Nikhilesh Dutta vs State Of H.P.& Anr

Jyotsna Rewal Dua, J

The petitioner seeks quashing of FIR No. 146/2018, dated 10.12.2018, under Sections 279, 337 and 338 of Indian Penal Code, registered at Police

Station, Shimla East, District Shimla alongwith consequential proceedings.

FIR was registered on the basis of a complaint lodged by respondent No. 2 to the effect that his nephew Niyam Gupta minor son of Shri Anil Gupta

sustained injuries due to rash and negligent driving of motor cycle bearing No. HP-07D-1998 driven by the petitioner on 10.12.2018.

Alongwith the petition, a compromise dated 21.4.2021 executed between the petitioner and respondent No. 2 has been placed on record to the

effect that parties have compromised the matter amongst themselves in order to maintain amicable relations. The complainant i.e. respondent No. 2

does not want to pursue the matter any further. Along with the petition, affidavit of Shri Anil Gupta, father of victim Niyam Gupta, has also been

appended recording that parties have settled the matter amicably and further that being natural guardian of minor child Niyam Gupta he does not want

to continue with the FIR as well as the criminal proceedings initiated against the petitioner.

The petitioner as well as respondent No. 2 have attended the hearing today and have been identified as such by their respective learned counsel.

They have separately recorded their statements to the effect that the matter involved in the FIR has been amicably settled by them and further that

respondent No. 2 and father of the minor child victim have no objection for allowing this petition for quashing of the FIR and the consequential criminal

proceedings.

In view of the compromise arrived at between the parties and their statements recorded to this effect in the court, state has no objection in allowing

the present petition.

The law laid down in respect of exercise of powers under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure for quashing or for refusing to quash the

FIR and resultant proceedings on the basis of compromise effected by the parties laid down in (2012) 10 SCC 303 titled Gian Singh vs. State of

Punjab; (2014) 6 SCC 466 titled Narinder Singh vs. State of Punjab; (2017) 9 SCC 641 titled as Parbatbhai Aahir vs. State of Gujarat, has been

noticed again by Hon’ble Apex Court in (2019) 5 SCC 688, titled as State of Madhaya Pradesh vs. Laxmi Narayan, with following observations:-

“15. Considering the law on the point and the other decisions of this Court on the point, referred to hereinabove, it is observed and held as under:

15.1 That the power conferred under Section 482 of the Code to quash the criminal proceedings for the non-compoundable offences under Section

320 of the Code can be exercised having overwhelmingly and predominantly the civil character, particularly those arising out of commercial

transactions or arising out of matrimonial relationship or family disputes and when the parties have resolved the entire dispute amongst themselves;

15.2. Such power is not to be exercised in those prosecutions which involved heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like

murder, rape, dacoity, etc. Such offences are not private in nature and have a serious impact on society;

15.3 Similarly, such power is not to be exercised for the offences under the special statutes like Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences

committed by public servants while working in that capacity are not to be quashed merely on the basis of compromise between the victim and the

offender;

15.4 Offences under Section 307 IPC and the Arms Act etc. would fall in the category of heinous and serious offences and therefore are to be

treated as crime against the society and not against the individual alone, and therefore, the criminal proceedings for the offence under Section 307 IPC

and/or the Arms Act etc. which have a serious impact on the society cannot be quashed in exercise of powers under Section 482 of the Code, on the

ground that the parties have resolved their entire dispute amongst themselves. However, the High Court would not rest its decision merely because

there is a mention of Section 307 IPC in the FIR or the charge is framed under this provision. It would be open to the High Court to examine as to

whether incorporation of Section 307 IPC is there for the sake of it or the prosecution has collected sufficient evidence, which if proved, would lead to

framing the charge under Section 307 IPC. For this purpose, it would be open to the High Court to go by the nature of injury sustained, whether such

injury is inflicted on the vital/delegate parts of the body, nature of weapons used etc. However, such an exercise by the High Court would be

permissible only after the evidence is collected after investigation and the charge sheet is filed/charge is framed and/or during the trial. Such exercise

is not permissible when the matter is still under investigation. Therefore, the ultimate conclusion in paragraphs 29.6 and 29.7 of the decision of this

Court in the case of Narinder Singh (supra) should be read harmoniously and to be read as a whole and in the circumstances stated hereinabove;

15.5 While exercising the power under Section 482 of the Code to quash the criminal proceedings in respect of non-compoundable offences, which

are private in nature and do not have a serious impart on society, on the ground that there is a settlement/compromise between the victim and the

offender, the High Court is required to consider the antecedents of the accused; the conduct of the accused, namely, whether the accused was

absconding and why he was absconding, how he had managed with the complainant to enter into a compromise etc.â€​

Applying the above guidelines to the instant case, I am of the considered view that the offences for which, the petitioner has been accused in FIR

No. 146/2018, cannot be stricto-sensu said to be the offences against the State or involving social impact. In view of the amicable settlement arrived at

between the parties, no fruitful purpose will be served in continuing the proceedings in question; the present case does not fall within the exceptions

carved out by the Hon’ble Apex Court when amicable settlement arrived at between the parties cannot be acted upon for quashing the FIR and

the consequent proceedings; the possibility of conviction in such circumstances would be very very remote. The continuation of the proceedings will

be to the great detriment of the petitioner causing him unnecessary harassment and injustice. When the private respondents do not want to hold the

petitioner responsible, then quashing of such FIR would certainly be in the interest of justice.

Consequently, the present petition is allowed and the FIR No. 146/2018, dated 10.12.2018, under Sections 279, 337 and 338 of Indian Penal Code,

registered at Police Station, Shimla East, District Shimla alongwith consequential proceedings, if any, are quashed. The petition stands disposed of

accordingly.

Copy Dasti.