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Judgment
K. Venkataswami, J.—This revision petition is filed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India challenging an order of the tribunal below
allowing I.A. 127 of 1990 a petition for reviewing an order already passed on 31.1.1990 in I.A. No. 435 of 1989 in S.R. No. 1899 of 1989.
Brief facts are the following:
In a motor accident that took place on 23.12.1986 minor John Bright, the first respondent herein was permanently disabled. Unfortunately the
father and guardian of the minor did not take-timely steps to file a petition for compensation u/s 110-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, but filed
the same after a delay of 737 days with a petition to condone that delay. That petition namely I.A. No. 435 of 1989 was dismissed. Aggrieved by
that the minor represented by the father and guardian has filed I.A. No. 127 of 1990 purporting to invoke the provisions of Order 47, Rule 1 of
the Code of Civil Procedure.
The court below overruling the objections of the petitioner herein entertained the review application and allowed the same. Hence the present
revision petition.
At the outset it is to be pointed out that there is nothing to suggest from the original application or from the original records that I.A. No. 127 of
1990 was filed before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and dealt with as such. However, the counter filed by the petitioner herein as second
respondent in the said LA. proceeds as if the application was filed before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal (District Court Kanyakumari at
Nagcrcoil. It proceed on the basis that the application was disposed of by the claims tribunal though the cause title shows as if it was disposed of
by the District Court.
Mrs. Bhagirathi Narayanan, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner raised two important contentions before me. The first contention was
that the tribunal has no inherent power to review an earlier order passed by it. The second contention was even assuming that the tribunal has
power to review its order the order under revision cannot be sustained as no reason is given in the order. Learned Counsel placed reliance on two
judgments of the Supreme Court one judgment of this Court and another judgment of Bombay High Court. They are Patel Narshi Thakershi and
Others Vs. Shri Pradyumansinghji Arjunsinghji, , Col. Avtar Singh Sekhon Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Others, . V. Dhandayuthapani Vs. S.P.
Krishnamurthi and Others, and National Hotel and Others Vs. Rukaiyabai and Others, .
Mr. V.K. Rajagopal learned Counsel appearing for the first respondent submitted that the tribunal has power to review its order and though the
review order does not contain any reason having regard to the fact that the minor''s career has been seriously affected and that the minor is not in a
position to look after himself as a result of the accident this Court may not be pleased to interfere with the order under revision. In support of his
contention that the tribunal has power to review its earlier order he cited the decision in State of Haryana Vs. Smt. Darshana Devi and Others, and
also the decision in Bhagwathi Deri and Ors. v. I.S. Goel and Ors. 1983 A.C.J. 123.
I have considered the rival submissions.
Before going into the actual question namely whether the tribunal has power to review it is relevant to note down the provisions relating to
''procedure and powers of claims tribunals'' Section 110-C of the Motor Vehicles Act 1939 reads as follows:
110-C : Procedure and powers of claims tribunals : (1) In holdingahy inquiry u/s 110 B the claims tribunal may subject to any rules that may be
made in this behalf follow such summary procedure as it thinks fit.
(2) The claims tribunal shall have all the powers of a Civil -Court for the purpose of taking evidence on oath and of enforcing the attend dance of
witnesses and of compelling the discovery and production of documents and material objects and for other purposes as may be prescribed; and
the claims tribunal shall be deemed to be a civil court for all the purposes of Sec 195 and Chapter XXVI of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
(2 of 1974).
(2-A) Where in the course of any inquiry the claims tribunal is satisfied that-
(i) there is collusion between the person making the claim and the person against whom the claim is made, or
(ii) the person against whom the claim is made has failed to contest the claim, it may for reasons to be recorded by it in writing, direct that the
insurer who may be liable in respect of such claim, shall be impleaded as a party to the proceeding and the insurer so impleaded shall thereupon
have the right to contest the claim on all or any of the grounds that are available to the person against whom the claim has been made.
