Ram Chandra Maurya vs State of U.P. and Others

B.S. Chauhan, J.—This criminal writ petition has been filed for issuing a direction to the Respondent No. 6 to lodge and register the F.I.R. of the Petitioner u/s 154(1), Cr. P.C. and to investigate the matter and to restore the possession of the premises in dispute, along with books, general files and stationeries, etc.

The Petitioner, in person, an advocate of this Court has submitted that he came into possession of two rooms, kitchen, latrine and bathroom in the first floor of House No. 28-D/1, Khalasi Line, Kydganj, Allahabad, by an oral agreement of tenancy at the rate of Rs. 200 per month as rent in December, 1999. He asked for the issuance of the rent receipt in December, 2000 for the first time, but the landlady-Respondent No. 8 refused to issue the same, however, he regularly paid the rent every month. In the month of December, 2002, the landlady-Respondent No. 8 stopped receiving the rent. Thus, the Petitioner approached the Civil Court by filing application u/s 30 (1) of the U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972, wherein the rent was deposited upto April, 2003. In spite of paying the rent regularly, he has forcibly been dispossessed by the landlady Respondent No. 8 in collusion with the police authorities on 29th May, 2003. Petitioner tried his best to get the F.I.R. lodged, but in vain. Hence, this petition for aforesaid reliefs.

The learned Counsel for the Respondent Nos. 8 and 9 have submitted that the Petitioner had executed a rent deed (Annexure-2CA) which was duly notorised and he agreed to pay the rent at the rate of Rs. 1,800 per month. However, the Petitioner did not pay any rent whatsoever and started harassing the landlady threatening her with dire consequences merely being an advocate stating that he was the law unto himself and could do whatever he wanted to do. Being aggrieved, the landlady wrote several complaints to the Secretary Bar Council of U.P., Hon''ble Chief Justice of this Court and to other authorities, copies of which have been filed as Annexure-C.A. 3. Subsequently, large number of persons intervened and a written compromise was reached on 25.5.2003 between the parties which was reduced in writing on a stamp paper, wherein the Petitioner agreed to vacate the premises and pay the arrears of rent in instalments and the said compromise deed had been duly signed by the Petitioner, several witnesses including two advocates of this Court on behalf of the Petitioner. In pursuance of the said compromise deed he vacated the tenanted premises and got another premises in the neighbourhood as House No. 212A Krishna Nagar, Kydganj, Allahabad, on rent and the rent agreement dated 25.5.2003 with the owner of the said house has also been filed as Annexure-C.A. 5.

Thus, according to the learned Counsel for the Respondents, Petitioner wilfully vacated the house and agreed to pay the arrears of rent in instalments and it is only to harass the landlady with the intention not to pay the arrears of rent, this petition had been filed.

It is further submitted that Petitioner has been guilty for concealing the material fact as he had filed a Writ Petition No. 1346 of 2003 earlier alleging that he was apprehending danger to his life from landlady for seeking police protection. This Court dismissed the said writ petition vide order dated 1st April, 2003 doubting the bona fides of the Petitioner and holding that the writ petition was a rogue not to pay the rent and a misuse of his robes of being an advocate.

Therefore, in view of the above, it is contended by the learned Counsel for the Respondents that petition was liable to be rejected with a very heavy cost. The learned standing counsel adopted the arguments taken by Shri S. K. Srivastava, learned Counsel for the landlady and further contended that presenting the writ petition in such a manner was nothing but an abuse of process of law and thus, such a litigant should be dealt with a heavy hand by the Court.

We have heard the learned Counsel for the parties and perused the record.

There is no dispute regarding the settled legal proposition that getting the F.I.R. lodged and registering it is a statutory right of any of the person and police authorities are bound to lodge the F.I.R. in view of the provisions of Section 154, Cr. P.C.

The object of lodging the F.I.R. is to put the police in motion in order to investigate into the crime. Its evidentiary value is not very much as it is not a substantive piece of evidence but its value depends on the circumstances of each case including the nature of the crime and the position of the informant, etc. The receipt and recording of the information by the police, though may not be a condition precedent for setting in motion of a criminal proceeding but it is a statutory right of the complainant to lodge a report for the reason that an informant has a right to set the criminal law in motion and also from the point of view of the investigating authorities it is important for obtaining information about the alleged criminal activity so as to take appropriate and suitable steps for tracing and bringing at the book the guilty party.

