Noor Mohammad vs Pporansingh

 The petitioner before this Court has filed this present writ petition being aggrieved by the order dated 12/6/2020 passed by the Civil Judge, Shujalpur

in Case No. 10B/2019.

Facts of the case reveal that the petitioner â€" plaintiff has filed a Civil Suit for recovery of a sum of Rs.11,25,000. During the pendency of the Civil

Suit an application was preferred under Order 38 Rule 5 read with Sec. 94 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 and the same has been rejected by

the trial Court by observing that the doctrine of lis pendens shall be applicable.

This Court has carefully gone through the Writ Petition and the order passed by the learned Civil Judge. The learned Civil Judge was certainly justified

in holding that the doctrine of lis pendens is applicable and any transfer made by the defendant shall be subject to the provision of Sec. 52 of the

Transfer of Property Act, 1882.

This Court does not find any reason to interfere with the order passed by the learned Civil Judge.

The Apex Court in the case of Shalini Shyam Shetty Vs. Rajendra Shankar Patil reported in 2010 (8) SCC 329 in paragraph No.49 has held as under:-

On an analysis of the aforesaid decisions of this Court, the following principles on the exercise of High Court's jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution

may be formulated:

(a) A petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is different from a petition under Article 227.

The mode of exercise of power by High Court under these two Articles is also different.

(b) In any event, a petition under Article 227Â cannot be called a writ petition. The history of the conferment of writ jurisdiction on High Courts is substantially

different from the history of conferment of the power of Superintendence on the High Courts under Article 227 and have been discussed above.

(c) High Courts cannot, on the drop of a hat, in exercise of its power of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution, interfere with the orders of

tribunals or Courts inferior to it. Nor can it, in exercise of this power, act as a Court of appeal over the orders of Court or tribunal subordinate to it. In cases where

an alternative statutory mode of redressal has been provided, that would also operate as a restrain on the exercise of this power by the High Court.

(d) The parameters of interference by High Courts in exercise of its power of superintendence have been repeatedly laid down by this Court. In this regard the High

Court must be guided by the principles laid down by the Constitution Bench of this Court in Waryam Singh (supra) and the principles in Waryam Singh (supra)

have been repeatedly followed by subsequent Constitution Benches and various other decisions of this Court. Â

(e) According to the ratio in Waryam Singh (supra), followed in subsequent cases, the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction of superintendence can interfere in

order only to keep the tribunals and Courts subordinate to it, `within the bounds of their authority'.

(f) In order to ensure that law is followed by such tribunals and Courts by exercising jurisdiction which is vested in them and by not declining to exercise the

jurisdiction which is vested in them.

(g) Apart from the situations pointed in (e) and (f), High Court can interfere in exercise of its power of superintendence when there has been a patent

perversity in the orders of tribunals and Courts subordinate to it or where there has been a gross and manifest failure of justice or the basic principles of natural

justice have been flouted.

(h) In exercise of its power of superintendence High Court cannot interfere to correct mere errors of law or fact or just because another view than the one taken

by  the tribunals or Courts subordinate to it, is a possible view. In other words the jurisdiction has to be very sparingly exercised.    Â

(i) High Court's power of superintendence under Article 227 cannot be curtailed by any statute. It has been declared a part of the basic structure of the Constitution

by the Constitution Bench of this Court in the case of L. Chandra Kumar vs. Union of India & others, reported in (1997) 3 SCC 261 and therefore abridgement by a

Constitutional amendment is also very doubtful.

(j) It may be true that a statutory amendment of a rather cognate provision, like Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code by the Civil Procedure Code (Amendment)

Act, 1999 does not and cannot cut down the ambit of High Court's power under Article 227. At the same time, it must be remembered that such statutory amendment

does not correspondingly expand the High Court's jurisdiction of superintendence under Article 227.

(k) The power is discretionary and has to be exercised on the equitable principle. In an appropriate case, power can be exercised suo motu.

(l) On a proper appreciation of the wide and unfettered power of the High Court under Article 227, it transpires that the main object of this Article is to keep strict

administrative and judicial control by the High Court on the administration of justice within its territory.

(m) The object of superintendence, both administrative and judicial, is to maintain efficiency, smooth and orderly functioning of the entire machinery of justice in

such a way as it does not bring it into any disrepute. The power of interference under this Article is to be kept to the minimum to ensure that the wheel of justice does

not come to a halt and the fountain of justice remains pure and unpolluted in order to maintain public confidence in the functioning of the tribunals and Courts

subordinate to High Court.

(n) This reserve and exceptional power of judicial intervention is not to be exercised just for grant of relief in individual cases but should be directed for promotion of

public confidence in the administration of justice in the larger public interest whereas Article 226 is meant for protection of individual grievance.

Therefore, the power under Article 227 may be unfettered but its exercise  is subject to high degree of judicial discipline pointed out above.

(o) An improper and a frequent exercise of this power will be counter-productive and will divest this extraordinary power of its strength and vitality.

In the light of the aforesaid judgment delivered by the apex Court, this Court is of the considered opinion that the order of the trial Court does not

suffers from any patent illegality nor any jurisdictional error has been committed by the Court below. Accordingly, the admission is declined.