Raja Ram Partap Singh vs State of Punjab and another

G.R. Majithia, J.—The writ-Petitioner has sought a mandate from this Court to the Respondents to pay compensation for land measuring 2 Bighas and 2 Biswas comprised in Khasra No. 671/543 situate in Badungar, District Patiala, or in the alternative to restore possession of the land to him.

Briefly, the facts as stated in the petition are that the Petitioner is the owner of land measuring 2 Bighas and 2 Biswas comprised in Khasra No. 671/543. Respondent No. 1 has appropriated this land for the construction of pucca road. The land has been acquired under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act and no compensation has been paid to the Petitioner. The Petitioner moved various representation to the authorities but to no effect The Petitioner has been deprived of his right to property in violation of the right ensured under Article 31 (2) of the Constitution.

Reply has been filed on behalf of the Respondents in which it has been stated, inter alia, that originally the land comprised in Khasra No. 671/543 was recorded in the Record of Rights as owned by "Sarkar Daulat Madar". Mutation No. 334 was sanctioned and this land was transferred in the name of Raja Harchand Singh Son of Shri Bhag-want Singh. This land is recorded as "Ghair Mumkin Sadak" under the possession of the Public Works Department in the Jamabandi for the year 1940-47. According to the revenue record, the road existed at the site even after the implementation of Mutation No 334. It was also objected, that the Petitioner had moved this, Court after the expiry of more than 40 years since the road has been in existence for the last more than 40 years.

The title of the Petitioner over the property in question has been very seriously disputed by the State and, in my opinion, rightly. In the Jamabandi for the years 1946-47 and 1950-51, the land in dispute is shown to be under the ownership of "Sarkar Daulat Madar Mazkur". Mutation No. 334 was enacted and sanctioned and ownership of the land in dispute was recorded in the name of Raja Harchand Singh. It cannot be disputed that the provisions of the Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1887 (for short "the Act") were applicable to the then princely State of Patiala. Section 37 of the Act provides that entries in records of rights or in annual records, except entries made in annual records, by patwaris under Clause (a) of Section 35 with respect to undisputed acquisitions of interest referred to in the section, shall not be varied in subsequent records, otherwise than by (a) making entries in accordance with facts proved or admitted, to having occurred (b) making such entriea as arc agreed to by all the parties intersted therein or are supported by a decree or order binding on those parties; and (c) making new maps where it is necessary to make them Entries in Jamabandi can be altered only on the basis of an obvious clerical error or patent fact (to be distinguished from a disputed fact) especially after the lapse of years and in the absence of any appeal against the alleged wrong entry. A safeguard is provided by Section 37 of the Act which enacts that the new entries must be in accordance with facts proved or admitted to have occurred or be agreed to by all the parties interested therein, or be supported by a decree or order binding on those parties. In the present case, the revenue officer while altering the ownership of the land in dispute of Raja Harchand Singh violated the mandatory provisions of the statute with impunity. A revenue officer who had little knowledge of revenue law would have hesitated to sanction the mutation changing the ownership of the State to a private individual in the absence of any of the conditions of Section 37 having been proved. The question of ownership with regard to the land in dispute can only be decided in a regular suit and not in these proceedings.

Apart from this writ petition deserve to be dismissed on the ground of laches and delay. The writ petition was filed in this Court on April 27, 1987. There is an unexplained delay of more than 40 years for moving this Court. It is true that there can be cases where this Court may interfere in a matter after the passage of certain length of time. But it would not be a sound exercise of discretion to exercise this extraordinary power under Article 226 of the Constitution in case of persons who do not approach it expetitiously for relief and who stand by and allow things to happen and then approach this Court to put-forward stale claims and try to settle matters. It will be useful to refer to Babu Singh and Others Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Others, . In that case, notification u/s 6 of the Land Acquisition Act was challenged through a writ petition after the expiry of six years after the publication of the impugned notification and five years after the award was announced and no explanation was offered why the writ petition was filed after such an inordinate delay. The apex Court held thus:

Before we conclude, it must be pointed out that the writ petition was filed on 22nd April, 1969, i.e. nearly six years and one month after the publication of the impugned notification and about 5 years after the award. No explanation is offered why writ petition was filed after such an inordinate delay and after the entire process of acquisition was over. The High Court dismissed the writ petition in limine presumably on account of delay. This Court in Aflatoon and Others Vs. Lt. Governor of Delhi and Others, and Indrapuri Griha Nirman Sahakari Samiti Ltd. Vs. The State of Rajasthan and Others, held that if a person allowed the Government to complete the acquisition proceedings on the basis that the notification u/s 5 and declaration u/s 6 were valid and then attacked the notification on the grounds which were available to him at the time when the notification was published it would be putting a premium on dilatory tactics. The length of the delay is an important circumstance because of the nature of the acts done within the interval on the basis of the notification and declaration and, therefore, a challenge to a notification u/s 4 and a declaration u/s 6 of the Act should be made within a reasonable time thereafter. If it is not so done the petition is liable to be dismissed. This appeal must fail for the additional reason because the challenge to two notifications was after a period of six years and after the whole process of acquisition was over and the State Government had spent a considerable amount in carrying out the public purpose.

For the foregoing reasons, this writ petition deserves to be dismissed. However, the parties are left to bear their own costs.