High CourtsSingle Bench

Ritesh Kumar vs State Of H.P. & Others

High Court Of Himachal Pradesh · Decided on 8 February 2021 · Citation: (2021) 02 SHI CK 0127

HON’BLE JUDGES
Jyotsna Rewal Dua, J
ACTS & SECTIONS REFERRED
Code Of Criminal Procedure, 1973 — Section 320, 482 · Indian Penal Code, 1860 — Section 279, 307, 337
RESULT
Allowed
CASE NUMBER
CRMMO No.55 Of 2021
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Judgment

56 paragraphs · 1,208 words

Jyotsna Rewal Dua, J

1.

The instant petition has been moved under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure for quashing of FIR No.162/2020, dated 24.12.2020,

under Sections 279 and 337 of the Indian Penal Code, registered at Police Station Majra, District Sirmaur, H.P.

2.

I have heard learned counsel for the parties.

3.

Facts are that :-

FIR in question was registered on the basis of a complaint lodged by respondent No.4, Sh. Gaurav Singh to the effect that the petitioner on 24.12.2020

while driving his motor cycle bearing Registration No. HP 17F-1123 in a rash and negligent manner collided with vehicle bearing No. HP 17E-7186, as

a result of which respondents 4 & 5 sustained injuries. Petitioner has placed on record a compromise deed (Annexure P-2) executed on 1.2.2021

between respondent No.4 and him. As per the compromise , parties have amicably settled all the issues arising out of the FIR in question. The

compromise also records that to maintain good relationship, peace and harmony with each other, respondent No.4 is not interested to pursue the

aforesaid FIR any further.

4.

The parties i.e. petitioner (Ritesh Kumar), respondent No.4 (Gaurav Singh) and respondent No.5 (Dhanveer Singh) are present in the Court and

have been identified as such by their respective learned counsel. By way of their separate statements recorded today, all the private parties have

stood by the compromise including respondent No.5. They are not willing to pursue the FIR in question any further in view of the compromise

(Annexure P-2) and settlement of disputes amongst them in relation to FIR in question. The parties have stated that compromise and settlement of

dispute (FIR No.162/2020) is out of their free will and without any pressure, fear or influence whatsoever. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits

that the challan in the instant case has not been put up as yet.

Learned Additional Advocate General has fairly submitted that he has no objection in case the relief prayed for in the petition is granted in view of the

aforesaid compromise and in view of amicable settlement of the disputes between the parties.

5.

The law laid down in respect of exercise of powers under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure for quashing or for refusing to quash the

FIR and resultant proceedings on the basis of compromise effected by the parties in (2012) 10 SCC 303 titled Gian Singh vs. State of Punjab; (2014) 6

SCC 466 titled Narinder Singh vs. State of Punjab; (2017) 9 SCC 641 titled as Parbatbhai Aahir vs. State of Gujarat, has been noticed again by

Hon’ble Apex Court in (2019) 5 SCC 688 , titled as State of Madhya Pradesh vs. Laxmi Narayan with following observations:-

“ 15 . Considering the law on the point and the other decisions of this Court on the point, referred to hereinabove, it is observed and held as under:

15.1 That the power conferred under Section 482 of the Code to quash the criminal proceedings for the non-compoundable offences under Section

320 of the Code can be exercised having overwhelmingly and predominantly the civil character, particularly those arising out of commercial

transactions or arising out of matrimonial relationship or family disputes and when the parties have resolved the entire dispute amongst themselves;

15.2. Such power is not to be exercised in those prosecutions which involved heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like

murder, rape, dacoity, etc. Such offences are not private in nature and have a serious impact on society;

15.3 Similarly, such power is not to be exercised for the offences under the special statutes like Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences

committed by public servants while working in that capacity are not to be quashed merely on the basis of compromise between the victim and the

offender;

15.4 Offences under Section 307 IPC and the Arms Act etc. would fall in the category of heinous and serious offences and therefore are to be

treated as crime against the society and not against the individual alone, and therefore, the criminal proceedings for the offence under Section 307 IPC

and/or the Arms Act etc. which have a serious impact on the society cannot be quashed in exercise of powers under Section 482 of the Code, on the

ground that the parties have resolved their entire dispute amongst themselves. However, the High Court would not rest its decision merely because

there is a mention of Section 307 IPC in the FIR or the charge is framed under this provision. It would be open to the High Court to examine as to

whether incorporation of Section 307 IPC is there for the sake of it or the prosecution has collected sufficient evidence, which if proved, would lead to

framing the charge under Section 307 IPC. For this purpose, it would be open to the High Court to go by the nature of injury sustained, whether such

injury is inflicted on the vital/delegate parts of the body, nature of weapons used etc. However, such an exercise by the High Court would be

permissible only after the evidence is collected after investigation and the charge sheet is filed/charge is framed and/or during the trial. Such exercise

is not permissible when the matter is still under investigation. Therefore, the ultimate conclusion in paragraphs 29.6 and 29.7 of the decision of this

Court in the case of Narinder Singh (supra) should be read harmoniously and to be read as a whole and in the circumstances stated hereinabove;

15.5 While exercising the power under Section 482 of the Code to quash the criminal proceedings in respect of non-compoundable offences, which

are private in nature and do not have a serious impart on society, on the ground that there is a settlement/compromise between the victim and the

offender, the High Court is required to consider the antecedents of the accused; the conduct of the accused, namely, whether the accused was

absconding and why he was absconding, how he had managed with the complainant to enter into a compromise etc.â€​

6.

Applying the above guidelines to the instant case, I am of the considered view that the offences for which, the petitioner has been accused in FIR

No. 162/2020, cannot be stricto-sensu said to be the offences against the State or involving social impact. In view of the amicable settlement arrived at

between the parties, no fruitful purpose will be served in continuing the proceedings in question; the present case does not fall within the exceptions

carved out by the Hon’ble Apex Court when amicable settlement arrived at between the parties cannot be acted upon for quashing the FIR and

the consequent proceedings; the possibility of conviction in such circumstances would be very very remote. The continuation of the proceedings will

be to the great detriment of the petitioner causing them unnecessary harassment and injustice. When the complainant does not want to hold the

accused person responsible, then quashing of such FIR would certainly be in the interest of justice.

Consequently, the present petition is allowed and FIR No. 162/2020, dated 24.12.2020, under Sections 279 and 337 of the Indian Penal Code

registered at Police Station Majra, District Sirmaour, H.P. is quashed. The petition stands disposed of accordingly.