High CourtsSingle Bench

Radhavani Vaidh vs Prakash Rao Vaidh

Chhattisgarh High Court · Decided on 5 September 2023 · Citation: (2023) 09 CHH CK 0006

HON’BLE JUDGES
Rajani Dubey, J
ACTS & SECTIONS REFERRED
Code Of Criminal Procedure, 1973 — Section 313, 417 · Indian Penal Code, 1860 — Section 34, 498A
RESULT
Dismissed
CASE NUMBER
Criminal Revision No. 816 Of 2013
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Judgment

19 paragraphs · 1,267 words
1.

The present revision is filed against the judgment dated 27.12.2012 passed in Criminal Appeal No.154/2012 by the learned 4th Additional Session Judge, Bilaspur (C.G.), whereby the learned Appellate Court below has dismissed the appeal filed by the applicant and confirmed the judgment dated 24.11.2011 passed in Criminal Case No.1243/2009 by the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Bilaspur (C.G.), whereby the accused/respondents have been acquitted from the offence punishable under Section 498-A of IPC.

2.

Brief facts of the case are that, the Complainant/applicant herein is wife of accused/respondent No.1 and their marriage was solemnized on 09.07.2008. After one month of marriage, accused/respondent No.1 and 2, husband and mother-in-law of complainant/applicant respectively, demanded dowry of Rs.40,000/-, motorcycle, sewing machine and gas stove pressurizing her to go to her parental house and bring the said articles and started beating the Complainant. The accused/respondents 1 and 2 also tortured the complainant mentally and physically. Owing to aforesaid demand of dowry, on 02.11.2008, the Complainant/applicant lodged an FIR against the accused/respondent Nos. 1 and 2 under Section 498 (A), 34 of IPC.

3.

After completion of usual investigation, charge sheet was filed before the jurisdictional Court, who in turn, framed charges against the accused/respondent Nos. 1 and 2 under Section 498-A of IPC. Before the learned Court below, prosecution has examined as many as 06 witnesses. Statement of the accused/respondent Nos. 1 and 2 were also recorded under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C. The learned trial Court, after appreciating oral and documentary evidence, by judgment dated 24.11.2011 acquitted the accused/respondent Nos. 1 and 2 from the ofence punishable under Section 498-A of IPC. Being aggrieved by the judgment of acquittal dated 24.11.2011, the Complainant/applicant herein filed an appeal before the Court of Sessions and the learned 4th Additional Sessions Judge, by judgment dated 27.12.2012, dismissed the appeal of complainant. Hence, this revision by the Complainant/applicant.

4.

Learned counsel for the applicant submits that the judgment of acquittal passed by the learned Courts below are illegal, bad in law and not sustainable in the eye of law. The learned trial Court without appreciating the records and without applying the mind in such a crucial matter had acquitted the accused/respondent Nos. 1 and 2. Learned counsel further submits that Complainant Radhavani Vaidh (PW/1) has specifically stated the incident and the evidence of Complainant is well corroborated by the statements of father of complainant Vaman Rao (PW/2), grandfather Narayan Rao (PW/3) and mother Geeta Bai (PW/4), but the learned trial Court only considering minor contradictions in their statements, acquitted the accused/respondent Nos. 1 and 2 of the charge levellled against them. The prosecution has proved its case beyond reasonable doubt against the accused/respondent Nos. 1 and 2. Thus, the revision filed by the applicant may be allowed and the accused/respondents be convicted under Section 498-A of IPC.

5.

Learned counsel for respondent Nos. 1 and 2 supported the impugned judgment of acquittal.

6.

Learned State counsel has supported the version of complainant.

7.

I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material available on record.

8.

Complainant (PW/1) has admitted this fact in her evidence that she lodged the FIR after one month of the incident. A bare perusal of the FIR (Ex.P/1) goes to show that the date of incident is written as 09.08.2008 to 18.10.2008 and the date of FIR is written as 02.11.2008. In this regard, the Complainant did not offer any plausible explanation. Further, in para 20 of her cross-examination, she has also admitted the suggestion of defence that at the time of marriage, respondents had not demanded any dowry.

9.

The learned trial Court while arriving at the conclusion of acquittal minutely appreciated the evidence of Complainant (PW/1) and other witnesses and recorded its finding that the statements of prosecution witnesses are not reliable and further held that the prosecution has failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. The learned Appellate Court also appreciated the statements of Complainant (PW/1) and other witnesses and dismissed the appeal of the applicant holding no infirmity and illegality in the order passed by the learned trial Court.

10.

Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of Murlidhar alias Gidda & Another v. State of Karnataka passed in (2014) 5 SCC 730 has held in paras 11 & 12 as under:-

11.

As early as in 1952, this Court in Surajpal Singh V. State [AIR 1952 SC 52: 1952 Cri LJ 331] while dealing with the powers of the High Court in an appeal against acquittal under Section 417 of the Criminal Procedure Code observed: (AIR p.54, para 7)

“7...... the High Court has full power to review the evidence upon which the order of acquittal was founded, but it is equally well settled that the presumption of innocence of the accused is further reinforced by his acquittal by the trial court, and the findings of the trial court which had the advantage of seeing the witnesses and hearing their evidence can be reversed only for very substantial and compelling reasons.”

12.

Suffice it to say that this Court has consistently held that in dealing with appeals against acquittal, the appellate court must bear in mind the following:-

(i) There is presumption of innocence in favour of an accused person and such presumption is strengthened by the order of acquittal passed in his favour by the trial court;

(ii) The accused person is entitled to the benefit of reasonable doubt when it deals with the merit of the appeal against acquittal;

(iii) Thought, the powers of the appellate court in considering the appeals against acquittal are as extensive as its powers in appeals against convictions but the appellate court is generally loath in disturbing the finding of fact recorded by the trial court. It is so because the trial court had an advantage of seeing the demeanour of the witnesses. If the trial court takes a reasonable view of the facts of the case, interference by the appellate court with the judgment of acquittal is not justified. Unless, the conclusions reached by the trial court are palpably wrong or based on erroneous view of the law or if such conclusions are allowed to stand, they are likely to result in grave injustice, the reluctance on the part of the appellate court in interfering with such conclusions is fully justified; and

(iv) Merely because the appellate court on reappreciation and re-evaluation of the evidence is inclined to take a different view, interference with the judgment of acquittal is not justified if the view taken by the trial court is a possible view. The evenly balanced views of the evidence must not result in the interference by the appellate court in the judgment of the trial court.

11.

Applying the aforesaid legal proposition in the present case as well and looking to the statement of witnesses and finding recorded by the learned Courts below, this Court is also of the view that the findings recorded by both the Courts below are based on proper appreciation of oral and documentary evidence. That apart, it is settled position of law that the scope of interference in exercise of revisional powers of the High Court is quite limited inasmuch as it has to only verify that whether there is any material irregularity and/or illegality coupled with arbitrariness or perverseness in the impugned order or not. In the present case, no such circumstance is there warranting interference by this Court.

12.

Accordingly, the criminal revision preferred by the applicant is bereft of any substance and, therefore, the same is liable to be and is hereby dismissed.