented premises. It is the bona fide intention of the landlady to reside in her own building as of right, without any objection from any source.

Even if there was no demand under Ex.A-2 for vacating the premises, it cannot be said that the claim of the landlady is in any way lacking in good

faith. Both the Authorities below have concurrently found that the claim of the landlady is bonafide. It is a finding of fact. I do not find any illegality

in the findings of the Authorities below in that regard.

Once I find that the claim of the landlady is bonafide, and she wants her own building for her own occupation, in view of the decision of the

Division Bench of the Kerala High Court reported in (1995) 2 Ker L T 763 (supra), it may not be necessary for me to consider whether the

landlady has substantiated the other ground, namely, demolition and reconstruction. If the claim is bonafide, and the landlady gets possession of her

building on that ground, then it is for the landlady to decide whether she should demolish it, repair it, or make use of the same building after making

such adjustments according to her requirements. But the Learned Senior Counsel for the Revision petitioners seriously argued that since both the

Authorities below have rendered a finding en demolition and reconstruction, a finding is required from this Court also. The contention is that the

existing building is only 20 years old on the date of petition, and the landlady has no case that the building is in a bad shape and, therefore,

according to Learned Senior Counsel, eviction on the ground of demolition and reconstruction cannot be granted.

I have already extracted the prayer of the landlady in her petition under Sec.14 (1) (b). There also, what the petitioner says is that she wants to

reconstruct the building for the purpose of their own use. P. W. 1 has state d in his evidence that he has got the means to put up a new

construction. He has been a practising lawyer for more than 25 years as on the date of petition. In fact, the financial position of the landlady is not

seriously challenged by any of the revision petitioners. It is said that Ex.P-23 plan will show that the landlady does not want to demolish the

building, but she wants to make only alterations to the existing building and, therefore, Sec.14 (1) (b) may not have any application. Even if I hold

that Sec.14 (1) (b) of the Act will not have application to this case, that is not going to change the result, for, eviction order passed by the

Authorities below has to be confirmed on the ground of bona fide occupation.

Learned Senior Counsel for the revision petitioners submitted that the plan and licence were obtained only when P.W.2 was examined. Even

though originally they wanted to demolish the building, subsequently they have changed their idea, and it is said that they want to retain the existing

three rooms, and they want to only remodel the same, and, therefore, it is not a demolition as contemplated under S.14 (1) (b).

Rent Control Act does not say that the entire building must be levelled to the ground, and then only that will amount to demolition and

reconstruction.

This Court in the decision reported in 1965-I-M.L.J. 78 = (1964) 77 L.W. 632 (Ramachandran v. Kasim Khaleeli), said that even partial

demolition is demolition as contemplated under Sec.14 (1) (b) of the Act. In that case, it was stated that demolition may be in respect of part of the

building, i.e., (1) entire ground floor, entire first floor, or entire second floor. (2) There can be demolition work in the ground floor even when the

first floor is left undisturbed. (3) The demolition can be in portion of the ground floor or in a portion of the first floor. It need not be of the entire

ground floor or of the entire first floor. (4) In such a case, the building, after the fresh work is finished, would comprise partly the old building and

party the new building. (5) The fresh work may be outside in the exterior or inside in the interior. If the work undertaken, though in a portion of the

building and in the interior, is such that the completed work involved demolition and also substantial structural alternation so as to change the

identity and give a new look altogether, Sec.14 (1) (b) would clearly apply to such a case. (6) The words ""rebuilding"" ""reconstruction"" and

erecting a new building"" have the same meaning (7) Erection of a new building may be by the use of brick and mortar or by steel or even by wood

work or may be by the use of all the materials. The crucial test is; Is it not erecting a new building or reconstructing or remodeling? In view of the

settled position of law, and also on the basis of Ex.A-3 plan, the contention of learned senior counsel for the petitioners has to fall. It may be noted

that the said decision was followed by out High Court again in the decision reported in 1971-II-M.L.J. 297 = 84 L.W. 523 (S. A. Henry v.