(3) Subject to any rules that may be made in this behalf, the claims tribunal may, for the purpose of adjudicating upon may claim for compensation
choose one or more persons possessing special knowledge of any matter relevant to the inquiry to assist it in holding the inquiry.
The relevant rule framed in this regard by the Tamil Nadu Government is rule No. 18 which reads as follows:
CPC to apply in certain cases....
The following provisions of the First Schedule to the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, shall so far as may be apply to proceedings before the claims
tribunal namely Order 5, Rules 9 to 13 and 15 to 30 Order 9, Order 13, Rules 3 to 1.0; Order 16, Rules 1 to 21; Order 17 and Order 23, Rules
1 to 3.
The contention of Mrs. Bhagirathi Narayanan was that neither Section 110-C (2) nor Rule 18 refers to Order 47, C.P.C. to enable the tribunal
to invoke the power of review. Therefore according to the learned Counsel the tribunal has no jurisdiction to review its earlier order as it has
otherwise no inherent jurisdiction.
On the first blush the above argument is not only attractive but appeals for acceptance. However, it requires a detailed discussion.
In Patel Narshi Thakershi and Others Vs. Shri Pradyumansinghji Arjunsinghji, , the Supreme Court has held as follows:
The first question that we have to consider is whether Mr. Mankodi had competence to quash the order made by the Saurashtra Government on
October 22, 1956. It must be remembered that Mr. Mankodi was functioning as the delegate of the Slate Government. The order passed by Mr.
Mankodi in law amounted to a review of the order made by Saurashtra Government. It is well settled that the power to review is not an inherent
power. It must be conferred by law either specifically or by necessary implication. No provisions in the act was brought to our notice from which it
could be gathered that the Government had power to review its own order. If the Government had no power to review its own order it is obvious
that its delegate could not have reviewed its order....
The above ruling of the Supreme Court was applied by a Division Bench of this Court in the case reported in V. Dhandayuthapani v. S.P.
Krishnamurthi AIR 1988 Mad. 78. Again the ruling of the Supreme Court was applied in the case relied on by the learned Counsel for the
petitioner namely National Hotel and Others Vs. Rukaiyabai and Others, .
As against this it has to be found out whether the above ruling of the Supreme Court applied by this Court and the Bombay High Court as
noticed above can be applied to the facts of this case.
In State of Haryana Vs. Smt. Darshana Devi and Others, , the Supreme Court while finding fault with. the. State of Haryana for filing a SLP
against the judgment of the Punjab and Haryana High Court granting leave to file a petition for compensation as indigent person under Order 33,
C.P.C. observed as follows:
...The court must give, the benefit of doubt against levy of a price to enter the temple of justice until one day the whole issue of the validity of profit
making through sale of civil justice disguised as court-fee is fully reviewed by this Court. Before parting with this point we just express our poignant
feeling that no Slate, it seems, has as yet framed rules to give effect to the benignant provision of legal aid to the power in Order 33, Rule 9-A,
Civil Procedure Code, although several years have passed since the enactment parliament is stultified and the people are frustrated. Even after a
law has been enacted for the benefit of the poor the State does not bring into force by wilful default in fulfilling the condition sine qua nan. It is a
public duty of each great branch of Government to obey the rule of law and uphold the tryst with the Constitution by making rules to effectuate
legislation meant to help the poor.
Even though Order 33, C.P.C. is not expressly mentioned either in the Motor Vehicles Act or in the rules framed thereunder by the respective
states in the aforesaid Supreme Court Judgment the learned judges have upheld the leave granted under Order 33, C.P.C. to file the application as
indigent person.
Again the Supreme court in Bhagwathi Devi v. I.S. Goel 1983 A.C.J. 123, held as follows:
In view of the observations of this Court in State of Haryana Vs. Smt. Darshana Devi and Others, , we are of the view that the Motor Accident
Claims Tribunal constituted under the Motor Vehicles Act is a civil court for the purpose of Section 25 of the Code of the Civil Procedure. We are
satisfied that the cases before us are fit cases for being transferred from the file of the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Moradabad to the file of
the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Delhi. The transfer petitions are accordingly allowed and compensation application Nos. 3 to 15 of 1982
pending before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Moradabad are transferred to the file of the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Delhi.
