R. Venkitaraman vs Central Road Traffic Board and Others

Subramania Iyer, J.—This is an application presented by R. Venkitaraman, Managing Director, The Union Motor Service Ltd., Trivandrum, against three Respondents (1) the Central Road Traffic Board, Travapcore-Cochin State, Trivandrum, represented, by the Chairman of the said Board, (2) the Road Traffic Board, Trivandrum District and (3) A.N. Satyanesan, General Manager, Kerala Commercial Corporation, Trivandrum, respectively, asking the Court:

(1) that a writ of certiorari or such other directions be issued to the 1st counter-Petitioner to call up the records and proceedings in order ROC. 1/CB-TAT/52 dated 18-1-1953 of the Central Road Traffic Board, Travancore-Cochin State, Trivandrum and to quash the same.

(2) that the 2nd counter-Petitioner be ordered not to implement the direction contained in ROC. 1/CB-TAT/52 dated 18-1-1953 of the Central Road Traffic Board, Travancore-Cochin State, Trivandrum, to stop the bus TCT.1677 on the Trivandrum-Kazhakuttam route; and

(3) that such other incidental reliefs as may be found necessary be granted and that this petition be allowed with costs.

The facts are as follows: By order (Ex. B) passed at their meeting held on 17th adjourned to 19th and 25th June 1950, the Transport Authority, constituted under the Travancore-Cochin Motor Vehicles Act 10 of 1125, sanctioned three routes to the company represented by the Petitioner. Disputes between the company''s directors led to an application dated 14-11-1950 (Ex. IV) by one of them for withholding the issue of permits pursuant to the sanction which was allowed. The Directors made up their differences and presented a joint, application on 22-1-1951 (Ex. V) as a result of which permits were granted for two of the routes for which vehicles were presented. Vehicle for the third route not having been produced on 12-8-1951 a permit (Ex. C) was given to Anr. party to run a bus on that route which was curtailed. On 30-8-1952 the Petitioner applied to the Chairman of the Transport Authority for a permit for the third route pursuant to the aforesaid sanction which was granted two years earlier. Before this application was dealt with by the Transport Authority, on 23-9-1952 the Petitioner applied to the Secretary of the Transport Authority (Ex. E) for the issue of a permit. The next day, that is on 24-9-1952 a parmit (Ex. F) signed by Shri Lopez on behalf of the Secretary was issued. The Petitioner started service pursuant thereto. The 24th September 1952 on which date the said permit was issued was the last day of the existence of the transport authority, and from the next day, that is, from 25-9-1952 Respondents 1 and 2 the Central Board and the Road Traffic Board started functioning. Discovering that, the Petitioner was plying a bus pursuant to Ex. P which was in their view void running was stopped as from 19-1-1952 by order dated the previous day (Ex. A). This is the order sought to be quashed in these proceedings.

Respondent 3 filed a petition before Respondent 1 and it is for that reason there happened to be a third Respondent to this application. Respondent 3, however, does not contend either that he is entitled to or that he did prefer an appeal though he admits having brought useful information to the notice of Respondent 1 after which that authority took action, which is not sought to be supported as action taken on an appeal by any party. No relief is claimed against Respondent 3 nor is the necessity or justification to impleading him made manifest. The petition should, therefore, be dismissed so far as he is concerned with costs and advocate''s fee which is fixed at Rs. 25/-.

The rules framed under the Travancore-Cochin Act 10 of 1125, continued to be in force until 25-9-1952 when they were replaced by the new rules. Rule 146 of the old rules (new Rule 175) reads thus:

146(a) No permit shall be issued until the registration mark of the vehicle to which it relates has been entered therein.

(b) When the applicant is unable to produce the certificate of registration on the date of his application for the permit, owing to the fact that he is not on that date in possession of the vehicle duly registered, or for some other reason, the applicant shall within one month of the sanction of the application by the Transport Authority or such longer period as the Authority may specify produce the certificate of registration of the vehicle before that authority in order that particulars of the registration mark may be entered in the permit. In the event of any applicant failing to produce the certificate of registration within the period specified by the Transport Authority, the Transport Authority may revoke its sanction of the application.

