Patel Mahesh Pravinbhai and 3 Ors. vs State of Gujarat and Another

R.M. Chhaya, J.—By way of this petition u/s 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure the petitioners have prayed for quashing and setting aside the impugned FIR registered as CR No. I-001 of 2013 registered before the Gambhoi Police Station, Sabarkantha for the alleged offences under sections 498(A), 323, 307, 294(A) and 114 of Indian Penal Code. Heard Mr. Devang Joshi, learned Advocate for the petitioners, Mr. Abhaykumar Shah, learned Advocate for respondent No. 2-first informant and Ms. Moxa Thakkar, learned APP. for respondent No. 1. Mr. Devang Joshi, learned Advocate for the petitioners and Mr. Abhaykumar Shah, learned Advocate for respondent No. 2-first informant have stated before the Court that the parties have settled the issue. Both the learned Advocates have further submitted that petitioner No. 1 and respondent No. 2 have reunited again as husband and wife and at present stay together. It is further submitted that even the compromise is entered into between the petitioners and respondent No. 2 the first informant. Considering the aforesaid facts, it is not necessary to discuss the allegations made in the FIR in detail. It is alleged in the FIR that petitioner No. 3 got hold of first informant and petitioner No. 2 poured some medicine in the mouth of the first informant. In addition to this, there are further allegations of ill treatment and beating for which it is further alleged in the FIR that the first informant took treatment in Avishkar Hospital. Mr. Devang Joshi for the petitioners has submitted that the FIR came to be lodged due to some misunderstanding between the parties and the dispute was of matrimonial dispute. Mr. Joshi further submitted that the parties have amicably resolved the issue and petitioner No. 1 and respondent No. 1 have reunited and stay together as husband and wife. Mr. Joshi further states that any further continuation of criminal proceedings in relation to the impugned FIR against the petitioners-original accused would be unnecessary harassment to the petitioner No. 1 and the first informant in particular as they are reunited in life. Mr. Joshi further submitted that trial would be futile and the same would amount to abuse of process of law. Mr. Joshi further invited the attention of this Court that the first informant has filed affidavit today wherein it is contended by the first informant herself that the parties have amicably resolved the issue. Mr. Joshi further submitted that in order to secure the ends of justice this Court may exercise its inherent jurisdiction u/S. 482 of the Code.

Ms. Moxa Thakkar, learned APP. candidly submitted that the allegations made in the FIR related to a matrimonial dispute and as the settlement is arrived at between the parties, this Court may pass appropriate order.

Mr. Abhaykumar Shah has filed his appearance for respondent No. 2 the first informant today. Mr. Shah has also tendered affidavit referred to by Mr. Joshi which is already taken on record. Mr. Shah has reiterated all the contentions which are raised and have submitted that the parties have amicably resolved the issue and respondent No. 2 at present is staying with petitioner No. 1 husband Maheshbhai Pravinbhai Patel. Mr. Shah identified respondent No. 2 Priyanka who is present in the Court. On inquiry respondent No. 2 Priyanka has declared before this Court that now she stays with petitioner No. 1 her husband happily.

Considering the aforesaid facts and circumstances it therefore transpires that parties have amicably resolved the issue and therefore this Court is of the opinion that any further continuance of the criminal proceedings pursuant to the impugned FIR would amount to harassment to the parties and petitioner No. 1 and the first informant in particular as they are reunited in life and the trial would be futile and it would be abuse of process of Court and law.

It would also be advantageous at this stage to refer to the judgment of the Hon''ble Apex Court in the case of Gian Singh Vs. State of Punjab and Another, wherein it has been observed thus:

It needs no emphasis that exercise of inherent power by the High Court would entirely depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. It is neither permissible nor proper for the court to provide a straitjacket formula regulating the exercise of inherent powers u/s 482. No precise and inflexible guidelines can also be provided.

Quashing of offence or criminal proceedings on the ground of settlement between an offender and victim is not the same thing as compounding of offence. They are different and not interchangeable. Strictly speaking, the power of compounding of offences given to a court u/s 320 is materially different from the quashing of criminal proceedings by the High Court in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction. In compounding of offences, power of a criminal court is circumscribed by the provisions contained in Section 320 and the court is guided solely and squarely thereby while, on the other hand, the formation of opinion by the High Court for quashing a criminal offence or criminal proceeding or criminal complaint is guided by the material on record as to whether the ends of justice would justify such exercise of power although the ultimate consequence may be acquittal or dismissal of indictment.