Section 154 of the Code has three-folded objects, i.e., (i) it keeps the police and the District Magistrate to inform ; (ii) it makes available to the judicial officer the material on which the investigation commences ; and (iii) it is a safe-guard against embellishment or forgetfulness. Moreso, it is not necessary that there must be a complete or satisfactory proof of the offence at the time as the information may merely indicate that the offence has been committed. The F.I.R. must be recorded at once and the police cannot wait until it is certain that the offence has been committed. The information can be lodged by any person and it is not necessary that the offender or the witnesses should be named therein.

The issue: whether F.I.R., when lodged, must be lodged or not, has been considered from time to time by the Courts. In A.R. Antulay Vs. Ramdas Sriniwas Nayak and Another, , the Constitution Bench of the Hon''ble Supreme Court has held that "any one can set or put the criminal law in motion except where the statute enacting or creating an offence indicates to the contrary. The scheme of the Code of Criminal Procedure envisages two parallel and independent agencies for taking criminal offences to Court. Even for most serious offence of murder, it was not disputed that a private complaint cannot only be filed but can be entertained and proceeded with in accordance with law. Locus standi of the complainant is a concept foreign to the criminal jurisdiction.

In State of Haryana and others Vs. Ch. Bhajan Lal and others, , the Hon''ble Supreme Court observed as under:

At the stage of registration of a crime or a case on the basis of the information disclosing a cognizable offence in compliance with the mandate of Section 154(1) of the Code, the concerned police officer cannot embark upon an enquiry as to whether the information lodged by the informant is reliable or genuine or otherwise and refuse to register a case on the ground that the information is not reliable or credible. On the other hand, the officer incharge of a police station is statutorily obliged to register, a case and then to proceed with the investigation if he has reason to suspect the commission of an offence which he is empowered u/s 156 of the Code to investigate, subject to the proviso to Section 157 Be it noted that Section 154(1) of the Code, the Legislature in its wisdom has carefully and consciously used the expression ''information'' without qualifying the same as in Section 41(1) (a) or (g) of the Code wherein the expressions ''reasonable complaint'' and ''credible information'' are used. Evidently, the non-qualification of the word ''information'' in Section 154(1) unlike in Section 41(1) (a) and (g) of the Code may be for the reason that the police officer should not refuse to record an information relating to the commission of a cognizable offence and to register a case thereon on the ground that he is not satisfied with the reasonableness or credibility of the information. In other words "reasonableness'' or ''credibility'' of the said information is not a condition precedent for registration of a case.

From the above, it becomes apparent that the only condition precedent for recording the F.I.R. is that there must be an information disclosing commission of a cognizable offence and once such an information is furnished, it becomes sine qua non for lodging the report and in such a situation when information disclosing commission of a cognizable offence is conveyed to the Officer Incharge of a police station, he cannot refuse to register a case on the ground that the information is not reliable or credible, rather he is under legal obligation to register a case on the said information. Needless to say that he has an option u/s 157 of the Code subsequent thereto to make up his mind as to whether he would or would not enter on an investigation.

Even otherwise, under the Scheme of the Code, on registration of a case u/s 154(1) of the Code irrespective of whether the investigation is embarked upon or not, the matter is bound to be placed before an independent and impartial judicial forum and when it is so placed, various options are available to the judicial officer. Therefore, to accept the submission made on behalf of the State would have the effect of the matter never coming to the guise of the judicial scrutiny. Such a situation has not been contemplated by the Code.

In Kuldeep Singh v. State, 1994 (2) AD (Del) 445, the Delhi High Court, in a similar case, held as under:

Confirment of absolute and uncanalised discretion to the police to register a cognizable offence or not, would be violative of equality clause enshrined in our Constitution. The Code vests power in judiciary to control the discretion of the police. The judiciary will remain unaware in absence of recording the F.I.R. Whenever the police officer, after recording of the F.I.R., has reasonable doubt about the commission of a cognizable offence, he has power not to proceed with investigation but that is subject to check by the judiciary...on information being led before the police about the commission of cognizable offence, the police has no option but to register the case and then to proceed with investigation of the case under the provisions of Chapter XII of the Code.... The police has no right to refuse registration of a case on the information being led before it about the commission of cognizable offence and instead proceed with an enquiry and refuse registration as a result of said enquiry.

In Mohindro v. State of Punjab and Ors. 2001 Cr LR (SC) 132, the Hon''ble Supreme Court rejected the submission of the investigating agency that F.I.R. u/s 154(1) of the Code cannot be registered for the reason that enquiry in the matter had already been conducted and held that enquiry cannot be conducted without registering a case. The Hon''ble Supreme Court directed that a case be registered on the basis of the report at the police station having territorial jurisdiction and to duly investigate into the matter and to take appropriate action according to law.

