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Judgment
R.M. Chhaya, J.—Heard Mr. Sandip Bhatt, learned counsel for the applicants, Mr. Alkesh Shah, learned Assistant Public Prosecutor for the State-respondent No. 1 and Mr. Y.J. Patel, learned counsel for respondent No. 2-Original Complainant. By way of the present application u/s 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (''the Code'' for short), the applicants have prayed for quashing and setting aside the F.I.R. being C.R. No. I-143 of 2013 registered at Vejalpur Police Station, Ahmedabad, by respondent No. 2-Original complainant for the alleged offences punishable under Sections 306, 498(A) and 114 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 and Sections 3 and 7 of the Dowry Prohibition Act.
Learned counsel for the applicants has submitted that the First Information Report came to be lodged on probabilities and because of some misunderstanding. The impugned First Information Report does not state the correct facts. It is further submitted that the dispute has been resolved because of intervention of family members of the respective parties and therefore, any further continuation of the proceedings in pursuant to said First Information Report would result into harassment to the parties. It is further submitted that as the settlement is arrived at, trial would be futile and any further continuation of the proceedings of said F.I.R. would also amount to abuse of process of Court and law and therefore, in order to secure the ends of justice, this Court may exercise its inherent jurisdiction u/s 482 of the Code and allow the application as prayed for.
Per Contra, Mr. Patel, learned counsel for respondent No. 2-original complainant has reiterated the contentions raised by learned counsel for the petitioner. He relying upon the affidavit dated 05.09.2013 filed before this Court, has stated that the impugned F.I.R. was filed out of sheer emotion and misunderstanding, however, in reality, it was found that the allegations leveled against the applicants are not correct. It is further contended that respondent No. 2, who was present before this Court has also submitted the same facts, therefore, this Court may allow this application as prayed for.
Mr. Alkesh Shah, learned Assistant Public Prosecutor has candidly submitted that in view of the fact that the dispute has been amicably resolved, which was of personal in nature, this Court may pass appropriate order.
It may be noted that this Court vide order dated 03.12.2013 has passed the following order:--
Respondent No. 2-Laxmanbhai Punjabhai Kalal, original informant, is present in the court, who is identified by Mr. Y.J. Patel, learned counsel appearing for respondent No. 2. Mr. Patel also tenders a photocopy of the driving license in order to establish the identity of respondent No. 2.
On inquiry, respondent No. 2 has submitted that because of intervention of the members of the community, the dispute has been resolved. S.O. To 10.12.2013.
Learned Assistant Public Prosecutor appearing for the respondent-State shall call for the relevant police papers for perusal of the court on the next date.
It would be advantageous at this stage to refer to the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Gian Singh Vs. State of Punjab and Another, wherein it has been observed thus:--
It needs no emphasis that exercise of inherent power by the High Court would entirely depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. It is neither permissible nor proper for the Court to provide a straitjacket formula regulating the exercise of inherent powers u/s 482. No precise and inflexible guidelines can also be provided.
Quashing of offence or criminal proceedings on the ground of settlement between an offender and victim is not the same thing as compounding of offence. They are different and not interchangeable. Strictly speaking, the power of compounding of offences given to a Court u/s 320 is materially different from the quashing of criminal proceedings by the High Court in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction. In compounding of offences, power of a criminal Court is circumscribed by the provisions contained in Section 320 and the Court is guided solely and squarely thereby while, on the other hand, the formation of opinion by the High Court for quashing a criminal offence or criminal proceeding or criminal complaint is guided by the material on record as to whether the ends of justice would justify such exercise of power although the ultimate consequence may be acquittal or dismissal of indictment.