As per the above rule the certificate of registration of the vehicle for which permit is to be granted has to be produced within a month of the sanction. The Transport Authority have delegated authority to their Secretary to issue the permit should the certificate of registration be produced within the aforesaid time. By their order dated 20-9-1950 (Ex. IX) the delegation of authority to the Secretary to endorse permits was extended for a period of three months from the date of sanction. This was confirmed by Government by order dated 17-4-1951 (Ex. III). Should the certificate of registration be not produced within the time aforesaid, it was competent for the Authority to revoke the sanction. It is thus clear that the Secretary had power to endorse and grant the permit only for a period of three months from the date of sanction. In this case the sanction was accorded in June 1950 but was communicated to the Petitioner only on 16-8-1950. Taking 16-8-1950 to be the date of sanction three months therefrom expired on 16-11-1950. The authority of the Secretary to endorse and issue the permit pursuant to the aforesaid sanction terminated then. The Secretary had no jurisdiction thereafter to issue the permit. The Petitioner knew teat to obtain the permit pursuant to the aforesaid sanction, approach to the Transport Authority was essential. Such approach was made by him by the aforesaid application of 30-8-1952 which was addressed to their Chairman. Before waiting for orders thereon, he approached the Secretary with an application (Ex. E) about a month after. The Secretary appears to have condoned the delay even on 17-9-1952 - on what occasion or provocation does not appear - and granted the disputed permit. This approach to the Secretary on the eve of the termination of the existence of the Transport Authority under the Travancore-Cochin Act and his hurried action ill issuing the permit especially when the application made to the Chairman for the identical purpose was awaiting orders to the knowledge both of the Petitioner as well as of the Secretary, can justly be characterised, as was done by the learned Advocate General on behalf of Respondents 1 and 2, as mala fide and collusive. But whatever they may be, it is clear that the Petitioner knew or ought to have known the limit of time to the authority of the Secretary in, the matter of endorsement of the permit. But whether he did or did not know, the authority of the Secretary was and was only what he had, namely to endorse and issue the permit within three months of the sanction and the permit endorsed and issued by him two years thereafter would be void and of no effect. In - ''Collector of Masulipatam v. Vencata Narrainapah'' 8 Moo Ind App 529 at p. 554 (PC) (A), Lord Justice Turner in delivering the judgment of the Judicial. Committee observed as follows:

Again the acts of a Government officer bind the Government only when he is acting in the discharge of a certain duty within the limits of his authority, or, if he exceed that authority, when the Government in fact, or in law, directly, or by implication, ratified the excess.

The law of agency has really no application in a case of this description as in the granting oft a permit there is no question of contract involved. The person issuing the permit has either authority to issue it or he has not. If he has, the permit would be good; if he has not, it would be void. There is no scope for invoking the principles of agency at all. But even in a case where the principle of agency does apply, the consideration applicable to the case of a private principal and agent will not hold good in the case of a public officer doing duty under the Government. Says Story at page 375, Footnote 1, in his "Law of Agency", Ninth Edition, as follows:

By the law of agency at the common law there is this difference between individuals and the Government; the former are liable to the extent of the power they have apparently given to their agents, while the Government is liable only to the extent of the power it has actually given to its officers.

Reliance for this position is placed upon - ''the Floyd Acceptances; Pierce v. United States'' (1869) 7 Wall 666 (B), which has been followed in later cases. See ''U.S. Supreme Court Reports 19" Law Ed page 1060''. This Court held so in - ''State v. J.C. Gammon Ltd.'' AIR 1953 Trav 45 at p. 48 (C) ''et seq.'' para. 15.

Even if the ordinary rule of agency applicable'' to the case of a private principal and agent be regarded as applicable, the Petitioner having known or ought to have known the limit of the authority of the Secretary, cannot depend upon any apparent authority.

The permit Ex. F is ultra vires the authority of the Secretary who granted it and is therefore void and of no effect. The Petitioner was not entitled to ply his bus pursuant to that permit and Respondents 1 and 2 were justified in having issued the order, Ex. A and stopped the unauthorised running of the bus by the Petitioner.

Learned Counsel for the Petitioner referred to and relied upon the provisions of the Evidence Act, Section 114, illus. (e) and those of Article 261 of the Constitution of India. He invited the Court to, presume the propriety of the act of the Secretary in issuing the permit because it is an official act which may be presumed to be properly done. Section 114(e), Evidence Act, no doubt enables the raising of a presumption "that official acts have been regularly performed. The words ''may presume'' in Section 114, leave it to the Court to make or not to make the presumption, according to the circumstances of the case; and the presumption when made is rebuttable." AIR 1943 75 (Federal Court) .

It is to provide for cases which, on account of lapse of time, may not admit of clear and direct proof, that the presumption u/s 114, Evidence Act, is sanctioned. There is no scope for presumption when facts are known. Here the transaction is recent and all the facts have been ascertained and there is, therefore, no scope for any presumption as urged on behalf of the Petitioner by his learned Counsel.

Article 261 of the Constitution which provides by Clause (1) that:

Full faith and credit shall be given throughout the territory of India to public acts, records and judicial proceedings of the Union and of every State.

does not help the Petitioner because the Article applies only to acts which are valid and good and not to those that are void. The act in question in this case is the issue of the permit, Ex. F, which, as already stated, is void. The permit, Ex. F, is really not a permit at all as its grant was ultra vires its granter viz., the Secretary. It never had value or life as a permit, that is to say, it never came into existence as a permit though it had the semblance of a permit. It is not, therefore, an act within the meaning of ''Article 201 of the Constitution.

It appears to me that if ever there was a clear case, this is one which falls within that description. The Petitioner has no cause of complaint and his resort to this Court for relief was altogether unjustifiable.

It is of the utmost importance that public officers, particularly those like the Secretary whose position is one of confidence as the word itself indicates, should confine strictly to the limits of their authority and not betray the confidence reposed in them. The issue of the permit in this case is a clear case of breach of such confidence and the Petitioner has not merely brought about such a breach but seeks redress against the termination of the consequence of that breach on its discovery.

The petition should, therefore, be dismissed with costs of Respondents 1 and 2 as well as advocate''s fee Rs. 100/-.