J.V.K. Rao) wherein K.S. Ramamurti, J. said that ""all that Sec. 14(1)(b) requires is a demolition followed by structural alterations by way of

reconstruction so as to give a new face to the form and structure of the premises''. In that case, the learned judge further followed an earlier

decision of this Court reported in 1965-2-M.L.J. 144 = 78 L.W. 363 (Kannappa Pillai v. Venkataratnam) wherein it was held thus:-

...In Kannappa Pillai v. Venkataratnam, Venkatadri, J. had to deal with the question as to when the building can be said to be a new building

taking the place of the old building. In the discussion he has referred to the relevant English and Indian decisions from which he has enunciated the

principle that in order to hold that the fresh work undertaken amounts to the construction of a new building, the structural alterations in the premises

should be such that the original building has completely lost its identity....

(Emphasis supplied)

If the original building completely loses its identity, that will amount to demolition and reconstruction for the purpose of the Act.

In the instant case, we find that a building having three rooms having RCC roof is now being converted into a multi-storeyed building. Even the

existing three rooms are completely changed. The shape of each and every room is changed. A complete alteration is going to be effected, and a

single story building is going to be converted into a double-storeyed one. Even the original roof will cease to be the roof of the structure. Even the

vacant land on the rear side of the building is sought to be converted into an office- cum-residential portion. On going through the plan, it is clear

that old building and the new building that is going to be put up have no comparison. It will completely lose its identity. In effect, all the ingredients

of Sec. 14(1)(b) of the Act are satisfied in this case.

Learned counsel submitted that the physical condition is also one of the materials to be considered. The landlady has no case that the structure

is in any way weak. Though it is not dilapidated, that has also some relevance in considering the requirement under Sec.14 (1) (b) of the Act. The

said contention also cannot be accepted. The condition of building has got a larger meaning. Occasionally, the suitability of a building for the

purpose for which it is intended to be used can also be taken into consideration If the existing condition of the building is not suitable and that

requires a great change, to that extent, it can be said that the physical condition of the building is also not good. While considering the bonafides

under that head, every recent decision of the Supreme Court reported in 1996-II-C.T.C.586 = 1997-1-L.W. 218 (Vijay Singh v. Vijayalakshmi

Ammal) is also relevant, wherein, their Lordships said that the physical condition of the building is only one of the requirements, and not of primary

importance.

The contention of the learned senior counsel for the revision petitioners that the plan and licence were obtained only subsequent to the filing of

the eviction petitions, and that too when P.W.2 was in the witness box also, cannot be a ground to suspect the bona fides of the requirement of the

landlady. Under Sec. 14(1)(b) of the Act, production of plan and licence is not made a condition precedent for getting an order of eviction. Court

can also take judicial notice of the fact that even if a plan is filed before Court at the time of filing of the eviction petition, that cannot remain valid till

the possession of the building is obtained by the landlord/landlady. Plan and licence can be obtained only for a particular period. Every now and

then the landlord will have to get it renewed, and on account of various circumstances, plant that was obtained by the landlady may become

unsuitable. Plan and licence are necessary only to prove that if possession is given to her, immediately she can start the demolition and

reconstruction work. On the basis of the plan and licence produced in this case, P.W.2 was cross-examined in detail. So, on that ground also, the

landlady''s bona fides cannot be suspected. On going through the judgments of the Authorities below, I do not find that the Learned Senior

Counsel for the petitioners was successful in persuading me to enter a different finding, nor was he successful in substantiating that the Authorities

have acted illegally, irregularly, or that they have committed any impropriety. The Revision Petitions are, therefore, without merits and they are

accordingly dismissed, however, without any order as to costs. After the order was pronounced, counsel on record for the petitioners sought time

to vacate the premises. Since the petitioners are doing business in the premises in question, I grant three months'' time from to day for the

petitioners to vacate and surrender vacant possession to the landlord, subject to their filing an affidavit of undertaking that they will do so

unconditionally on or before the time granted hereinabove. The petitioners shall also pay the entire arrears of rent due by them. The condition as to

the filing of affidavit of undertaking before this Court and payment of entire arrears of rent shall be within two weeks from to-day. Failing

compliance of either of the aforesaid conditions, the landlord shall be at liberty to seek possession, irrespective of the time granted herein.