Pardeep Kumar Mahajan vs Punjab Gramin Bank and Another

Tejinder Singh Dhindsa, J.—Petitioner, who is working on the post of Manager with the Punjab Gramin Bank has impugned in the present writ petition the order dated 12.3.2009, issued by the disciplinary authority, whereby a penalty of reduction by three stages in the time scale of pay has been imposed upon him. Challenge has also been laid upon the order dated 21.1.2011, whereby the statutory appeal preferred by the petitioner against the aforementioned order dated 12.3.2009 has been dismissed, thereby affirming the major penalty.

Stated in brief the facts are that the petitioner while working on the post of Manager at Branch Office, Jahangir, Distt. Amritsar was served with a charge sheet dated 8.1.2007 in respect of certain alleged lapses committed by him. The competent authority having found his reply to the charge sheet as "not satisfactory" passed the order dated 30.3.2007 for holding a regular departmental inquiry u/s 40 of the Punjab Gramin Bank (Officers and employees) Service Regulations (herein after referred to as the 2005 Regulations). An officer of the rank of Senior Manager, Head Office was appointed as Inquiry Officer, who after conducting regular inquiry proceedings furnished an inquiry report dated 16.11.2007 holding the petitioner to be guilty of the various charges levelled against him. Copy of the inquiry report was furnished to the petitioner so as to enable him to raise his submissions/objections thereto. Disciplinary authority after duly considering the submissions made by the petitioner as regards the inquiry report issued a show cause notice dated 29.1.2009, wherein a tentative view was disclosed as regards imposition of a penalty of reduction of three stages in the time scale of pay. The disciplinary authority after considering the reply submitted by the petitioner to the show cause notice as also having afforded opportunity of personal hearing to him passed the impugned order dated 12.3.2009 imposing a major penalty of reduction by three stages in the time scale of pay. Such order of penalty has been affirmed by the appellate authority vide order dated 21.1.2011.

Mr. C.M. Munjal, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner has been heard at length.

Learned counsel submits that the impugned orders have been passed to the detriment of the petitioner and the same are in violation of the principles of natural justice. It has also been contended that the penalty imposed upon the petitioner is not even covered under the 2005 Regulations and as a matter of last resort learned counsel takes up a plea that the penalty is disproportionate to the charges levelled and as such is highly excessive.

I find myself unable to agree to the contentions raised by the petitioner. The petitioner is holding a responsible position in the bank. The charges against him are serious in nature. The petitioner has been held guilty of unauthorizedly sanctioning loans to ineligible borrowers, there were improper, pre-sanctioned appraisals, mortgage of agricultural land prone to changing river water course, were taken and further the petitioner had not ensured qualitative lending and as such had put the bank fund in jeopardy. The impugned orders have been passed after having afforded due and reasonable opportunity to the petitioner at each stage. Not only was a regular inquiry held but even a report of the inquiry findings was also furnished to the petitioner to raise objections, if, any. The disciplinary authority has duly considered the objections so raised and thereafter issued a show cause notice as regards the proposed penalty. A personal hearing was also afforded to him and it is only thereafter that a detailed and reasoned order was passed by the disciplinary authority imposing the penalty. Even the impugned appellate order is a detailed and reasoned order. In proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, this Court does not examine the evidence against the delinquent official as a Court of Appeal. No procedural irregularity has been pointed out in the inquiry proceedings conducted against the petitioner, which has led to the passing of the impugned orders. The petitioner as such having been given a full and reasonable opportunity, there is no ground to interfere with such order.

Regulation 39 (i) (b) (ii) of the 2005 Regulations reads as follows:

Without prejudice to foregoing Regulations of this Chapter an officer or employee who commits a breach of these Regulations or who displays negligence, inefficiency or indolence or who commits acts detrimental to the interests of the Bank or in conflict with its instructions, or who commits a breach of discipline or is guilty of any other acts of misconduct, shall be liable for any one or more penalties as prescribed hereinafter.

