High Courts

Raizada Luxmi Narain vs Financial Commissioner

Punjab And Haryana At Chandigarh · Decided on 10 January 1986 · Citation: (1986) 1 LLR 413 : (1986) PLJ 437 : (1986) Rent LR 129 : (1986) RRR 203

HON’BLE JUDGES
D.V.Sehgal, J
CASE NUMBER
Civil Writ Petition No. 1985 of 1978
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Judgment

6 paragraphs · 1,316 words

D.V. Sehgal, J.

1.

The petitioner abandoned 94 standard acres 143/4 units of land in Pakistan, which included the land owned by him in villages Langrial and Jaleelpur in district Multan. The land is these two villages was claimed to be suburban land. In lieu of the aforesaid land he was allotted 50 standard acres 63/4 units of rural land and 7 standard acres 5 units of suburban land in the year 194950 on his migration from West Punjab to the Indian territory. On 18.10.1969 the Assistant RegistrarcumManaging Officer respondent No. 3 made a reference to the Chief Settlement Commissioner respondent No. 2 that the petitioner was holding excess allotment to the extent of 7 standard acres 7 units. The ground, inter alia, was that villages Langrial and Jaleelpur were not suburban and he wrongly got allotted in his favour suburban land in lieu of the land left by him in the aforesaid two villages. Respondent No. 2 vide his order dated 22.8.1972 Annexure P.1 after hearing the petitioner''s counsel accepted the reference made by respondent No. 3 and ordered that permanent rights to the extent of 7 standard acres 7 units be set aside and the said area should be retrieved to the Rehabilitation Department. This order was purportedly passed by respondent No. 2 under Section 24 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1954 (hereinafter called `the Act''). The petitioner filed a petition under Section 33 of the Act before the Secretary, Rehabilitation Department, Haryana, which was however dismissed by respondent No. 1 vide his order dated 21.11.1977 Annexure P. 3. Through the present writ petition the petitioner has challenged the legality and validity of the orders Annexures P. 1 and P. 3 and has prayed for a writ of certiorari for quashing the same.

2.

The learned counsel for the petitioner has raised three contentions before me. Firstly, he contended that on receipt of reference from respondent No. 3 the notice issued to the petitioner by respondent No. 2 did not disclose the grounds on which cancellation of permanent allotment of 7 standard acres 7 units of land had been proposed. He relied on Smt. Sudarshana v. The Union of India, 1974 PLJ 481, and Jaswant Singh Saluja v. Chief Settlement Commissioner, New Delhi, AIR 1971 S.C. 748, in support of his contention. In my view, however, there is no force in this contention. The petitioner did not assail the notice issued to him on this basis either before respondent No. 2 or before respondent No. 1. Even in this Court, besides making a bare averment in para 3 of the petition that no grounds had been given in the notice issued by respondent No. 2, no material in support of the same has been produced. Even a copy of the notice received by him has not been supplied with the petition to ascertain whether this ground can be substantiated. I, therefore, reject this contention.

3.

Secondly, the learned counsel submitted that even while exercising suo motu powers under Section 24 of the Act, respondent No. 2 could do so within a reasonable time. Where there is apparent delay in invoking the powers under Section 24 of the Act, such delay is required to be explained. In support of this contention, the learned counsel relied on Smt Krishna Wanti v. The Secretary, Rehabilitation, Haryana State, 1976 PLJ 279. I, however, find that the delay if any in exercise of the powers under Section 24 of the Act by respondent No. 2 stands fully explained. As rightly noticed by respondent No. 1, the records with regard to the villages in which the land of the petitioner was located in Pakistan including the record of villages Langrial and Jaleelpur was received only in the year 1961 including the list of suburban villages. Each individual case had to be sorted out by respondent No. 3 on the basis of the record so received from Pakistan and it was quite natural that time would have been consumed in detecting any erroneous allotment.

4.

The third contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that respondent No. 2 simply relied on a list of suburban villages received from Pakistan which list, according to the respondents, did not include the villages of Langrial and Jaleelpur of Multan district. He states that the list of the suburban villages so supplied by Pakistan could not be given recognition. The records which are required to be considered for determination of ownership and nature of the land left by a displaced person in Pakistan is to be determined on the basis of the record enumerated in para 23 of the Land Resettlement Manual by Tarlok Singh, which record includes extracts of Shajrah Nasab of villages, Jamabandi, Khewats or Khatonis, copies of all loose mutations entered before 15.8.1947 and other authenticated record enumerated in the said paragraph. According to him, the list of suburban villages received from Pakistan could not be considered conclusive so as to exclude consideration of the relevant revenue record. He drew my attention to the sketch plan Kishatwar village Multan Cantt., which is Annexure P. 4 with the petition. This is shown to have been prepared from the certified copy of Akash Shajra. A perusal of Annexure P. 4 shows that village Langrial and Jaleelpur are on the North of Multan Cantt., and about the boundaries of the Cantt. The list of towns in Pakistan which comes into the scheme of suburban allotment is given in Annexure II at page 131 of the Resettlement Manual ibid Multan appears at S.No. 13 and is shown to have population of 1,42,768. Annexure III appearing at page 134 of the said Manual has classified the towns in categories `A'', `B'' and `C''. A town having population of 50,000 or over falls in category `A''. Again, the claimants in respect of land left by them in the suburbs of `A'' class towns fall into two groups, i.e. Group (i) where the land is situate within 1 mile of the town, and Group (ii) where the land is situate within 1 to 2 miles of the town. The order Annexure P. 3 shows that the petitioner tried to establish that the lands left by him in villages Langrial and Jaleelpur are suburban. A reference to the Gazetteer to Multan 1926 was ruled out of consideration by respondent No. 1 on the ground that since the list of suburban villages supplied by Pakistan did not include these two villages, no notice could be taken of the Gazetteer. I am of the considered view that the Rehabilitation authorities have fallen in error in their approach to the question. The petitioner ought to have been given an opportunity to establish by producing Akas Shajra, Gazetteer of Multan, Jamabandis and other authentic relevant record which he could produce to negative the view taken by the authorities that the land left by him, in villages Langrial and Jaleelpur was not suburban land. By completely shutting out this evidence, his rights have been seriously prejudiced. The allotment in his favour of a huge chunk of land, i.e. 7 standard acres 7 units, could not be cancelled without affording an opportunity to him for adducing such documentary evidence as he considered necessary to rebut the list of suburban villages received by the Rehabilitation Department from Pakistan. After all the said list could not be considered conclusive evidence on the question and could be shown to be erroneous.

5.

In this view of the matter, I allow this writ petition, quash the orders Annexures P. 1 and P. 3 and remand the case to the Chief Settlement Commissioner, Haryana, respondent No. 2 to decide the matter afresh after taking into consideration the Gazetteer of Multan, Akas Shajrah and other authenticated revenue record which the petitioner may choose to produce before him. There shall, however, be no order as to costs.