Perianna Gounder vs Jayarao Nainar

K. Veeraswami, J.—This appeal is from an order of the District Judge of South Arcot at Cuddalore apportioning compensation for land

acquired which was deposited by the Land Acquisition Officer u/s 31(2) of the Land Acquisition Act. The deposit was made because he thought

that there was a dispute as to its apportionment but he made no reference u/s 30 of the Act. The District Judge of his own accord initiated

proceedings and decided that the appellant and the respondent were entitled to the compensation amount deposited in equal moieties on the view

that the two items of property acquired were owned by the appellant and the respondent''s predecessor-in-title in common.

Item I which is a site of an extent of 55 cents with a tiled house thereon was purchased by the appellant on 26th April, 1934 in his own name.

The other item is a land 31 cents in extent. The District Judge considered that the second item was ancestral property set apart for the maintenance

of the appellant''s mother and that the respondent who had purchased a half share from the appellant''s brother was entitled to that half. It seems to

me that no exception can be taken to this view of the District Judge.

But as regards item I, the decision of the District Judge appears to be clearly perverse. This will be patent from a perusal of his judgment itself to

the effect that even though the sale deed in relation to item I was in the name of the first claimant (appellant) nevertheless he must establish that he

has title to that item. He, therefore, in effect expected the appellant to adduce evidence that the respondent or his predecessor-in-title had no share

in the property. The respondent himself remained ex parte. There was nothing to show that the appellant and the respondent''s predecessor-in-title

continued to be members of a joint Hindu family even on 26th April, 1934 when the appellant purchased the item. Nor was there any evidence to

show that the purchase of that item was out of any part of the joint family funds or nucleus. In such circumstances the District Judge should have

upheld the title of the appellant to the entirety of item I.

On behalf of the respondent it was urged that the appeal itself would be incompetent because the order of the District Judge was not one made

on a reference u/s 30 and therefore, it could not be regarded as an award u/s 26(1). Where there is a dispute as regards the apportionment of

compensation amount it is no doubt true that the Land Acquisition Officer himself may refer the dispute to the decision of the Court having

jurisdiction u/s 30 and at the same time he may also deposit the compensation amount into Court u/s 31(2). In such a case the decision of the

Court will be regarded as one u/s 26(1) and the order will have the effect of a decree u/s 26(2) from which an appeal would lie. But in this case for

some reason which does not appear, the Land Acquisition Officer made, the deposit u/s 31(2) but made no reference u/s 30. Under the

circumstances there is force in the contention for the respondent that no appeal would lie from an order made u/s 31. I am, however, inclined to

convert the appeal into a revision u/s 115 of the CPC and it is done accordingly. It is contended for the respondent that even so, there is no error

of jurisdiction. The contention is not altogether without force but I am satisfied that grave injustice has been caused by the District Judge declining

to give effect to the sale deed dated 26th April, 1934 in favour of the appellant. As I said, the view of the District Judge on the question borders on

perversity, that being the case, this Court feels justified in interfering with the order of the District Judge.

The Revision Petition, which form the appeal takes, is allowed in part and it is ordered that the appellant will be entitled to the entirety of the

compensation for item I but the Civil Revision Petition is dismissed in respect of the second item. There will be no order as to costs in this Court.