Pritam Singh vs State of Haryana

S.S. Grewal, J.

This petition under Section 482 of the'' Code of Criminal Procedure, 197'' (hereinafter to be referred to as the Code) relates to quashment of proceedings under Section 16(1)(a)(o) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act (hereinafter to be referred to as the Act), against the petitioner pending in the trial court.

In brief, the facts relevant for the disposal of this case, are that a complaint under Section 7 read with Section 16(l)(a)(i) of the Act was Wed by the Food Inspector in the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Kurukshetra, against the petitioner. According to the allegations in the said complaint, the sample of Ice Candy was taken from the petitioner on 1751985 and was found to be adulterated. Initially when the trial of this case commenced warrant procedure was followed. After recording precharge evidence, the trial Magistrate passed an order dated 16th of December, 1987 to the effect that the case should be tried as warrant case as sentence of more than one year was likely to'' be passed in this case. Later on, vide order dated 1021988 Chief Judicial Magistrate ''ordered that the case shall be tried summarily in accordance with the provisions of Section 16A of the Act, and the evidence already recorded shall not be read against him.

The learned counsel for the parties were heard. On behalf of the petitioner, it was urged that the trial Magistrate erred in proceeding with the trial of this case as warrant case initially, without passing any specific order under Section 16A of the Act and that the learned trial Magistrate could not rectify this defect by passing subsequent order on 16th December 1987; that once charge had been framed against the petitioner on 16th of December, 1987, the learned trial court again erred in passing impugned order dated 1021988 whereby it was directed that the accused shall be tried summarily in accordance with the provisions of Section 16A of the Act and the evidence already recorded shall not be read against him. It was further submitted that once the trial Magistrate had followed the warrant procedure it was not open to him to order that the accused be tried summarily and. because of the aforesaid defects the case against the petitioner has unnecessarily been prolonged without any fault of the petitioner.

It is true that in case the trial Magistrate wanted to follow warrant procedure for trial of this case, he ought to have passed an order under Section 16A of the Act either at the commencement of proceedings, or, during the course of the trial to the effect that the nature of the case was such that a sentence of imprisonment exceeding one year may have to be passed or for any other reason it was not desirable to try the case summarily. The learned trial Magistrate rectified this defect by passing specific order in consonance of Section 16 A of the Act by passing order dated 16th December, 1982 and thereafter framed charge against the petitioner. JUDGMENT passed by the learned trial Court upto this stage cannot be said to be illegal or perverse. The order dated 10th of February, 1988 whereby the learned Magistrate again ordered that the case be tried summarily, too cannot be said to be illegal or perverse. Thus the objection raised concerning the charge in procedure or merely on that account the entire trial has been vitiated, is hardly, tenable in the facts and circumstances of the present case. I find support in this point from Division Bench of this Court in Sham Lal v. State, 1991(1) PLR 361 (Volume 99) wherein it was held that it was open to the Magistrate in the Course of the trial to switch over from summary procedure to a warrant procedure and rule that once charge is framed, the case must end either in acquittal or conviction is subject to well recognised exceptions. It was further observed in the afore cited authority that rectification of a procedural mistake was one such exception and it cannot be laid down that on the passing of the order changing one procedure from another would by itself result in proceedings being vitiated.

However, the fact remains that in the present case which relates to sale of Ice Candy, the petitioner who is the vendor of Ice Candy has already undergone agony of trial for. about six years, The trial of the case is still pending and it may take sufficient time before the trial is actually completed. Unnecessary and inordinate delay in completion of the trial of this case, in my view has adversely affected the inalienable right of the petitioner to have a speedy trial enshrined in Article 21 of the Constitution of India. Inordinate and prolonged delay in account of which the trial of the petitioner has'' been unnecessarily delayed because of the change in procedure adopted by the trial court and not on account of any fault of reason which can be ascribed to the petitioner himself, would amount to abuse of the process, of the court, in case the complaint and further proceedings initiated, against the accused petitioner are not quashed. The case of the petitioner is fully covered by Full Bench decision Of the Patna High Court in Madheshwardbari Singh and another v. State of Bihar, 1986 Cri. L J. 1771 wherein it was held as under :

"The right of a speedy public trial is now an inalienable fundamental right of a citizen under Article 21 of the Constitution. It has further been ruled that a callous and inordinately prolonged delay of seven years or more (which does not arise from the default of the accused or is otherwise not occasioned by any extraordinary or exceptional reason) in investigation and original trial for offences other than capital ones plainly violates the constitutional guarantee of a speedy public trial under Article 21 of the Constitution."

For the foregoing reasons, the complaint and the subsequent proceedings initiated against the petitioner before the trial court are directed to be quashed. This petition is accordingly allowed.