Parkash Singh alias Passa vs State of Punjab

V.S. Aggarwal, J.

This is a petition filed by Parkash Singh petitioner seeking quashing of F.I.R. No. 95 dated 9.11.1995 with respect to offences punishable under Sections 307/326/148/149 IPC registered at Police Station Division No. 4, Jalandhar and in cross case under Sections 326/452 IPC.

The relevant facts are that the above said first information report was recorded on basis of the statement of Narinder Pal Singh alias Goldy. He had mentioned that on 9.11.1995 he along with his cousin brother Avtar Singh alias Happy and other friends of Avtar Singh were standing at Ladowali road near railway crossing. Sukhwinder Singh who is also known as Mehtawala is a student of Khalsa College, Jalandhar. He was having a Kirpan in his hands. Bhagta a resident of Raipur and Parkash Singh resident of Jalandhar Cantonment both armed with kirpans were there. Jang Bahadur was having a hockey stick in his hands. Bhagta had exhorted by saying that Narinder Pal Singh should be taught a lesson for quarrelling with him at the bus stand. On this Jang Bahadur alongwith other persons caught hold of Narinder Pal Singh. Sukhwinder Singh had given a kirpan blow on his head. Bhagta gave him a kirpan blow on his head which hit him on the back of his head. Parkash Singh gave a kirpan blow. Narinder Pal Singh had raised his right hand. Thereupon, the kirpan hit him on the fingers of his right hand. Narinder Pal Singh fell down. Kala gave him a kirpan blow on his right elbow while Jang Bahadur gave him a hockey blow. Narinder Pal Singh raised an alarm. His companions Avtar Singh and Rinku got him freed. On these broad facts, a case had been registered against the petitioner and others for offences punishable under Sections 307/326/148 and 149 IPC.

It is contended that both the parties have arrived at a compromise. They have signed their respective affidavits and, therefore, the first information report should be quashed. The petition as such has been contested.

The short argument advanced was as to whether when the offences are non compoundable, whether under the facts and circumstances, this Court would be justified in quashing the first information report accepting the compromise or not ? Learned counsel for the petitioner highlighted and argued that parties have since amicably settled their dispute and they should be allowed to live peacefully and compound the offence. In any case, according to him the first information report may well be quashed.

While analysing the said argument, reference can well be made to Section 320 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. It gives the broad scheme as to which the offences can be compounded without permission of the court and those which can be compounded with permission of the court. Subsection (1) of Section 320 Cr.P.C. refers to certain offences which can be compounded by the person mentioned in the third column of the table appended with subsection (1) of Section 320 Cr.P.C. Subsection (2) of Section 320 Cr.P.C. refers to certain offences which can be compounded only with the permission of the court. The other offences which are not mentioned in the table appended with subsections (1) and (2) of Section 320 Cr.P.C. are noncompoundable. Necessarily they are serious offences and since they are offences under the society at large, it has been felt by the legislature that they must be tried in court.

It is true that under Section 482 Cr.P.C. the High Courts have been invested with certain powers. The inherent powers would be utilized to give effect to an order of the court, to prevent the abuse of the process of the court or to secure the ends of justice. Unless there are compelling reasons, offences which are noncompoundable will not be permitted to be compounded under the inherent powers of the court.

Learned counsel for the petitioner had drawn the attention of this court to number of precedents to urge that such an offence should be permitted to be compounded. Reference to some of them would be in the fitness of things. In the case of Jagdev Singh v. State of Punjab, 1991(2) RCR 689 a first information report was lodged by the wife against her husband. It pertained to offences punishable under Sections 326/323 and 324 IPC. This Court quashed the proceedings and the first information report holding that the wife was not interested in prosecuting the case. There was no likelihood of the conviction of the accused. The same view prevailed with this Court in the case State of Punjab v. Shinder Paul, 1992(3) RCR 506. In the cited case, Sections 279 and 338 of the Indian Penal Code had been involved and pressed into service. Section 279 IPC is a noncompoundable offence. The injured had compromised with the accused. The Division Bench of this Court held that courts would lean in favour of a compromise to note that cases should be less serious in nature. The petition was allowed holding that there was little chance of success. In the case of Mohinder Singh and others v. State of Punjab and others, 1994(1) RCR 84 the first information report registered under Sections 307/326 and 324 IPC was also quashed. More recently in the case of Mohinder Singh Khosla v. State of Union Territory of Chandigarh, 1996(1) Recent CR 120 once again the Court felt that it would be an exercise in futility to allow the challan to be filed when there is no chance of success. The first information report was quashed.