To facilitate the matter further, it has been repeatedly held by the Hon''ble Supreme Court that the information/report can be lodged at a police station even having no territorial jurisdiction over the place of crime or power to investigate the matter in case of complaint about a cognizable offence. In State of Andhra Pradesh Vs. Punati Ramulu and others, , the Hon''ble Supreme Court held that not recording the report on the ground that the concerned police station has no territorial jurisdiction over the place of crime, amounts to dereliction from duty and in such an event, the report must be accepted and furnished to the police having jurisdiction over the place of crime. Similar view has been reiterated in Satvinder Kaur Vs. State (Govt. of N.C.T. of Delhi) and Another,

In Suresh Chandra Jain v. State, 2001 (1) ACrR 586 (SC): JT 2001 SC 81, the Apex Court held, that it is the duty of the officer incharge of a police station to register an F.I.R. regarding the cognizable offence disclosed by the complainant because the police officer would take further steps contemplated in Chapter XII of the Code only thereafter.

But at the time of argument, the Petitioner in person did not ask the Court to grant the said relief, thus no direction is required to be issued in this respect.

It is settled legal proposition that even a trespasser is to be dispossessed with due process of the law. No one is to be thrown out of possession forcibly as where a person is in settled possession of property, even on the assumption that he has no right to remain in possession, he can be evicted only by recourse to law. In Ram Rattan and Others Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh, , the Hon''ble Supreme Court held that an owner of the property has every right to dispossess or throw-out a trespasser while he is in the act of or process of trespassing, but this right is not available to the true owner, if the trespasser has been successful in accomplishing his possession to the knowledge of the true owner. In such a circumstance, the law requires that the true owner should dispossess the trespasser by taking recourse to the remedies provided under the law. Similar view has been taken in Lallu Yeshant Singh (dead) by his legal representative v. Rao Jagdish Singh and Ors. AIR 1968 SC 620 and Krishna Ram Mahale (Dead), by his Lrs. Vs. Mrs. Shobha Venkat Rao, , wherein the Apex Court considered and approved the law laid down by the Privy Council in Midnapur Zamindari Company Ltd. v. Naresh Narain Roy AIR 1924 PC 144.

In Nagar Palika, Jind Vs. Jagat Singh, Advocate, , the Hon''ble Apex Court has observed that "Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, is based on the principle that even a trespasser is entitled to protect his possession except against the true owner and purports to protect a person in possession from being dispossessed except in due process of law".

Thus, it is evident from the aforesaid discussion that any person, who is in settled possession of the property, cannot be thrown out forcibly without resorting to the procedure prescribed by law.

The case is required to be considered in the light of the aforesaid settled legal proposition. In the instant case, admittedly there is a rent note (Annexure-2 C.A.) showing that the Petitioner had agreed to pay the rent at the rate of Rs. 1,800 per month. Petitioner in person had been served the copy of the said rent note, but he has not made any averment in rebuttal. Further, there is a compromise deed duly signed by the Petitioner and the document has also been witnessed by several persons including two advocates, that he would vacate the said premises and hand over the possession to the landlady Respondent No. 8 and would pay the arrears of rent in instalments. Petitioner has not rebutted this averment taken by the landlady in the counter-affidavit. Further there are documents filed by the Respondents showing that the Petitioner is residing at a different house and the rent deed of the same has been filed. No attempt has been made by the Petitioner even by making a bald statement to deny the same.

Therefore, there is nothing on record to substantiate the allegations made by the Petitioner in this petition and it appears that he is misusing his position being a practicing advocate. He had earlier filed a writ petition seeking police protection apprehending the danger of his life from the landlady and this Court vide order dated 1st April, 2003, dismissed the said Writ Petition No. 1346 of 2003 observing as under:

The Petitioner is occupying a house as a monthly tenant under the Respondents-landlords. The learned A.G.A. called both the Petitioner and the Respondent-landlord to bring out a settlement between them. The Petitioner is in arrears of house rent and on the suggestion of Sri Singh landlord agreed to receive payment in instalments, besides the rent for the current month. Later on the Petitioner intimated Sri Singh over phone that he does not agree to the settlement.

The Petitioner wants to take benefit of his robe. He wants to continue to occupy the tenanted premises without making any payment to the landlord. So, by filing the present petition he has prayed for providing necessary protection by the police. In other words, he wants to occupy the house with the help of the police without paying rent. If any protection is given to the Petitioner it would be a misplaced sympathy.