Here again though Section 25 of the CPC was not referred to either in the Motor Vehicles Act of in the Rules framed thereunder the application of
that section was justified by the Supreme Court.
Applying the principle laid down by the Supreme Court in Bhagwathi Devi v. I.S. Gael 1983 A.C.J. 123, Srinivasan, J., in Kanniammal and
Ors. v. P. Narayanan and Ors. 1988 T.L.N.J. 310, has held as follows:
Thus the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal having been held to be a civil court for the purpose of Section 25, CPC is certainly a court subordinate
to the High Court for the purpose of Section 24, Code of Civil Procedure.
xxx xxx xxx
According to learned Counsel it is only those course which are specifically referred to in Section 3 CPC are subordinate to High Court and not any
other statutory tribunal which may be equated to civil court for certain purposes. Section 110(c)(2) of the Motor Vehicles act is to the effect that
the tribunal shall have all the powers which civil courts have for taking evidence for enforcing the attendance of witness for diseovery for
production of documents and the like. It is also stated that the claim tribunal shall be deemed to be a civil court for the purpose of Section 195 and
Chapter 35, Crl. P.C. 1898 (Act 5 of 1898). In view of the decision of the Supreme Court and the provisions of Section 10(e)(2) of the Motor
Vehicles Act it is clear that the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal is a civil court for certain purposes. As it is held to be a civil Court for the
purpose of Section 25, CPC ii is necessarily a court subordinate to the High Court for the purpose of Section 24, CPC because it is a court of a
grade inferior to that of a District Court....
A Division Bench of this Court in S.V.R. Natarajan Chettiar v. Stale of Madras ILR 1960 Mad. 449, on the question whether the tribunal
constituted under the Madias Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, 1948, has got power to review its judgment held as follows:
It is argued that this decision of the tribunal was without jurisdiction that the consent of the appellants could not confer jurisdiction upon the tribunal
and that we must set aside the subsequent order illegally passed in the present appeal. The argument appears to us to be quite unsustainable upon
two broad grounds. Firstly, whatever view we may lake of the technical position whether a quasi judicial tribunal would or would not possess
rights of review under the CPC the proposition certainly seems maintainable that in order to render justice all such tribunals so long as they exercise
judicial functions should he held to possess inherent powers to review their judgments where due cause is shown. Our attention has been drawn to
a decision briefly reported in Balakhrishnayya v. State of Andhra, where Balakrishna Aiyar, J. held under somewhat similar circumstances that the
inam Settlement Officer had no jurisdiction to reopen an enquiry made u/s 9 of Act XXVI of 1948 at the question of the ryots. We do not think
that it is necessary to dilate upon this aspect for the learned Judge was dealing with the case of a Settlement Officer making some kind of an
administrative enquiry though under the act. In the present case we are concerned with a quasi-judicial tribunal giving a finding in the presence of
the parties whether a particular village did or did not fall within the ambit of the relevant provision. As we have already stressed there can be do
doubt that an inherent power to review should be presumed in all such cases, as it cannot be just and expedient that such tribunals rendering
judicial decisions should be unable to rectify an error apparent on the face of the record or to exercise powers of review for similar adequate
causes.