Officer

(a) Minor Penalties

(i) Censure

(ii) With holding or stoppage of increments of pay with or without cumulative effect.

(iii) Withholding of promotion.

(b) Major Penalties

(i) Recovery from emoluments or such other amounts as may be due to him of the whole or part or any pecuniary loss caused to the Bank by negligence or breach of.

(ii) Reduction to a lower grade or post, or to a lower scale in a time scale.

(iii) Compulsory retirement.

(iv) Removal from service which shall not be a disqualification for future employment.

(v) Dismissal.

A bare reading of the aforesaid Regulations would make it apparent that the penalty imposed upon the petitioner is clearly covered and envisaged under the 2005 Regulations.

The submission made by learned counsel as regards the punishment being highly excessive is also without any merit. It is now settled law that this Court would interfere in an order of punishment as regards the quantum only in a situation, where the punishment awarded is totally irrational and is grossly arbitrary. In the matter of State of Karnataka Vs. H. Nagaraj reported as 1999 (1) S.C.T 738 the Hon''ble Supreme Court observed as under:-

We fail to see how the Tribunal, when it upheld the enquiry could have interfered with the quantum of punishment in this fashion. As far back as in 1989, this Court in the case of Union of India (UOI) Vs. Parma Nanda, held that the jurisdiction of the Tribunal to interfere with disciplinary matters and punishment cannot be equated with appellate jurisdiction. The Tribunal cannot interfere with the findings of the Enquiry Officer or the Competent Authority where they are not arbitrary or utterly perverse. The Court said (JT.P141, ara 27):

It is appropriate to remember that the power to impose penalty on a delinquent officer is conferred on the competent authority either by an Act of legislature or rules made under the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution. If there has been an enquiry consistent with the rules and in accordance with principles of natural justice what punishment would meet the ends of justice is a matter exclusively within the jurisdiction of the competent authority.

The same view has been reiterated in a more recent decision of this Court in Union of India and another Vs. G. Ganayutham (Dead) by LRs., . This Court has held that the principle of proportionality can be invoked regarding punishment only in a case where the punishment was totally irrational in the sense that it was in outrageous defiance of logic or moral standards. Such is not in the present case. Hence, the order of the Tribunal which is impugned before us is set aside and the order of the appellate authority is restored. The appeal is accordingly allowed. No costs.

Appeal allowed.

A Division Bench of this Court in the matter of Maan Singh Vs. Central Administrative Tribunal, Chandigarh Bench, Chandigarh and Others reported as 2011 (2) S.C.T. 44 while following the dictum in case of State of Karnataka v. H. Nagaraja (supra) has held in the following terms:

Before the Tribunal no procedural lapse prejudicing the rights of the applicant-petitioner or violation of the mandatory Rules was pointed out. The principles of natural justice has been religiously followed during inquiry and no complaint could be made in that respect. It is well settled that if the findings are based on evidence then the Courts are not to act as a Court of Appeal and enter the area of re-appreciation of evidence to record a finding other than the one recorded by the Enquiry Officer merely because another view is possible. Such a course is not permissible in law. For the aforesaid proposition reliance may be placed on the judgements of Hon''ble the Supreme Court rendered in the cases of Govt. of A.P. and Others Vs. Mohd. Narsullah Khan, Apparel Export Promotion Council Vs. A.K. Chopra, ; U.P.S.R.T.C. Vs. Mitthu Singh, South Bengal State Transport Corpn. Vs. Swapan Kumar Mitra and Others, and Commandant T.N. Special Police v. D. Paul 1999 SC (L&S) 789. In view of the aforesaid settled legal position, it is not possible to find any fault with the findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer as approved by the Tribunal. Even otherwise, the charge of accepting illegal gratification is serious and it could not be argued that the punishment of dismissal is disproportionate to the charge.

In view of the reasons recorded above, there is no basis to interfere with the order imposing the penalty of reduction by three stages in the time scale of pay, imposed upon the petitioner.

This petition is, accordingly, dismissed.