Where High Court quashes a criminal proceeding having regard to the fact that dispute between the offender and victim has been settled although offences are not compoundable, it does so as in its opinion, continuation of criminal proceedings will be an exercise in futility and justice in the case demands that the dispute between the parties is put to an end and peace is restored; securing the ends of justice being the ultimate guiding factor. No doubt, crimes are acts which have harmful effect on the public and consist in wrong doing that seriously endangers and threatens well-being of society and it is not safe to leave the crime- doer only because he and the victim have settled the dispute amicably or that the victim has been paid compensation, yet certain crimes have been made compoundable in law, with or without permission of the Court. In respect of serious offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc; or other offences of mental depravity under IPC or offences of moral turpitude under special statutes, like Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity, the settlement between offender and victim can have no legal sanction at all. However, certain offences which overwhelmingly and predominantly bear civil flavour having arisen out of civil, mercantile, commercial, financial, partnership or such like transactions or the offences arising out of matrimony, particularly relating to dowry, etc. or the family dispute, where the wrong is basically to victim and the offender and victim have settled all disputes between them amicably, irrespective of the fact that such offences have not been made compoundable, the High Court may within the framework of its inherent power, quash the criminal proceeding or criminal complaint or F.I.R. if it is satisfied that on the face of such settlement, there is hardly any likelihood of offender being convicted and by not quashing the criminal proceedings, justice shall be casualty and ends of justice shall be defeated. The above list is illustrative and not exhaustive. Each case will depend on its own facts and no hard and fast category can be prescribed.
The position that emerges from the above discussion can be summarised thus : the power of the High Court in quashing a criminal proceeding or FIR or complaint in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction is distinct and different from the power given to a criminal Court for compounding the offences u/s 320 of the Code. Inherent power is of wide plenitude with no statutory limitation but it has to be exercised in accord with the guideline engrafted in such power viz; (i) to secure the ends of justice or (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any Court. In what cases power to quash the criminal proceeding or complaint or F.I.R. may be exercised where the offender and victim have settled their dispute would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case and no category can be prescribed. However, before exercise of such power, the High Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the crime. Heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. cannot be fittingly quashed even though the victim or victims family and the offender have settled the dispute. Such offences are not private in nature and have serious impact on society. Similarly, any compromise between the victim and offender in relation to the offences under special statutes like Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity etc; cannot provide for any basis for quashing criminal proceedings involving such offences. But the criminal cases having overwhelmingly and pre-dominatingly civil flavour stand on different footing for the purposes of quashing, particularly the offences arising from commercial, financial, mercantile, civil, partnership or such like transactions or the offences arising out of matrimony relating to dowry, etc. or the family disputes where the wrong is basically private or personal in nature and the parties have resolved their entire dispute. In this category of cases, High Court may quash criminal proceedings if in its view, because of the compromise between the offender and victim, the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of criminal case would put accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal case despite full and complete settlement and compromise with the victim. In other words, the High Court must consider whether it would be unfair or contrary to the interest of justice to continue with the criminal proceeding or continuation of the criminal proceeding would tantamount to abuse of process of law despite settlement and compromise between the victim and wrongdoer and whether to secure the ends of justice, it is appropriate that criminal case is put to an end and if the answer to the above question(s) is in affirmative, the High Court shall be well within its jurisdiction to quash the criminal proceeding.
Having heard learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respective parties, considering the facts and circumstances arising out of the present application as well as considering the ratio of the decision rendered in the case of Gian Singh (supra), it appears that further continuation of criminal proceedings in relation to the impugned F.I.R. against the applicants-original accused would be unnecessary harassment to the applicants and the trial would be futile and would also amount to abuse of process of Court and law and, therefore, it is submitted that in order to secure the ends of justice, the impugned F.I.R. is required to be quashed in exercise of power u/s 482 of the Code.
For the reasons stated hereinabove, the present application is allowed. Impugned F.I.R. being I-C.R. No. 143 of 2013 registered at Vejalpur Police Station, Ahmedabad as well as all the other consequential proceedings arising out of the aforesaid F.I.R. are hereby quashed and set aside. Rule is made absolute to the aforesaid extent.