Puran Lal vs State of U.P. and Others

Rajiv Sharma, J.—Heard learned Counsel for the petitioner and learned Standing Counsel.

The present petition has been filed against order dated 21.01.2003 passed by the Sub-Divisional Officer, Mohammadi, district Lakhimpur Kheri (Annexure-1) and order dated 28.11.2011 passed by the Deputy Commissioner (Food), Lucknow Division, Lucknow (Annexure-2).

The facts necessary for disposal of the petition are that the petitioner was license holder of fair price shop. On 3.12.2003, a meeting comprising of Pradhan, Gram Panchayat Vikas Adhikari and other members was held, in which a decision was taken for cancellation of the contract of fair price run by the petitioner. The petitioner was given opportunity by the Sub Divisional Magistrate to submit registers of distribution of fair price commodities and his reply, which the petitioner failed to do. Thus, by order dated 21.01.2003 the Sub-Divisional Officer, Mohammadi, district Lakhimpur Kheri cancelled the contract of the petitioner.

Against the order dated 21.1.2003, the petitioner did not file any appeal within limitation. However, he filed appeal after lapse of about 8 years on 07.09.2011 on the ground that earlier he had engaged a lawyer to file the appeal but the appeal was not filed. The ground taken by the petitioner did not find favour with the Deputy Commissioner (Food) Lucknow Division, Lucknow who rejected the appeal being highly belated by order dated 28.11.2011.

I have heard learned counsel for the petitioner and have gone through the record.

It is now well settled principle of law that "delay defeats equity" has its fullest application in the matter of grant of relief under Article 226 of the Constitution. It is correct that no period of limitation is provided to invoke writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution but the same does not mean that the machinery of writ jurisdiction can be set in motion at any time at the whims and fancies of a party. It is also settled that there may be cases where even the delay of shorter period would be considered sufficient to decline relief under Article 226 of the Constitution while in certain cases the court may be persuaded to condone the long delay if sufficient reasons are disclosed by such party.

In various legal pronouncements the Supreme Court has taken the limitation period which is prescribed for filing a civil suit as a guiding factor even for filing the writ petitions. A reference in this regard may be made to the judgment of the Supreme Court in The Municipal Council, Ahmednagar and Another Vs. Shah Hyder Beig and Others, . The same is as under:

The High Court has thus misplaced the factual details and misread the same. It is now a well-settled principle of law and we need not dilate on this score to the effect that while no period of limitation is fixed but in the normal course of events, the period the party is required for filing a civil proceeding ought to be the guiding factor. While it is true that this extraordinary jurisdiction is available to mitigate the sufferings of the people in general but it is not out of place to mention that this extraordinary jurisdiction has been conferred on to the law Courts under Article 226 of the Constitution on a very sound equitable principle. Hence, the equitable doctrine, namely, "delay defeats equity" has its fullest application in the matter of grant of relief under Article 226 of the Constitution. The discretionary relief can be had provided one has not by his act or conduct given a go-by to his rights. Equity favours a vigilant rather than an indolent litigation and this being the basic tenet of law, the question of grant of an order as has been passed in the matter as regards restoration of possession upon cancellation of the notification does not and cannot arise.

The Hon''ble Delhi High Court in the case of Smt. Krishna Chaubey Vs. Government of NCT of Delhi III AD (Delhi) 576, has held that if no satisfactory explanation given by the party for delay in approaching the Court, the remedy of invoking writ jurisdiction would not be available on the ground of delay and laches. Para 23 of the said judgment is reproduced below:

A conspectus of the aforesaid judgments would show that ordinarily the period of limitation prescribed for filing a civil suit would be a guiding factor. This period was over long time ago in case the appellant would have preferred a civil suit. Even assuming that the petition ought to be entertained after that period of time, there has to be satisfactory explanation for the period of delay. Leave aside any satisfactory explanation, there is no explanation whatsoever other than saying that the appellant was approaching the Department from time to time and orally representing the matter. This is hardly a satisfactory explanation.

While exercising discretionary power under Article 226 of the Constitution, the Court has ample power to refuse the grant of writ of certiorari when it is found that there was delay due to negligence or omission by the petitioner to assert his right at a time where there was acquiescence in order on his part. By a catena of decisions, it has been settled that delay defeats equity and court helps only those who are vigilant and do not slumber over their rights. The writ petition suffers from inordinate, unexplained delay. Therefore, there is no averments as to why the petitioner remained idle for more than two and a half year.

Learned Counsel for the petitioner did not satisfy the Court as to why he has filed the appeal beyond time. From the bare perusal of the memo of writ petition, it is evident that the petitioner has failed to advance any reasons or any explanation much less any sufficient explanation for such a long delay in challenging the impugned order dated 21.1.2003.

For the aforesaid reasons, I do not find any good ground to interfere under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

The writ petition is, therefore, dismissed.