Radhey Shyam Chauhan @ Bobby vs State Of Himachal Pradesh & Ors

Jyotsna Rewal Dua, J

The petitioner seeks quashing of FIR No.220/2021, dated 06.12.2021, registered under Section 379 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) at Police Station Dhalli, District Shimla, H.P. Prayer for quashing of the FIR and for setting aside the consequent judicial proceedings has been made on the basis of compromise deed arrived at between the parties.

The case set up by the prosecution is that respondent No.3 had availed loan for purchase of vehicle bearing registration No. HP-02A-1594 (school bus) from M/s Cholamandalam Investment and Finance Company Ltd. Respondent No.3 failed to repay the loan amount, hence, vehicle’s possession was taken over by the petitioner, being agent of the company. However, at the time of lodging the FIR, respondent No.3 was not aware of this fact. Hence, it lodged the FIR under Section 379 IPC.

During hearing of the case today, Sh. Roshan Chauhan put in appearance in his own capacity as respondent No.2 and in the capacity of Secretary of respondent No.3. Alongwith the petition, compromise deeds executed between the parties & M/s Cholamandlam on 31. 03.2023 & 11.04.2023 have been placed on record at Annexure P- 2 (colly.). In terms of this compromise, the petitioner and respondents No.2 & 3, have resolved their disputes with each other and with M/s Cholamandlam. The compromise deed records that the respondent/complainant has repaid the loan amount and the complainant is no more interested in pursuing the instant FIR any further and has no objection in case the FIR and consequential criminal proceedings are culminated.

The parties have attended today’s hearing. They were duly identified by their learned counsel. In their separate statements recorded today, the complainant as well as accused have stood by the averments made in the compromise deed dated 31.03.2023 (Annexure P-2). In terms of the said compromise, complainant does not want to pursue the matter any further.

The law laid down in respect of exercise of powers under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure for quashing or for refusing to quash the FIR and resultant proceedings on the basis of compromise effected by the parties laid down in (2012) 10 SCC 303, titled Gian Singh vs. State of Punjab; (2014) 6 SCC 466, titled Narinder Singh vs. State of Punjab; (2017) 9 SCC 641, titled as Parbatbhai Aahir vs. State of Gujarat, has been noticed again by Hon’ble Apex Court in (2019) 5 SCC 688, titled State of Madhya Pradesh vs. Laxmi Narayan, with following observations:-

“15. Considering the law on the point and the other decisions of this Court on the point, referred to hereinabove, it is observed and held as under:

15.1 That the power conferred under Section 482 of the Code to quash the criminal proceedings for the non-compoundable offences under Section 320 of the Code can be exercised having overwhelmingly and predominantly the civil character, particularly those arising out of commercial transactions or arising out of matrimonial relationship or family disputes and when the parties have resolved the entire dispute amongst themselves;

15.2 Such power is not to be exercised in those prosecutions which involved heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. Such offences are not private in nature and have a serious impact on society;

15.3 Similarly, such power is not to be exercised for the offences under the special statutes like Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity are not to be quashed merely on the basis of compromise between the victim and the offender;

15.4 Offences under Section 307 IPC and the Arms Act etc. would fall in the category of heinous and serious offences and therefore are to be treated as crime against the society and not against the individual alone, and therefore, the criminal proceedings for the offence under Section 307 IPC and/or the Arms Act etc. which have a serious impact on the society cannot be quashed in exercise of powers under Section 482 of the Code, on the ground that the parties have resolved their entire dispute amongst themselves. However, the High Court would not rest its decision merely because there is a mention of Section 307 IPC in the FIR or the charge is framed under this provision. It would be open to the High Court to examine as to whether incorporation of Section 307 IPC is there for the sake of it or the prosecution has collected sufficient evidence, which if proved, would lead to framing the charge under Section 307 IPC. For this purpose, it would be open to the High Court to go by the nature of injury sustained, whether such injury is inflicted on the vital/delegate parts of the body, nature of weapons used etc. However, such an exercise by the High Court would be permissible only after the evidence is collected after investigation and the charge sheet is filed/charge is framed and/or during the trial. Such exercise is not permissible when the matter is still under investigation. Therefore, the ultimate conclusion in paragraphs 29.6 and 29.7 of the decision of this Court in the case of Narinder Singh (supra) should be read harmoniously and to be read as a whole and in the circumstances stated hereinabove;

15.5 While exercising the power under Section 482 of the Code to quash the criminal proceedings in respect of non-compoundable offences, which are private in nature and do not have a serious impact on society, on the ground that there is a settlement/ compromise between the victim and the offender, the High Court is required to consider the antecedents of the accused; the conduct of the accused, namely, whether the accused was absconding and why he was absconding, how he had managed with the complainant to enter into a compromise.”

Though, the FIR in question has been registered under Section 379 IPC, however the statements of the parties recorded on oath today and the compromise deed executed between them indicate that the case was not of theft of vehicle by the petitioner. Learned Additional Advocate General submits that in view of the compromise, respondent No.1 has no objection to quashing of FIR and for consequent criminal proceedings.

Taking into consideration nature of dispute and the fact that the parties have amicably settled the matter amongst themselves, no purpose will be served by keeping the litigation alive. Continuation of the FIR and consequential criminal proceedings would not advance the cause of justice when the complainant is not interested in pursuing the matter any further. The chances of conviction of the petitioner would be very very remote. Hence, interest of justice requires that the FIR is quashed and consequential judicial proceedings are set aside.

Consequently, the present petition is allowed. No.220/2021, dated 06.12.2021, registered under Section 379 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) at Police Station Dhalli, District Shimla, H.P. is quashed and consequential proceedings, if any, are set aside.

The petition stands disposed of in the above terms, so also the pending miscellaneous application(s), if any.