In New India Assurance Company Ltd. v. Minque Lourence Cornea 1986 A.C.J. 646, a learned single Judge of the Bombay High Court on
the question of power to review by Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal held as follows:
On a careful consideration of the above authorities 1 am of the opinion that the decision of the Supreme Court in Northern India Caterers (India)
Ltd. Vs. Lt. Governor of Delhi, , is not of any help for the purpose of determining as to whether or not the power of review has to be expressly
conferred. In fact the said authority deals with the problem as to when powers of review are to be exercised. However, the authority in Patel
Narshi Thakershi and Others Vs. Shri Pradyumansinghji Arjunsinghji, , is more to the point. Their Lordships had made it clear that the power of
review can be said to have been conferred in an authority or court if there is an express provision therefore or such power has to be read by
necessary implication. Now applying these observations to the case before me I am bound to hold that powers of review have been vested in the
Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal. In fact Section 3-A empowers the Slate Government to make rules for the purpose of carrying into effect the
provisions of Sections 110 to 110-E of the Act and in particular to make rules enabling the claims tribunal to exercise the powers vested in a civil
court. In exercise of such powers the Government of Goa, Daman and Diu has enacted the Goa, Daman and Diu Motor Accidents Claims
Tribunal Rules 1966. Rule 6 specifically provides that the claims tribunal may exercise all the powers of a civil court save in so far as the same are
not inconsistent with the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 and Rules framed thereunder. Rule 6 vests in the claims tribunal all the
powers of a civil court which are not inconsistent with the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act and the rules framed thereunder. The power of
review is by no stretch of imagination inconsistent with the provisions of the act and the rules framed thereunder. Thus it has to be held that the act
read with the rules by necessary implication vests the power of review in the claims tribunal.
Though that judgment was in the light of the rules made in that State u/s 111-A of the Motor Vehicles Act the point to be noticed is that there was
no-express provision either in the Act or rules framed thereunder.
We have now seen that the Supreme Court has categorically held that the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal is a civil court. Further the
Supreme Court as well as this Court had applied the provisions of the CPC not expressly mentioned either in the Actor name Rules framed
thereunder. Following that trend, and as observed by a Division Bench of this Court in the decision reported in S.V.R. Natarajan Chettiar v. State
of Madras ILR 1960 Mad. 449, it should be held that the tribunal so long as it exercises judicial functions should be held to possess power to
review its judgment where due cause is shown. In view of the later Supreme Court judgments holding that the tribunal is a civil court. I do not think
that the ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in Patel Narshi Thakershi and Others Vs. Shri Pradyumansinghji Arjunsinghji, , can be pressed into
service. In the light of the foregoing I am inclined to hold that the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal has jurisdiction to review its earlier order where
due cause is shown.
Now coming to the second question whether the order is sustainable in the absence of any reason given therefor, in support of her contention
that the order under revision cannot be sustained, the learned Counsel for the petitioner cited a judgment of the Supreme Court in Col. Avtar Singh
Sekhon Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Others, , wherein the Supreme Court hits observed as follows:
A review is not a routine procedure. An earlier order cannot be reviewed unless the court is satisfied that material error manifest on the face of the
order undermines its soundness or results in miscarriage of justice. A review of a judgment is a serious step and resort to it is proper only where a
glaringomission or patent mistake or like grave error has crept in earlier by judicial fallibility....
No doubt the above judgment supports the contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioner. However, in the facts of the present case I find
that equity is not in favour of the petitioner. Considering that I expected the petitioner to compromise the matter and for that purpose the matter
was adjourned. However the learned Counsel for the petitioner expressed her inability to persuade the petitioner to compromise the matter. In this
connection, the exercise of the jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India being discretionary I would like to quote and apply an
observation of Ismail, J. as he then was while considering the scope of Section 115 of the CPC in Chennichi Alias Parikkal Goundar Vs. D.A.
Srinivasan Chettiar, , which reads as follows:
The revisional jurisdiction of the court is intended to secure and subserve ends of justice and not to deny or defeat it if interference in a particular
case will result in hardship or injustice to a party the High Court will be justified in refusing to interfere in the Exercise of its revisional jurisdiction,
even if the order is found to be one without jurisdiction.
The above passage has been approved and applied by a Division Bench of this Court in S.N. Kuba v. P.P.L. Vaithyanathan 1988 T.L.N.J. 1, I
am inclined to apply the above ratio to the facts of this case and declined to exercise my discretionary jurisdiction in favour of the petitioner.
Accordingly the civil revision petition fails and the same is dismissed. No costs.