Santosh Rani vs Suresh and Others

Daya Chaudhary, J.—The present application u/s 378(4) read with Section 482 Cr.P.C. has been filed for grant of leave to file appeal against judgment of acquittal dated 16.4.2013 passed by Chief Judicial Magistrate, Hisar, whereby, the respondents have been acquitted of the charges by the trial Court. Briefly, the facts of the case are that the applicant has filed a complaint on the allegations that her marriage was performed with respondent No. 1 on 27.12.1996. Sufficient dowry was given to respondents No. 1 to 3 at the time of marriage and an amount approximately Rs. six lacs was spent by her father on her marriage. After the marriage, the applicant was harassed by the respondents by raising demand of dowry and for that reason only she was given beatings by the accused persons on various dates and finally on 10.5.1997 she had been thrown out of her matrimonial home. It was also mentioned in the complaint that on 6.12.1997 when the accused persons visited the house of applicant, they demanded a sum of Rs. one lac and when she and her father had shown their inability in giving the amount, the accused persons had beaten the applicant in the presence of her father. Thereafter, the applicant had approached the police authorities but when no action was taken and the applicant was forced to file a complaint u/s 156(3) Cr.P.C.

The police authorities thereafter investigated the matter and filed cancellation report against the accused persons. Feeling dissatisfied with the cancellation report, the applicant wanted to lead preliminary evidence but her request was declined by learned JMIC, Hisar vide order dated 10.10.2000. The applicant challenged the order by way of filing revision petition before learned Additional Sessions Judge, Hisar, which was allowed and order passed dated 10.10.2000 passed by learned JMIC, Hisar was set aside. Thereafter preliminary evidence was recorded and the respondents were summoned by learned JMIC, Hisar vide order dated 17.9.2002 for commission of offence punishable under Sections 498-A, 406, 506 and 120-B IPC.

On appraisal of evidence, the accused persons were acquitted of the charges by Chief Judicial Magistrate, Hisar vide order dated 16.4.2013, which is subject matter of challenge in the present petition.

Learned counsel for the applicant has challenged the judgment of acquittal on the ground that there was specific averment of demand of dowry in the statements of PW-1 and PW-2 but the same has not been considered by the trial Court and a wrong finding has been given that there was no demand of dowry before the marriage or at the time of marriage. Learned counsel further submits that the judgment relied upon by the trial Court in case of Suresh Vs. Smt. Santosh Ex. D1 dated 6.1.2006 is not applicable keeping in view the facts and circumstances of the case. Learned counsel also submits that the trial Court has totally discarded oral as well as documentary evidence available on the record and judgment of acquittal has been passed without recording any specific finding.

Heard the arguments advanced by learned counsel for the applicant and have also perused the impugned judgment of the trial Court and other documents available on the file.

Learned trial Court has acquitted the respondents on the ground that applicant-complainant-Smt. Santosh Rani (PW-1) in her cross-examination has stated that the expenses of marriage and gifts were given by her parents and relatives out of their free will and she has also denied having prepared any list of articles given at the time of marriage. It has also been stated that dowry articles were not shown to anybody. Similarly, the father of the complainant, who has appeared as PW-2, has also stated in his cross-examination that he had spent money at the time of marriage out of his own free will and no demand of dowry was ever raised. He has also denied about preparation of list of any dowry articles. Learned trial Court has held that from the statements of PW-1 and PW-2, neither demand of dowry nor any ill-treatment with the respondents was proved and all allegations are general in nature.

It has also come on record that Suresh-respondent No. 1 had filed a petition for dissolution of marriage on the ground of cruelty, which was allowed and marriage between the parties was dissolved by decree of divorce. There were allegations of giving beatings to the complainant but the Doctor, who medico legally examined the applicant was even not produced in court as witness and injuries, therefore, could not be proved. On the basis of statements of witnesses examined, the prosecution has failed to prove its case beyond any shadow of reasonable doubt and respondents, by giving benefit of doubt, were acquitted of the charges by the trial Court.

It is a settled principle of law that the judgment of acquittal is to be interfered with only when compelling and substantial reasons exists in doing so. If the judgment of acquittal is unreasonable and the relevant and convincing material has been eliminated in the process in an unjustifiable manner, only than the judgment of acquittal should be interfered with. This position has been reiterated by Hon''ble the Supreme Court in Joseph alias Jose Vs. State of Kerala, Devatha Venkataswamy @ Rangaiah Vs. Public Prosecutor, High Court of A.P., ; State of U.P. Vs. Babu, 2003 (4) RCR (Crl.) 673 and Suchand Pal Vs. Phani Pal and Another,

The law with regard to interference in judgment of acquittal is well settled to the effect that only in exceptional cases where there are compelling circumstances and the judgment in appeal is found to be perverse, the appellate Court can interfere with the judgment of acquittal. The appellate Court while hearing such matter should bear in mind the presumption of innocence of the accused and further that the trial Court''s acquittal bolsters the presumption of innocence. Interference in a routine manner where the other view is possible should be avoided, unless there are good reasons for interference.

In Arulvelu and Another Vs. State represented by the Public Prosecutor and Another, , the Supreme Court has laid down the following guidelines for appellate Court in dealing with cases where trial Court had acquitted the accused:--

The accused is presumed to be innocent until proved guilty. The accused possessed this presumption when he was before the trial Court. The trial Court''s acquittal bolsters the presumption that he is innocent.

The power of reviewing evidence is wide and the appellate Court can re-appreciate the entire evidence on record. It can review the trial Court''s conclusion with respect to both facts and law, but the Appellate Court must given due weight and consideration to the decision of the trial Court.

The appellate Court should also keep in mind that the trial Court had the distinct advantage of watching the demeanor of the witnesses. The trial Court is in a better position to evaluate the credibility of the witnesses.

The appellate Court may only overrule or otherwise disturb the trial Court''s acquittal if it has very substantial and reasons" for doing so.

If two reasonable or possible views can be reached-one that leads to acquittal, the other to conviction - the High Courts/appellate courts must rule in favour of the accused.

An order of acquittal should not be lightly interfered with even if Court believes that there is some evidence pointing out the finger towards the accused.

The trial Court judgment cannot be set aside because the appellate Court''s view is more probable. The appellate Court would not be justified in setting aside the trial court judgment unless it arrives at a clear finding on marshaling the entire evidence on record that the judgment of the trial Court is either perverse or wholly unsustainable in law.

Hon''ble the Apex Court in Tota Singh and Another Vs. State of Punjab, has observed that if two views are possible on appraisal of evidence adduced in the case and the trial Court has taken a view which is a plausible one, the appellate Court should refrain from interfering with an order of acquittal. In view of what has been discussed above, I am of the view that the judgment of the trial Court on the basis of evidence available on record is reasonable and plausible one and the same does not require any interference by this Court. There is no merit in the arguments advanced by learned counsel for the applicant. Accordingly, application for grant of special leave to appeal is dismissed.