Two decisions of the Supreme Court in this regard can also be noted. In the case of Y. Suresh Babu v. State of A.P. and another, JT 1987(2) S.C. 361 a case was registered with respect to the offence punishable under Section 326 IPC. Keeping in view the compromise, compounding of the offence was allowed and it was held :

"Taking an overall view of the facts and circumstances, we grant leave as a special case to the parties to compound the offence on condition that the appellant pays Rs. 10,000/ to respondent No. 2 by way of compensation for the physical injury suffered by him. The amount of compensation shall be deposited in the Court of IInd Additional Metropolitan Sessions Judge, Hyderabad within one month from today. If the amount is not deposited within the period allowed, the conviction and sentence recorded by the Courts below against the appellant under Section 326 of the Code shall stand. However, if the amount is deposited within the time allowed, the conviction and sentence of the appellant under Section 326 of the Indian Penal Code shall be set aside. Respondent No. 2 shall be at liberty to withdraw the said amount unconditionally. The appellant shall in the meanwhile be enlarged on bail by the learned IInd Additional Metropolitan Sessions Judge on such terms as he thinks fit. This case shall not be treated as a precedent." (emphasis added).

Even in the case of Mahesh Chand and another v. State of Rajasthan, 1990(3) RCR 332 compounding of the offence was permitted which was registered under Section 307 IPC.

What then would be the legal position ? Is this Court bound to allow all such petitions where the parties compromise ? The answer cannot be given in a strait jacket. Facts of each case have to be examined. Seriousness of the offence has to be taken note of. If after noting the case, it appears that chances of conviction are less and there can be peace in the society, the Court may grant the permission. Powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. have to be used sparingly. The decision in the case of Y. Suresh Babu (supra) as noted above cannot be used as a precedent. The Supreme Court in the peculiar facts in the case of Mahesh Chand and another (supra) had allowed the compromise. Therefore, it cannot be taken that in all serious offences, the court would become a rubber stamp, the moment the parties inform the High Court that they have settled their disputes. The other cited decisions of this Court noted that chances of compromise were bleak; this cannot be so stated in the present case.

Reference with advantage may be made to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Ramesh Kumar v. Ram Kumar and others, AIR 1984 SC 1029. A case was registered under Section 302 IPC. The accused was convicted by the Court of Sessions. In appeal some gift was made to the widow of the victim. The High Court converted the offence punishable under Section 304A IPC. The Supreme Court held that Courts are to dispense justice and not to dispense with justice. It was observed :

"We can only say that the judgment of the High Court has left us shocked and perplexed. We are at a total loss to understand it. The entire system of administration of criminal justice is reduced to a mockery. If the judgment of the High Court is upheld, it is as if a person who can afford to make gifts of land or money to the heirs of the victim may get away even with a charge of murder. Courts are to dispense justice, not to dispense with justice. And, justice to be dispensed is not palmtree justice or idiosyncratic justice. The judgment cannot stand a second''s scrutiny. It is accordingly set aside and the matter is remanded to the High Court so that the criminal appeals and revision may be reheard. On behalf of the accused a very curious request was made, that the land gifted by the father of the accused to the widow of the deceased may be directed to be returned to the father of the accused. We take no notice of the gift and we reject the request."

This Court had considered this aspect about seriousness of offences in case Sangat Singh and others v. State of Haryana, 1997(1) RCC 82. A similar request had been made. Keeping in view the seriousness of the offence and the manner in which it was committed, the request was rejected and it was held :

"Indeed one cannot permit compounding of the offences where seriousness of the same stares glaringly at one''s face. Four of the accused had entered the house of the complainant at night prepared, thus, to cause even an injury. They kidnapped a young child and detained him for more than two days. It would, therefore, be totally improper on the facts of the case to permit compounding of the offence because this would amount to making mockery of the criminal trial. The request is rejected."

Reverting back to the facts of the present case, it is clear that a pre mediated attempt had been made. Petitioner accompanied by others assaulted the injured with kirpans. In the peculiar facts of the present case, it cannot even be termed that chances of conviction are bleak. Even if the injured had settled his score, still as has been noted above, there are other eyewitnesses mentioned. If their testimonies are reliable, the Court may act upon it. It cannot thus be stated that there is no chance of the conviction. Keeping in view the seriousness of the offences, the manner in which they were committed and totality of circumstances, there is no ground to allow the petition. The request is rejected.

For these reasons, the petition being without merit fails and is dismissed.