Where High Court quashes a criminal proceeding having regard to the fact that dispute between the offender and victim has been settled although offences are not compoundable, it does so as in its opinion, continuation of criminal proceedings will be an exercise in futility and justice in the case demands that the dispute between the parties is put to an end and peace is restored; securing the ends of justice being the ultimate guiding factor. No doubt, crimes are acts which have harmful effect on the public and consist in wrong doing that seriously endangers and threatens well-being of society and it is not safe to leave the crime-doer only because he and the victim have settled the dispute amicably or that the victim has been paid compensation, yet certain crimes have been made compoundable in law, with or without permission of the Court. In respect of serious offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc; or other offences of mental depravity under IPC or offences of moral turpitude under special statutes, like Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity, the settlement between offender and victim can have no legal sanction at all. However, certain offences which overwhelmingly and predominantly bear civil flavour having arisen out of civil, mercantile, commercial, financial, partnership or such like transactions or the offences arising out of matrimony, particularly relating to dowry, etc. or the family dispute, where the wrong is basically to victim and the offender and victim have settled all disputes between them amicably, irrespective of the fact that such offences have not been made compoundable, the High Court may within the framework of its inherent power, quash the criminal proceeding or criminal complaint or F.I.R. if it is satisfied that on the face of such settlement, there is hardly any likelihood of offender being convicted and by not quashing the criminal proceedings, justice shall be casualty and ends of justice shall be defeated. The above list is illustrative and not exhaustive. Each case will depend on its own facts and no hard and fast category can be prescribed.

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The position that emerges from the above discussion can be summarised thus: the power of the High Court in quashing a criminal proceeding or FIR or complaint in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction is distinct and different from the power given to a criminal court for compounding the offences u/s 320 of the Code. Inherent power is of wide plenitude with no statutory limitation but it has to be exercised in accord with the guideline engrafted in such power viz; (i) to secure the ends of justice or (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any Court. In what cases power to quash the criminal proceeding or complaint or F.I.R. may be exercised where the offender and victim have settled their dispute would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case and no category can be prescribed. However, before exercise of such power, the High Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the crime. Heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. cannot be fittingly quashed even though the victim or victims family and the offender have settled the dispute. Such offences are not private in nature and have serious impact on society. Similarly, any compromise between the victim and offender in relation to the offences under special statutes like Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity etc; cannot provide for any basis for quashing criminal proceedings involving such offences. But the criminal cases having overwhelmingly and pre-dominatingly civil flavour stand on different footing for the purposes of quashing, particularly the offences arising from commercial, financial, mercantile, civil, partnership or such like transactions or the offences arising out of matrimony relating to dowry, etc. or the family disputes where the wrong is basically private or personal in nature and the parties have resolved their entire dispute. In this category of cases, High Court may quash criminal proceedings if in its view, because of the compromise between the offender and victim, the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of criminal case would put accused to great oppression and prejudice and I extreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal case despite full and complete settlement and compromise with the victim. In other words, the High Court must consider whether it would be unfair or contrary to the interest of justice to continue with the criminal proceeding or continuation of the criminal proceeding would tantamount to abuse of process of law despite settlement and compromise between the victim and wrongdoer and whether to secure the ends of justice, it is appropriate that criminal case is put to an end and if the answer to the above question(s) is in affirmative, the High Court shall be well within its jurisdiction to quash the criminal proceeding.

It is also advantageous to refer to recent judgment of the Hon''ble Apex Court in the case of Dimpey Gujral and Others Vs. Union Territory Through Administrator, U.T. Chandigarh and Others, , considering the ratio laid down in Gian Singh (Supra) has observed as under:

In light of the above observations of this court in Gian Singh, we feel that this is a case where the continuation of criminal proceedings would tantamount to abuse of process of law because the alleged offences are not heinous offences showing extreme depravity nor are they against the society. They are offences of a personal nature and burying them would bring about peace and amity between the two sides. In the circumstances of the case, FIR No. 163 dated 26/10/2006 registered under Sections 147, 148, 149, 323, 307, 452 and 506 of the IPC at Police Station Sector 3, Chandigarh and all consequential proceedings arising therefrom including the final report presented u/s 173 of the Code and charges framed by the trial court are hereby quashed.

Having heard the learned Counsels appearing on behalf of the respective parties and considering the facts and circumstances arising out of the present petition as well as considering the ratio of the decision rendered in the case of Dimpey Gujaral & Ors. Vs. Union Territory, Through Administrator, U.T. Chandigarh and Ors., and Gian Singh Vs. State (supra), Madan Mohan Abbot Vs. State of Punjab, , Nikhil Merchant Vs. Central Bureau of Investigation & Anr., reported in 2009 (1) GLH 31 as well as in the case of Manoj Sharma Vs. State & Ors., 2009 (1) GLH 190, it appears that further continuation of criminal proceedings in relation to the impugned FIR against the petitioners-original accused would be unnecessary harassment to the petitioners and would amount to abuse of process of law and Court and the trial would be futile.

For the reasons stated hereinabove, the present petition is allowed. The impugned FIR being CR No. I-001 of 2013 registered before the Gambhoi Police Station, Sabarkantha for the alleged offences under sections 498(A), 323, 307, 294(A) and 114 of Indian Penal Code as well as other consequential proceedings arising out of the aforesaid FIR are hereby quashed and set aside. Rule is made absolute to the aforesaid extent.