Thus, it appears that the petition has been filed to achieve ulterior purpose and walk out from the compromise entered into by the Petitioner to pay the arrears of rent in instalments. During the course of argument, the Petitioner could not satisfy the Court as if the agreed rent had been Rs. 1,800 per month then how could he pay the rent @ Rs. 200 per month and whether it was possible for him to get the accommodation in dispute at such a cheaper rate in the heart of the city of Allahabad and why he had never insisted and asked the landlady to issue the receipt of rent paid by the Petitioner every month.

The judgments, i.e., Commander N.P. Kulshreshtha and Ors. v. State of U.P. and Ors. 1996 (2) AWC 1052 ; Sanjay Singh v. State of U.P. and Ors. 2001 (1) JIC 754 (All) ; and a judgment passed by this Court in C.M.W.P. No. 17599 of 1999, Shiv Patti Devi v. District Magistrate, Gorakhpur and Ors. passed on 22.4.2003, referred to and relied upon by the Petitioner in person are of no assistance to him as these rent cases where the landlord/landlady had been dispossessed forcibly by the house grabbers and the said encroachers had been evicted by this Court in exercise of writ jurisdiction, thus the Petitioner has referred to and relied upon the said judgments without realising the principles of law enunciated therein.

On proper appreciation of facts as placed by the parties, we reach the inescapable conclusion that Petitioner had been a monthly tenant of the Respondent No. 8 at the agreed rate of rent of Rs. 1,800 per month. He did not make the payment of rent regularly. On being asked to pay the rent and its arrears, Petitioner approached this Court for police protection. After meeting his waterloo in the Court, he considered it proper to settle the matter and in pursuance thereof, he signed the settlement deed and vacated the premises, giving undertaking to pay the arrears in instalment. He approached this Court by filing this petition only to avoid his liability to pay the arrears of rent. It is so evident from Petitioner''s conduct, as he did not ask for issuing a direction for registration of the F.I.R. The petition is totally misconceived, afterthought and product of a crafty mind. Petitioner did not disclose that he had approached this Court earlier for police protection but could not succeed. Thus, he is not only guilty of suppressing the material facts but also abusing the process of the Court.

When a person approaches a Court of Equity in exercise of its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226/227 of the Constitution, he should approach the Court not only with clean hands but also with clean mind, clean heart and clean objective. (Vide The Ramjas Foundation and Others Vs. Union of India and Others, and K.R. Srinivas Vs. R.M. Premchand and Others, . Thus, who seeks equity must do equity. The legal maxim "Jure Naturae Aequum Est Neminem cum Alterius Detrimento Et Injuria Fieri Locupletiorem", means that it is a law of nature that one should not be enriched by the loss or injury to another.

In Noorduddin Vs. Dr K.L. Anand, , the Hon''ble Supreme Court observed as under:

...Equally, the judicial process should never become an instrument of appreciation or abuse or a means in the process of the Court to subvert justice.

Similarly in Ramniklal N. Bhutta and another Vs. State of Maharashtra and others, , the Hon''ble Apex Court observed as under:

The power under Article 226 is discretionary. It will be exercised only in furtherance of justice and not merely on the making out of a legal point...the interest of justice and public interest coalesce. They are very often one and the same.... The Courts have to weigh the public interest vis-a-vis the private interest while exercising the power under Article 226...indeed any of their discretionary powers.

(Emphasis added)

In Dr. Buddhi Kota Subbarao Vs. K.Parasaran and others, , the Hon''ble Supreme Court has observed as under:

No litigant has a right to unlimited drought on the Court time and public money in order to get his affairs settled in the manner he wishes. However, access to justice should not be misused as a licence to file misconceived and frivolous petitions.

Similar view has been reiterated by the Supreme Court in K.K. Modi Vs. K.N. Modi and Others,

In Sabia Khan and Others Vs. State of U.P. and Others, , the Hon''ble Apex Court held that filing totally misconceived petition amounts to abuse of the process of the Court and such litigant is not required to be dealt with lightly.

In Abdul Rahman v. Prasoni Bai and Anr. 2003 (2) AWC 1678 (SC): 2003 AIR SCW 14, the Hon''ble Supreme Court held that wherever the Court comes to the conclusion that the process of the Court is being abused, the Court would be justified in refusing to proceed further and refuse the party from pursuing the remedy in law.

In view of the above, we find no force in the petition, it is accordingly dismissed.