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Judgment
13 paragraphs · 1,586 wordsHon''ble Sudhir Agarwal, J.—Admittedly, result of examination in question was declared on 14.9.2010 and this writ petition has been filed after one and a half years.
Learned Counsel for the petitioners admitted when writ petition of some other candidates, who had approached this Court in 2010 itself was decided on 8.2.2012 that these petitioners then became aware of the matter and now have filed this writ petition. There is virtually no explanation for delay and laches what to say of satisfactory explanation.
Delay and laches constitute substantial reason for disentitling relief in equitable jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In New Delhi Municipal Council Vs. Pan Singh and Others, , the Apex Court observed that after a long time the writ petition should not have been entertained even if the petitioners are similarly situated and discretionary jurisdiction may not be exercised in favour of those who approached the Court after a long time. It was held that delay and laches were relevant factors for exercise of equitable jurisdiction. In Lipton India Ltd. and Others Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Others, and M.R. Gupta Vs. Union of India and others, it was held that though there was no period of limitation provided for filing a petition under Article 226 of Constitution of India, ordinarily a writ petition should be filed within reasonable time. In The Oriol Industries Ltd. Vs. The Bombay Mercantile Bank Ltd., , it was said that representation would not be adequate explanation to take care of delay. Same view was reiterated in State of Orissa Vs. Pyarimohan Samantaray and Others, and State of Orissa and Others Vs. Shri Arun Kumar Patnaik and Others, and the said view has also been followed recently in Shiv Dass Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Others, and New Delhi Municipal Council (supra). The aforesaid authorities of the Apex Court has also been followed by this Court in Chunvad Pandey Vs. State of U.P. and others 2008(4) ESC 2423. This has been followed in Virender Chaudhary Vs. Bharat Petroleum Corporation and Others, . In S.S. Balu and Another Vs. State of Kerala and Others, the Apex Court held that it is well settled principle of law that delay defeats equity. It is now a trite law that where the writ petitioners approaches the High Court after a long delay, reliefs prayed for may be denied to them on account of delay and laches irrespective of the fact that they are similarly situated to other candidates who have got the benefit. In Yunus (Baboobhai) A Hamid Padvekar Vs. State of Maharashtra through its Secretary and Others, the Court referred to the observations of Sir Barnes Peacock in Lindsay Petroleum Company Vs. Prosper Armstrong Hurde etc. (1874) 5 PC 239 and held as under:
Now the doctrine of laches in Courts of Equity is not an arbitrary or technical doctrine. Where it would be practically unjust to give a remedy either because the party has, by his conduct done that which might fairly be regarded as equivalent to a waiver of it, or where by his conduct and neglect he has though perhaps not waiving that remedy, yet put the other party in a situation in which it would not be reasonable to place him if the remedy were afterwards to be asserted, in either of these cases, lapse of time and delay are most material....... Two circumstances always important in such cases are, the length of the delay and the nature of the acts done during the interval which might affect either party and cause a balance of justice or injustice in taking the one course or the other, so far as relates to the remedy.
Learned Counsel for the petitioners however placed reliance on Apex Court decision in Lt. Governor of Delhi and others Vs. Const. Dharampal and others, wherein some persons of Police Force who had participated in agitation were terminated but later some constables were reinducted. The Apex Court held that same treatment ought to have been given to all others. The judgment has no application in the case in hand inasmuch as the matter of termination of an employee relates to his personal cause of action and even if he is reinstated, it would not cause any impediment to any body else in his right.
In the present case if after such lapse of time petitioners'' request is accepted, it is likely to affect a number of persons who are several hundreds, had already been appointed, are working since long, and who are not party in this writ petition. There is no challenge to their appointment. Therefore this case would not lend any help to the petitioners.
Another decision relied by petitioners is Jawahar Lal Sazawal and Others Vs. State of Jammu and Kashmir and Others, . Here the High Court declined to follow its earlier order taking a different view which was not appreciated by Apex court. That is not the case here. While granting equitable relief under Article 226 the person who has approached the Court well in time stand on different footing than those who are guilty of extra ordinary delay and laches. For illustration, against a seniority list the Apex court intervened when found the petitioners to have raised the dispute well in time in P.D. Aggarwal and Others Vs. State of U.P. and Others, but against the same seniority list, for other persons, the Apex Court declined to grant any relief on the ground of undue delay and laches in G.C. Gupta and Others Vs. N.K. Pandey and Others, .
Relying on this Court''s judgment delivered on 08.2.2012 in writ petition No.61659 of 2010 connected with 11 other writ petitions which all were filed in 2010 Learned Counsel for the petitioners submitted that the petitioners are also entitled for the same treatment since the relief granted in the above matter should also be extended to them as they are similarly placed.
The very basic submission that petitioners are similarly placed, in my view, is not correct. The petitioners belong to category of litigants who did not agitate the matter after selection was over, kept silence and slept over their rights. On the contrary, petitioners in Writ Petition No.61659 of 2010 and other connected matters decided on 08.02.2012 constitute that group of vigilant litigants who came to this Court immediately and within a reasonable time for protection of their rights and invoked jurisdiction of this Court without any undue delay and laches. It is true that those writ petitions relate to the same examination which has been disputed in the present writ petition. It is requested that relief granted vide aforesaid judgment should be extended to the petitioners also. However, there also the Court examined the consequences of delay in filing writ petition only but immediately after declaration of final result in the context of what relief can be granted to those petitioners. It is evident from the said judgment that selection was held for more than 500 vacancies and as stated in the counter affidavit filed in the above matters, all selectees were already appointed. Third party rights were created and the incumbents appointed pursuant to the above selection were/are working for quite some time. The petitioners who have not challenged those appointments at any point of time for the last almost one and a half years, at this stage, if their writ petition is entertained for the first time ignoring undue delay and laches on their part, it may cause a topsy-turvy in the entire selection which has already ended in appointment and hundreds of appointments which have already been finalized may have to be reviewed without any fault on the part of appointees. The entire set of appointees, which is several hundreds in number, cannot be put in jeopardy by permitting these petitioners to reckon the issue after such a long time. It is true that in the earlier set of writ petition filed in 2010, there was an interim order that appointments, if any, shall be subject to result of writ petition but when the aforesaid set of petitions are pending before this Court, all the appointees were aware of the fact that only a few candidates have disputed the selection and therefore, dispute pending before this Court would not cause a massive impact on entire set of appointments but may result in disturbance of few of the appointees, if necessary. But, now, if fresh writ petitions are entertained ignoring extra ordinary and undue delay and laches, that will make entire process of selection and appointment uncertain and that will amount to unscramble of scrambled egg. In my view, it should not and cannot be permitted.
It is in these peculiar facts and circumstances of the case and considering the fact that these petitioners are definitely guilty of undue delay and laches having not come to this Court within reasonable time, I do not find it fit to interfere and entertain this writ petition at this belated stage.
Moreover, I also find that after such a extra ordinary delay and laches, these petitioners should not be granted any relief in a matter in which appointments have been made long back and the persons likely to be affected, in case any indulgence is made to the writ petition, have not been impleaded.
In the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, I decline to interfere under Article 226 of the constitution if India.
Dismissed.
